EK407 Tailstrike @ ML

[advisory]

SO the Emirates crew fled to DXB - can you blame them after the OZ authorites reaction to the QLD oil spill accident by the Pacific Adventurer? They have the Captain under "house arrest" on his ship and have confiscated his passport and he is threatened with a $250K fine. As if he meant those 31 containers to go overboard.

A sure way to get people to be open an co-operative with the investigation and prevent it happening again - not.

OZ now lies with countries like Japan - if there is an incident, regardless, you are under arrest. Better hope you you have a good lawyer - presumaby paid for by IFALPA.

[Dysag]

OZ now lies with countries like Japan...

... and Taiwan, which detained the crew of the crashed SIA 747 for two months.

[forget]

... and Taiwan, which detained the crew of the crashed SIA 747 for two months.

Huge difference. SIA - Take-off attempt on the wrong runway - and fatalities.

[Inspector Clueless]

Tailscrape

There is no pilot union at EK as many know and therefore IFALPA will have limited effect if any.

This event will join various others under the EK carpet in AARs office with JNB,AKL ,A345 in flight smoke in 2002 etc etc.

The fact that there thankfully were no fatalities will allow little A and his cronies to limit the publicity and damage.

It was in the UK press then immediately removed from BBC.

Funny old world.

IC

[Ron & Edna Johns]

You're kidding - these guys were loaded onto another jet and got the hell out of Aus before speaking with safety authorities?? I hope that's incorrect.....

At fault or not at fault, you DON'T do that! Whether you like it or not, you actually do have this little thing called "responsibility": to present some basic information on what happened. I'm not saying you should be locked up or detained, or have passports confiscated. But some basic questions have to be answered. Goodness me, can you imagine a truck driver fleeing the scene of a road accident or a ship's Captain hightailing after a marine collision? Totally unacceptable - so why should we, as professional airmen, be any different? All it does is make your actions look more suspicious.

It's evidence of a very immature airline, I'm afraid - one that doesn't really know how to handle the situation, one that doesn't know how to support the crew whilst abroad while at the same time respecting the laws and authorities of the applicable country.

[firstchoice7e7]

incident is still being reported on bbc

BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | Plane makes emergency landing

[Dairyground]

Tailscrape or bellyscrape?

From the photographs in post #2, the worst of the damage seems to be well forward of the back door and gets progressively less towards the tail.

Judging from such photographs of the type as I have been able to find quickly, it looks to me as though the only way to scrape that far forward without removing most of the lower part of the rear fuselage is to have the main wheels up.

Could this be a case of wheels up early, flaps in far too early?

[captjns]

Possible wrong weight or CG.

To the Airbus flyers... does Airbus have over-rotation protection to prevent tail strikes?

[Jetjock330]

Possible wrong weight or CG.

To the Airbus flyers... does Airbus have over-rotation protection to prevent tail strikes?

It has a pitch limiter indication on the PFD, an orange "V" indication the approaching angle of pitch that would incur a tail strike if over rotated beyond the bottom point of the "V".

But there is no flight control law preventing the tail from striking the ground. There is a very small tail skid, but more of a tell tale sign if touched or scrapped.

[PJ2]

Some information from an Airbus A340 - 500 FCOM may assist in providing some sober second thoughts and perhaps a pause before contributing some of the inexperienced, uninformed and wilder notions we are seeing.

The following is in no way intended as speculation but only as information.

Tailstrikes on any transport category aircraft have a fairly narrow range of causes. In tailstrike incidents and takeoff accidents, the following have occurred:

- incorrect rotation technique, (early, fast, two-stage)
- incorrect takeoff data calculation, (wrong weights, wrong runway)
- incorrect takeoff data entry, (correct calculation, wrong FMGC entry)
- wrong runway used for takeoff, (taxiway used in some cases)
- incorrect weight and balance numbers, (includes incorrect stabilizer setting)
- incorrect stabilizer setting by the crew (correctly calculated, wrong setting)
- cargo shift, (extremely rare today, but it has happened in the past)
- strong tailwinds/windshear (rare)

Operational Bulletins (not cautionary in nature but expanding upon operations), for the Airbus 340-500 state that, with respect to the A340-300, the flight control laws have been adapted to take into account the longer fuselage length and that the tail clearance is monitored and if marginal, the rotation rate is reduced until lift-off. The information also states, (and this ought to be obvious to anyone), the airplane has a large inertia and the rotation takes time to build up. For rotation, one "sets" the sidestick about 2/3rds back and waits - one does not pull further.

