Three airlines drop self-reporting safety program
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Three airlines drop self-reporting safety program
By Alan Levin, USA TODAY
Three large airlines have abandoned a safety program credited with helping to lower accident rates, prompting criticism of the airlines and unions by safety advocates and government regulators.
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Comair have dropped programs that encourage pilots to come forward and report their own mistakes without fear of being punished. Known as the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), the program has helped airlines and regulators uncover scores of potentially dangerous situations and make fixes before they caused crashes.
ASAP depends on a consensus among pilot unions, airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), any of which can halt the agreement by refusing to participate.
Union leaders have charged that airlines have gone back on their word and unfairly punished pilots who voluntarily disclosed problems.
The airlines insist that they have treated employees fairly.
Several leading safety experts and the FAA's acting chief criticized the companies and unions in recent days, accusing the two sides of letting politics and bargaining get in the way of safety.
"There are at least two sides to every story, but I couldn't care less about either," said Bill Voss, president of the Flight Safety Foundation.
"Safety systems do not belong on the bargaining table. There is simply no excuse."
FAA acting Administrator Bobby Sturgell called the breakdown "disheartening," in a speech last week.
National Transportation Safety Board member Robert Sumwalt said the shutdowns represent a troubling trend. "The relevant players need to do whatever is necessary to ensure that these programs remain active and vital safety tools," Sumwalt said.
American, the first carrier to start ASAP 14 years ago, suspended its program in October after talks with the Allied Pilots Association (APA) broke down.
APA's safety chief, Mike Michaelis, said the program broke down because of a lack of trust. Capt. Billy Nolen, American's flight safety manager, said the company wants to renew a program that has operated for years.
Delta halted its program in November 2006 over disagreements with the Air Line Pilots Association.
Comair, whose pilots are represented by the same union, suspended its ASAP last October.
As unions charge “that the airlines have gone back on their word and unfairly punished pilots who voluntarily disclosed problems”, this does not bode well for the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), or Safety Management Systems. I feel that in order for Safety Management Systems (ICAO implementation) to work, it is essential that effective whistleblower protections are in place.
Thoughts, anyone? How do you make whistleblower protection work?
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dch2 widow...interesting name...I hope it doesn't mean what I think it means.
anyway.
What we are seeing is the true commercialization of flying...with disregard to safety.
either do things right, or battle out pilots vs. management.
its all bull****.
anyway.
What we are seeing is the true commercialization of flying...with disregard to safety.
either do things right, or battle out pilots vs. management.
its all bull****.
I get the impression here at the bottom of the world, that our airlines are run by people who don't fully understand how safety works within aviation. It seems to me that the management teams don't have enough (any) time at the coal face to understand how their policies often reduce safety. Does it feel like that up north?
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I suspect those airlines have refused to update the ASAP Memorandum of Understanding to the new template, just like our mismanagement. They want to keep the "hammer" to punish pilots who properly use the program. As a result, our ASAP stopped after the trial phase.
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What we are seeing is the true commercialization of flying...with disregard to safety.
Self-regulation worked well in the financial services industry, didn't it?
The intent of SMS and the self-reporting is good. But there will always be the commercial and punitive factors to deal with in any voluntary reporting.
There has to be an independent 3rd party or some type of ombudsman to run this type of program. I'd suggest expanding the NASA program. Make the program managers responsible for delivering the info on each carrier to airline management on a monthly basis...in a non-punitive manner, in keeping with the spirit of these efforts. That removes the intercompany squabbles between pilots and management. But it does nothing to enhance safety, except provide information. No pro-active "self-correction" in place. A truly "enlightened" management may actually do something.
Ensuring that something gets done has to come from the FAA exercising its oversight duties. I'm sure they're quite happy with this type of chaos as they can place the blame for failures on inter-company squabbling, not lax oversight.
tbavprof;
I've posted elsewhere on PPRuNe on that very topic.
