Five people to face Concorde crash trial
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DL-EDI has hit the nail on the head when he says that the piece of tyre did NOT puncture the fuel tank and that it was an internal shock wave reflected from the upper surface of the tank that caused it to burst open. This eventuality had been anticipated by the manufacturer so that the clearance to service required that there should be an air gap between fuel and structure in this tank on take off, and this was incorporated in SOPs. Because the crash aircraft had elected to go for a short taxi (hence downwind T/O), this air gap did not exist because anticipated fuel had not been used. Just one link in the chain! But an important one that might constitute an intentional breach of SOPs.
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Was that after the relatively similar incident in Washington in 1979 ?
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Sorry about the second identical posting - finger trouble! Atakacs - yes! I also understand that, had rotate been at the correct speed, the fire would not have been in contact with the structure and, had the aircraft stayed airborne just a little longer, all the fuel would have gone from the tank such was the size of the breach. The fire would have extinguished itself, and had the good engine not been shut down, there is a significant possibility that it could just have been a spectacular incident
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Quote: ".........how can a maintenance worker in Texas be considered subject to French criminal law?"
Try the same way the NatWest three were subject to USA law. Try the same way Charles Taylor of Liberia was subject to some self-appointed court in The Netherlands. Try the same way Manuel Noriega was apprehended via a military invasion in another country and made subject to the USA's courts. Then there are all the inmates of Guantanamo Bay.
Self-appointed kangaroo courts that give themselves worldwide jurisdiction are springing up all over the place and some existing courts in many countries, particularly the USA, are giving themselves worldwide jurisdiction. Political toadies such as those in the UK government kow-tow to this out of control pseudo-justice. If they had any balls they would put out warrants for the apprehension of all of those insolent foreign persons who have pushed their own courts aside and after trial and conviction let said foreign persons have many years to reflect on the wrongness of their insolent actions.
Try the same way the NatWest three were subject to USA law. Try the same way Charles Taylor of Liberia was subject to some self-appointed court in The Netherlands. Try the same way Manuel Noriega was apprehended via a military invasion in another country and made subject to the USA's courts. Then there are all the inmates of Guantanamo Bay.
Self-appointed kangaroo courts that give themselves worldwide jurisdiction are springing up all over the place and some existing courts in many countries, particularly the USA, are giving themselves worldwide jurisdiction. Political toadies such as those in the UK government kow-tow to this out of control pseudo-justice. If they had any balls they would put out warrants for the apprehension of all of those insolent foreign persons who have pushed their own courts aside and after trial and conviction let said foreign persons have many years to reflect on the wrongness of their insolent actions.
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AAIB wrote as a dissenting comment in the report that it could have been either the shock wave, or a penetration, or a combination of both that ruptured the wing skin and fuel tank. They said neither theory could claim precedence.
Informally, AAIB people were saying at the time that it was far more likely that it was a penetration by a lump of rubber since this had already happened, at Dulles in 79. There were IIRC some seven holes in the wing skin, and a passenger even saw a lump go through the top of the wing.
The French, I think, were anxious to conclude that the entire BTSC accident sequence was totally unprecedented -- which is why they came up with the, quite frankly, implausible theory about why the leaking fuel ignited -- because if any part of it had a precedent, then it should have been prevented from recurring. This explains the indictment by the French of DGCA people and some of the Concorde designers.
The French BEA said the afterburners lit the leaking fuel, the Brits that it was shorts in the wheel bay. Shorts had occurred in the wheel bay at Dulles and subsequent French research concluded that the possibility of that happening again was so remote that it was not worth guarding against, especially since tyre strength was improved. You don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to see why these exotic explanations were arrived at.
Informally, AAIB people were saying at the time that it was far more likely that it was a penetration by a lump of rubber since this had already happened, at Dulles in 79. There were IIRC some seven holes in the wing skin, and a passenger even saw a lump go through the top of the wing.
The French, I think, were anxious to conclude that the entire BTSC accident sequence was totally unprecedented -- which is why they came up with the, quite frankly, implausible theory about why the leaking fuel ignited -- because if any part of it had a precedent, then it should have been prevented from recurring. This explains the indictment by the French of DGCA people and some of the Concorde designers.
