Number5

Hey. I'm new here and thanks for this brilliant analysis of this event. I'm Polish, but I have absolutly no conspiration theories and I hope everyone else, Polish or not, keeps them out of this objective and level-headed analysis. The facts are for me pretty clear, the crew were put under pressure but still made serious errors. I'm however not a pilot, just an interested normal person. (with maybe a bit of above-average knowledge for a non-pilot)
One point I noticed and you seemed not to is that the the crew seemed to know about this depression in the terrain before the runway...at 10:30:50 in the transcript the 2IC said: "the worst thing there is that there is a hole, there are clouds and fog came up"
(I cannot think of any other thing he would describe as a "hole")

I also think both pilots sounded a bit "fed up" before the approach, certainly due to "meddling" by the brass aboard.

i'll try to isolate all passages which could give us clues about the situation the crew found itself in.

at 10:17, they talked to (probably, due to her female name) a flight attendant, telling her "fog came up, unknown if we can land"
At 10:19 they decided to "get close and have a look"
at 10:23, someone important (he got adressed as "commander"- probably chief of polish air force?) came into the cockpit and asked something about the landing but the most important part is untelliglible :/
at 10:25 they communicated with the jak 40 - crew, they told them in no uncertain terms about the bad weather ("its a **** down here" - let's translate this with "its ******* bad down here").
they answered that they will try a approach, but if the weather isn't there they will go for another round.
jak 40 answered that they got in at the last possible moment, then told: "to be honest: you can try... at the most. there are two APMs, they made a "gate", so you can try... but if you don't succeed the second time, you should go to moscow or somewhere else"
at 10:26 the captain told a "director" that "in this conditions we cant land. we'll try once, but there will probably come nothing out of it"
director answered "now we have a problem"
at 10:29 they spoke with the jak again, asking whether the "russians" (the il-76) landed. answer: "no, il went away 2 times (probably meaning 2missed approaches?) and then flew away somewhere") 2IC to captain "you heard it?" captain: "beautiful"

at 10:30 the "director" said: "until now there is no decision by the president what to do"
afterwards, the discussion about the "hole" -2IC "the worst thing there is that there is a hole, there are clouds and fog came up"

at 10:39, 2 minutes before the crash, there is still "general blasik" in the cockpit, seemingly reading a "card" but for me it sounds a bit as if he was reading a manual, trying to figure out what the real crew is doing right now. but this is a bit of speculation, he might also be reading a checklist or something. but this is something a ******* 4-man-cockpit crew (!) should be very well able to do without him i would think.

I've omitted every "technical" part, you guys probably know about those way better than me. For me you've described the critical errors during the approach very well and I'm very happy with such a explanation, I'll hope my translations help a bit to explain why the pilots tried this reckless maneuvre.

I'll take a back seat now and let you continue with your discussion - if you however need a translation just tell me.

dukof

I don't see why you believe the "go around" callout was ignored.. The problem is that also those words fell too late..

The height profile/path, as currently plotted, indicates on its own that a TOGA was indeed initiated immediately after the "go around" was given at 80m RA reading (!). At the 80m readout, their height was only approx 30m above birch tree, and 35m above their lowest subsequent point. With the high rate of descent they were in, such loss of height is natural even if TOGA was pushed at 10:40:51.5-52.0, within a second after the "go around". The problem is they did not monitor rate of descent at around 100m, to make sure the plane leveled off, but kept waiting for the RA readout, probably thinking "I'll go a little bit lower just to check".. The ultimate fatal words were the second "100" readout from navigator, actually at 55m (!). This delayed any action or command just a few seconds, long enough for the crash to be unavoidable.

Everybody seems 110% focused, the Navigator on the RA readout, the FO and Captain probably both on visual, with nobody monitoring instruments for verifying height and rate of descent. Just a flick of an eye on some of the instruments in these critical seconds, would probably have been enough to save them.

All this would of course have been perfectly avoided, had it not been for the mental pressure of having the whole Polish political elite pushing and breathing down their neck, manifested in person by the presence of the Air Force Commander. The crew would likely have dealt fine with the pressure of the president's strong desire to land, but the actual interference in the cockpit during final approach was simply what made everybody go to "extreme concentration", and not act in the way they normally would have. So part of the blame is clearly on the President, including the indirect effect from his history of public humiliation of "cowardly pilot" in the past, and a big part on the one who sent Blasik into the cockpit, being it himself or maybe also that by command of the President. Of course the responsibility lies with the crew, but still, the cause of why the crew did such mistakes is clearly due to how the intervention played out.

LeClercus

Link to English translation of CVR transcript (from Polish).
https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?...WMjdnY3c&hl=en

Google Docs.

Link for sharing: http://bit.ly/92Jb76
Thanks

SadPole

So, if I say that pilots should make the final call on the "land or not to land" question and not some politico, I am "initiating political discussion?"

Let's try it again:

• Any politician who tries to order pilots around over safety issues is an idiot
• Any pilot who lets himself to be micromanaged in safety issues is incompetent.

Knowing how to assert one's authority in these matters is at least as important as being able to read instruments and operate controls of the plane. Some people know it and some don't. And it is the same with pilots, engineers, military officers, and everybody else who is supposed to be in a positions of responsibility and authority.