What executive(s) of financial institutions is/are in jail or even under suspicion over the recent financial collapse? Nobody. They're lined up at the Christmas bonus trough and will be lining up again at the "performance bonus" trough.
What we are seeing, although the term is now being disputed by those interested in promoting SMS for reasons other than flight safety, is the "deregulation of flight safety", under the heading of "neoliberal" economic principles (google the term) - the privatization of everything under the sun and the accountability of no one in management or the executive, (because even under SMS, no executive is going to be found "accountable" - it will be the crew who is criminally charged and historical safety data whose collection is mandated under SMS will be used against that crew) - just watch what's coming.
We are going to see the rapidly-descending graph line representing all fatal accidents from 1950 to the present, begin to rise over the next decade because of these foolish and risky industrial and legal decisions, and the executives and politicians who started this process are going to walk while blame for accidents once again returns to the cockpit so that the crew, if they survive at all, will be criminally prosecuted instead of executives who chose to ignore SMS because, when no one is watching, they could.
I have seen this happen already in a serious incident when the aircraft was simply re-dispatched and the downloaded flight safety program data ignored. Our protestations were similarly ignored.
SMS will work only if it has strong oversight by the regulator and not just of the audit process - otherwise, "profit", shareholder value and shareprice, especially these days, rules all behaviours and corporate decision-making. It is no more complicated than that. With safety programs dumped, the airline returns itself to a happy state of being able to live, and claim to be living, in willful ignorance of what their airplanes and crews are doing on a daily basis. That in itself is, in my view, criminal but that's why I'm not a lawyer.
Bill Voss is completely right in his comments but is fighting a tremendous tide against spending and/or supporting those departments within private corporations, the Flight Safety Departments and the Safety Reporting System, that aren't "profit centers", to use the business term.
As this kind of thinking takes hold throughout the industry, until the stupidity and recklessness of this response is realized, it will be increasingly up to commanders to exercise their legal authority to mind the store even more carefully and where necessary aggressively defend their operation against commercial priorities and pressures. The commander is always in charge, but the airline must make money so that everyone has a job. That said, commanders must know when they must set the park brake to achieve that which is required for safe flight. I've done it and it works very effectively because no department wants the blame for a delay.
That kind of exercising of command authority, to be effective and respected, must be extremely rare. Further, it has to be reasonable and it has to be by the book. Most airline ops are non-events and accomplished without untoward delay.
But when the shxt hits the fan and it's all coming apart and tough decisions must be made, they must be made from the cockpit because everyone else is eventually leaving their comfortable desk and is going home to a warm bed while you're still on the ramp dealing with a technical or de-icing or?... procedure before departing.
There is only one person who is going to end up in the oak chair answering questions from the prosecution if something goes south and you are one of the survivors, and it won't be an airline executive. Sadly, there are very few justices around anymore with the courage, patience and prescience of a Virgil Moshansky.
Self-regulation worked well in the financial services industry, didn't it?
What executive(s) of financial institutions is/are in jail or even under suspicion over the recent financial collapse? Nobody. They're lined up at the Christmas bonus trough and will be lining up again at the "performance bonus" trough.
What we are seeing, although the term is now being disputed by those interested in promoting SMS for reasons other than flight safety, is the "deregulation of flight safety", under the heading of "neoliberal" economic principles (google the term) - the privatization of everything under the sun and the accountability of no one in management or the executive, (because even under SMS, no executive is going to be found "accountable" - it will be the crew who is criminally charged and historical safety data whose collection is mandated under SMS will be used against that crew) - just watch what's coming.
We are going to see the rapidly-descending graph line representing all fatal accidents from 1950 to the present, begin to rise over the next decade because of these foolish and risky industrial and legal decisions, and the executives and politicians who started this process are going to walk while blame for accidents once again returns to the cockpit so that the crew, if they survive at all, will be criminally prosecuted instead of executives who chose to ignore SMS because, when no one is watching, they could.
