Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: Sweden
Age: 77
Posts: 37
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ditching
I didn't include the JAL DC8 at SFO simply because I don't believe that they knew that they were ditching in the bay.
I think you're refering to the SAS DC8 with all three crewmembers investigating
a stuck nosegear during approach to LAX.
I think you're refering to the SAS DC8 with all three crewmembers investigating
a stuck nosegear during approach to LAX.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: USA
Age: 60
Posts: 30
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
hmmm....interesting...
I find it somewhat ironic that many of our standard airline op type posters are suspiciously quiet on this thread.
Many many threads dealing with the possibility of a dual engine failure were responded to in kind with responses like....'never happen' 'so rare as to not think about'....of course that crowd is of the feeling that holding V2 and some prescribed deck angle is thier only option...vs high speed aborts, ditchings, aborting into the weeds at the end of the runway....
Well this should give them something to think about...sometimes, oh my gosh....planes don't want to fly, no matter what your airspeed indicator says.
I will say this...the capt, he made a decision, and everyone walked away...and while not in my opinion, parking a plane in the middle of the river is the pinnacle of pilot skill, it's much better then those guys that would have continued on the departure, while going down...put it into some buildings, ect....with both engines out, he made the right decision.
Now how both engines came to flame out to begin with...is another story...
Many many threads dealing with the possibility of a dual engine failure were responded to in kind with responses like....'never happen' 'so rare as to not think about'....of course that crowd is of the feeling that holding V2 and some prescribed deck angle is thier only option...vs high speed aborts, ditchings, aborting into the weeds at the end of the runway....
Well this should give them something to think about...sometimes, oh my gosh....planes don't want to fly, no matter what your airspeed indicator says.
I will say this...the capt, he made a decision, and everyone walked away...and while not in my opinion, parking a plane in the middle of the river is the pinnacle of pilot skill, it's much better then those guys that would have continued on the departure, while going down...put it into some buildings, ect....with both engines out, he made the right decision.
Now how both engines came to flame out to begin with...is another story...
Join Date: Nov 2006
Location: SoCalif
Posts: 896
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Water Runway
Ditching on the Hudson leaves a lot more leeway in energy management than landing almost anywhere else in the state New York. It gives you a runway hundreds or thousands of feet wide and miles long. It's just the touchdown that's really tricky, huh? Compared to attempting a landing deadstick at an airport or on a levee, it leaves lots more accommodation of variables that might occur on the way down, such as flap/slat deployment. It certainly had to be the correct decision in this instance.
Fact as reported: Flight crew did not hit the ditch switch.
Fact as reported: FA did not know they were ditching until they were on the water.
Those are lessons learned, to be added to training curriculum, no doubt, and possibly addition of circuitry to the Ditch Switch, to automatically warn CC of impending ditching. Or, seeing the belly damage, they might just do away with the Ditch Switch.
GB
Fact as reported: Flight crew did not hit the ditch switch.
Fact as reported: FA did not know they were ditching until they were on the water.
Those are lessons learned, to be added to training curriculum, no doubt, and possibly addition of circuitry to the Ditch Switch, to automatically warn CC of impending ditching. Or, seeing the belly damage, they might just do away with the Ditch Switch.
GB
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: London
Age: 64
Posts: 118
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: No one's home...
Posts: 416
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Greybeard said
The ditching checklist is a full page and designed for a planned ditching, not something evolving from a dual engine failure at low altitude.
Second, the USAir procedures recommend that the Capt go to the checklist and the F/O fly the airplane using the autopilot. In this circumstance, the Capt took the airplane and worked on finding a suitable place to put it down while the F/O worked on the engine relight checklist.
And yes, there was apparently no time to tell the FAs it would be a ditching but the time line suggests it was about three minutes from bird strike to touchdown, little time to do little other than 1) fly and 2) try to relight the engines.
Still, this is an example of a team effort. The FAs are all senior and experienced and this was the last leg of a 4 day trip. The group of individuals had become a functioning team and although comm was not perfect, it didn't have to be. Preferred? Yes. Required? No.
