Go Back  PPRuNe Forums > Flight Deck Forums > Rumours & News
Reload this Page >

Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

Rumours & News Reporting Points that may affect our jobs or lives as professional pilots. Also, items that may be of interest to professional pilots.

Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:24
  #1041 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: malta
Posts: 199
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
@grebllaw123d

Well, if the RA showed -8, it is not failed (as far as the system goes), therefore the AP will not disconnect.. (I think)
the_stranger is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:24
  #1042 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: Belgium
Age: 63
Posts: 72
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
cover page press release translation from Dutch

"Investigation Board warns Boeing for possible faults in radio-altimeter of Boeing 737-800

The Safety investigation board has warned aircraft manufacturer Boeing as a result of the first findings in the investigation of the Boeing 737-800 that crashed on 25 February 2009 shortly before landing on the polderbaan (red RWY 18R) of Schiphol airport. Because of a malfunctioning radio-altimeter the auto throttle, as part of the automatic pilot, received faulty signals. The president of the investigation board, prof.mr. Pieter Van Vollenhove, said on Wednesday afternoon that, while the aircraft was still flying at a an altitude of 1950 feet, de radio-altimeter indicated a height of minus 8 feet, so that the auto throttle retarded and also for the rest set the configuration as if the aircraft was positioned only a few meters above the runway. When the crew of the Turkish Airlines aircraft noticed what was happening, it was too late to effectively intervene.

Boeing has indicated that a warning will be sent to all operators of this type of aircraft, to alert them to this possible risk."
Dutch Bru is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:29
  #1043 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Cloudbase
Posts: 149
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
SR71

I aggree re he man/machine interface.

And re redundancy and failure detection: if you can't decide from two, you need three. Some digital instruments are smart enough to figure out when they're wrong (and the radalt seemed to have signalled just that, no?) in some other cases, you have a redundancy of three (like the airspeed indicators in the Birgenair case. Two on the main screens, one steam gauge somewhere else).

But that isn't my point really. The point is that, and you said it right: things fail, but they must either fail towards a safe mode or, if they fail to manual intervention, they must announce that completely unmistakeable.

The thing that I find shocking here is: surely the PF was required to have his hand on the throttles. If he had, he would have been fully aware of them going to idle, no?
SoaringTheSkies is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:30
  #1044 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: southwest
Age: 78
Posts: 287
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Dutch Bru

Could you please clarify where the "trainee" was sitting? It's in the Dutch report but I'm not going to guess what it says. Thanks.
Dysag is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:32
  #1045 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Europe, Africa
Posts: 78
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
of course we know it was a dual coupled approach and so 'autoland' ready.
The aircraft I fly will always go into DUAL mode when passing 1200 ft RA.
D-OCHO is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:32
  #1046 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Benelux
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
If it wasn't there wouldn't be a 'retard and flare' capability (which is an auto land function only).
How do you know? I can't find it in the books, nor have I ever had the A/P engaged below 50 feet on a single channel approach. (SOP, Boeing limitation)
Navigator33 is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:33
  #1047 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2002
Location: Zone of Alienation
Age: 79
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Looks like Boeing is understandably upset with this crash. They're going to get sued yet the culprit are training and cultural problems. Stunning lack of airmanship here... "Welcome to the World of Turkish Airlines"
FIRESYSOK is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:39
  #1048 (permalink)  
Guest
 
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: In the shadow of R101
Posts: 259
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Can any radalt ever correctly indicate -8 feet? I would expect it to read 0ft with wheels on the ground, so a negative reading implies an error if not a detected failure.
Feathers McGraw is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:40
  #1049 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Benelux
Posts: 111
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
No it actually reads -2 when on ground.
Because this way the RA will read 0 with a positive pitch attitude at touchdown.
Navigator33 is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:43
  #1050 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: I wouldn't know.
Posts: 4,497
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
If it wasn't there wouldn't be a 'retard and flare' capability (which is an auto land function only).
Retard is an speed mode only and has nothing to do with autopilot nor automatic landing (which is actually possible single channel, just not approved). You will see the FMA announce RETARD even on manual landings.