For information, the aircraft does not have a tailskid, but nor do most transports including the B747. The DC8-61 and 63 series did and the B720 had a ventral fin which may have acted as a bit of protection but that aircraft had a very short fuselage compared to the 707.

The Airbus A340-500 rotation technique requires some care. Even though the technique is (or certainly should be) well known/understood by those trained on the airplane, there is specific guidance in the FCOM regarding the maneuver, there remains an aspect to rotation of the Airbus A340-500 that can be a bit of a surprise if one is not prepared for it or knowledgeable about it.

I stress here that this information is for those new on the airplane. This is a non-issue for someone who has been flying the -500 for more than a couple of legs. The FCOM has very specific cautions on rotation technique:

AT VR SPEED
PNF..."ROTATE"
PNF observes the speed and completes the call by VR. When V1 and VR are the same, the calls must be completed by VR.

At VR , the PF initiates the rotation with a positive sidestick input and maintains the positive sidestick input to achieve a continuous rotation rate of about 3°/sec towards a pitch attitude of 12½°

[A343] /15° [A345, A330]. Changes to the sidestick position should not be made until airborne. After lift off, follow SRS pitch command bar. In the event of no FD after liftoff select 12½° [A343] /15° [A345, A330] pitch with all engines (maintain minimum V2 plus 10 kt) or 12½° in the event of an engine failure (maintain minimum V2).

As the rotation maneuver is flown in Direct Law with full authority, pitch control is very sensitive to sidestick inputs. Altering sidestick backpressure can produce pilot induced oscillations and/or may produce a two-stage rotation which significantly increases the chance of tail strike.

Minimize lateral inputs on ground and during the rotation, to avoid spoiler extension. In strong crosswind conditions, small lateral stick inputs may be used, if necessary, to maintain wings level.

If some lateral control has been applied on the ground, the Sidestick should be centralised during rotation so that the aircraft becomes airborne with a zero roll rate demand.

Info
Airbus Training advises that once the rotation has begun, increasing side stick back pressure will increase chance of a tail strike.

CAUTION

In the unlikely event that a tail strike should occur, flight at altitude requiring a pressurized cabin must be avoided and a return to the nearest suitable airport should be performed for damage assessment.

[woodja51]

tail issues

So far the best post on this link is that of CANADAIR - who doesnt even work for EK. He seems to have a big picture approach to this case.

We are all only as good as out last flight .. I have 5000 hours on the 330/345 and can understand why errors can be made from a pilots perspective that might lead to this event/similar

The jet is not fool proof as AB would have us believe.

Neither is the 777 that I fly now and there have been several cases of 'almost's' with that jet too.

I know at least one of the guys on the incident jet, and cannot be lead to believe that any errors would have been made without mitigating factors - as there always are.

What ever the events that occurred the other night, be it incorrect FM inputs, overzealous side stick input, environmental or load shift. All are possible causes. Lets wait and see what the prelim gives.

I do find it odd that the crew were evac'd before making a statement to CASA/ BASI or who ever else is responsible. However, I guess the fact is that no other party was involved or injured therefore - like in a car crash if no injuries , death or other issues , this is not a crime scene and merely an incident.

However it does reflect badly on EK to 'spirit' the crew away, However , after an incident letting them be interviewed might not be in anyones interest and prejudicial to fair play given the legal vultures that inhabit the universe.

The folks were very lucky if the aircraft managed to cut up the overrun/LLZ etc as with the better part of 100 000 kg of Jet A on board any tank rupture may have been a different outcome.

As always pilots are their own worse critics ( unlike the medical profession!)

Regardless of what the cause is determined to be , the guys flying that day are probably wishing that this event didnt cause almost '600' to be viewing the post as we speak.

Good on them for a glass half full not half empty - regardless of the initial cause.
Probably wont make the transition back to the roster any easier!!

EK' s 'find him and kill him approach' used to work at 33 SQN but not in the real world I suspect!
woodj

[xkoote]

Just like to make a quick comment regarding one of the possible factors, namely the cargo shift theory.

