Qantas A380 uncontained #2 engine failure
Interestingly we don't seem to have any photos of the wing bottom surface damage, although the 'green' diagram shows 2 penetrations 'c' and 'd'.
I'm awaiting the report from the investigators (not from non-experts) that describe system damage from all the bits and not just the nicks and tears.
I would expect that the (3)? disk pieces would be the most significant, but certainly some lessons are to be learned here.
Taken together it is the both the minimization of the disk failure in combination with the minimization of the sytem damage within the crew's ability to handle the ATB that provides the passengers with their safety.
Repair costs are not very news worthy
For bear and Nick:
I didn't see in your side bar a discussion of claims between Qantas and RR the matter of warranty, and "loss of use," but very much enjoyed your back and forth as insight in trying to determine how far open the kimono may get in RR's case.
Of all parties, Airbus as the systems' intergrator, writ large, figures to be looked in re the secondary malfunctions and failures. Not sure what to remedy when one considers the departed wheel as basically a AAA round.
I didn't see in your side bar a discussion of claims between Qantas and RR the matter of warranty, and "loss of use," but very much enjoyed your back and forth as insight in trying to determine how far open the kimono may get in RR's case.
Of all parties, Airbus as the systems' intergrator, writ large, figures to be looked in re the secondary malfunctions and failures. Not sure what to remedy when one considers the departed wheel as basically a AAA round.
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Lonewolf50
In golf, Qantas is in what has become known as the "Garden Spot". Outsourced Maintenance, a Lease for Power, etc. They are the "aggrieved Party" here. Whatever damage was done to their 380 is on other's shoulders, but more importantly, Loss of Revenue will be quite large, and again, at this point, seeming to be on the Metallic shoulders of the Derby firm.
For instance, and I am sure this is not new to Qantas: "I'll take NEW please, no repairs for me". "A new engine, upgraded, out the crate, installed., thank you very much".Singapore and LH have a lesser claim, but it's in there as well. It will be more difficult to make a case agin the FAA, though that possibility is front and center. What of ALL the e-mails twixt RR and the Regulator? Thanks, again.
Fourty engines, let's see, there's a Billion Dollars, out the gate. Lost revenue and Badge tarnishment? To be determined. Etc. The bearing and seal division is not sleeping well of late. Let's not forget the contract with Boeing for x number of the "X". This is epic, I feel for the firm.
for lomapaseo
Yes, it is unknown, perhaps forever, how many "large" pieces the disc made. Because the piece discovered is close to 120 degrees, that means What? That there are somewhere two more just like it? please, eh?
From your statement that repairs are not newsworthy a personal departure; I believe they will be, as will final cost, and the possible demise of a Legacy firm that is unthinkable for me, ..........may make them unavoidable in the Press.
bear
In golf, Qantas is in what has become known as the "Garden Spot". Outsourced Maintenance, a Lease for Power, etc. They are the "aggrieved Party" here. Whatever damage was done to their 380 is on other's shoulders, but more importantly, Loss of Revenue will be quite large, and again, at this point, seeming to be on the Metallic shoulders of the Derby firm.
For instance, and I am sure this is not new to Qantas: "I'll take NEW please, no repairs for me". "A new engine, upgraded, out the crate, installed., thank you very much".Singapore and LH have a lesser claim, but it's in there as well. It will be more difficult to make a case agin the FAA, though that possibility is front and center. What of ALL the e-mails twixt RR and the Regulator? Thanks, again.
Fourty engines, let's see, there's a Billion Dollars, out the gate. Lost revenue and Badge tarnishment? To be determined. Etc. The bearing and seal division is not sleeping well of late. Let's not forget the contract with Boeing for x number of the "X". This is epic, I feel for the firm.
for lomapaseo
Yes, it is unknown, perhaps forever, how many "large" pieces the disc made. Because the piece discovered is close to 120 degrees, that means What? That there are somewhere two more just like it? please, eh?
From your statement that repairs are not newsworthy a personal departure; I believe they will be, as will final cost, and the possible demise of a Legacy firm that is unthinkable for me, ..........may make them unavoidable in the Press.
bear
bear, what case is there against the FAA? (I presume you mean the US government agency in that regard). There are a number of certifying and regulatory agencies who have oversight/approval of commercial air vehicles and their subsystems.
