Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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...just what we don`t need....face saving versus the blatantly obvious. How can safety improve if you can never admit that human beings make errors....shame on the Turkish media.
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Report in English
Here's the report in English.
Dutch officials say faulty altimeter played role in Turkish plane crash
Dutch officials say faulty altimeter played role in Turkish plane crash
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What "cultural problem" are you referring to?
1. Turkish Airlines initially confirmed that 'all passengers have survived'
2. Turkish Airlines confirmed not a few hours after the crash that the airplane's maintenance status was beyond reproach
3. Turkish pride or whatever you might call it leads Turkish Airlines president to compare this with the Hudson river landing and their pilots have "martyred" themselves in the process of saving everyone.
4. This leaves anti-Boeing and anti-American sentiments to continue in a place where martyrdom trumps professionalism in any matter of the day, including a flight crew that stalled and crashed a 737 because of a faulty rad alt...
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Some homework my friend
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/16294...-autoland.html
As far as I know you DO get the aircraft on the ground, but that's because of the GS transmitter position and angle close to the ground. Might be different in the NG.
But the question is about the retard capability. If nr1 RA fails there is no retards capability because it's dependent on nr 1 RA.
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/16294...-autoland.html
As far as I know you DO get the aircraft on the ground, but that's because of the GS transmitter position and angle close to the ground. Might be different in the NG.
But the question is about the retard capability. If nr1 RA fails there is no retards capability because it's dependent on nr 1 RA.
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For your info,
The Trainee as everybody calls him is a Fully Licensed and qualified Co-pilot who has passed all of his tests. The only thing he has not is Line flying experience. What he was doing on this flight and what hundreds of other pilots are doing every day is Line Training. Getting training/experience on the line under supervision of a Line Training Captain.
The other Co-pilot on the extra seat in the cockpit (Also called jumpseat) is there for safety reasons. He is the so called Safety Pilot. If the Captain would be unable to perform his duty's he should be able to safely land the aircraft.
Why this safety pilot has not intervened I do not know. This might/could be a Cultural problem though.
The Trainee as everybody calls him is a Fully Licensed and qualified Co-pilot who has passed all of his tests. The only thing he has not is Line flying experience. What he was doing on this flight and what hundreds of other pilots are doing every day is Line Training. Getting training/experience on the line under supervision of a Line Training Captain.
The other Co-pilot on the extra seat in the cockpit (Also called jumpseat) is there for safety reasons. He is the so called Safety Pilot. If the Captain would be unable to perform his duty's he should be able to safely land the aircraft.
Why this safety pilot has not intervened I do not know. This might/could be a Cultural problem though.
I don't think it has been established which F/O was in the right seat doing Line Indoctrination training.
Was the jumpseat F/O an experienced "Safety Pilot" or an untrained observer on a familiarization flight?
The "No corrective crew action taken" comment refers to a moment in the approach phase when such an action still could have made a difference.
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Cyberstreak said:
I'm not a professional pilot, but I am a professional software developer. What you say tells me the systems doesn't "talk" to each other.
AT thinks the aircraft has landed (or very close to landing) and closes throttles. AT struggles to stay on glide slope. Glide slope is a slope, hence after just a few seconds the "clever" system should notice there's something wrong. This is what we call a "sanity check".
10-15 seconds after the AT thinks it's on the ground, AP should yell: "Hey, I'm still trying to follow that glide slope!". One on them must be wrong! What to do next?
There is always a chance of a faulty system. Either the AT is wrong, or the AP is wrong. As a software developer I would say the best way to deal with such situations is to assume the AT is wrong. That is, give the AP authorization to override AT and command a TOGA. If the aircraft is on the runway the responsibility lays in the hands to the pilots. If it's not on the ground it would just go around. And that should wake up the sleeping pilots.
I agree that the pilots should monitor and stay alert, but from a software point of view there are improvements to be made. To me it looks pretty simple; use all available sources of altitude info. If they do no agree simply do not allow Autoland. If you can't land manually go to alternative airport. Then you have to fix a faulty rad alt before you can Autoland. The money language would yield a quick fix: Too expensive to go to alternative.
No, it (AP) struggled to stay on the GS until stick shaker & stall. Max thrust then apllied to no avail at the low altitude.
AT thinks the aircraft has landed (or very close to landing) and closes throttles. AT struggles to stay on glide slope. Glide slope is a slope, hence after just a few seconds the "clever" system should notice there's something wrong. This is what we call a "sanity check".