BMP

https://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?...WMjdnY3c&hl=en

This transcript shows that the last instruction from ATC was that they were on glidepath ...just 10 seconds before the crew tried to abort.

Only after this does it appear that ATC gives the first warning "horizon".

criss

BMP - nothing political, simply what you state/quote is not based on any known things or reports, so has zero value.

SINGAPURCANAC

@BMp,
if it is not clear to you I will tell you.Polish side ACCEPT responsibility.

You made rellevannt points.Russian ATC confirmed correct position for a/c at mment where they were already too low.
altimeter settings procedures also.
approach procedures and landing clearance was never given.

Now only criss will tell that it is so obvious that only Polish pilot is guilty.
If russian deduct my gas bill this winter I will also said that it is only Polish crew mistake.
who cares about truth and aviation safety.

for normal people and countries there is no need to fly to russian military airports.If you accept thjis that it is absolutely your fault.
no one forced them to go Smolensk Military airport.

Ptkay

SINGAPURCANAC,

the former Warsaw Pact military PAR procedures are completely different
from ICAO or NATO PAR procedures.

Take your time, go to the other, closed Tu-154 thread and find the discussion.

The Smoleńsk ATC was working according to procedure,
the Polish pilots didn't.

In short, the procedure is:

- the PAR ATC gives the distance to RWY in km and suggestions
"on course, on path" or left, right down, up
- the pilot should respond with the QFE altitude (height)

The ATC was doing his job, the pilots never responded:

10:39:10 ATC: 101, distance 10, entering glide path
(pilots reading check list, no response to ATC)

10:39:31 ATC: 8, on course and path
(pilots no response)

10:39:41 ATC: runway clear
(pilots no response)

10:39:44 ATC: landing additionally 120- 3 (wind from 120, 3m/s)
10:39:46 PIC: Thank you non standard response, no read back

10:39:50 ATC: Approaching outer NDB, on course and path, distance 6
(pilots no response)

10:40:14 ATC: 4, on course and path
10:40:16 PIC:on course and path (responding for the first time, still no confirmation of altitude, expected by ATC and procedure)

10:40:27 ATC: 3, on course and path
(pilots no response)

10:40:32 ATC: turn on landing lights
10:40:34 PIC: turned on

10:40:38 ATC: 2, on course and path
(pilots no response)

10:40:52 ATC: 101 horizon
(pilots no response)

10:40:55 ATC: Altitude check, horizon
(pilots no response)

10:41:03 ATC: GO AROUND!

So, what in your opinion was the ATC fault?
The pilot was not responding at all, against the procedure.
Shortly after the accident the ATC in an interview, very emotional
complained, that the Polish pilots were not responding:
"On nie kvitoval!"
He even suggested, the pilots maybe didn't know how to pronounce
Russian numbers, and that was the reason, they were not giving him
the read back of their altitudes.

Anyway, first learn the applicable procedures and then cast blame
on the ATC. It was the most experienced and diligent of the
men on the tower, shortly before his retirement.

Put yourself in his shoes, you talk to the book, nobody responds...

Ptkay

BMP:

if Polish pilots just once have read back the QFE altitude to ATC,
as the procedure requires, and the ATC was used to,
it would have been immediately obvious for both parties,
if the QFE was wrong.
And I mean, IF. Because it was correct.
It has been confirmed by the Yak crew.

This is, among others, what this procedure is for!

Ptkay

Because at this moment, on 150m, 2km from RWY they were on course and glide path.

Look on the simulations.

They dived right after that!

The last instruction "2, on course and path" was 27 seconds from impact.
... not just 10 seconds, 10 sec is an eternity in the landing aircraft.

Fake Sealion

PTkay

Ref your last post:-

I write as someone who has flown many PAR's - albeit NATO versions.

I'm not sure I understand why the Russian ATC required a read back of QFE based altitiude when he was apparently observing the descent of the 154 on his PAR screen which provides him with both a vertical and horizontal position of the target.

If however, the controller did not have glidepath (height) information because the pilot was not providing this to him, then why did he on FIVE occasions in the transcript tell the pilot he was "on course and path" which I interpret as being its NATO equivalent of "on centreline on glidepath"

SadPole

Quote: "This transcript shows that the last instruction from ATC was that they were on glidepath ...just 10 seconds before the crew tried to abort."

The way this NON-PRECISION approach with that (admittedly old equipment) works is the landing aircraft reads current altitude, the ATC guy looks at the distance of the aircraft from the runway (that he knows from the radar) and confirms the glide-path. (Has it finally been confirmed if and what type PAR equipment was used?) You can clearly see from the transcript this was the problem as the ATC was probably trying to spot the plane and could not, which he attributed to the crew forgetting to turn the plane's headlights on. He issues the "horizon" command probably the moment the plane disappeared from the radar due to being too low and below the runway level.

At this point, it is almost certain they have used the radio altimeter readings for approach guidance - which is specifically forbidden by all procedures. It has not been concluded yet why on earth they would do that. Using the RA is the best explanation why their rate of descend was so high, among many other things making it impossible for the ATC to guess in time what was going on.