If you have been in and out of KLGA and KTEB you will know that they sit amid densely populated areas, runways are only 7000ft long and at LGA 3 runways end near or going into the water. You have one shot at getting it down, on the runway and stopped and it is not a good one.. thus the Hudson.
No doubt by now some -320 sim team has duplicated this and tried to make it into LGA or TEB. Like post United 232 simulations, I doubt most initial efforts were successful. I could be wrong.
Serious errors, apparently: reportedly the PNF had not selected the Ditch switch, nor notified the cabin crew of ditching.
Second, the USAir procedures recommend that the Capt go to the checklist and the F/O fly the airplane using the autopilot. In this circumstance, the Capt took the airplane and worked on finding a suitable place to put it down while the F/O worked on the engine relight checklist.
And yes, there was apparently no time to tell the FAs it would be a ditching but the time line suggests it was about three minutes from bird strike to touchdown, little time to do little other than 1) fly and 2) try to relight the engines.
Still, this is an example of a team effort. The FAs are all senior and experienced and this was the last leg of a 4 day trip. The group of individuals had become a functioning team and although comm was not perfect, it didn't have to be. Preferred? Yes. Required? No.
If you have been in and out of KLGA and KTEB you will know that they sit amid densely populated areas, runways are only 7000ft long and at LGA 3 runways end near or going into the water. You have one shot at getting it down, on the runway and stopped and it is not a good one.. thus the Hudson.
No doubt by now some -320 sim team has duplicated this and tried to make it into LGA or TEB. Like post United 232 simulations, I doubt most initial efforts were successful. I could be wrong.
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: No one's home...
Posts: 416
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NNCO said
Fly the airplane first and try to get the engines started.
In this case, the Capt resorted to the old maxim 'fly the airplane'. From what I have read, the F/O worked on the engine restart checklist. The ditching checklist is designed for a planned ditching, not for this type of event.
Second, no one listens to the pre-takeoff briefing, especially the part about the life jackets and even less so when departing from inland cities such as LGA or CLT. One can imagine that at least for the next few weeks, anyone with a sense of geography will study the cards a bit more when departing cities near large bodies of water (lakes, gulf, etc) or rivers.
For A320 Crew - Would you have worked your way through the ENG DUAL FAILURE (fuel remaining) checklist or would you switch/jump at some point to the DITCHING procedure.
In this case, the Capt resorted to the old maxim 'fly the airplane'. From what I have read, the F/O worked on the engine restart checklist. The ditching checklist is designed for a planned ditching, not for this type of event.
Second, no one listens to the pre-takeoff briefing, especially the part about the life jackets and even less so when departing from inland cities such as LGA or CLT. One can imagine that at least for the next few weeks, anyone with a sense of geography will study the cards a bit more when departing cities near large bodies of water (lakes, gulf, etc) or rivers.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Sonoma, CA, USA
Age: 79
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jal Dc-8
I was there also. I was flying freight in DC-3s out of SFO to LAX, PHX, SLC, PDX and SEA. It was a strange site seeing the DC-8 sitting in the water while I was flying approaches to the 28s at SFO.
I don't know if it's just a rumor, but a story was going around that the FO was aware of the situation but didn't tell the Captain that he was low because he didn't want the Captain to lose face.
I believe the Captain committed suicide.
I don't know if it's just a rumor, but a story was going around that the FO was aware of the situation but didn't tell the Captain that he was low because he didn't want the Captain to lose face.
I believe the Captain committed suicide.
Last edited by Robert Campbell; 19th Jan 2009 at 19:42. Reason: Spelling
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: No one's home...
Posts: 416
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Southern 242 accident was, like all other accidents, unique. The crew penetrated what they thought was the area with least activity when in fact it was the area of the MOST activity in the line of thunderstorms. The initial penetration smashed the cockpit windows and filled the intakes with hail. When the throttles were moved reportedly the engines were immediately burned out. The crew advised ATC of their problem and ATC, not fully understanding the problem, gave them a frequency change. During this time the crew made a few turns and eventually tried to land on a road. As noted, they clipped a few telephone poles and the aircraft broke up with fatalities. The airports mentioned, Dobbins AFB was out of range and Cartersville is a gen av airport with runways too short for a -9.