Were you using FAA as a generic term for regulatory agencies?
Were you using FAA as a generic term for regulatory agencies?
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Hi Bear
I did not mean to suggest that you were advocating that any case would be tried under US law. The point I have been trying to make is that laws of different lands are not like laws of physics, By that I mean they will vary as you cross international boundaries. Obviously the laws of physics are not affected by such boundaries. So I apologise for any missunderstandings that I may have caused.
My original post was in response to JFZ90's questions and you reply which was quite detailed on the US legal position. I was trying to make the point that in other countries there will be differences to the US view. Which of course just complicates things.
Lonewolf_50 thanks for saying that you have enjoyed Bear's and my "back and forth" on this topic.
Not having any knowledge of aviation contracts but a detailed knowledge of building and civil engineering contracts all I can say is that in those contracts, warranty and loss of use. is extensively covered so I guess it would be the same in this case. But as I have said earlier without seeing the contracts, none of us can know for certain.
Finally Bear I have found your technical comments very interesting but as SLF a bit beyond my understanding.
Regards
Nick
I did not mean to suggest that you were advocating that any case would be tried under US law. The point I have been trying to make is that laws of different lands are not like laws of physics, By that I mean they will vary as you cross international boundaries. Obviously the laws of physics are not affected by such boundaries. So I apologise for any missunderstandings that I may have caused.
My original post was in response to JFZ90's questions and you reply which was quite detailed on the US legal position. I was trying to make the point that in other countries there will be differences to the US view. Which of course just complicates things.
Lonewolf_50 thanks for saying that you have enjoyed Bear's and my "back and forth" on this topic.
Not having any knowledge of aviation contracts but a detailed knowledge of building and civil engineering contracts all I can say is that in those contracts, warranty and loss of use. is extensively covered so I guess it would be the same in this case. But as I have said earlier without seeing the contracts, none of us can know for certain.
Finally Bear I have found your technical comments very interesting but as SLF a bit beyond my understanding.
Regards
Nick
Last edited by Nick Thomas; 18th Nov 2010 at 17:35. Reason: Typo error
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Yes, "FAA"/ Regulator/Etc. Specifically to draw attention to the separate purview of the Administrative agency in charge of "Ombudsmanning" the Public's right to safety and the Operator's right to profit. Though seldom memorialized, to say the "FAA" hasn't an interest in profit, is most naive. Their shortcomings and missteps are in play right along with the others save for the fact of recovering "from" (misfeasance) and "receiving" ($$), "damages".
Nick, I take your point. Your reference to Physics is most apt. "Law" follows "Natural" (Common) Law, more than we know, and to say that International Law is unlike "Physics" in any way is not entirely accurate, though again, it is a most apt comment.
cheers
bear
Nick, I take your point. Your reference to Physics is most apt. "Law" follows "Natural" (Common) Law, more than we know, and to say that International Law is unlike "Physics" in any way is not entirely accurate, though again, it is a most apt comment.
cheers
bear
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Some pictures and technical insights of the incident: The Anatomy of the Airbus A380 QF32 near disaster – Plane Talking
Re my question - thanks for the responses. I recognise there were no fatalities, but I think considering this possibiliy helped expand the discussion.
My intention was to explore/open up the fact that no-one can be sure what the liability issues are, or draw conclusions as to whether there maybe motive for RR to withhold information - as Sandilands suggests.
As some have commented, I don't think he can be so sure of his assertions - hence the plaudits about how sharp his analysis is are misplaced I think.
Journos take note.
My intention was to explore/open up the fact that no-one can be sure what the liability issues are, or draw conclusions as to whether there maybe motive for RR to withhold information - as Sandilands suggests.
As some have commented, I don't think he can be so sure of his assertions - hence the plaudits about how sharp his analysis is are misplaced I think.
Journos take note.
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a question if i may;
before Qantas goes scraeming ` we want new` - can it be shown they actually inspected the engines as per the previous AD? if they are using the word `complied` - does that mean they were aware of the AD , but had not , as yet , actually inspected the engines?
before Qantas goes scraeming ` we want new` - can it be shown they actually inspected the engines as per the previous AD? if they are using the word `complied` - does that mean they were aware of the AD , but had not , as yet , actually inspected the engines?
