Afriqiyah Airbus 330 Crash
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Dutch TV program Nova contained an interesting clip tonight of the whole crash site, filmed from another plane as it approached 09 (today or yesterday, time footage was shot is unclear).
After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it might be possible that the plane was intact and with its wings level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain.
And maybe it's only me, but I have no clues at this time as to the causal factors.
SkyGod
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I put my money on a last-ditch course correction which went badly wrong, or "low level aerobatics" as someone put it
Having worked in the Middle East, I have seen that in the simulator with locals now and then.
Have also seen job offers being tied to good family connections and not to flying skills or common sense in general.
(No relation to this accident of course)
lomapaseo;
Yes, agree, seeing this new information. The ground path appears not to have a large initial impact mark, (for example, tail first, as at AMS), but a relatively smooth path.
If confirmed it does not match IMO The A330 Test flight nor Nagoya. I still do not believe that the evidence suggests a flameout lack of fuel (too much engine damage and too intense a fire in some areas in the photos).
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Similar CFITS (and a factor that fits both recent final approach accidents)
From another forum:
There are quite a lot of discussion on the TU154 accident : people talking about instrument approaches procedures in Russia, heirloom from the soviet era :
There are three possibilities on the procedure they were shooting (but the clue is in the ATC observation that "they lost altitude very quickly" close in):
1/- A GCA approach, which would confirm the initial Russian controller who said that " they stopped acknowledging my messages and they lost altitude very quickly..." required vis is 1000 m.
2/- A very unusual procedure - apparently quite common in the ex-soviet world - in which, the pilots would use two NDBs for the alignment on centerline, while being talked down by a ground operator. I have never heard of that method until to-day, and it seems to me quite dangerous as the pilot has to deal with two mental pictures - one from his instruments on a visual cue, another from the required "correlation" of some height orders from the ground (aural / visual cues ). Required min vis is 1200 m.
3/- A dual NDB approach. The problem with this letdown is the absence of any glide slope information ; everything is done by stopwatch, down to an MDH of some 200m / 600 ft.
Contrary to what some may think, the lateral precision of that approach is very good (the deviation of some 45 m at 1500 m from the threshold amount to a precision of less than 2° (and Yes, on that sort of approach, that's "smack on the centerline" ! )
Another image I would have liked to see is a cockpit view of that approach, especially at the point where they started that strange "dive"... i.e. was there a visual clue that made them think they were closer to the runway ( and too high, of course ) ?
*
For comparison, at the link below is a picture of the TU154 accident debris trail in which the Polish president died a short while ago.
Also apparently a CFIT during approach. TU154 crash site debris distribution ( http://bi.gazeta.pl/im/3/7765/m7765863.jpg )
You will appreciate that the length of the wreckage trail is dependent on the combined forward and downward vector. A high-speed accident with a large vertical component can leave a shorter trail than a low speed accident with a lesser vertical component. Other varying factors are the ground composition, obstacles and obviously the behaviour of the a/c structure during the impact sequence.
*
But it's likely that the TU-154 accident and the Tripoli accident were very similar in their origins. See explanation below.
*
Picked up this photo (below): of the TU-154 crash
.....showing that the big piece first torn from the airplane was indeed the tip of the left wing.
So thanks to this fact, we have confirmed that the reason the TU154 veered to the left and - apparently - ended up upside down, was a sharp low altitude left bank (and tree-top connection) which resulted in the airplane impacting the ground inverted.
Using that elevation/location data, here on Pprune some theorists have plotted the TU154's finals flightpath on a terrain profile and found out that, at the first tree impact, theTU154 was well below the airfield elevation and their subsequent trajectory was a 5% climb, insufficient to clear all obstacles.
That 5% value would be puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with approach illusions, being way below the height and gradient from which we would expect a go-around/missed approach to commence; and with that puzzling final approach geometry, it would tend to make any stabilized final approach a lot more difficult than normal...even if they were well above stall speed... However this puzzling low altitude close-in on final approach could easily be explained away by a visual illusion caused by a runway upslope.... in limited visibility.
*
Yet it's hard to establish whether or not runway 26 at Smolensk has any upslope - as the Russian military don't publish public charts/plates for their military airfields. I'll keep looking, but it's conceivably a common factor. The inordinately low altitude during the TU-154's approach would appear to support an upslope visual illusion theory. As with Aspen CO's 2001 Gulfstream III crash, superimpose a 2% upsloping runway upon a standard 3% approach profile and the pilot is inevitably being visually "conned" into descending into a subterranean approach - once he becomes visual with the first half of the runway. It's an illusion that's very difficult to perceive or even anticipate, so how can one avoid it - particularly in low visibility?