I have seen this happen already in a serious incident when the aircraft was simply re-dispatched and the downloaded flight safety program data ignored. Our protestations were similarly ignored.
SMS will work only if it has strong oversight by the regulator and not just of the audit process - otherwise, "profit", shareholder value and shareprice, especially these days, rules all behaviours and corporate decision-making. It is no more complicated than that. With safety programs dumped, the airline returns itself to a happy state of being able to live, and claim to be living, in willful ignorance of what their airplanes and crews are doing on a daily basis. That in itself is, in my view, criminal but that's why I'm not a lawyer.
Bill Voss is completely right in his comments but is fighting a tremendous tide against spending and/or supporting those departments within private corporations, the Flight Safety Departments and the Safety Reporting System, that aren't "profit centers", to use the business term.
As this kind of thinking takes hold throughout the industry, until the stupidity and recklessness of this response is realized, it will be increasingly up to commanders to exercise their legal authority to mind the store even more carefully and where necessary aggressively defend their operation against commercial priorities and pressures. The commander is always in charge, but the airline must make money so that everyone has a job. That said, commanders must know when they must set the park brake to achieve that which is required for safe flight. I've done it and it works very effectively because no department wants the blame for a delay.
That kind of exercising of command authority, to be effective and respected, must be extremely rare. Further, it has to be reasonable and it has to be by the book. Most airline ops are non-events and accomplished without untoward delay.
But when the shxt hits the fan and it's all coming apart and tough decisions must be made, they must be made from the cockpit because everyone else is eventually leaving their comfortable desk and is going home to a warm bed while you're still on the ramp dealing with a technical or de-icing or?... procedure before departing.
There is only one person who is going to end up in the oak chair answering questions from the prosecution if something goes south and you are one of the survivors, and it won't be an airline executive. Sadly, there are very few justices around anymore with the courage, patience and prescience of a Virgil Moshansky.
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Mutual trust and respect
Safety culture is not at all just about investment of money. There is an enormous personal investment required.
None of these VOLUNTARY programs will work without mutual trust and respect between the parties; associations and managements, and indeed the regulatory authority. Many companies say they have an SMS on property, but they pay it lip service; a true "just culture" is in part founded on mutual trust and respect, and in part involves non-punitive safety programs, unless of course the intentional disregard for safety clauses apply.
It is hopeless if one division of a company wants you to come forward and tell it all, while another one is sitting waiting to clobber you.
None of these VOLUNTARY programs will work without mutual trust and respect between the parties; associations and managements, and indeed the regulatory authority. Many companies say they have an SMS on property, but they pay it lip service; a true "just culture" is in part founded on mutual trust and respect, and in part involves non-punitive safety programs, unless of course the intentional disregard for safety clauses apply.
It is hopeless if one division of a company wants you to come forward and tell it all, while another one is sitting waiting to clobber you.
Mutual trust and respect
So here we are wringing our hands and slapping our foreheads about this situation, yet in spite of the headlines the real issues haven't surfaced.
If this is about non-punitive voluntary disclosures then the FAA should stay out of it since they have to uphold an implied responsibility to the public in open.
If this is about identifying causal factors and solutions is it then not entirely in the realm of the safety office for the airlines and the people who share lessons between airlines?
I'll admit that it can be somewhat subjective in judging "intentional disregard for safety clauses" but if this judgement is made at the initial airline safety office and sticks 90% of the time, why can't this program work?
I presume that it did work for some time (I've seen the results) but what now has derailed it?
I don't like white wash words like "lack of trust" for an explanation because that implies somebody is hiding behind weasel words and we need to get this out in the open or the public is going to lose confidence pretty damn quick since it's all over the news.
If this is about non-punitive voluntary disclosures then the FAA should stay out of it since they have to uphold an implied responsibility to the public in open.
If this is about identifying causal factors and solutions is it then not entirely in the realm of the safety office for the airlines and the people who share lessons between airlines?
I'll admit that it can be somewhat subjective in judging "intentional disregard for safety clauses" but if this judgement is made at the initial airline safety office and sticks 90% of the time, why can't this program work?