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With the exception of QF32 #2 engine and I guess probably #1 as well, I doubt that there will be any new engines being handed out. The beauty of gas turbine engines is that they are repairable forever. It would be just too expensive, let alone precident setting, to exchange all affected engines with new. Not to mention they don't have engines just sitting around. However, some commercial arrangement will likely be arranged but you can be sure it will be confidential.
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My understanding is that Qantas has "Contract" maintenance, performed by Lufthansa.
Any inspection, borescope, or repair is simply not do-able on the Ramp. Therefore, why would Qantas be responsible for any maintenance of the sort under discussion here?
They may be reluctant to allow inspections for reasons of dispatch, but that is understandable. Again, if the inspections were demanded under the ADs, they would be impossibly foolish to not allow the required "maintenance" by their subcontractor.
v-aero "Too expensive...." Whose call is that? The contract language drives the results here, so who knows?
bear
Any inspection, borescope, or repair is simply not do-able on the Ramp. Therefore, why would Qantas be responsible for any maintenance of the sort under discussion here?
They may be reluctant to allow inspections for reasons of dispatch, but that is understandable. Again, if the inspections were demanded under the ADs, they would be impossibly foolish to not allow the required "maintenance" by their subcontractor.
v-aero "Too expensive...." Whose call is that? The contract language drives the results here, so who knows?
bear
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Bear
You're right that contract language rules. Based on my years working in that aspect of the business at an OEM, I'm confident that the RR contract is safe and that they will not be obligated to replace undamaged engines that can be modified. I guess time will tell.
You're right that contract language rules. Based on my years working in that aspect of the business at an OEM, I'm confident that the RR contract is safe and that they will not be obligated to replace undamaged engines that can be modified. I guess time will tell.
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There are stories of QF avoiding inconvenient Tech Log entries, managers pencil wipping defects and LAEs being fired for snagging faults outside the scope of what they are told to look at
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...-sabotage.html
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...-sabotage.html
Shell:
That's an interesting thread, but I am not sure how that relates to engine maintenance, which seems (based on some posts in this thread) to be contracted out to Lufthansa.
That's an interesting thread, but I am not sure how that relates to engine maintenance, which seems (based on some posts in this thread) to be contracted out to Lufthansa.
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RR "Lease" "...........including, but not limited to, peripheral structures, supplies of sufficient liquids and its management, by others, and any duff parts in the core of said powerplant, the responsibility of Lessee, and obtaining to matters of maintenance,
inspection, and other responsibilities once installed and accepted.....Lessor is held harmless for further inspections, including and not limited to defect in manufacture or design, and all such damages as may be assessed by any entity.. except the Lessor, to include Regulatory bulletins, restrictions and anything that is expensive, in the eyes of Lessor, etc. any and all determinations to be the sole domain of Lessor, and subject to his Warranty offered limited solely in the execution of very ginger TO's and Landings, and TOGA excluded, plus anything we don't like......"
This is not, nor intended to be, an actual recitation of any agreement twixt anyone, anywhere, especially those who might be "Lawyered Up".and given to facile communications of Cease and Decist, or other, ever, in perpetuity.....Further this is an attempt at humor in the vein of satire, and not to be taken as an affront to the Heirs and Assigns of the Estate of Jonathan Swift, deceased.
By, bearfoil
inspection, and other responsibilities once installed and accepted.....Lessor is held harmless for further inspections, including and not limited to defect in manufacture or design, and all such damages as may be assessed by any entity.. except the Lessor, to include Regulatory bulletins, restrictions and anything that is expensive, in the eyes of Lessor, etc. any and all determinations to be the sole domain of Lessor, and subject to his Warranty offered limited solely in the execution of very ginger TO's and Landings, and TOGA excluded, plus anything we don't like......"
This is not, nor intended to be, an actual recitation of any agreement twixt anyone, anywhere, especially those who might be "Lawyered Up".and given to facile communications of Cease and Decist, or other, ever, in perpetuity.....Further this is an attempt at humor in the vein of satire, and not to be taken as an affront to the Heirs and Assigns of the Estate of Jonathan Swift, deceased.
