captplaystation

S.F.L.Y

You are determined to squeeze every last drop from this favourite lemon aren't you.

Perhaps he intended to disconnect @ 600' but on realising there were other problems, decided against it & let the A/P fly whilst he tried to figure out what was happening.
Rightly or wrongly, he probably wished to fly the G/P , and indeed probably expected the engines or A/T to recover, thereby enabling him to do so whilst maintaining or regaining airspeed.
The lack of available thrust meant that the decision to remain on the glide resulted in a loss of speed. Whilst he may have (or not you seem to be assuming) been aware of this, the only remedy was to duck under the glide. It appears he didn't want to. The stick shaker prompted him to take control and in doing so he also disconnected the autopilot, which he may or may not have been too worried about being engaged, as it was probably doing what he wanted, maintaining the glide path.
As a previous poster stated, the feel of the controls on this aircraft would not make it possible to believe "you " were flying the aircraft whilst the A/P was still engaged.
Do you seriously think that his feel for the controls had suddenly downgraded to your level of comprehension of this whole 35sec scenario, and that he couldn't feel for himself that the A/P was still engaged ?
If the aircraft was following the flightpath desired by the crew, and there was insufficient thrust available to maintain the speed, do you accept that in the short time available perhaps they prioritised making the clear area , and accepted whatever speed above stall speed this gave them ?

I know you think that this was putting priorities in the wrong order, however " the proof of the cake is in the eating" and their priorities on that day seemed to have served them well.
Which part of your personality / character makes it impossible for you to realise that as a professional pilot body we seem to be broadly agreed that your fixation on two points here (the failure to fly best L/D & the delay in disconnecting, or according to you, failure to realise status of, the A/P ) is somewhat blinding you to the big picture.

You are an army of 1 here, that fact alone should be ringing some alarms bells somewhere in your head, where Oh where is YOUR situational awareness ? wedged between your buttocks I would hazard.

Love_joy

The argument about "who was flying the plane" is madness.

The FO was pilot flying having 'taken control' off the back of a monitored approach. He intended to disconnect the AP at approx 600ft, but due to the obvious distractions he didn't, or believed that he had.

Either way, the aircraft was flying as he expected it to (except the distinct lack of power). If he was manipulating the controls, or trimming, the AP would have dropped out anyway - but as its flight path was essentially as desired, it doesn't matter.

All pilots know that aircraft don't have to be flown hands on, AP connected or not.

SK8TRBOI

TIMA9X, I concur. I was admitedly enjoying the "back and forth" in everyone trying to deal with "he-who-shall-not-be-named"s inane posts, when I too clicked that BBC link and watched the interview.

That did it for me - it quickly refoucused my thoughts on the stark "unknowns" the crew was faced with in those 35 short seconds. The courage, skill and professionalism of Captain Burkill is palpable on that interview.

Bravo to the two gents up front. Period.

NEW: I only now realized that CA PB himself was posting earlier!

Captain Burkill - again, Bravo. I'm quite speechless at the moment...I guess the only thing I can think to say is: if my own family are ever aboard a flight when an emergency such as you encountered that day occurs, I hope and pray that you and your FO would be the two up-front and flying.

All the best to you in the future, Sir.

DERG

Hi jumbojet

Your pal increased speed to decimal 88 to increase the fuel temps?

This works because the higher engine oil temp transfers to the fuel mass via a heat exchanger? Of course he had four engines as opposed to two.

So in your company SOP you have a plan to address low fuel temps en route?

Now it seems to me that if instructions were to SAVE FUEL from BA operations I can see another possible factor in the failure.

Just wondering

A PM from SFLY "Sorry if my question is annoying you but I think it would be quite interesting to know why nobody was aware of who actually controlled the aircraft for almost one minute, at the most crucial moment of this emergency.Is there anything wrong with that?There was obvioulsy a problem of crew communication."


Taking the discussion to a P.M. You are obviously obsessed by your issues.

You've certainly never been in a time constrained emergency. You are definately not an experienced aviator. "If" you are a pilot then I hope you don't find out the answers to your questions the hard way - you will probably find out something about yourself very quickly.

In my loss of airspeed incident - communication between me and my co captain was at a bare minimum ..... I had to instantly deal with, after I got over the surprise, an emergency that I had never seen before. If you don't understand the process of recognition, data gathering, communication, decision and action in these circumstances then what can I say - 35 seconds - go for it superman !!