I presume that it did work for some time (I've seen the results) but what now has derailed it?
I don't like white wash words like "lack of trust" for an explanation because that implies somebody is hiding behind weasel words and we need to get this out in the open or the public is going to lose confidence pretty damn quick since it's all over the news.
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lomapaseo Good point. We do need to know more. AA and Delta have different unions so is it really the same root cause?
But it is clear that having no reporting scheme means poor safety culture and thus no SMS is possible in these operators.
Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.
Meanwhile management and unions should hang their heads in shame for letting down both the travelling public and themselves.
But it is clear that having no reporting scheme means poor safety culture and thus no SMS is possible in these operators.
Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.
Meanwhile management and unions should hang their heads in shame for letting down both the travelling public and themselves.
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Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.
Hey, Canada made a helluva robot arm for the space shuttle.
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That would be because of disfunctional crew comms, runway overuns, lax security screening, drunks and druggies, 2 digit IQs etc., etc., etc.
Seriously: Are you proud of this ASAP situation??
At least other carriers AND mechanics and cabin crew at Delta & AA haave made agreements with their managment
http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_i...rticipants.pdf
Seriously: Are you proud of this ASAP situation??
At least other carriers AND mechanics and cabin crew at Delta & AA haave made agreements with their managment
http://www.faa.gov/safety/programs_i...rticipants.pdf
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Why the different perspectives?
Not long ago I listened to the Senior pilot at our company speak about this.
As background, I happen to know this guy from my 727 days, and I think very highly of him...except on this one subject.
He stated that he had an obligation to our passengers to ensure that our crews are operating correctly. For that reason, even though ASAP was the source for highlighting an event that did not comply with our SOPs, he felt that the crew should be pulled off the line and retrained.
I do not believe this is within the boundaries established by the ASAP Advisory Circular put out by the FAA.
Had the ASAP program not been in existence, more than likely this event would never have been brought to the attention of anyone in our company. In other words, without ASAP, it didn't happen, and no analysis or mishap prevention measures can be initiated to prevent a recurrence.
My opinion is that confidentiality is a must with any mishap prevention program.
As background, I happen to know this guy from my 727 days, and I think very highly of him...except on this one subject.
He stated that he had an obligation to our passengers to ensure that our crews are operating correctly. For that reason, even though ASAP was the source for highlighting an event that did not comply with our SOPs, he felt that the crew should be pulled off the line and retrained.
I do not believe this is within the boundaries established by the ASAP Advisory Circular put out by the FAA.
Had the ASAP program not been in existence, more than likely this event would never have been brought to the attention of anyone in our company. In other words, without ASAP, it didn't happen, and no analysis or mishap prevention measures can be initiated to prevent a recurrence.
My opinion is that confidentiality is a must with any mishap prevention program.
My views on these issues are well known on this forum by now. I fully support such safety programs as ASAP and FOQA, which are about trend analysis, not pursuing individual crews.
However, any agreement between management and the pilots' association must include a process by which serious and intentional incidents and deviations from SOPs can be dealt with. In short, the association must buy into all aspects of the safety program if it is to succeed.
The agreement must include a process that can identify and assist the airline when a serious, individual incident requires further enquiry. Sometimes that circumstance unfolds well because the crew itself, self-reports and is held harmless in favour of continuing the broader goals of the safety program - almost always, these circumstances and the individuals are known by most and management deals with the issue quietly and internally to the benefit of all. If you don't know or believe that, your finger's not on the pulse.
Again however, if we have intentional, serious deviations from SOPs, a good FOQA or ASAP agreement will have incorporated procedures and processes by which an individual pilot may be approached and his/her circumstances handled so as to mitigate then reverse any untoward operational issues. For some FOQA Programs, it's a "2 strikes" approach - if a captain is found to have two serious operational issues within a six month period, for example, that captain is interviewed and the reasons determined. Sometimes its the usual stuff like economic, personal or medical circumstances - Rarely is it a true "rogue".