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So, addressing two of those points in that circulating 'failure management' email
RAT deployment:
Likely didn't deploy, but ECAM msg that it would or might deploy was seen?
Only 100 metres of runway left:
This may well have been deliberate attempt to go easy on brakes as well as arrive close to fire crews knowing they might need lots of foam and water as soon as?
RAT deployment:
Likely didn't deploy, but ECAM msg that it would or might deploy was seen?
Only 100 metres of runway left:
This may well have been deliberate attempt to go easy on brakes as well as arrive close to fire crews knowing they might need lots of foam and water as soon as?
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Please, tell me again about the coming unmanned airliners......
Drama in the cockpit: Qantas crew faced 54 alarms
By JOAN LOWY, Associated Press –
WASHINGTON – Nobody trains for chaos like this. Out the pilots' left window, far above the ocean, an engine as big as a bus had disintegrated, blasting shrapnel holes in the superjumbo's wing. And now an overwhelming flood of computer alarms was warning the pilots that critical systems might be failing.
Two weeks after the pilots somehow landed their Qantas jetliner and its 450 passengers, their two-hour cockpit drama was described Thursday in an interview with The Associated Press by the vice president of the Australian and International Pilots Association.
"The amount of failures is unprecedented," said Richard Woodward, a fellow Qantas A380 pilot who has spoken to all five pilots. "There is probably a one in 100 million chance to have all that go wrong."
But it did.
Engine pieces sliced electric cables and hydraulic lines in the wing. Would the pilots still be able to fly the seven-story-tall plane?
The wing's forward spar — one of the beams that attaches it to the plane — was damaged as well. And the wing's two fuel tanks were punctured. As fuel leaked out, a growing imbalance was created between the left and right sides of the plane, Woodward said.
The electrical power problems prevented the pilots from pumping fuel forward from tanks in the tail. The plane became tail heavy.
That may have posed the greatest risk, safety experts said. If the plane got too far out of balance, the Singapore-to-Sydney jetliner would lose lift, stall and crash.
And then there was that incredible stream of computer messages, 54 in all, alerting the pilots to system failures or warning of impending failures.
One warned that a ram air turbine — a backup power supply — was about to deploy, although that never did happen, Woodward said. The message was especially worrisome because the system deploys only when main power systems are lost. The smaller backup supply is able only to power vital aircraft systems.
That's "the last thing you need in that kind of situation," he said.
The pilots watched as computer screens filled, only to be replaced by new screenfuls of warnings, he said.
"I don't think any crew in the world would have been trained to deal with the amount of different issues this crew faced," Woodward said.
As luck would have it, there were five experienced pilots — including three captains — aboard the plane. The flight's captain, Richard de Crespigny, was being given his annual check ride — a test of his piloting skills — by another captain. That man was himself being evaluated by a third captain. There were also first and second officers, part of the normal three-pilot team. In all, the crew had over 100 years of flying experience.
De Crespigny concentrated on flying the plane, while the others dealt with the computer alarms and made announcements to the giant planeload of passengers, some of whom said they were frantically pointing to flames streaming from the engine. Working flat out, it took 50 minutes for the pilots work through all of the messages.
When pilots receive safety warnings, they are supposed to check the airline's operating manual and implement specific procedures. But with so many warnings, the Qantas pilots had to sort through and prioritize the most serious problems first.
It's likely that for some of the problems there were no procedures because no airline anticipates so many things going wrong at once, John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board member said.
Attention since the Nov. 4 incident has focused on the Airbus 380's damaged Rolls Royce engine. As many as half of the 80 engines that power A380s, the world's largest jetliners, may need to be replaced, Qantas CEO Alan Joyce said Thursday. That raises the possibility of shortages that could delay future deliveries of the superjumbo.
Qantas has grounded its fleet of six A380s.
The drama two weeks ago still wasn't over when the pilots finally got the plane back to Singapore and the runway was in sight.
Wing flaps that are used to slow the plane were inoperable. So were the landing gear doors. The pilots used gravity to lower the gear.
Brake temperatures reached over 1,650 degrees Fahrenheit during the landing, causing several flat tires. If fuel leaking from the damaged wing had hit the brakes, it could have caused a fire. The pilots allowed the plane to roll almost to the end of the runway so it would be close to fire trucks that could put foam on the brakes and undercarriage.