On a second point, much is being made of the glider. The USAir Capt has his glider rating and so do I but every pilot is somewhat experienced in gliding when they pull the throttle to idle and descend. You maintain speed with pitch when there is fixed (or lack of) thrust. The main thing is to not get distracted with procedures and fly the airplane which this Capt did. Again, an extraordinary feat by the entire crew.
On a second point, much is being made of the glider. The USAir Capt has his glider rating and so do I but every pilot is somewhat experienced in gliding when they pull the throttle to idle and descend. You maintain speed with pitch when there is fixed (or lack of) thrust. The main thing is to not get distracted with procedures and fly the airplane which this Capt did. Again, an extraordinary feat by the entire crew.
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: No one's home...
Posts: 416
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The JAL DC-8 Captain confused the command bars which were in a pitch mode with a capture mode on the ILS. He flew a stabilzed approach into the water.
National airlines had a 727 which went into Pensacola Bay, unplanned.
National airlines had a 727 which went into Pensacola Bay, unplanned.
Join Date: Oct 2008
Location: NY
Posts: 38
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
No Harryman, you would be incorrect.
I believe the A-320 in question was an EOW (extended overwater) ship. In which case it met the requirements of 121.339.
I think it was mentioned earlier that this ship had the detachable slide/rafts which meet the requirements of the above mentioned FAR.
I believe the A-320 in question was an EOW (extended overwater) ship. In which case it met the requirements of 121.339.
I think it was mentioned earlier that this ship had the detachable slide/rafts which meet the requirements of the above mentioned FAR.
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: MI
Posts: 570
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
'airfoilmod'
"JAL DC8 is correct, was there, saw it."
There's a case where the aircraft (after a ditching) returned to service. I've flown it! It was a one-of-a-kind in our fleet as it had the modified glareshield. We called it the "Rice Rocket".
"JAL DC8 is correct, was there, saw it."
There's a case where the aircraft (after a ditching) returned to service. I've flown it! It was a one-of-a-kind in our fleet as it had the modified glareshield. We called it the "Rice Rocket".
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: California
Age: 61
Posts: 255
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Another point, the flight was AWE1549. Note that AWE is the American West 'Cactus' callsign, rather than USA 'US AIR.'
The company, based in the Phoenix, Arizona area, within the past several months ordered all crews (USA and AWE) crews to use the Cactus call sign, not just the AWE crews. I guess that's part of the multi-year merging process.
But, this lead to HUGE confusion amongst air traffic controllers. They asked that if the USA crewed flights were going to use the Cactus call sign, that they also use the AWE identifier on their flight plans.
I doubt that Capt Sully ever has flown for the former AWE, since he flew for PSA, which was bought by USA in the 1980's. Same for the other crew members who came from Allegheny and Piedmont. I think the FO was the only crew member potentially hired directly by USA.
None of the crew members appear to have ever served as America West crew members.
With regards to the CC. While there was no announcement of ditching, they certainly were aware of the situation and their surroundings. One stopped a passenger from opening the aft door, for instance. One was injured, but the evac went well and quickly-a real kudo for a situationally aware team.
Reading the NY blogs, apparently a number of pax refused to leave without carry-on bags. Some are seen on the wing with baggage. One lady refused to leave without her bags then blocked the exit with the bags after falling the water-those inside threw the bags over. She was pulled into a "raft". One wonders how well it would have worked had pax played by the rules.
With ditching switches relatively new and the F/O just out of of IOE, I suspect he didn't even think of it or get to the checklist.
GF
Reading the NY blogs, apparently a number of pax refused to leave without carry-on bags. Some are seen on the wing with baggage. One lady refused to leave without her bags then blocked the exit with the bags after falling the water-those inside threw the bags over. She was pulled into a "raft". One wonders how well it would have worked had pax played by the rules.