The French BEA said the afterburners lit the leaking fuel, the Brits that it was shorts in the wheel bay. Shorts had occurred in the wheel bay at Dulles and subsequent French research concluded that the possibility of that happening again was so remote that it was not worth guarding against, especially since tyre strength was improved. You don't have to be a conspiracy theorist to see why these exotic explanations were arrived at.
Last edited by Frangible; 5th Jul 2008 at 14:49.
One question to which I've never seen the answer:
What was the Regulated TOW on departure? Not the ATOW or structural MTOW, but the performance limited TOW for the conditions of the day including the tailwind?
My feeling is that Marty knowingly began the take-off not only marginally over structural MTOW, but well over RTOW. In other words, he took a gamble with the passenger's lives by operating outside Scheduled Performance rules.
Then the uncommanded shut-down and poor CRM. Sorry, but the total blame lies with Air France culture which led to this risk-taking mentality. If they hadn't gambled on taking-off outside limits, they would never have hit the runway debris.
What was the Regulated TOW on departure? Not the ATOW or structural MTOW, but the performance limited TOW for the conditions of the day including the tailwind?
My feeling is that Marty knowingly began the take-off not only marginally over structural MTOW, but well over RTOW. In other words, he took a gamble with the passenger's lives by operating outside Scheduled Performance rules.
Then the uncommanded shut-down and poor CRM. Sorry, but the total blame lies with Air France culture which led to this risk-taking mentality. If they hadn't gambled on taking-off outside limits, they would never have hit the runway debris.
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One question to which I've never seen the answer:
What was the Regulated TOW on departure? Not the ATOW or structural MTOW, but the performance limited TOW for the conditions of the day including the tailwind?
My feeling is that Marty knowingly began the take-off not only marginally over structural MTOW, but well over RTOW. In other words, he took a gamble with the passenger's lives by operating outside Scheduled Performance rules.
Then the uncommanded shut-down and poor CRM. Sorry, but the total blame lies with Air France culture which led to this risk-taking mentality. If they hadn't gambled on taking-off outside limits, they would never have hit the runway debris.
What was the Regulated TOW on departure? Not the ATOW or structural MTOW, but the performance limited TOW for the conditions of the day including the tailwind?
My feeling is that Marty knowingly began the take-off not only marginally over structural MTOW, but well over RTOW. In other words, he took a gamble with the passenger's lives by operating outside Scheduled Performance rules.
Then the uncommanded shut-down and poor CRM. Sorry, but the total blame lies with Air France culture which led to this risk-taking mentality. If they hadn't gambled on taking-off outside limits, they would never have hit the runway debris.
I don't have a Concorde L&B manual with me, but I'm sure some do.
TODA was 3370m I believe, and 090@8 on RW 26.
Not sure of the temp, but I know the perf calcs were done with wind calm....
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I had the honour of knowing Christian Marty personally and did not have him down as a risk taker.
He was a true professional and a credit to AF.
I see nothing to be gained by the impending legalities and would rather offer once again my thoughts to his family, the crew and pax.
May they rest in peace.
He was a true professional and a credit to AF.
I see nothing to be gained by the impending legalities and would rather offer once again my thoughts to his family, the crew and pax.
May they rest in peace.
My feeling is that Marty knowingly began the take-off not only marginally over structural MTOW, but well over RTOW. In other words, he took a gamble with the passenger's lives by operating outside Scheduled Performance rules.
Frankly once they rotated early and shut down #2 their fate was sealed. In retrospect I really see this as one of the most unfortunate accident in recent history. Sure there was some negligence by Conti staff, ADP, Air France, the crew or even the certification authorities but it's really hard to blame anyone to the extent of a judiciary sanction.
Just my 2c
atakacs:
I respectfully disagree. The report has examined the early rotation and indicated that the effect on the accident sequence was immaterial, as was the shutting down, by the requirements in the book, of #2 and which never developed much more than idle thrust post-fire. Their fate was sealed once the fire began. The relevant section of the report is,
, my emphases.
Regarding accidents and your observation,
Not sure how much you know about recent accident history, causal paths, the effects of broad-reaching forces such as airline safety culture (Flt Ops and Maintenance) and human factors but, without denying that this is indeed a terribly tragic accident, it is by no means and no stretch, alone in it's genesis and tragic outcome. Many of us here can cite accident after accident in which the causal pathways were known beforehand and, through the "Normalization of Deviance", were set aside in favour of either politics or commercial interests or combinations of both. This forum is chock-full of such discussions, made all the more disconcerting in the face of introducing SMS - an-essentially self-regulatory safety environment - really, the "de-regulation of safety".
