Five people to face Concorde crash trial

[M2dude]

This is NOT French bashing, in fact there is pressure in France to finally get the truth out about this tragic accident. There has seems to have been a deliberate and orchestrated hiding of facts from the very begining. Please read and learn and don't be so patronising sir. Honest debate is what PPrune forums are all about.

[Capetonian]

I read down this thread from top to bottom and was waiting for something like this If this thread is going to turn into the usual french bashing, then it is a horrible waste of pprune's bandwidth. to rear its head.

Why is it a waste of bandwidth? If people have opinions surely this is the place to voice them. It has been acknowledged from the start that there were operational and maintenance related deficiencies in the way the SSC was operated by AF, and more recently there has been a lot of talk, speculation if you prefer, about the standards of airmanship in AF after a spate of incidents.

Fingers have been pointed at Continental stating that they were to blame for the tragedy. Can you blame the people there for wanting to clear their name?

By the way, as I recall, the Captain (Christian Marty if my memory is correct) was one of AF's most experienced and well regarded captains, so it will be interesting to see what comes out in this enquiry.

[M2dude]

Gobonastick. I'm not sure f you understand anything about this dreadful tragedy, but the French Judiciary are blaming Continental Airllnes for the bulk of the accident. Most relevantly learned people here are of the opinion that the explosive destruction of the tyre was more due to a comnination of being grossly overweight, the front wheels on the L/H U/C skewing badly from true (due to the missing spacer) and running over a very rough (awaiting repair) initial runway surface, NOT the strip on the runway.. Oh, and also the fuel tanks were under pressure, due to illegal placement of fuel inlet valves to over-ride, ('hiding' fuel in the fuel transfer galleries from the fuel gauging system/fuel weight computation). So when the tyre destruction occured (not a blow out in the normal sense) we have a terrible set of ingredients. This overweight aircraft veered hard along the L/H side of the runway, took out a taxi llight which in turn seriously damaged an engine. It then took off on 3 1/2 engines, way below V2 and in flames. A good, thrust producing engine was then shut down leaving 2 1/2 engines. RAF studies show that the only hope of extinguishing such a fuel fed fire is enough IAS to cause the flames to become detached from the source. The Bogie Beam alignment circuit on the L/H gear had been damaged, preventing raising of the gear. The aircraft desperately needed to climb and accelerate to survive; it could do neither, and tragically came down on the hotel at Gonez.

[nnc0]

Can somebody clarify why a charge of involuntary manslaughter has been applied in this case. I've seen this before in European aviation accidents but don't understand why it is applied in some cases and not others. What criteria must be satisfied that result in charges being laid against individuals.

[S.F.L.Y]

Originally Posted by M2dude

But this crash followed many French near-misses, spread over all the years of Concorde operation. Misses due to questionable airmanship or maintenance, often combinations of both.

Actually BA suffered a higher number of serious tires incidents than AF... (BA: 5 previous occurrences of fuel tank perforations due to tire incidents and associated engines damages. AF: 1 previous occurrence).
All of these incidents could have led to exactly the same result. There was a major issue with the aircraft, voluntary ignored for decades by operators, civil aviations, crews and manufacturer. The tire incidents rate and related repetitive extensive damages have nothing to do with airmanship or maintenance (even if it played a significant role in 2000), it's above all a major design issue and blatant lacks of responsibilities from all involved parties (certainly not only French).

I think this is pretty clear:
http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2000/f-...appendix5p.pdf

[M2dude]

Oh dear, I do love armchair critics!! The REASON that BA had more incidents than AF was because BA both operated more A/C (7 as opposed to 5) and flew infinitely greater hours. Before you make statements like this you need to be in posession of a few facts. OK, everyone accepts that the original high pressure tyre design was far too volatile shall we say, but any damage done was relatively minor. No British aircraft ever had an A4 section of the lower wing blown out. And get your facts right before you make such statements about something you clearly know nothing about; many modifications were carried out to reduce/minimise tyre blow out incidents. And as people have been trying to explain to people like you, the BEA report was terribly tainted, with half-truths and ignored evidence. We an all post hyperlinks.

[S.F.L.Y]

The REASON that BA had more incidents than AF was because BA both operated more A/C (7 as opposed to 5) and flew infinitely greater hours.

Whatever was the reason, the fact is that there were enough occurrences to take appropriate actions from a CAA & manufacturer point of view.

but any damage done was relatively minor

You call this minor?

1981 Impacts on wing, Tank 5 penetrated, Hydraulics, Elevon, Engines 1/2/3
1985 Impacts on fuselage, damage to brake, Tank 5 penetrated, Engines 1 and 2, Deflector+I67
1988 Loss of wheel bolts, Impacts on wing, Tank 7 damaged
1993 Impacts on wing, Tank 8 penetrated, Green hydraulics, Engine 3, Deflector
1993 Impacts on wing, Deflector, Tank 1 penetrated

And get your facts right before you make such statements about something you clearly know nothing about

What is untrue in my statement and what make you think I know nothing about it?
By the way the issue with the missing spacer wasn't on the takeoff phases but during the landings preceding the accident...