Among the other issues Woodward said the pilots faced:
• When the engine failed it caught fire, but the fire suppression system was difficult to deploy.
• An electrical bus — a connection between electrical devices — on the left wing failed. The plane was designed so that a second bus on the same wing or the two buses on the opposite wing would pick up the load. That didn't happen.
Actually, Woodward praised the plane, saying it was a testament to its strength that it was able to continue to fly relatively well despite all the problems. But he also said it's likely reconsideration will be given to the design and location electrical wiring in the wings.
Airplanes are supposed to be designed with redundancy so that if one part or system fails, there is still another to perform the same function. That didn't always happen in this case, safety experts say.
"The circumstances around this accident will certainly cause the regulatory authorities to take a long and hard look at a number of certification issues," said Goglia, the former National Transportation Safety Board member and an expert on aircraft maintenance.
"What we have got to ensure is that systems are separated so that no single point of failure can damage a system completely," Woodward said. "In this situation the wiring in the leading edge of the wing was cut. That lost multiple systems."
However, Michael Barr, who teaches aviation safety at the University of Southern California, said a commercial plane can't be designed with certainty to withstand a spray of shrapnel, which can inflict damage anywhere. The proper focus, he said, should be on determining what caused the engine to fail and fixing that problem.
All the experts were agreed on one point.
"It must have been an exciting time on that flight deck," Barr said drily. "It's not something you'd ever want to try again."
___
Associated Press writers Rohan Sullivan in Sydney, Greg Keller in Paris and Joshua Freed in Minneapolis contributed to this report.
Drama in the cockpit: Qantas crew faced 54 alarms
By JOAN LOWY, Associated Press –
WASHINGTON – Nobody trains for chaos like this. Out the pilots' left window, far above the ocean, an engine as big as a bus had disintegrated, blasting shrapnel holes in the superjumbo's wing. And now an overwhelming flood of computer alarms was warning the pilots that critical systems might be failing.
Two weeks after the pilots somehow landed their Qantas jetliner and its 450 passengers, their two-hour cockpit drama was described Thursday in an interview with The Associated Press by the vice president of the Australian and International Pilots Association.
"The amount of failures is unprecedented," said Richard Woodward, a fellow Qantas A380 pilot who has spoken to all five pilots. "There is probably a one in 100 million chance to have all that go wrong."
But it did.
Engine pieces sliced electric cables and hydraulic lines in the wing. Would the pilots still be able to fly the seven-story-tall plane?
The wing's forward spar — one of the beams that attaches it to the plane — was damaged as well. And the wing's two fuel tanks were punctured. As fuel leaked out, a growing imbalance was created between the left and right sides of the plane, Woodward said.
The electrical power problems prevented the pilots from pumping fuel forward from tanks in the tail. The plane became tail heavy.
That may have posed the greatest risk, safety experts said. If the plane got too far out of balance, the Singapore-to-Sydney jetliner would lose lift, stall and crash.
And then there was that incredible stream of computer messages, 54 in all, alerting the pilots to system failures or warning of impending failures.
One warned that a ram air turbine — a backup power supply — was about to deploy, although that never did happen, Woodward said. The message was especially worrisome because the system deploys only when main power systems are lost. The smaller backup supply is able only to power vital aircraft systems.
That's "the last thing you need in that kind of situation," he said.
The pilots watched as computer screens filled, only to be replaced by new screenfuls of warnings, he said.
"I don't think any crew in the world would have been trained to deal with the amount of different issues this crew faced," Woodward said.
As luck would have it, there were five experienced pilots — including three captains — aboard the plane. The flight's captain, Richard de Crespigny, was being given his annual check ride — a test of his piloting skills — by another captain. That man was himself being evaluated by a third captain. There were also first and second officers, part of the normal three-pilot team. In all, the crew had over 100 years of flying experience.
De Crespigny concentrated on flying the plane, while the others dealt with the computer alarms and made announcements to the giant planeload of passengers, some of whom said they were frantically pointing to flames streaming from the engine. Working flat out, it took 50 minutes for the pilots work through all of the messages.