With ditching switches relatively new and the F/O just out of of IOE, I suspect he didn't even think of it or get to the checklist.
GF
wileydog
Just a minor correction but indeed a lesson learned.
When the throttles were moved the engines began to surge. Without any abatement to the throttles the surging continued until the compressor baldes failed on one engine after the other "we got the other engine going too damn it". It is presumed that continued restart attempts with no compressor led to completely burned out turbines. But the real lesson learned about the engines was to throttle back just out of the engine stalling bucket and cross your fingers that you can keep it in the air that way.
The Southern 242 accident was, like all other accidents, unique. The crew penetrated what they thought was the area with least activity when in fact it was the area of the MOST activity in the line of thunderstorms. The initial penetration smashed the cockpit windows and filled the intakes with hail. When the throttles were moved reportedly the engines were immediately burned out.
When the throttles were moved the engines began to surge. Without any abatement to the throttles the surging continued until the compressor baldes failed on one engine after the other "we got the other engine going too damn it". It is presumed that continued restart attempts with no compressor led to completely burned out turbines. But the real lesson learned about the engines was to throttle back just out of the engine stalling bucket and cross your fingers that you can keep it in the air that way.
Join Date: Nov 2007
Location: California
Age: 61
Posts: 255
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Even answering ATC if they can't help you is a waste of time in an emergency. Notice on the transcripts ATC did not ask for those annoying reports on souls on board, fuel, etc, but left them alone to deal with the ditching, probably required if you declared an emergency, or Mayday for the brits.
Mayday is the correct call worldwide. ICAO.
And if ATC did not ask for souls, fuel, etc, then they will no doubt be given a tongue lashing by some brain dead FAA manager who would sh*t his drawers if a bird hit his office window.
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: US
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
courtney (post 842) - You think it's stupid to believe an airline can glide 9 nm miles from 3000'?
Map out the distance flown from engine failure to landing. Without knowing the exact touchdown point and flight path, but reasonable estimates available from flightracking websites and photos, it looks like they flew almost exactly 9 n.m.
Peak altitude was 3400', glide distance about 10.5 st. miles. Sorry, but "9 miles from 3000' " is a fine estimate.
Map out the distance flown from engine failure to landing. Without knowing the exact touchdown point and flight path, but reasonable estimates available from flightracking websites and photos, it looks like they flew almost exactly 9 n.m.
Peak altitude was 3400', glide distance about 10.5 st. miles. Sorry, but "9 miles from 3000' " is a fine estimate.
Join Date: Dec 2005
Location: At home
Posts: 244
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fact as reported: Flight crew did not hit the ditch switch.
Fact as reported: FA did not know they were ditching until they were on the water.
Fact as reported: FA did not know they were ditching until they were on the water.
More generally the learnings from this accident are IMO that passenger evacuation procedures never play out exactly as designed because, generally, no passenger has previous training or experience. I.e. there will always be those people going the wrong way and who do not listen to or react to commands from anyone. The challenge when designing future emergency procedures is to be able to handle also these "disturbances" and still ensure everyone survives.
It will be interesting to hear how real accident experts will judge the outcome of this emergency situation. Obviously it's an excellent benchmark of an accident where everyone survived despite some, let's say minor, imperfections in the execution of the evacuation procedures. The next challenge will be to see what can be done to achieve the same survivability also in more challenging external circumstances than was the case on the Hudson river.
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: USA
Posts: 3
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Garuda 737-300
On Jan. 16, 2002 a Garuda 737-300 made a successful ditching in the Benjawang Solo River after suffering a double flame-out in a cloudburst. Unfortunately there was a fatality - a flight attendent drowned during evacuation.
Apparently the current prevalent airliner configuration - low wing with large diameter engines on pylons under the wing - is capable of controlled ditchings, at least in moderate wave conditions.
Chinookflyer
Apparently the current prevalent airliner configuration - low wing with large diameter engines on pylons under the wing - is capable of controlled ditchings, at least in moderate wave conditions.
Chinookflyer