PTH:
Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride...that is what flying is all about.
So, if I understand your post correctly then, you set aside flight safety work such as FOQA, ASRs etc as "academic research" to be placed in opposition to "dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride" with the latter favoured over the former, and that is what flying is all about?
What part of FOQA does not deal with these very elements and facts? Are you suggesting that "research" does not accomodate or acknowledge these factors?
The approach I discuss is part of the very processes you describe. I fully concur with acknowledging the very real human factors issues and operational problems of running an airiine at a profit. None of this precludes the factors which you highlight but the obvious problem, as we see here, is there remain many who don't understand this important aspect of airline work yet.
Saying: we fired a guy for flying cowboy like without a good reason...is it worth it? Now that gets someone's attention.
Interesting solution for, "Dealing with real people with real emotions, problems and pride..."
Thanks for the discussion.
Air Rabbit;
as such, isn’t it time we changed the regulatory requirements?
Yes, and not as a result of kicking tin as the recent FAA changes are responding to. Changing legislation is very difficult, demanding and time-consuming given special interests focussed solely on short-term cost-savings and quartery profit statements.
but you know what they say about a small amount of “leven”…
Yep. Wise statement. Re familiarity with FOQA, sorry, don't mean to ever "preach" - just unfamiliar with others' familiarity with the program.
Re the outliers and the "possibly-intentionals" - there are a number of solutions which address the issues which arise and I'm sure you're familiar with them. One is, the pilot safety representatives deal with such matters and have the power to intervene with training, displacement or whatever is required to address the event(s) in question. The ASR program is not seen as a get-out-of-jail card and even if there is an element of such, that is the price paid for greater knowledge and awareness. At some point the buck stops with the pilot however and if an event is serious enough to warrant a safety investigation, these kinds of questions enter the arena.
If actions are truly errant and well outside SOPs, then truly we are dealing with other human issues than just straight competency or operational flight safety issues and that requires a different approach. In an enlightened program, that requires processes employed with employee/pilot health programs which deal with broader issues. Again, extremely rare but not non-existent.
Again, the FAA document regarding ferry flights is instructive: If the data reveals that a pilot (rather, a crew) were "fooling around with the airplane", what then? Is straight firing the solution? I would submit to those who think so that 1) they haven't been involved in such cases on a first-hand basis, and 2) they aren't aware of, or don't believe in, the success rate of any interventionary processes designed to handle such matters. If we wish to be specific, dealing with alcohol abuse or serious but undetected illnesses are two clear examples where abberant behaviours have occurred but firing isn't the answer.
As we know, it's not black and white.