*
The TU154 Smolensk and Tripoli A330 accidents would appear to have much in common. That final "drive" and descent to the "now visible" runway, after an NPA approach, is totally dependent upon what the pilot perceives his approach angle to be....in limited visibility (i.e. with few cues). If he's unknowingly coping with (i.e. subject to) an upslope illusion, and consequently very low, any last minute line-up banking will put a wingtip perilously close to the ground..... but he won't realize that. It's a deadly combo.
There are quite a lot of discussion on the TU154 accident : people talking about instrument approaches procedures in Russia, heirloom from the soviet era :
There are three possibilities on the procedure they were shooting (but the clue is in the ATC observation that "they lost altitude very quickly" close in):
1/- A GCA approach, which would confirm the initial Russian controller who said that " they stopped acknowledging my messages and they lost altitude very quickly..." required vis is 1000 m.
2/- A very unusual procedure - apparently quite common in the ex-soviet world - in which, the pilots would use two NDBs for the alignment on centerline, while being talked down by a ground operator. I have never heard of that method until to-day, and it seems to me quite dangerous as the pilot has to deal with two mental pictures - one from his instruments on a visual cue, another from the required "correlation" of some height orders from the ground (aural / visual cues ). Required min vis is 1200 m.
3/- A dual NDB approach. The problem with this letdown is the absence of any glide slope information ; everything is done by stopwatch, down to an MDH of some 200m / 600 ft.
Contrary to what some may think, the lateral precision of that approach is very good (the deviation of some 45 m at 1500 m from the threshold amount to a precision of less than 2° (and Yes, on that sort of approach, that's "smack on the centerline" ! )
Another image I would have liked to see is a cockpit view of that approach, especially at the point where they started that strange "dive"... i.e. was there a visual clue that made them think they were closer to the runway ( and too high, of course ) ?
Dutch TV program Nova contains an interesting clip of the whole Tripoli crash site, filmed from another plane as it approached Tripoli's runway 09.
Fast Forward to 20 min 43 seconds, approximately. Disregard Dutch comment, it's not related to the clip itself.
Visible is what could resemble a first impact area plus signs of the plane sliding straight forward. The tail section plus smaller debris appears to be located some 200 meters after this first impact area (in front of the mosque described by others). It appears the plane was more or less intact before that point.
A large debris field can be seen after the tail-section with relatively small pieces and stretches for some 240 meters. One large section (wings?) appears approx 200 meters further on, with relatively little (if any) debris in between those 2 points (though it appears the ground is scratched in between). There's approx 730 meters between what appears to be first impact area and this large*object (wings?).
After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it's probable that the plane was intact and with its wings almost level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In the clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain (i.e. a "berm").
Fast Forward to 20 min 43 seconds, approximately. Disregard Dutch comment, it's not related to the clip itself.
Visible is what could resemble a first impact area plus signs of the plane sliding straight forward. The tail section plus smaller debris appears to be located some 200 meters after this first impact area (in front of the mosque described by others). It appears the plane was more or less intact before that point.
A large debris field can be seen after the tail-section with relatively small pieces and stretches for some 240 meters. One large section (wings?) appears approx 200 meters further on, with relatively little (if any) debris in between those 2 points (though it appears the ground is scratched in between). There's approx 730 meters between what appears to be first impact area and this large*object (wings?).
After carefully watching this clip a few times, I believe it's probable that the plane was intact and with its wings almost level when it hit the ground and slid for some 200 meters and eventually broke up (tail first) when it hit the road which runs North-West near the mosque. In the clip, this road appears to be slightly higher then surrounding terrain (i.e. a "berm").
For comparison, at the link below is a picture of the TU154 accident debris trail in which the Polish president died a short while ago.
Also apparently a CFIT during approach. TU154 crash site debris distribution ( http://bi.gazeta.pl/im/3/7765/m7765863.jpg )
You will appreciate that the length of the wreckage trail is dependent on the combined forward and downward vector. A high-speed accident with a large vertical component can leave a shorter trail than a low speed accident with a lesser vertical component. Other varying factors are the ground composition, obstacles and obviously the behaviour of the a/c structure during the impact sequence.
*
But it's likely that the TU-154 accident and the Tripoli accident were very similar in their origins. See explanation below.