The primary most likely cause of crash, however, is still trying to land in circumstances completely unsafe for conditions and equipment available. Dare to ask yourself why.

Yes, Russians have plenty of problems on their own, which they should deal with. One of them has always been the paranoia of publishing accurate maps, especially near military bases, but the Polish military, out of all people, should have known that. Back during my scout years we tried to get a topo map for a very insignificant forest nowhere near any military base so we could have a little tracking competition. We were refused because all topo maps were "military secret" you see. Russian generals still whine about Google Earth making maps available as it (according to their doctrine) endangers them. Having a topo map apparently enables rebels/terrorists/partisans/insurgents to fire mortars and such and accurately hit whatever it is they might want to hit. For the same reasons all Soviet era Russian city maps had purposely distorted scaling. If they gave that nonsense up, it is only because of GoogleEarth and not because they figured out on their own that this was stupid.

But, this is all yet another reason why it is not a good idea to try to fly to Russia to some old abandoned military airports, only to make some political or emotional statements until we can trust one another and then risk landing in fog while assuming the Russian ATC commands whatever they are can be politically motivated. See the problem yet? What if the shoe was on the other foot and Putin tried to land in fog in some abandoned Polish base? If he did that, we would say he was an idiot, would we not?

Ptkay

There is nothing to understand. This is the procedure.
It is designed to cross check the instruments in the A/C and tower.

SINGAPURCANAC

@ptkay,
Thanks for correct explanation,now things are more clear,
could you be so kind to explain,under eastern military bloc standard ,who is responsible for separation between a/c and ground obsatcles,during radar approach?

I suppose that answer will be in the line with criss idea of aviation.PILOT is guilty.

Since I am paying full price for russian gas, I know that ATC also remains huge responsibility for separation.

not only at the West and East,but in Normal countries as well.

So there is no doubt,CFIT happened in full radar environment.
Pilot is the only one who is guilty.

ST27

Beyond that, who's responsibility is it under the Russian system to call off a descent and initiate a missed approach?

I wouldn't expect it to be ATC, since they can't tell what the pilot can or can't see out the windscreen at the DA. Surely it is up to the crew alone to monitor their altitude and make that important decision themselves.

dukof

Ptkay,

It may well be that readback was not according to procedure. But what is the procedure for ATCO when receiving poor readback...? It clearly will not be to continue normal "ok"-calls until the plane looks to be crashing, and then shut up..

10:40:38,7 - 10:40:39,9 ATC: 2 on course, on glideslope

..is given as they cross the glidpath in a steep descent. Within 3 seconds they reach DH 100m. Still, the ATCO needs another 10.5 seconds (more than an eternity), before he calls his first command that gives any indication of alert:

10:40:52,5 - 10:40:53,4 ATC: Horizon 101.

..and the plane, as this call is given, is between 0-5m height. Although it was way too late for whatever he was going to say, the call is also far too vague relative to position of the plane. What was he doing for these 13.5 seconds.. taking a leak?


IMO, 3 parties contributed to the crash; Crew, ATC and unauthorized persons in cockpit. Any of these three would individually have caused the crash not to happen, if acting properly. None of them did. In addition, you have the 4th party, the Polish Air Force training system, which in the broader perspective is also responsible. Final investigations, if completed without bias, will definitely conclude in such lines. I can not understand otherwise.

Fake Sealion

The fact remains that after the 154 "dived" (due to falling terrain/RA confusion) after being identified as "on path" at 2KM out, there was no response to this action from ATC for a full 14 seconds.
Did they not see this "dive" below the glidepath, was there an interruption in signal .....14 seconds of silence at such a late stage of a PAR approach is astonishing.

criss

Singapurcanac - sorry, but your failure to udnerstand written text is appalling.

BMP - I don't know were you got this pressure thing from, but most probably you're mixing QFE and QNH.

BOAC

Well, from all the translated CVR transcripts I have seen there is NO evidence of any 'control' by ATC for the final approach. As I said previously, I suspect the PAR controller was just monitoring the approach which was being flown by the crew somehow, and offered confirmation of the glide and azimuth at various points. I would not expect these so-called 'standard' responses from the crew in this case. There is no mention anywhere of a command to commence descent on the glide (unless something is missing?) as you would receive for a PAR. Also 100m is high for a PAR decision height - I would expect around 60-65m

With the little amount of information I have I would think the controller is not to blame and probably (correctly?) thought the steeper descent was a deliberate manoeuvre by the crew for those few seconds until he realised they were descending far too low and tried to call a g/round.

Ptkay

This is the ATC, of course.
But also the pilot has to cooperate by reading back the altitude.
If he fails to do so, the ATC, in normal case of Russian military a/c
approaching, calls "go around', or "abort".

Within military procedures the ATC has the authority
to permit or call off the landing.

In this case, Polish pilot didn't have to obey the orders,
the confusion was complete.

The ATC was just trying to do his job as usual, confronted
with what in his mind was complete "insubordination" of the pilot.

This is a very good question. Maybe he just was not believing his eyes
or his instruments, and "froze" like the PIC froze on his side after
go around call ?