The agreement with management then provides that such pilot is removed from the roster and provided with training, or medical assistance or whatever is needed to return that pilot, in healthy state, to the line. It is the pilots' association which takes responsibility for the crew member and who advises the airline that so-and-so member will be "off the line" for the "next two weeks - do not call".
That kind of agreement works. It is in place at a major carrier.
That is indeed, what true flight safety and pilot assistance programs are about when and if circumstances get that far.
That these programs have fallen apart speaks to both management and association failure to place flight safety ahead of other, less important issues. That those issues have not yet been elucidated speaks, I think, to the nature of the disagreement.
Believe me, I do understand how such issues can unfold. An airline trying to do due diligence and ensure that it is operating in accordance with FAA requirements but also trying to be fair to pilots who may be caught in circumstances involving all parties, is in a difficult spot these days when money, politics, and public impressions especially after recent issues regarding the FAA, are all impinging upon how management and the pilots association respond to these naturally-intrusive safety programs.
However, any agreement between management and the pilots' association must include a process by which serious and intentional incidents and deviations from SOPs can be dealt with. In short, the association must buy into all aspects of the safety program if it is to succeed.
The agreement must include a process that can identify and assist the airline when a serious, individual incident requires further enquiry. Sometimes that circumstance unfolds well because the crew itself, self-reports and is held harmless in favour of continuing the broader goals of the safety program - almost always, these circumstances and the individuals are known by most and management deals with the issue quietly and internally to the benefit of all. If you don't know or believe that, your finger's not on the pulse.
Again however, if we have intentional, serious deviations from SOPs, a good FOQA or ASAP agreement will have incorporated procedures and processes by which an individual pilot may be approached and his/her circumstances handled so as to mitigate then reverse any untoward operational issues. For some FOQA Programs, it's a "2 strikes" approach - if a captain is found to have two serious operational issues within a six month period, for example, that captain is interviewed and the reasons determined. Sometimes its the usual stuff like economic, personal or medical circumstances - Rarely is it a true "rogue".
The agreement with management then provides that such pilot is removed from the roster and provided with training, or medical assistance or whatever is needed to return that pilot, in healthy state, to the line. It is the pilots' association which takes responsibility for the crew member and who advises the airline that so-and-so member will be "off the line" for the "next two weeks - do not call".
That kind of agreement works. It is in place at a major carrier.
That is indeed, what true flight safety and pilot assistance programs are about when and if circumstances get that far.
That these programs have fallen apart speaks to both management and association failure to place flight safety ahead of other, less important issues. That those issues have not yet been elucidated speaks, I think, to the nature of the disagreement.
Believe me, I do understand how such issues can unfold. An airline trying to do due diligence and ensure that it is operating in accordance with FAA requirements but also trying to be fair to pilots who may be caught in circumstances involving all parties, is in a difficult spot these days when money, politics, and public impressions especially after recent issues regarding the FAA, are all impinging upon how management and the pilots association respond to these naturally-intrusive safety programs.
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Yet again the US demonstrates that they are way behind their neighbours and the rest of the world and the FAA are seen to be a sham of a regulator incapable of facilitating the advancement of safety.
What we are seeing, although the term is now being disputed by those interested in promoting SMS for reasons other than flight safety, is the "deregulation of flight safety", under the heading of "neoliberal" economic principles (google the term) - the privatization of everything under the sun and the accountability of no one in management or the executive, ... - just watch what's coming.
The privatised group, with a working title of Newco, will replace the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) as the airport’s owner and manager. The government announced the decision in October and said Newco would control the Changi Airport group and a new civil aviation authority. The authority will be responsible for the development and administration of national aviation policy, regulatory issues and air traffic management. “The whole idea of transferring ownership to Temasek is to have a clearer separation of the role of policymaker, regulator and the operators,” said Senior Minister of State for Transport, Lim Hwee Hua.