*
Picked up this photo (below): of the TU-154 crash
.....showing that the big piece first torn from the airplane was indeed the tip of the left wing.
So thanks to this fact, we have confirmed that the reason the TU154 veered to the left and - apparently - ended up upside down, was a sharp low altitude left bank (and tree-top connection) which resulted in the airplane impacting the ground inverted.
Using that elevation/location data, here on Pprune some theorists have plotted the TU154's finals flightpath on a terrain profile and found out that, at the first tree impact, theTU154 was well below the airfield elevation and their subsequent trajectory was a 5% climb, insufficient to clear all obstacles.
That 5% value would be puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with approach illusions, being way below the height and gradient from which we would expect a go-around/missed approach to commence; and with that puzzling final approach geometry, it would tend to make any stabilized final approach a lot more difficult than normal...even if they were well above stall speed... However this puzzling low altitude close-in on final approach could easily be explained away by a visual illusion caused by a runway upslope.... in limited visibility.
*
Yet it's hard to establish whether or not runway 26 at Smolensk has any upslope - as the Russian military don't publish public charts/plates for their military airfields. I'll keep looking, but it's conceivably a common factor. The inordinately low altitude during the TU-154's approach would appear to support an upslope visual illusion theory. As with Aspen CO's 2001 Gulfstream III crash, superimpose a 2% upsloping runway upon a standard 3% approach profile and the pilot is inevitably being visually "conned" into descending into a subterranean approach - once he becomes visual with the first half of the runway. It's an illusion that's very difficult to perceive or even anticipate, so how can one avoid it - particularly in low visibility?
*
The TU154 Smolensk and Tripoli A330 accidents would appear to have much in common. That final "drive" and descent to the "now visible" runway, after an NPA approach, is totally dependent upon what the pilot perceives his approach angle to be....in limited visibility (i.e. with few cues). If he's unknowingly coping with (i.e. subject to) an upslope illusion, and consequently very low, any last minute line-up banking will put a wingtip perilously close to the ground..... but he won't realize that. It's a deadly combo.
Last edited by UNCTUOUS; 16th May 2010 at 02:24.
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Aircraft
SubscribeYou are in: Home › Aircraft › News Article
DATE:12/05/10
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Crashed Libyan A330 had logged just 1,600 hours
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Airframer data for the crashed Afriqiyah Airways Airbus A330-200 shows that it had accumulated just 1,600 flight hours before the accident.
Airbus has confirmed the carrier's identification of the airframe as serial number 1024, adding that it had conducted some 420 flights since delivery in September.
"Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft crashed short of the runway threshold during approach," it adds.
There is no information on the level of experience of the cockpit crew. Afriqiyah confirms that a child was the sole survivor from among the 93 passengers - mainly Dutch nationals - and 11 crew on board.
Video images from the scene suggest that both flight recorders have been recovered from the wreckage.
Source: Libyan TV
Sunrise time for Tripoli on 12 May is listed by astronomical charts as 06:10.
Weather information for Tripoli International Airport indicates visiblity had started varying around the time of the Afriqiyah Airbus A330 crash, given as about 06:00.
While meteorological data at 05:50 indicated visibility of 6,000m, this had dropped back to 5,000m at 06:20 and an update timed at 06:25 puts the figure at 2,000m.
Tripoli's main runway is desginated 09/27. There is no confirmation of the runway in use, or the type of approach carried out, but the weather data suggests westerly winds prevailed.
Related content
SubscribeYou are in: Home › Aircraft › News Article
DATE:12/05/10
SOURCE:Air Transport Intelligence news
Crashed Libyan A330 had logged just 1,600 hours
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Airframer data for the crashed Afriqiyah Airways Airbus A330-200 shows that it had accumulated just 1,600 flight hours before the accident.
Airbus has confirmed the carrier's identification of the airframe as serial number 1024, adding that it had conducted some 420 flights since delivery in September.
"Preliminary reports indicate that the aircraft crashed short of the runway threshold during approach," it adds.
There is no information on the level of experience of the cockpit crew. Afriqiyah confirms that a child was the sole survivor from among the 93 passengers - mainly Dutch nationals - and 11 crew on board.
Video images from the scene suggest that both flight recorders have been recovered from the wreckage.
Sunrise time for Tripoli on 12 May is listed by astronomical charts as 06:10.
Weather information for Tripoli International Airport indicates visiblity had started varying around the time of the Afriqiyah Airbus A330 crash, given as about 06:00.