10-15 seconds after the AT thinks it's on the ground, AP should yell: "Hey, I'm still trying to follow that glide slope!". One on them must be wrong! What to do next?
There is always a chance of a faulty system. Either the AT is wrong, or the AP is wrong. As a software developer I would say the best way to deal with such situations is to assume the AT is wrong. That is, give the AP authorization to override AT and command a TOGA. If the aircraft is on the runway the responsibility lays in the hands to the pilots. If it's not on the ground it would just go around. And that should wake up the sleeping pilots.
I agree that the pilots should monitor and stay alert, but from a software point of view there are improvements to be made. To me it looks pretty simple; use all available sources of altitude info. If they do no agree simply do not allow Autoland. If you can't land manually go to alternative airport. Then you have to fix a faulty rad alt before you can Autoland. The money language would yield a quick fix: Too expensive to go to alternative.
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Unnecessary
A minor technical problem caused the airplane to fly away with the three pilots. A completely unnecessary accident. The exact opposite of the Hudson accident....
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Shame no one pressed toga, this would have exited the landing mode and applied reduced g/a power.
I guess they may have been distracted by the radalt failure, plus at 2000ft they may have been reading the landing check list, transferring to tower etc.
Someone should have been monitoring the aircraft, and flare and retard would have been unnunciated on the FMAs with a box round them. This should have been noticed. At this point either they should have disconnected A/P and A/T and manually recovered, or as I said, pressed toga and it would have performed an auto go-around (with or without A/P depending on single or dual channel).
The first action on the stall recovery procedure for a 737 is disconnect A/P and A/T and manually apply full thrust.
I guess they may have been distracted by the radalt failure, plus at 2000ft they may have been reading the landing check list, transferring to tower etc.
Someone should have been monitoring the aircraft, and flare and retard would have been unnunciated on the FMAs with a box round them. This should have been noticed. At this point either they should have disconnected A/P and A/T and manually recovered, or as I said, pressed toga and it would have performed an auto go-around (with or without A/P depending on single or dual channel).
The first action on the stall recovery procedure for a 737 is disconnect A/P and A/T and manually apply full thrust.
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BOAC, when you have finished smoking that link which Dimiair so exquisitely stuck in your pipe, referring back to your very own 2005 thread querying 737 (Classic) single channel autoland, please do return quickly and tell us again if on NG in 2009 it is now a red herring (the question that is, and not what you now have smouldering in your pipe 
).
).
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translation of 3rd and 4th (also last) text page of prelim report
"The weather conditions, in particular the view because of the low cloud base and the fog, have probably contributed to the fact that at the height in which the lowering for approach was started, the Polderbaan was not yet very well visible.
In its investigation the OVV is assisted by the following organisations in order to learn:
Internationally, both by the ICAO and by the European Union, it is stipulated that parties concerned can be part of the investigation by the Board (Partysystem).
However, the Board is leading the investigation and has the responsibility for it.
For its investigation the Board has received many data from the Public Prosecutor.
In addition many police organisations have contributed in terms of content. The Corps of National Police Services (KLPD), in particular all staff of the National team of forensic detection, responsible for forensic investigation at the accident site, the Aviation police amongst others for making all aerial photographs and the National Transport Assistance Team which assisted the Board amongst others with measurings at the accident site.
Also the Public Prosecutor has confiscated/impounded the aircraft, as a result of which the guarding of the aircraft fully laid with the Public Prosecutor.
For that police personnel from all over the country were deployed.
We are very grateful for their outstanding and careful way of working and the guarding of the aircraft.
There has been a difference of opinion about the use of the data from the cockpit (voice recorder and flightdata recorder (black box).
However, according to Dutch law the Public Prosecutor can only have access to these data in case of hostage taking, terrorism, murder or manslaughter.
In such circumstances the Board is legally obliged to hand over these data to the Public Prosecutor.
In principle at the scene of the accident two investigations are ongoing:
Between the two investigations there is a field of tension. In the frame of the criminal investigation one is entitled to remain silent. No one has to contribute to his or her conviction. In the independent investigation one wants to stimulate that everything is said.
For this reason the reports of the Board are not allowed as evidence in legal disputes.
From today onwards the investigation of the Board is focussed on two subjects:
The technical investigation is directed to the functioning of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle system and the coupling with/towards the radio-altimeter. <this is pursued with the same parties involved>.