Shaka Zulu

DERG you are talking absolute arse.

captplaystation

Just wondering,

Don't worry I have had two as well, wondering why he can't ask the same question repeatedly for two weeks without us all being nasty and rude to him.
In between this thread, and the Turkish airlines thread where he spends his time unable to comprehend the difference between the two accidents, er S.F.L.Y. these guys had no power, the other guys didn't use it . . . . and the Concorde thread where his main target seems to be BA, he is unable to understand that we are a bit fed up to respond repeatedly to his same assertions day after day, whilst no-one actually agrees with them. Tedious doesn't even begin to describe it.
He fails to understand the difference (or is it similarity? ) between being thick-skinned and simply thick.

No experience, and even worse, no imagination or humility, to even allow him to begin to imagine how those 35secs must have felt.

Waste of space/energy.

DERG

Hiya Shaka

I use BS..better than the word you used.

Well unless I have missed a fundamental fact about this planets atmosphere... I believe that the higher you go the colder it gets..yes? no?

As you go lower the air gets denser..yes? no?

I may be mistaken...Please entlighten me!

captplaystation

DERG
I may be becoming senile, but wasn't it all about increasing skin temperature i.e. TAT, to increase the fuel temp ? well if my memory serves me it is on a 737 anyhow, rather than as a function of increased power/heat exchanger.
The difference in power required to maintain the higher speed will be minimal, the difference in temp I would suspect not be enough, but maybe tangible. This is obviously more viable at lower altitudes where you have a somewhat larger window of airspeed available to increase to, shurely not the case here on a long flight.
Anyway, Shirley, if everyone else was descending, either there was a problem with the fuel temp measuring on MMM or everyone else was in a different bit of air, as I seem to remember the report stated the fuel temp remained within limits for the duration of the flight.

jumbojet, did any of your colleagues note the fuel temperature they experienced and whether it differed greatly with the FDR readings in the report pertaining to the accident aircraft. Perhaps a tech problem that is being missed.

Mmmayday38

SFLY

Just need to tell you that I'm in the middle of the school run at the moment; but will respond to this later on, as soon as I can.

Shaka Zulu

DERG,

First off, the atmosphere does not always follow a linear path in temperature.
I have seen it quite a couple times where climbing actually increases the SAT (static air temp). A lot of the time it has to do with troposphere/pause/stratosphere.

Secondly, yes increasing the oil temperature helps warming the fuel however flying faster increases the TAT (total air temperature) due to more skin friction. This increase of temperature can be in the order of 4/5C. Depending on how much you can accelerate of course.

Thirdly, the number of engines is completely irrelevant.

Fourth, we do not get instructions from BA Ops to ''save fuel''.
Best practice dictates that if fuel temperature does not look like it's going to be a problem then why not climb if it saves fuel?
Plus we are largely second guessing to why BA038 climbed. It could well have been that their Mach No was restricted on the few airways that connect Europe to the Far East.
Hence climbing and increasing the Mach No might have been more beneficial then sitting ''low and slow''.
At any rate it's complete guesswork.

As long as the low fuel temp warning (3deg typically of Fuel Freeze Temp) does not illuminate and the forward flight plan has been asessed for OAT's then climbing ''should'' have absolutely no impact whatsoever.

MATELO

TBH, I wouldnt bother. Just ignore them with the contempt they deserve.

horsebadorties

If you had bothered to read the whole report instead of jumping to the conclusions (in both senses of that...), you might have found the following:

Assessment of flight crew actions - summary
From the available evidence, it is apparent that the flight crew’s preparation and conduct of the flight preceding the engine rollbacks was orderly, and in accordance with the operating company’s standard operating procedures.

On the final approach to land the flight crew were presented with an operational situation, a double-engine rollback at a low height, which was unprecedented. Most importantly at this point, when the stick shaker was alerting them to an impending stall, they kept the aircraft flying and under control so that, at impact, it was wings level and at a moderate pitch attitude. The reduction in flap setting did allow the aircraft to clear the ILS aerial array and, given more height, it would have been more effective.

In analysing the flight crew’s actions during final approach, the first indication of a problem was the thrust lever split. The flight crew did not, at this time, realise that this was associated with the ensuing engine rollback; slight splits in the thrust lever positions are common and manually moving the thrust levers back into alignment is a normal response. The flight crew became fully aware of the problem some 30 seconds before touchdown and at this point the subsequent high rate of descent at impact was inevitable.