While meteorological data at 05:50 indicated visibility of 6,000m, this had dropped back to 5,000m at 06:20 and an update timed at 06:25 puts the figure at 2,000m.
Tripoli's main runway is desginated 09/27. There is no confirmation of the runway in use, or the type of approach carried out, but the weather data suggests westerly winds prevailed.
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This approach ladies and gentlemen was more than likely unstable. One or more of the criteria for a stabilized approach was not met on that early morning approach into Tripoli. This aircraft was a perfectly good working aircraft up until the point of impact. To be stabilized you need to be on the correct flight path, laterally and vertically. Correct VAPP and in the landing config is a must and hopefully checklist read with just monitoring to be done with the autopilot on and track/FPA with flight path director on. I can only assume that Air Afiqiyah conduct CANPA approaches into Tripoli and this approach should not have posed a big problem for anyone who knows how to do a non precision approach in the A330, whether it be managed or selected.
Situational awareness in this cockpit was poor as well. However I have no doubt that the crew knew that something was going wrong but failed to take the appropriate action of going around in time. Perhaps a go around was conducted but they may have even failed to pitch up and drove the aircraft into the ground.
Situational awareness in this cockpit was poor as well. However I have no doubt that the crew knew that something was going wrong but failed to take the appropriate action of going around in time. Perhaps a go around was conducted but they may have even failed to pitch up and drove the aircraft into the ground.
Below is a very rough composite of the video taken on final and presented on NOVA at Player omroep.nl.
The image is intentionally not cleaned up; it is necessarily choppy due to the changing perspective which is not possible to represent on a flat surface; I tried it in pTgui (panorama building program) but it couldn't deal with the series of images. The 'S-turn's' at the beginning are a result of the composite work rather than the actual track of the aircraft.
As has been observed by others who have watched the video, the initial ground contact appears more flat and not at high descent rate as I first thought. Given the length of the path, the fragmentation of the fuselage and location of the wings, (far left in the composite) it may be reasonable to posit a high speed, low-rate of descent scenario.
PJ2
The image is intentionally not cleaned up; it is necessarily choppy due to the changing perspective which is not possible to represent on a flat surface; I tried it in pTgui (panorama building program) but it couldn't deal with the series of images. The 'S-turn's' at the beginning are a result of the composite work rather than the actual track of the aircraft.
As has been observed by others who have watched the video, the initial ground contact appears more flat and not at high descent rate as I first thought. Given the length of the path, the fragmentation of the fuselage and location of the wings, (far left in the composite) it may be reasonable to posit a high speed, low-rate of descent scenario.
PJ2
Last edited by PJ2; 15th May 2010 at 07:03.
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Crew Composition - Crew Rest
My comments are on crew composition and rest and PLEASE all you who knew the crew, Africa, Afriqiyah etc. do not get fired up. I am just trying to establish facts and possible contributing factors.
The flight took off on Monday at 19:30 and Landed in Joburg at 04:20 on Tuesday Morning
After 17 hours departed Joburg at 21:30 and landed in Tripoli at 06:20
All times from Afriqiyah published schedule
So, we have two night sectors flown by the same crew with 15 or less hours rest.
First question to the long rangers:
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?
The crew was 1 Captain and 2 FO
Second question:
Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?
Third question:
Could it be that, being a landing at home etc. the two FOs were at the controls?
As I said, I am not having a go at the professionality etc. of Afriqiyah pilots.
BTW, Takata, I will try to go to the site this afternoon and all the latest discussions on the first impact will guide me to look well before the mosque... if I make it there.
The flight took off on Monday at 19:30 and Landed in Joburg at 04:20 on Tuesday Morning
After 17 hours departed Joburg at 21:30 and landed in Tripoli at 06:20
All times from Afriqiyah published schedule
So, we have two night sectors flown by the same crew with 15 or less hours rest.
First question to the long rangers:
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?
The crew was 1 Captain and 2 FO
Second question:
Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?
Third question:
Could it be that, being a landing at home etc. the two FOs were at the controls?
As I said, I am not having a go at the professionality etc. of Afriqiyah pilots.
BTW, Takata, I will try to go to the site this afternoon and all the latest discussions on the first impact will guide me to look well before the mosque... if I make it there.
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The first area where you can see the plane came down has no debris (seen from aerial video) but a definite path. Can this be due to the fact that high thrust from the engines could have created this? If the plane would have hit there it would leave some debris but it has not...debris start just before the mosque. Any ideas? Anyone also have a approx location of the cockpit?