When pilots receive safety warnings, they are supposed to check the airline's operating manual and implement specific procedures. But with so many warnings, the Qantas pilots had to sort through and prioritize the most serious problems first.
It's likely that for some of the problems there were no procedures because no airline anticipates so many things going wrong at once, John Goglia, a former National Transportation Safety Board member said.
Attention since the Nov. 4 incident has focused on the Airbus 380's damaged Rolls Royce engine. As many as half of the 80 engines that power A380s, the world's largest jetliners, may need to be replaced, Qantas CEO Alan Joyce said Thursday. That raises the possibility of shortages that could delay future deliveries of the superjumbo.
Qantas has grounded its fleet of six A380s.
The drama two weeks ago still wasn't over when the pilots finally got the plane back to Singapore and the runway was in sight.
Wing flaps that are used to slow the plane were inoperable. So were the landing gear doors. The pilots used gravity to lower the gear.
Brake temperatures reached over 1,650 degrees Fahrenheit during the landing, causing several flat tires. If fuel leaking from the damaged wing had hit the brakes, it could have caused a fire. The pilots allowed the plane to roll almost to the end of the runway so it would be close to fire trucks that could put foam on the brakes and undercarriage.
Among the other issues Woodward said the pilots faced:
• When the engine failed it caught fire, but the fire suppression system was difficult to deploy.
• An electrical bus — a connection between electrical devices — on the left wing failed. The plane was designed so that a second bus on the same wing or the two buses on the opposite wing would pick up the load. That didn't happen.
Actually, Woodward praised the plane, saying it was a testament to its strength that it was able to continue to fly relatively well despite all the problems. But he also said it's likely reconsideration will be given to the design and location electrical wiring in the wings.
Airplanes are supposed to be designed with redundancy so that if one part or system fails, there is still another to perform the same function. That didn't always happen in this case, safety experts say.
"The circumstances around this accident will certainly cause the regulatory authorities to take a long and hard look at a number of certification issues," said Goglia, the former National Transportation Safety Board member and an expert on aircraft maintenance.
"What we have got to ensure is that systems are separated so that no single point of failure can damage a system completely," Woodward said. "In this situation the wiring in the leading edge of the wing was cut. That lost multiple systems."
However, Michael Barr, who teaches aviation safety at the University of Southern California, said a commercial plane can't be designed with certainty to withstand a spray of shrapnel, which can inflict damage anywhere. The proper focus, he said, should be on determining what caused the engine to fail and fixing that problem.
All the experts were agreed on one point.
"It must have been an exciting time on that flight deck," Barr said drily. "It's not something you'd ever want to try again."
___
Associated Press writers Rohan Sullivan in Sydney, Greg Keller in Paris and Joshua Freed in Minneapolis contributed to this report.
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Much has been said about the failure of the engine. However, not much has been said about the failure of the cowling itself.
I thought the cowling was supposed to prevent parts of the engine penetrating the wing in the event of catastrophic engine failure?
If the cowling had done it's job properly then the media would have dropped this story ages ago..
I thought the cowling was supposed to prevent parts of the engine penetrating the wing in the event of catastrophic engine failure?
If the cowling had done it's job properly then the media would have dropped this story ages ago..
Shell: re Sunstate popsicle intrusion protection...
Concur with LW50, interesting for a number of reasons but not pertinent to the topic at hand. What would be is how AI risk management ended up taking a triple redundant system down to a dual system.... that is curious, and it would follow that the impact damage survey plotted relative to the single remaining hydraulic system layout would be of interest.
hydraulic failures, and fire are a pain in most transports, wonder how the decision was made to justify the removal of potential redundancy. Heck, the one thing I liked about the 787 was the relatively original concept of modularised independent hydraulic systems to each actuator....
FDR
Concur with LW50, interesting for a number of reasons but not pertinent to the topic at hand. What would be is how AI risk management ended up taking a triple redundant system down to a dual system.... that is curious, and it would follow that the impact damage survey plotted relative to the single remaining hydraulic system layout would be of interest.
hydraulic failures, and fire are a pain in most transports, wonder how the decision was made to justify the removal of potential redundancy. Heck, the one thing I liked about the 787 was the relatively original concept of modularised independent hydraulic systems to each actuator....
FDR