The crew’s attention was on monitoring the approach and the external environment and, while the autopilot remained engaged, the crew’s focus was on the developing situation with falling engine thrust and reducing airspeed, and their subsequent attempts to restore power.

In the very limited time available after identification of the problem, the flight crew clearly prioritised their actions and thus did make the ‘MAYDAY’ call, although they were not able to make the ‘brace brace’ call. The initial use of the VHF radio rather than PA system for the cabin evacuation call had no effect on the accident outcome


It is on P140 in case you are interestd.

Flightmech

Mmmayday38,
I wouldn't bother entertaining him either NO pilot involved in an incident/accident is REQUIRED to come on here and answer questions. That's what official reports are for. However, thousands are grateful to you for coming on here and sharing your experience.

TIMA9X

Mmmayday38
Agree 100% Flightmech, Peter has done so much to explain things never with a hint of malice.
I am afraid SFLY you need to understand that two or three pages ago everyone was praising Peter Birkill & crew, all of them well known current pilots and you come along and the whole thread went back to the "what if's" or "I know better" which has besieged this thread from day one.

If Mmmayday38 does respond, will you accept what he has to say then leave it alone for a while? SFLY my understanding of the words "good result" seem to differ from yours. BA038 ended up a great result considering all the circumstances in those 50 seconds or so the crew had to handle!!! Who cares about when the AP was switched off, you have to agree with the principle that a pilot with a lot of hours under his belt on a triple 7 knows the the feel of the AC!

This has been discussed over and over again. Someone said "humanity" please also keep this word in mind, pilots are not machines with AP switches implanted.

Baron rouge

Here we have all those captains prising the skill and luck of BA 038 crew for saving all those lives and it is perfectly understandable as in civil aviation the first thing you are told is :
"In case of emergency engage the AP if you can, or leave it engaged because it flies better than you!!!!"
No surprise then , they kept the AP ON., and the co-pilot, PF, was trying to understand what the f.. was going on instead of FLYING the A/C in short finals….

You can say what ever you want guys, but so close to the ground, the only job of the PF in a dire emergency is TO FLY the A/C.

And if you think, I do not know what I am talking about, I landed a Mystere IV after a flame out in short finals and a Jaguar on the undershoot after a bird strike again in short finals… all I did then was flying the A/C .

The PNF did his part retracting the flaps, the PF did not Fly the A/C.

EBMissfit

Phil Golin
"It is amazingly obvious that they did/do not want to mention the actual water content of the fuel on the flight. It SEEMS to be mention only three times and almost only in passing at "35 - 40" ppm, HOWEVER, all the tests were run with concentrations of 90 ppm (or more). There is no examination in detail of the actual measured water levels or what the actual state of the fuel/water mixture might have been like at the landing stage."


1) 35-40ppm is what was left in the fuel after landing - in other words that does not include water which may have settled and been recirculated by the water scavenging pumps.

2) The estimates for water concentration at loading are (admitedly up to) 40ppm dissolved and 30ppm entrained - or up to 70ppm. To get from 70-ppm at the start to 40ppm at the end, the concentration of water in the fuel leaving the tanks needs to be higher than 70ppm. If you read the bit on water scavenge system, you will see that the low lying fuel (more likely to have higher concentrations of water) is re-injected near to the pump inlets - why, because you are trying to get rid of the water or it will just settle back to the bottom - the way out is through the engine.

3) "A target water concentration of 90 ppm (as defined in ARP 1401) was selected for all the tests." SAE-ARP 1401 being the international standards publication for "Aircraft Fuel System and Component Icing Test".

Its not a glaring gap - its not precise, but then again as they have stated, very little about reproducing this is precise, their testing was to prove the viability of their hypothosis, because it was basically a new hypthosis.

phil gollin

EB Missfit

If you look back (if it is possible) at the previous two "mega-threads" covering this accident, you would see that we have covered the water content of the fuel (both in conjunction with the interim reports and from other info) and it is the LACK of any of all this previous info being repeated/summarised in the final report which is so amazing.