[Brit312]

Oh dear here we go again, so let me state that I have got no new information as to what caused the sad Concorde crash, but I might be able to help as to what happened in the past.

1] BA in the early years of operation did have a number of tyre problems with Concorde, but these were caused by FOD mainly on the departure stands.Concorde had very hard and high pressure tyres and so any FOD which was run over during push back or taxi usually penetrated the tyre and caused a deflation [slow or otherwise] of that tyre, but it now caused the other tyre on that axle to be overloaded, which usually caused it to shed its tread during the take off run. This detached tread usually damage the hydraulic pipes on the landing gear, sometimes damaged the wing, but nearly always was accompaanied by high vibration, surging engines [Usually both on that side]as the two engines ate the remains of the tyre. The vibration could be so bad that it was difficult to see the engine instruements. Once the tyre debrie had passed through the engine the vibration would stop and the engines operated normally, the only give away that they had run down was the yaw of the aircraft. Damage to the wing was normally done by the fibre glass/ metal water deflector in front of the tyres being ripped off [by the departing tread] and hitting the wing.

To over come this certain mods were introduced
1] Flat tyre detection system was introduced
2] Protection guards positioned over exposed hydraulic pipes on the the
landing gear
3] Stronger tyres and hubs were introduced
4] Metal reinforcing wires were fitted into the water deflector to prevent it
from detaching itself and so hitting the wing

All BA Concordes had all these Mods incorporated

Also BA introduced a vigorous inspection of the push back area prior to departure

If my memory serves me correctly by the 1990s only one company made the tyres for Concorde, which only used NEW tyres and not remoulds or retreads.
IIRC that company was Kleber

One thing about Concorde was that it had 3 hydraulic systems two normal and one emergency backup. These system were kept rigidly apart except at the flying controls power control jacks. Now Concorde had no mechanical back up to it's flying controls and so if all hyds was lost then there would be no way of controlling the aircraft, which as it was a delta wing would then pitch very nose up and possibly turn over.
If you look at the picture of the aircraft taking off you can see that the flames are playing over the port inner elevon PFCU and I suggest would not take long to melt the hydraulic pipes of all three system so causing a complete hyd loss and so complete loss of control of the aircraft
If my theory is correct the result might have been the same no matter what the crew did or how many engines were running.

Just to finish up with the missing spacer apparently was missing for the previous 3 round trips of Paris to New York and those crews did not mention having any problems with the aircraft.

Anyway a sad accident, as they all are.

Brit312

[norodnik]

"Just seems a remarkable coincidence to me that a clear cut in the tyre matched the shape of the metal strip which fell off the CO jet."

Before you continue with your dumb conclusions, why don't you go and do a bit of background reading. You'll then be armed with all the facts so blatantly ignored by our French Cousins.

The fire started no where near the titanium strip. It's not disputed that the tyre ran over it (eventually), but what is clear is that the aircaft should have been in the air long before it ever reached it. Why it wasn't is well understood by most (non-BEA) and has already been alluded to above.

[S.F.L.Y]

Still 14 tire incidents after 1990 including 4 involving deflectors on BA's aircraft... 24 years of clearly identified and documented incidents. The FAA clearly expressed its concerned following the 1979 incident without appropriate action from the CAA, AAIB/BEA or manufacturer...

Before you continue with your dumb conclusions, why don't you go and do a bit of background reading. You'll then be armed with all the facts so blatantly ignored by our French Cousins.

It's funny to start your sentence with dumb conclusions and to end it with the same

[norodnik]

so what are you trying to say... That Concorde is/was the only aircraft flying that had some identified weakness and should have been grounded.

The risk was understood, and mitigated as far as possible. As many have said previously, 737's, MD11's still fly around despite having well publicised faults and there are plenty other issues less well publicised.

The facts show why Concorde crashed on that day and had it been operated and maintained as per the manuals it would have had an immeasurably better chance of surviving.

[M2dude]

Very good points Brit312, but remember that bearing migration if the spacer was ommited would almost certainly be progressive, not sudden. Remamber that this take off was grossly over weight, with a CG well aft of the MAXIMUM allowable 54%, over an initially VERY rough surface not being used by any other traffic. (The runway, 26L was damaged at it's extremity and no other aircraft were using full length). The aft CG alone would have radically reduced the effectiveness of the nose wheel steering. (Oh, and the takeoff was into wind too). It takes very little imagination to picture the trauma that the L/H gear was experiencding. Your points regarding fire damage possibly seem valid, although PFCU pipes were titanium, if I remember rightly,but the FDR showed that the aircraft just ran out of flying speed when it came down. The whole point here is to try and get all of the facts out, not just those that suit AF!!
But over all, a good post with accurate information.