Next to the technical investigation, the investigation is also focussing on crisis management. How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from that.
In this investigation also attention will be paid to the passenger list.
The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week.
For – possible- further research the aircraft will be transported to another location.
It is the opinion of the Board that extra attention is necessary for the functioning of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the auto throttle. The Board has issued a warning to Boeing in which extra attention is requested for a part of a manual of the Boeing 737, in which it is said that in case the radio altimeter(s) is/are not functioning, the automatic pilot and auto throttles coupled to that can not be used for approach and landing. The Board has suggested Boeing to investigate whether this procedure should also be applied during the (red: other parts of) the flight.
Except for the malfunctioning of the left radio altimeter the investigation team of the Board has until now not found any other (red: technical) anomalities."
In its investigation the OVV is assisted by the following organisations in order to learn:
- The National Transport Safety Board,
- Bureau d'Enquettes et d'Analyse (BEA)
- Aviation Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB)
- Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkish State Aviation Service DGCA)
- Boieing
- Turkish Airlines
- The engine manufacturer, CFM
- The Inspection for Transport (IVW)
- Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, US)
- Dutch Association of Airline Pilots
- Dutch Association of Cabin Crew
Internationally, both by the ICAO and by the European Union, it is stipulated that parties concerned can be part of the investigation by the Board (Partysystem).
However, the Board is leading the investigation and has the responsibility for it.
For its investigation the Board has received many data from the Public Prosecutor.
In addition many police organisations have contributed in terms of content. The Corps of National Police Services (KLPD), in particular all staff of the National team of forensic detection, responsible for forensic investigation at the accident site, the Aviation police amongst others for making all aerial photographs and the National Transport Assistance Team which assisted the Board amongst others with measurings at the accident site.
Also the Public Prosecutor has confiscated/impounded the aircraft, as a result of which the guarding of the aircraft fully laid with the Public Prosecutor.
For that police personnel from all over the country were deployed.
We are very grateful for their outstanding and careful way of working and the guarding of the aircraft.
There has been a difference of opinion about the use of the data from the cockpit (voice recorder and flightdata recorder (black box).
However, according to Dutch law the Public Prosecutor can only have access to these data in case of hostage taking, terrorism, murder or manslaughter.
In such circumstances the Board is legally obliged to hand over these data to the Public Prosecutor.
In principle at the scene of the accident two investigations are ongoing:
- The criminal investigation; the investigation into criminal fact and in relation to that into answering the question of guilt.
- The independent investigation. This investigation is fully focussed on what has happened and to learn lessons from that.
Between the two investigations there is a field of tension. In the frame of the criminal investigation one is entitled to remain silent. No one has to contribute to his or her conviction. In the independent investigation one wants to stimulate that everything is said.
For this reason the reports of the Board are not allowed as evidence in legal disputes.
From today onwards the investigation of the Board is focussed on two subjects:
The technical investigation is directed to the functioning of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle system and the coupling with/towards the radio-altimeter. <this is pursued with the same parties involved>.
Next to the technical investigation, the investigation is also focussing on crisis management. How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from that.
In this investigation also attention will be paid to the passenger list.
The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week.
For – possible- further research the aircraft will be transported to another location.
It is the opinion of the Board that extra attention is necessary for the functioning of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the auto throttle. The Board has issued a warning to Boeing in which extra attention is requested for a part of a manual of the Boeing 737, in which it is said that in case the radio altimeter(s) is/are not functioning, the automatic pilot and auto throttles coupled to that can not be used for approach and landing. The Board has suggested Boeing to investigate whether this procedure should also be applied during the (red: other parts of) the flight.
Except for the malfunctioning of the left radio altimeter the investigation team of the Board has until now not found any other (red: technical) anomalities."
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RADALT Notes
Some notes from the 737ng....if the #1 RADALT receiver/transmitter is inop do not use the associated FCC or autopilot for the approach. This would have allowed the autopilot to capture the LOC/GS if the FO was flying in CMD B. One of the major issues in this crash is a failure of the #1 RADALT you would lose modes 1-4 of the GPWS.
1) Excessive sink rate
2) "terrain..terrain..."
3) Do not sink after climb
4) unsafe altitude while not in the landing configuration.
RADALT failures in the NG can catch you by suprise especially the #2 RADALT failure with the FO flying. You get AutoPilot disengage with the LOC Capture with approach armend. Not applicable in this scenario but it does catch you off guard.
1) Excessive sink rate
2) "terrain..terrain..."