A CAAS deputy director general for operations, Lee Seow Hiang, will be Newco’s chief executive and Lee Hsien Yang, the brother of Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, will chair the authority.
A CAAS deputy director general for operations, Lee Seow Hiang, will be Newco’s chief executive and Lee Hsien Yang, the brother of Singapore’s prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, will chair the authority.
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The ASAP program does not protect the pilot in all cases. If the airline learns of the incident or error from independent sources they have the right to start a punitive response. If the error involved willful disregard of rules or procedures, or negligence, there is no bar to the airline firing the pilot. Only genuine mistakes are meant to be covered. Some believe that it is a "get out of jail free" program and that is not what it is.
However it is a great tool and definitely improves safety.
I run a safety program and the majority of what I do does not cost the company a penny. It is a change in attitude more than throwing money at a problem. I don't have ASAP but I apply the principles of it and so far the reporting system has been thriving. We have incidents, but we learn.
However it is a great tool and definitely improves safety.
I run a safety program and the majority of what I do does not cost the company a penny. It is a change in attitude more than throwing money at a problem. I don't have ASAP but I apply the principles of it and so far the reporting system has been thriving. We have incidents, but we learn.
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It's about absolute control. Airline managers in the US, are, on the whole, have astonishingly bad leadership skills. They have come out of the schools of accounting and see everything in terms of dollars, not realizing that you need to LEAD a company, not drive it. The other part of that most executives in the US really don't care about the industry they're in, or the end result, but only how many tens of millions of dollars they can soak out of it as fast as possible. The traitors that drove the banking industry in the US off the cliff, while they pocketed literally hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and compensation are proof of this. These guys are not incompetent. Far from it. They knew exactly what they were doing.
Roadtrip;
Well, it's very sad but that post deserves quoting in full because it is absolutely 100% correct. We at FDA have been pushing rope for a decade and nobody wants anything to do with it, hates it and ignores it every chance they get. It's a box tick because they don't really know the business they're in. No executive I have ever met and I've met all of them here, understands the principles of flight safety and how such programs work to protect the very thing they care for most and which is priority #1 - shareholder value. They're comfortably numb.
lomapaseo;
What would you think of a flight safety department that is run by, financed by and reports directly to, the VP of Flt Ops? What flight safety information do you think is going to get past the palace guards to the CEO, (assuming s/he cares to know in the first place)?
It's about absolute control. Airline managers in the US, are, on the whole, have astonishingly bad leadership skills. They have come out of the schools of accounting and see everything in terms of dollars, not realizing that you need to LEAD a company, not drive it. The other part of that most executives in the US really don't care about the industry they're in, or the end result, but only how many tens of millions of dollars they can soak out of it as fast as possible. The traitors that drove the banking industry in the US off the cliff, while they pocketed literally hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses and compensation are proof of this. These guys are not incompetent. Far from it. They knew exactly what they were doing.
lomapaseo;
If this is about identifying causal factors and solutions is it then not entirely in the realm of the safety office for the airlines and the people who share lessons between airlines?
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Interesting topic! It's good to see such a proffessional response, however it would be better to have response from management rather then pilots, after all managers don't get hurt in an accident pilots do.
Over the last 20 years I have seen safety develop in a good direction, but lately it seems that the basic priciples are being re-discussed. New managers, new mistakes and again we must re train our management.
Safety culture is like any culture the collective achievement of a group of individuals that characterises freedom form injury or risk. like so many cultures it's the persons at the top that can influence culture (albeit only in a negative way)
My experience is that a 100% confidential system is the only working system!
Over the last 20 years I have seen safety develop in a good direction, but lately it seems that the basic priciples are being re-discussed. New managers, new mistakes and again we must re train our management.
Safety culture is like any culture the collective achievement of a group of individuals that characterises freedom form injury or risk. like so many cultures it's the persons at the top that can influence culture (albeit only in a negative way)
My experience is that a 100% confidential system is the only working system!