I understand very well, what you're trying to say in empathizing with those affected by this particular tragedy but please keep in mind that there are tens of thousands of others so affected by other, equally, especially tragic outcomes which, but for all factors lining up, were, in hindsight, preventable, and, as I watch data and what is being done with it locally - (ie, nothing), I can see causal pathways developing as we speak and, quite frankly, do not sleep at night.
The work of flight safety today is preventative. Kicking tin, reading DFDRs and listening to last words on CVRs is only designed to prevent the second accident, not the first. With today's capabilities in data analysis, knowledge of human factors and the prohibitive, (perhaps airline-ending) costs of an accident, such an approach is intolerable if not perhaps criminal. Pre-emptive actions on the part of operators is essential in an SMS environment for without it, and with the tendency to reduce hiring standards to staff cockpits around the world, the accident rate is going to rise.
If an operator is in possession of safety data in which the understood causal pathways of an accident such as non-stable approaches, long landings, idle-thrust landings, not following SOPs, are indicating high risk, and that operator does nothing with the data or merely creates the illusion of action when none in fact is taking place, that operator is taking the same risks, though this time, with clear knowledge, as those who normalized deviance with various aspects of the Concorde operation. Because of all this, it is important to comprehend that the Concorde accident is in many ways, "not special". Now please, I do NOT mean this to sound callous nor do I dismiss this tragedy as nothing special, but mean that the factors which put this beautiful airplane with it's passengers in harm's way are not unique to Concorde.
Frankly once they rotated early and shut down #2 their fate was sealed.
1.16.13.3 Effect of the Early Rotation
To study the effect of the early rotation on the aircraft’s initial climb, a model of the
aircraft’s track in the vertical plane was made based on the following hypotheses:
• VR = 198 kt and trim = 13°, values written on the takeoff sheet,
• loss of engine thrust identical to that on the accident flight.
Note: the 13° trim is what is planned to counter an engine failure on takeoff.
In these conditions, at cycle 97660, thus before the final loss of thrust on engine 1, the
altitude would have been 470 feet and the speed 200 kt.
These values would not have made it possible to counter the loss of a second engine.
1.16.13.4 Consequences of Aborting the Takeoff
Two simulations of a possible acceleration-stop were performed, one based on the
aircraft’s speed when the rotation was commenced (that is to say in fact the first moment
when the crew could have been warned by unusual sensations), at 183 kt, the other at
196 kt, when the FE said what can be understood as “stop”.
The simulations were conducted with the following hypotheses:
• braking on seven wheels, to take into account the destruction of tyre No 2,
• braking torque available at nominal value until the maximum energy indicated in
the Flight Manual (70 MJ), increased by 10%,
• use of thrust reversers on engines 1, 3 and 4.
With this set of hypotheses, it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of
the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff
aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such
a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been
catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
To study the effect of the early rotation on the aircraft’s initial climb, a model of the
aircraft’s track in the vertical plane was made based on the following hypotheses:
• VR = 198 kt and trim = 13°, values written on the takeoff sheet,
• loss of engine thrust identical to that on the accident flight.
Note: the 13° trim is what is planned to counter an engine failure on takeoff.
In these conditions, at cycle 97660, thus before the final loss of thrust on engine 1, the
altitude would have been 470 feet and the speed 200 kt.
These values would not have made it possible to counter the loss of a second engine.
1.16.13.4 Consequences of Aborting the Takeoff
Two simulations of a possible acceleration-stop were performed, one based on the
aircraft’s speed when the rotation was commenced (that is to say in fact the first moment
when the crew could have been warned by unusual sensations), at 183 kt, the other at
196 kt, when the FE said what can be understood as “stop”.
The simulations were conducted with the following hypotheses:
• braking on seven wheels, to take into account the destruction of tyre No 2,
• braking torque available at nominal value until the maximum energy indicated in
the Flight Manual (70 MJ), increased by 10%,
• use of thrust reversers on engines 1, 3 and 4.
