The TNT B737 EMA/Birmingham incident thread
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Originally Posted by anoxic
The long grooves in the grass were nearer the taxiway than the runway at EMA and not caused by "bouncing wheels" but by an aircraft that all but crashed there! The incident/accident at EMA seems of lesser consideration in this topic than the one at BHX. I think more attention should be addressed as to what happened at EMA.
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Originally Posted by Coconutty
Flaps15GearDown :
It will be interesting to see if this incident is quoted in any Planning permission applications !
It will be interesting to see if this incident is quoted in any Planning permission applications !
As for why the TNT crew used runway 15/33 instead of the x-runway in an emergency, they would have wanted the longest runway with the more straightforward approach!
Cheers
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Ok Magplug, I'll accept that in your previous post's you may have been talking about the classics and not 737 in general but you still havnt said why you think cockpit design may have played a part in this accident?
As I have said, Im a Classic pilot myself so I'm interested in any vices you feel this aircraft has.
As I have said, Im a Classic pilot myself so I'm interested in any vices you feel this aircraft has.
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Mercenary Pilot....
I would not describe the vices of the 737 as being contributory to this accident per-se although it certainly has some as you are aware. I imagine the old 737-200 was probably quite a nice balanced machine (although I never flew it), but the sons & grandsons of the -200 have been modified & stretched until you have the higher weight 400's et al that are unbalanced in pitch & roll and have the pitch/power couple from hell when you execute a go-around.
Moving onto your question....
Anyone who has flown another commercial jets before the 737 will have observed that the Auto-Flight modes are rather less than intuitive in some stages of flight. This lack of intuitive communication to the pilot is particularly manifest in the FMA indications... especially in the go-around sequence.
One of the most difficult concepts for every student new to the 737 is trying to understand the various modes you could find yourself in after a go-around from the various permutations of 1/2 AP +/- Flight Director.
As you know the 737 does not so much Autoland as execute a semi-automatic main-gear impact. The scenario of a CAT3 approach is procedurally a 'piece of cake' when all goes according to plan - we have all done it dozens of times. However a late malfunction or undetected LCZR/GP excursion will quickly put you outside that zone of familiarity into places you would rather not be. From this position of discomfort the autopilot will disconnect uncommanded and you will be presented with an out-of-trim aircraft that says 'God-Knows-What' on the FMA which you will then decide to ignore and manually wrestle the aircraft away from the ground. The success of that manoeuvre will hinge entirely on how late it happened and the sum-total of awake pilots on the flight deck.
My comments on the 'Macho' way that Boeing advocate certain procedures here is manifest in their QRH drills for Autoland failures that you might encounter below 1000'.... which of course you will be executing purely from memory! I count six malfunctions detailed in my QRH, four of which invite you to make a snap decision as to continue the approach or not. Is this really sound to be troubleshooting critical stuff so close to the ground? As I already said I have no allegiance to any particular manufacturer but Airbus certainly have the right idea.... When executing an Autoland in anger, any malfunction below 1000RA - Go Around.
If you have any doubts in your mind as to the validity of the two differing ideologies then simply open the flight deck door and ask for a show of hands amongst the passengers. What would they expect?
I would not describe the vices of the 737 as being contributory to this accident per-se although it certainly has some as you are aware. I imagine the old 737-200 was probably quite a nice balanced machine (although I never flew it), but the sons & grandsons of the -200 have been modified & stretched until you have the higher weight 400's et al that are unbalanced in pitch & roll and have the pitch/power couple from hell when you execute a go-around.
Moving onto your question....
Anyone who has flown another commercial jets before the 737 will have observed that the Auto-Flight modes are rather less than intuitive in some stages of flight. This lack of intuitive communication to the pilot is particularly manifest in the FMA indications... especially in the go-around sequence.
One of the most difficult concepts for every student new to the 737 is trying to understand the various modes you could find yourself in after a go-around from the various permutations of 1/2 AP +/- Flight Director.