The choice of a standard BUT NON-REPRESENTATIVE 90 ppm for any initial tests might have been a sensible starting point. However, the tests failed to get consistent failures even with the unrepresentative 90 ppm. There is no mention in the final report of any attempts at testing at more representative water/fuel levels, nor IF any such tests were performed of any results.

It is not possible to regard the tests quoted in the final report as significant to the actual flight conditions. That is the glaring problem with the report. The report did not (at the least) repeat/summarise the information in the interim reports about the actual and presumed water levels in the flight at the time of the accident. It did not explain why tests actually representative of the presumed water/fuel levels weren't undertaken. The report has taken inconsistent results from unrepresentative water/fuel mixtures and somehow stated that they show the probable cause.

"Their" tests did not consistently prove "their hypothesis" (as you put it) - there were only occassions when they managed it. So what did the tests actually acheive ?

And, as ever, I would add the there does not, so far at least, seem to be a major industry wide investigation into the "new" phenonmen, nor an examination of ALL engine/airframe combinations to see if other designs may be at risk.

.

PETTIFOGGER

SFLY

Quote:

The report says that:

I do not speak for the crew but ~
What you have written above is an interpretation of the AAIB report which is almost accurate, but not quite. I prefer to keep to the exact text of the report and its conclusions, neither adding to nor subtracting from it. For ease of reference, I should like to quote 6 of the conclusions from the AAIB report which seem to be the most relevant to your concerns.

Conclusion 15. “The co-pilot intended to disconnect the auto pilot at 600 ft but became distracted by the engine rollback, so the autopilot remained engaged.

16.The loss of engine power led to a reduction in airspeed as the autopilot attempted to follow the ILS glideslope, leading to a nose-high pitch attitude.

17. Thirty-four seconds before touchdown the flight crew became concerned about the reduction in airspeed below the target approach speed and attempted manually to increase engine thrust to compensate; there was no response from the engines.

18. At 240 ft agl the commander retracted the flap from FLAP 30 to FLAP 25 which increased the distance to touchdown by about 50 metres; if left at FLAP 30 the touchdown would have still been within the airfield boundary.

19. At 200 ft agl the stick shaker activated and as a touchdown short of the runway was inevitable the commander transmitted a ‘MAYDAY’ call three seconds before touchdown.

20. At the operation of the stick shaker, the co-pilot pushed forward on the control column and the autopilot disconnected."

There is a subtle but important difference between these 6 AAIB conclusions and your three. In my opinion, they allow more insight of the causal processes of this accident as it developed than do yours. One could argue that the delay in disconnecting the autopilot was a consequence of the engine rollback, which began at 720 ft agl but only became known to the crew at 430 agl. Even then, they cannot have been sure that they would not get the power back. There is no big red flag that pops out and says ‘sorry chaps, that’s it for today.’ So it was entirely reasonable to continue to follow the ILS glidescope, whether assisted by the autopilot or not. There is no suggestion in the report that the PF was not monitoring the approach with hands on the yoke.

Quote:

SFLY My understanding is that:

Your first point above is answered by Conclusion 15.
Concerning your second point, I choose to believe that he was aware that he was in control because he would have had his hands on the yoke if he thought he had disconnected the AP. The fact that he had not disconnected it is irrelevant because any firm input leads to immediate disconnection, as happened at 200 ft agl. This answer also covers your third question.

suninmyeyes

Jumbo jet

You wrote

The 777 has a different shaped wing to the 747-400 and cold fuel temperatures are not normally a problem. Although the 777 may have been flying higher than the 747-400s it is likely that it's fuel tank temperatures were warmer than what the 747-400s were experiencing.

The 038s fuel temp never got colder than minus 34 degrees with a fuel freeze point of minus 47 degrees. Obviously the 747-400s if they had to increase speed had considerably colder fuel.

As for S.F.L.Y. I get the feeling that if I or the other pilots on this forum were driving and our car went into a skid we would react instinctively. I suspect S.F.L.Y. would start thinking about theories and friction coefficients and what would be the best solution to his predicament. Too late.

I suspect that the stress and trauma experienced by the 038 crew in being involved in an accident that was not their fault is probably less than the trauma of having nearly two years of armchair experts pontificating on how they should have handled the situation better.

Best of luck Pete. I tried your scenario on the sim, absolutely horrendous feeling running out of height and speed and that is while knowing you are in a sim and cannot die. We did it a few times, could not make the runway either.

When's the book coming out?