With this set of hypotheses, it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of
the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff
aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such
a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been
catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
Regarding accidents and your observation,
In retrospect I really see this as one of the most unfortunate accident in recent history.
I understand very well, what you're trying to say in empathizing with those affected by this particular tragedy but please keep in mind that there are tens of thousands of others so affected by other, equally, especially tragic outcomes which, but for all factors lining up, were, in hindsight, preventable, and, as I watch data and what is being done with it locally - (ie, nothing), I can see causal pathways developing as we speak and, quite frankly, do not sleep at night.
The work of flight safety today is preventative. Kicking tin, reading DFDRs and listening to last words on CVRs is only designed to prevent the second accident, not the first. With today's capabilities in data analysis, knowledge of human factors and the prohibitive, (perhaps airline-ending) costs of an accident, such an approach is intolerable if not perhaps criminal. Pre-emptive actions on the part of operators is essential in an SMS environment for without it, and with the tendency to reduce hiring standards to staff cockpits around the world, the accident rate is going to rise.
If an operator is in possession of safety data in which the understood causal pathways of an accident such as non-stable approaches, long landings, idle-thrust landings, not following SOPs, are indicating high risk, and that operator does nothing with the data or merely creates the illusion of action when none in fact is taking place, that operator is taking the same risks, though this time, with clear knowledge, as those who normalized deviance with various aspects of the Concorde operation. Because of all this, it is important to comprehend that the Concorde accident is in many ways, "not special". Now please, I do NOT mean this to sound callous nor do I dismiss this tragedy as nothing special, but mean that the factors which put this beautiful airplane with it's passengers in harm's way are not unique to Concorde.
Last edited by PJ2; 5th Jul 2008 at 21:00.
I believe the RTOW was around 180,000.
When told the wind was not calm, but was an 8 knot tailwind, and knowing that they'd only used 800 kg of the 2000 kg assumed for taxying, why did none of the crew query the performance issue?
My view is that the Concorde was not always operated "by the book".......
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I think you'll find that BA certainly always operated Concorde by the book!
There is nothing to be proud about operating an aircraft in these conditions, even if it is as in the books.
By the way, thanks for blaming and naming a dead colleague.
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The aviation safety database lists 65 BA incidents since 1978, all but eight of which were Concorde incidents. This includes such gems as "No. 4 tyre burst due to FOD; damage to wheels no. 7 and 8 and engines no. 3 and 4." (An entry from 1979.)
Most of the others are related to tyre failures, with occasional bits dropping off in flight and the odd engine hiccup.
Most of the others are related to tyre failures, with occasional bits dropping off in flight and the odd engine hiccup.
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PJ2 thank you for your posts, very informative.
2 remarks :
1- from an ATC point of view , as Heathrow Director already pointed out, it is not a requirement in any place that I know of to visually inspect the runway before every departure. You have to do so at prescribed intervals, and/or after a FO is reported by someone or is suspected to be in there. Nothing more.
2-Re The Continental "strip" : I have heard ( rumour) that the French Prosecutor was shown a series of photos showing part of the engine cowling that the " strip" was supposed to cover, and that those photos implied a certain degree of negligence over a long period of time on the maintenance part of that aircraft..
The next argument is that should the part had been the original one ( in Aluminum ?) it could have been run over more safely. The non-standard part was in Titanium ( much harder) and was prone to be lost over time as it could not be attached properly because the cowling had a dozen or so holes from earlier attempts to attach similar strips .
The next argument is that other previous strips must have detached before and Continental maintenance must have known about the danger.
I do not think the judge will say that the Continental strip is the main cause of the accident but he might give a certain percentage of responsibility (i.e part of the damage claims ) to Continental insurance company...
2 remarks :
1- from an ATC point of view , as Heathrow Director already pointed out, it is not a requirement in any place that I know of to visually inspect the runway before every departure. You have to do so at prescribed intervals, and/or after a FO is reported by someone or is suspected to be in there. Nothing more.
2-Re The Continental "strip" : I have heard ( rumour) that the French Prosecutor was shown a series of photos showing part of the engine cowling that the " strip" was supposed to cover, and that those photos implied a certain degree of negligence over a long period of time on the maintenance part of that aircraft..