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First question to the long rangers:
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?
Is this ok in relation to crew duty and rest time?
The crew was 1 Captain and 2 FO
Second question:
Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?
Second question:
Is this composition acceptable? Will this mean that the Captain will always be at the controls or that in some instances the two FOs will be left alone in the cockpit if the Captain has a rest?
Could it be that, being a landing at home etc. the two FOs were at the controls
NO!
I cannot imagine airlines or authorities approving this.
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The markings of the slide path are not very clear on the printscreen from the video, but they could be interpretated as follows:
1) The markings are formed by sand which is pushed sideways through the pressure of the belly. In this case the landing gear was not yet deployed. Is that normal 1km before the runway?
2) The markings are formed by the landing gear. As only 2 traces are visible, the angle of attack was such that only the rear landing gear touched the ground, otherwise a third trace would have been visible in the middle. Are there pictures which show the location of the landing gear on the debris field?
The other interesting fact is that the wings are closely together at the end of the debris field, indicating that the aircraft made no rotational movement (around the yaw axis). The fact that the tail is rotated 180 degrees can be explained by the fact that the rudder had some output, leading to a rotational movement at such high speeds. Or it made (multiple) somersaults?
1) The markings are formed by sand which is pushed sideways through the pressure of the belly. In this case the landing gear was not yet deployed. Is that normal 1km before the runway?
2) The markings are formed by the landing gear. As only 2 traces are visible, the angle of attack was such that only the rear landing gear touched the ground, otherwise a third trace would have been visible in the middle. Are there pictures which show the location of the landing gear on the debris field?
The other interesting fact is that the wings are closely together at the end of the debris field, indicating that the aircraft made no rotational movement (around the yaw axis). The fact that the tail is rotated 180 degrees can be explained by the fact that the rudder had some output, leading to a rotational movement at such high speeds. Or it made (multiple) somersaults?
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Correlation between VOR DME Rwy 09 final approach course and crash site location
When checking the 13-1 VOR DME Rwy 09 approach plate (assuming that the aircraft was following this approach), I noticed that the Tripoli VOR (TPI) is located about 300 m south of the runway (also visible on the 10-9 airport chart). Extending the final approach course from the Ghararah (TW) locator to the Tripoli VOR (TPI) along 92° magnetic as per the approach, I noticed that it goes almost overhead the crash site. The crash site is indeed also located 300 m south of the extended centerline of runway 09. See my sketching below.
I speculate that the pilot was on a perfectly stable approach tracking towards the TPI VOR, descended below minima before D Locator (550' AMSL, only 288' above the threshold) while still in or suddenly engulfed in IMC (haze + direct sunlight). Pilots could not adjust course visually towards the runway as they were IMC and they continued as if on a ILS approach. Close to the ground the go-around was probably initiated, but came too late and its energy contributed to the disintegration. Wheels touched in the sand, pull-up, tail scraped and broke off, remainder fell hard back onto the sand.
Niner Mike.
I speculate that the pilot was on a perfectly stable approach tracking towards the TPI VOR, descended below minima before D Locator (550' AMSL, only 288' above the threshold) while still in or suddenly engulfed in IMC (haze + direct sunlight). Pilots could not adjust course visually towards the runway as they were IMC and they continued as if on a ILS approach. Close to the ground the go-around was probably initiated, but came too late and its energy contributed to the disintegration. Wheels touched in the sand, pull-up, tail scraped and broke off, remainder fell hard back onto the sand.
Niner Mike.
Last edited by Niner_Mike; 15th May 2010 at 11:00.
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The first area where you can see the plane came down has no debris (seen from aerial video) but a definite path. Can this be due to the fact that high thrust from the engines could have created this? If the plane would have hit there it would leave some debris but it has not...debris start just before the mosque. Any ideas? Anyone also have a approx location of the cockpit?
Looks like it did a perfect touchdown in the dirt, instead of on the runway.
It would be interesting to see if the initial trail contains any tyre tracks, or whether it was just the aft fuselage dragging along the ground. The width and depth would suggest tyre contact, but I cannot see any obvious tracks on that video.
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As far as crew rest is concerned, if the Captain is with two FOs who are not type rated s/he may not leave the cockpit except for "physiological" reasons and that does not include sleep. Some airlines make long haul (over 8 hours) at night with this crew configuration. Captain gets no rest. Don't know about the rule regarding this case.