[M2dude]

It's funny to start your sentence with dumb conclusions and to end it with the same

If the cap fits, then wear it. It seems to fit you perfectly sir!!

[S.F.L.Y]

The risk was understood, and mitigated as far as possible.

Are you convinced by what you are saying considering that mitigation didn't prevent occurrences to happen 24 years after the first one, including numerous similar fuel tank perforations?

As many have said previously, 737's, MD11's still fly around despite having well publicised faults and there are plenty other issues less well publicised.

737 and MD11 might have some faults, you can't compare the amount of hours flown by concordes with other aircrafts. Concorde had a tire incidents rate 300.000 times higher than on A330. Not only the tire incidents couldn't be reduced to a reasonable level, but the main issue with the fuel tanks being regularly perforated was not mitigated. This has little to do with one specific operator or one specific country...

[ABO944]

I was wondering who produced the loadsheet for this flight. Was it completed by a dispatcher or by the crew ?

Who signed for it ? If it was a dispatcher, is he one of the 5 people on trial too?

[M2dude]

737 and MD11 might have some faults, you can't compare the amount of hours flown by concordes with other aircrafts. Concorde had a tire incidents rate 300.000 times higher than on A330. Not only the tire incidents couldn't be reduced to a reasonable level, but the main issue with the fuel tanks being regularly perforated was not mitigated. This has little to do with one specific operator or one specific country...

OH COME ON SFLY, we can all Google statistics, this does not make you knowledgable. There is an old adage that the further you are away from a problem, the simpler it seems; you must be a million miles away. Certain other aircraft were allowed to continue with known stab trim, freight door and other problems, and MANY lives were lost as a result. But this is not at issue here (I'm not stooping to your level and bash Boeing/MD etc); Up until the Paris disaster Concorde never hurt a soul (actually helped save many lives with regular donated organ flights across the Atlantic). This is the stuff that a person jealous of, or not good enough for Concorde might say. I saw with my own eyes the majority of British incidents, did you? No matter what Google tells you, the material and systems damage was relatively minor

[Brit312]

M2dude,
Yes you are correct about the the runway but I thought the aircraft was taking off with a tail wind which in itself was not unusual but not at MTOW I have to say.

As I remember it the the aircraft was 1000 kgs estimated over weight which I know sounds a lot, but at the rate Concorde used fuel during the takeoff
[ 100,000 kgs/hr/ac] that excess would have been not considered too much of a performance problem.

You are correct though that one of the problems with a 54% take off was light nosewheel steering control,and yes especially if the runway was bumpy but when runway directional control became a problem wasn't the aircraft approaching V1 when rudder would have been the principal control.

Concorde was extremely sensitive to high nose up attitudes because of the extremely rapid increase in drag so any un intended increase in attitude would cause a rapid loss of airspeed. Without hydraulic all the automatic high incidence protection devices were useless and there was nothing they could do to stop it increasing, even more power would not have helped

You have to wonder why if the aircraft was indeed heavy and they were faced with a tail wind for takeoff , why they did not opt for a different runway, but I am sure if they were alive today they would be asking themselves the same questions.

Brit312

[forget]

SFLY

By the way the issue with the missing spacer wasn't on the takeoff phases but during the landings preceding the accident...

Eh? Are you saying that the aircraft had flown and landed, before the accident, with the bogie spacer missing. New one on me. See page 64 here

http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2000/f-...-sc000725a.pdf

[S.F.L.Y]

Up until the Paris disaster Concorde never hurt a soul

That's a very brilliant deduction. All of the previous 6 incidents with fuel tank perforations could virtually have led to the same result. The fuel tank perforation per flight hour ratio of the concorde is far far above any other aircraft's ratio of major issue per flight hour.

If you would have fully read the final report (and be "knowledgeable") you should know why my numbers aren't coming from google.

[M2dude]

BRIT 312 sir; I think that you will find that the 'estmated' 1 Tonne overweight does not take into account 19 suitcases not on the loadsheet, placed in the aft hold. We can only 'guestimate', but these were good folk going on a world cruise, these cases are unlikely to be very light.
Also remember that it has not been satisfactorilly explaind why there was large amounts of right rudder applied early on the T/O roll, with no heading change. What you have to realise about the 'bumpy' runway is that the rougness was at the extreme end; ie the beginning of the T/O roll, and that was where the damage was done. Remember, the early part of the T/O requires NWS as well as rudder for full control. By the time the A/C was travelling fast enough for the rudder to become effective, the A/C was already well over to the right, because of the U/C problems.
Your point about flying at the backside of the drag curve is of course correct, however there is no evidence that there was a detected loss of B, G or Y fluid. As I said before,did not have sufficient IAS, and the A/C needed to climb and accelerate, but because of reported factors it could do neither, once engine 2 was shut down there was absolutely no chance of survival.