As you know the 737 does not so much Autoland as execute a semi-automatic main-gear impact. The scenario of a CAT3 approach is procedurally a 'piece of cake' when all goes according to plan - we have all done it dozens of times. However a late malfunction or undetected LCZR/GP excursion will quickly put you outside that zone of familiarity into places you would rather not be. From this position of discomfort the autopilot will disconnect uncommanded and you will be presented with an out-of-trim aircraft that says 'God-Knows-What' on the FMA which you will then decide to ignore and manually wrestle the aircraft away from the ground. The success of that manoeuvre will hinge entirely on how late it happened and the sum-total of awake pilots on the flight deck.
My comments on the 'Macho' way that Boeing advocate certain procedures here is manifest in their QRH drills for Autoland failures that you might encounter below 1000'.... which of course you will be executing purely from memory! I count six malfunctions detailed in my QRH, four of which invite you to make a snap decision as to continue the approach or not. Is this really sound to be troubleshooting critical stuff so close to the ground? As I already said I have no allegiance to any particular manufacturer but Airbus certainly have the right idea.... When executing an Autoland in anger, any malfunction below 1000RA - Go Around.
If you have any doubts in your mind as to the validity of the two differing ideologies then simply open the flight deck door and ask for a show of hands amongst the passengers. What would they expect?
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F15GD :
Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.
Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?
.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?
Coconutty
Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.
Also just to correct you the runway was open for arrivals an hour or so after it was opened to departures.
Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?
.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?
Coconutty
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Originally Posted by Coconutty
F15GD :
Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.
Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?
.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?
Coconutty
Correct ! - I wasn't necessarily agreeing with the airport numb skull, just putting into context what he was trying to say ... if the runwaty had already been extended, then assuming he still touched down at the same point relative to the R3 threshold, and slowed at the same rate the extra room would have been ahead of where it stopped.
Did I say otherwise ? - Think not - I stated that aircraft were departing on R15 while the 737 was still stranded there, and that landings would have been a "no-no" - are you saying that aircraft DID land on R33 while the 737 was still there, in which case I stand corrected, or was this after it had been towed to the Alpha Loop ?
.... but Hey - where's the update on the East Mids incident ?
Coconutty
R33 was open for arrivals before the 733 was moved but the only a/c I know that used it was the citiation bringing the engineers to assess and secure the airframe before it could be moved.
There is also a rumour that the engineers found grass in the cowlings of number 2 engine before it was moved, and it didn't collect that in BHX. If that is true the crew were very lucky that they managed to get to BHX and walk away
Having just seen the 2 grooves at EMA, I just cannot understand how the aircraft did not end up in a million pieces smeared along the ground.
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.
The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.
A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.
When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.
The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.
A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.
When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...
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Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine....
)?PP
Originally Posted by HundredPercentPlease
Having just seen the 2 grooves at EMA, I just cannot understand how the aircraft did not end up in a million pieces smeared along the ground.
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.
The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.
A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.
When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...
The grooves are very deep and have churned up a lot of soil. Difficult to tell from the HP, but maybe 1.5' deep for the main gear and a bit less for the engine.
The aircraft impacted closer to the taxiway than the runway (so at least a couple of aircraft widths from the runway) and it looks like only the RHS of the aircraft hit. So the yaw must have been phenomenal.
A miracle, that a 733 can kind of crash into the ground, with a good dig-in on one side, and then get airborne again. The FDR data will be very interesting.
When you see it, it is also unbelievable that the aircraft was so far off the runway centreline. Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...
Good job they weren't carrying passengers - I can only imagine the headline in the Daily Mirror the next morning!!
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Magplug
Okay I will agree with the point regarding A/P modes during a missed approach, it can be a little confusing for a new pilot. However, I don’t think experienced crew (or just the captain if the F/O was new to type) would have any concerns with this.
As for the autoland, an undetected LZR/GP excursion..Do you mean because the pilots are not monitoring the instruments properly?
Ok, say this scenario is caused by a malfunction of some kind. Wouldn’t you be in the same situation with any commercial airliner?
No I agree with you, below 1000', real CATIII conditions, critical failure...GO AROUND! However, if the problem isn't critical and a safe landing can be made. I like the option to be able to do so, I don’t think this is a macho thing. We are professional, skilled people and the notion we are incapable of sound decisions is more than a little offensive. I believe the current trend for aircraft design to take pilots out of the "loop" is not the way to improve flight safety.