According to the Boeing bulleting posted above it was not a dual coupled approach but a normal single autopilot approach flown on Autopilot B.
Denti is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:43
  #1051 (permalink)  
Guest
 
Join Date: Nov 1999
Location: In the shadow of R101
Posts: 259
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
OK, thanks for that.

Is there any kind of cross checking between radar altitude and pressure altitude? That would provide a way of knowing which of a pair of disagreeing radalts was correct.
Feathers McGraw is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:43
  #1052 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jul 2004
Location: Found in Toronto
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by EmeraldEire
From reading the last few posts I believe this was a simulated CATIII autoland, more than likely required for the new trainee so as to have the observer (possible safety pilot) released.
Nowhere is it said they were doing a CatIII Autoland.


CatIII Autoland training is done in the simulator, not on the line.


I believe the "Trainee" occupying the right seat was fully qualified after initial Simulator Training and was probably doing "Line Training" to complete his qualification. Or it may have been Annual Recurrent Line training.

The pilot in the jumpseat appears to have been un-qualified on this type and was only observing for educational purposes.
Lost in Saigon is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:43
  #1053 (permalink)  
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
 
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Dimiair - you'd better get in touch with Boeing to correct their MOM. PS Flare and retard are individual functions. Try leaving the A/T in to touchdown on a single channel/?visual? sometime.

FM - RadAlt normally indicates about -4 on the ground.
BOAC is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:44
  #1054 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2000
Location: Somewhere in Europe
Posts: 47
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
This all goes back to basic IFR-flying. Keep your hands on the throttle and look at your instruments Thatīs the danger of full automation and of airlines who wants their pilots to fly on autopilot until the end...

Itīs incredible that they didnīt notice the idle thrust for 100 sec and didnīt see that the speed was dropping to 40kts below the approach speed.. What were they doing??

According to the Turkish newspapers the pilots were heroes...
EXCIN is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:44
  #1055 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Denmark
Age: 79
Posts: 158
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
the_stranger, RA fail?

You have a good point - just misreading but NO FAIL flag.

So, flying on Autopilot B, suppose the right, on LOC and GS until stick shaker with the throttle retarded due to inputs from the misreading left radio altimeter.

brgds
grebllaw123d is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:45
  #1056 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Belgium
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Dysag:

Literal translation:

In the cockpit 3 people were present, the captain, seated left front. To his right was seated the F/O for whom this was a training flight. (The F/O held all licenses/qualifications) Another extra F/O was seated in the middle of the cockpit.
Xalio is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:46
  #1057 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Europe, Africa
Posts: 78
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Some will use this accident to defend, with renewed vigour, the elimination of pilots from the flightdeck.
Automation caused the accident.
The only problem here was that the pilots did not in time figure out that it happened.

This is almost a copy of the 29th of December 1972, Eastern Airlines flight 401 accident in Miami. Two pilots and a flight engineer trying to fix a bulb and the aircraft parking itself in the Everglades.
D-OCHO is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:49
  #1058 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: In my head
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Originally Posted by captplaystation
... along with 3 asses that didn't feel the change in body angle required to stay on the glidepath.
Oh c'mon captain, we know you fly this exact kit, but in IMC and high workload, when did flying by the seat of your pants creep back as a requirement in commercial aviation??
slip and turn is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:50
  #1059 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Thirty West
Posts: 47
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes on 0 Posts
Just for clarification:

Many where asking why the AT was doing the Autoland command sequence, while the AP was still tracking the glideslope and not going into FLARE (unannouced in FMA on a single channel approach)

We see here that AT was used in conjunction with AP/B on a single channel approach.

AP/B takes it's radar altitude from LRRA B, that worked fine.
AT takes RA only from LRRA A, regardless which Autopilot is enganged.
Even during a dual channel approach only LRRA 1 supplies data to the AT, that is because AT is a single channel system.

Anyhow... this was a major f**kup by the crew, sorry to say so...
cirr737 is offline  
Old 4th Mar 2009, 13:50
  #1060 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: Planet Earth, mostly
Posts: 467
Received 6 Likes on 3 Posts
yet the culprit are training and cultural problems.
What "cultural problem" are you referring to?
etrang is offline  

Thread Tools
Search this Thread

Contact Us - Archive - Advertising - Cookie Policy - Privacy Statement - Terms of Service

Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.