In my opinion on a plane that is this full, it will be quite difficult for the cargo to shift with only acceleration. Especially one full of pax and fuel for a 10+ hour trip. Now one might say that on these planes, the containers are placed on rollers and can move quite freely. May well be as I don't fly them, only MD-80's. But even IF that was the case, they move to the rear of the plane allowing for early rotation and or difficulty controlling the aircraft. Kind of like the poor chaps taking off of runway 27R back in the day in Miami.
And if so they would have rotated much earlier and become airborne earlier. It does not account for why the plane refused to become airborne after 13,000 feet on a 12,000 foot long runway.
Really interested in the initial results form ATSB.

[CONF iture]

If they were not already in the air after a 12000 feet long runway not that far from sea level and desperately still scratching the tail ... the speed was just not there for liftoff ...
My guess would go a very underestimate GW and therefore just not enough applied thrust.

If no extra cargo, any estimate for the GW ?

[TDK mk2]

expanding on the cargo shift theory, if the load did shift rearward after V1 (which may have been low due to high GW and tailwind) which caused the aircraft to rotate early the crew would not abort the take off but drag would increase massively, induced drag from the wings and friction. Could that have prevented the aircraft from reaching Vr?

[Joetom]

Very lucky people indeed.

I will be very surprised if cargo shift played a role.

Just appears, the aircraft was not producing enough lift at a suitable point on the runway and even suitable lift at runway end.

I hope we learn all the lessons from this event.

My thoughts with all involved, Cheers.....

[PJ2]

xkoote;

FWIW, I agree - I doubt very much whether this is "cargo-shift" related. According to the METAR there was a slight headwind. A ten-hour flight is not a long flight for this aircraft so it will not have been near the MTOW which, depending upon the MTOW "purchased" by the airline, is around 372k kg's.

Unless the PF was new on the airplane and perhaps mis-handled the rotation, while I think the primary cause may be simple, the factors leading to the incident will be more complicated than they appear.

Thrust levels would not likely be an issue. There are two thrust lever positions for such a takeoff - TOGA and FLX/MCT. They would likely be well within the ability to use Flex takeoff thrust. The crew is warned if a Flex temperature isn't set or if the thrust levers are not in either the TOGA or FLX/MCT position.

I would be looking at first at FMC entries, then at the speed calculation process. FMC entries are usually captured by the DFDR and sometimes by the QAR if the airline has a FOQA Program. The takeoff data calculation process is fully automated in many operations but initial data entries are made by hand when requesting such data, usually from the aircraft and sent to company via the AOC (Airline Operational Control) functions in the ATSU using the flight plan weights and ATIS weather. The final load numbers may or may not require a change in the takeoff data. My first inclination is to believe that the weight & balance data was correct as those processes are normally highly automated and highly accurate.

I certainly feel for the crew. I know crews who have had this happen to them and the processes now unfolding are not pleasant. Hopefully the aforementioned Just Culture is the way this will be approached. If they whack the crew they risk losing the opportunity to learn.

[Hempy]

Blocky,

From our end thats how it looked; the end of the black stuff was coming up too fast, so hes yanked back on the stick to get it up. I'm assuming he's taken an intersection departure. DOK was on the boundary road near the golf course when he went over the top, apparently about 10" clear of the boundary fence and trailing a lot of sparks. I'm tipping the 34 strobes got a bit of a scare as well...

[PJ2]

hempy;

I'm assuming he's taken an intersection departure.

Just curious, do you have info that supports this? Not challenging the statement, just interested. I would have thought that intersection takeoffs were simply not done unless runway construction etc mandates such a departure.

The operation I am familiar with is capable of calculating takeoff data, (speeds for WAT data and flap position), for intersection takeoffs as well as displaced runway thresholds but it is policy that intersection takeoffs are not done, period. The fact that the runway is about 12,000ft long would have no bearing on the policy. So I would be interested in learning if the takeoff was done from an intersection. Obviously the takeoff data would be different vice the data for the entire length.

[alexmcfire]

Any pics of the runway availble?

[CONF iture]

My first inclination is to believe that the weight & balance data was correct as those processes are normally highly automated and highly accurate

... as long as the correct data are entered ...

According to the METAR there was a slight headwind. A ten-hour flight is not a long flight for this aircraft so it will not have been near the MTOW which, depending upon the MTOW "purchased" by the airline, is around 372k kg's

Headwind ?
Also 6300 NM would be more around 14 hours flight ...

My estimate would be around 310 tonnes (no cargo) ... (?)