The next argument is that should the part had been the original one ( in Aluminum ?) it could have been run over more safely. The non-standard part was in Titanium ( much harder) and was prone to be lost over time as it could not be attached properly because the cowling had a dozen or so holes from earlier attempts to attach similar strips .
The next argument is that other previous strips must have detached before and Continental maintenance must have known about the danger.
I do not think the judge will say that the Continental strip is the main cause of the accident but he might give a certain percentage of responsibility (i.e part of the damage claims ) to Continental insurance company...
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1/ Those canisters in the aircraft that hold fuel are called "fuel tanks". a "Fuel Cell" is a hydrogen/oxygen-fueled cell that provides electric power. Concorde has no fuel cells.
My racecar, a Porsche 911, has a "fuel cell." I has nothing to do with hydrogen being consumed to create electricity. It is what in the racing business is universally called a "fuel cell"--an aluminum gasoline tank filled with an absorbent medium that largely encapsulates the gas in the case of a crash. All serious racecars have fuel cells.
My racecar, a Porsche 911, has a "fuel cell." I has nothing to do with hydrogen being consumed to create electricity. It is what in the racing business is universally called a "fuel cell"--an aluminum gasoline tank filled with an absorbent medium that largely encapsulates the gas in the case of a crash. All serious racecars have fuel cells.
When this story was first reported, the brief radio commentary I heard about this had two points:
1) The piece that fell off was "supposed" to be aluminum (aluminium), but was actually titanium, which being a sturdier metal caused the tire puncture.
2) The pilot is ultimately responsible for a safe flight, so should not have taken off under unsafe conditions.
---------
Hard to argue with the simple logic behind the second point. The plane crashed, so it clearly wasn't a safe flight and thus was the pilot's "responsibility" (fault.) Beyond the death penalty handed out at the time, it's difficult to see where else to take it.
I suppose they expect every pilot to make a full inspection of the runway before takeoff. The reduction in traffic should make ATC's job much easier.
Note, I'm criticizing the radio jockey's comments rather than the merits of the case.
1) The piece that fell off was "supposed" to be aluminum (aluminium), but was actually titanium, which being a sturdier metal caused the tire puncture.
2) The pilot is ultimately responsible for a safe flight, so should not have taken off under unsafe conditions.
---------
Hard to argue with the simple logic behind the second point. The plane crashed, so it clearly wasn't a safe flight and thus was the pilot's "responsibility" (fault.) Beyond the death penalty handed out at the time, it's difficult to see where else to take it.
I suppose they expect every pilot to make a full inspection of the runway before takeoff. The reduction in traffic should make ATC's job much easier.
Note, I'm criticizing the radio jockey's comments rather than the merits of the case.
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The runway inspection has nothing to do with this issue.
A safe aircraft is supposed to be able to suffer a tyre loss without causing fuel tank perforation, fire, and loss of control.
Concorde used to blow its tyres even without continental's help, and this for years, without any action of the manufacturer or the operators (AF & BA). This accident is an opportunity to put into the light some serious lacks in Air France procedures, maintenance as for Continental, but this is NOT the fundamental cause of the accident. To my opinion, AF & BA holds the main responsibility in exposing for so many years the passengers to such well known risks without taking any action. It is absolutely silly to pretend BA operated safer flights than AF, the main issue was a design issue absolutely known by both operators. In any circumstances they should have tolerated to operate an aircraft with such high risks.
A safe aircraft is supposed to be able to suffer a tyre loss without causing fuel tank perforation, fire, and loss of control.
Concorde used to blow its tyres even without continental's help, and this for years, without any action of the manufacturer or the operators (AF & BA). This accident is an opportunity to put into the light some serious lacks in Air France procedures, maintenance as for Continental, but this is NOT the fundamental cause of the accident. To my opinion, AF & BA holds the main responsibility in exposing for so many years the passengers to such well known risks without taking any action. It is absolutely silly to pretend BA operated safer flights than AF, the main issue was a design issue absolutely known by both operators. In any circumstances they should have tolerated to operate an aircraft with such high risks.
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F-BTSC(203), being originally a model 100 (that would have been converted to a model 103 for Pan-Am), was the heaviest Concorde of all the Air France fleet: it was just under one ton heavier and two years older than the lighter and youngest F-BTSD (213).
One ton seems rather a lot for 'production variations' + Mods. No?