3) Do not sink after climb
4) unsafe altitude while not in the landing configuration.
RADALT failures in the NG can catch you by suprise especially the #2 RADALT failure with the FO flying. You get AutoPilot disengage with the LOC Capture with approach armend. Not applicable in this scenario but it does catch you off guard.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
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S&T - 2005????
I cannot remember last week......you'll have to remind me I'm afraid. I was merely asking Dimi to cease confusing the thread with irrelevancies since there was no involvement in 'single channel autolands' in this crash.
For the sake of repetition - Boeing say ?P2? was flying a s channel ILS with A/T engaged.
Your point was?
Jumpy - I THINK from what I have seen that GPWS WAS working (gear warning?) so I guess the radalt had not 'failed' but simply misread?
I cannot remember last week......you'll have to remind me I'm afraid. I was merely asking Dimi to cease confusing the thread with irrelevancies since there was no involvement in 'single channel autolands' in this crash. For the sake of repetition - Boeing say ?P2? was flying a s channel ILS with A/T engaged.
Your point was?
Jumpy - I THINK from what I have seen that GPWS WAS working (gear warning?) so I guess the radalt had not 'failed' but simply misread?
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What is the advantage of a five point harness for the crew as compared to the two point seat belt as provided for the passengers?
Does the front of the aircraft slow down more rapidly than the portion behind the flight deck door?
Seems to me that the passengers were better protected than the crew in this instance.
Does the front of the aircraft slow down more rapidly than the portion behind the flight deck door?
Seems to me that the passengers were better protected than the crew in this instance.
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Dimi, a few misconceptions from your side: The 737 is fail passive, well, that is partly true, but wrong as well. The NG allows fail operational operation since 2001, you just have to buy it (no idea if THY did that). And true, if the RA1 fails you should not get the RETARD mode, but it seems from the preliminary report that it didn't fail but merely reported the wrong height. A fail i normally shown with a flag and not any height indication unlike in this case where it did show something.
And of course, as has been pointed out several times now, autothrottle RETARD is independend of any autopilot mode and in fact a single channel operation at all times depending on RA1.
And of course, as has been pointed out several times now, autothrottle RETARD is independend of any autopilot mode and in fact a single channel operation at all times depending on RA1.
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I don't think it has been established which F/O was in the right seat doing Line Indoctrination training.
In de cockpit bevonden zich drie personen, de gezagvoerder, die linksvoor zat. Rechts bevond zich de eerste officier voor wie het een trainingsvlucht was.
In the cockpit there were three persons, the captain, left front. On the right the First Officer for whom it was a trainings flight.
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@rubik101 I would argue that the 5 point harness protects the crew better as in the event of a crash landing as they are 'pinned' in position rather than held across the waist so are able to assist with the evacuation, etc.
If they only had a lap belt then they would be subject to the same forces as the pax and may not be able to assist afterwards.
If they only had a lap belt then they would be subject to the same forces as the pax and may not be able to assist afterwards.
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So we now know why the speed decayed however we still don't know why the aircraft stalled.
Why do the investigators state that immeadiate response to stick shaker was "too late"? Why were the crew unable to recover it?
I find it very easy to see how AT going in to Retard mode at 1950ft could be "missed" (platform of ILS 2000ft on 18R at AMS, so thrust lever closing wouldn't be completely unusual as aircraft starts down the slope) however I find it very hard to accept an experienced training captain couldn't recover from a stick shaker.
"From the black box it appears that then the pilots immediately gave gas, full gas, however it was too late to recover," Mr van Vollenhoven went on.
I find it very easy to see how AT going in to Retard mode at 1950ft could be "missed" (platform of ILS 2000ft on 18R at AMS, so thrust lever closing wouldn't be completely unusual as aircraft starts down the slope) however I find it very hard to accept an experienced training captain couldn't recover from a stick shaker.
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Mode 5 of the EGPWS is inhibted below 30'.All GPWS modes feed off RA#1 which was reading -8'.No "Glideslope" warning.Stick-shaker was the only warning that woke them from their loss of SA.
Landing gear horn at 1950' means configuration and checklist completion interrupted monitoring of the approach..No call-outs at 4 dme,1000,500.Profile,speed and ROD all have to be monitored.
Landing gear horn at 1950' means configuration and checklist completion interrupted monitoring of the approach..No call-outs at 4 dme,1000,500.Profile,speed and ROD all have to be monitored.