Okay I will agree with the point regarding A/P modes during a missed approach, it can be a little confusing for a new pilot. However, I don’t think experienced crew (or just the captain if the F/O was new to type) would have any concerns with this.
As for the autoland, an undetected LZR/GP excursion..Do you mean because the pilots are not monitoring the instruments properly?
From this position of discomfort the autopilot will disconnect uncommanded and you will be presented with an out-of-trim aircraft that says 'God-Knows-What' on the FMA which you will then decide to ignore and manually wrestle the aircraft away from the ground. The success of that manoeuvre will hinge entirely on how late it happened and the sum-total of awake pilots on the flight deck.
My comments on the 'Macho' way that Boeing advocate certain procedures here is manifest in their QRH drills for Autoland failures that you might encounter below 1000'.... which of course you will be executing purely from memory! I count six malfunctions detailed in my QRH, four of which invite you to make a snap decision as to continue the approach or not. Is this really sound to be troubleshooting critical stuff so close to the ground? As I already said I have no allegiance to any particular manufacturer but Airbus certainly have the right idea.... When executing an Autoland in anger, any malfunction below 1000RA - Go Around
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I believe most of TNT 733s are non EFIS although I heard some are fully EFIS equipped.
This could also be a problem if crews are flying a non EFIS 737 on one day and the next day an EFIS, especially during a CAT 3.
Just a thought...
This could also be a problem if crews are flying a non EFIS 737 on one day and the next day an EFIS, especially during a CAT 3.
Just a thought...
Last edited by euroflyer; 20th Jun 2006 at 10:06.
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Maybe this is why the ILS at EMA is now going to be off for a couple of months...
If they did, and they obviously didn't crash, they must have gone-around, so surely ATC would have been very aware of any causal ILS fault.
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Originally Posted by GOLF-INDIA BRAVO
Brings back memories of the DC-8 at Stansted that hit another aircraft back in 70`/80`s and diverted to Manchester with a large gash in the wing and part of the flaps missing ( from memory )
When you looked at the damage you wondered how it ever made it to Manchester
Can anyone remember this and fill in the gaps for me
G-I-B
When you looked at the damage you wondered how it ever made it to Manchester
Can anyone remember this and fill in the gaps for me
G-I-B
Originally Posted by Curious Pax
This is going from memory, but my recollection of the DC8 incident is a Philipines registered DC8 doing a low go around at Stansted in early morning fog, clipping the tail of a Flying Tigers DC8, and diverting to Manchester. I think it was around 1982/3. A look round the net didn't find anything, but looking in the DC-8 database I found, I think that the offending aircraft was RP-C830 of Intercontinental. It was certainly a surprise to a young spotter who pedalled out one morning and saw it at Manchester - seems a lifetime ago when you just went on spec, and not because a message on the web had flagged something worth seeing!
) Does this near accident at EMA have a strong circumstancial link to the Air Algeria crash at Coventry some years ago?
http://aviation-safety.net/database/...1221-0&lang=en
Glad the crew walked away safe and well, from two in one day
.Be lucky
David
Last edited by The AvgasDinosaur; 20th Jun 2006 at 15:30.
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Shaggy Sheep
Probably not, the other night freight operators come in between 01-04z and this was after then. Unlikely to be a charter flight around then and next inbound is Ryanair at 07z
There have been to my knowledge no issues with the ILS
Probably not, the other night freight operators come in between 01-04z and this was after then. Unlikely to be a charter flight around then and next inbound is Ryanair at 07z
There have been to my knowledge no issues with the ILS
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Mercenary Pilot,
There could be several reasons for the excursion from the LCZR:
The whole crux of modern aircraft design is for us to admit that humans have a very poor success rate of making sound decisions when under time pressure. Only decisions taken at leisure with due regard for all available information are ultimately safe. We are much more skilled at monitoring than actually doing and any device or enhancement that improves that skill is a step in the right direction.
The fact that you find might find your judgement questioned as being offensive is a broadly held view amongst many pilots..... and a common human failing. Unfortunately we still lose aeroplanes worldwide on a daily basis, often because pilots are convinced they are right about something ....when they were not!
As for the Autoland, an undetected LCZR/GP excursion..Do you mean because the pilots are not monitoring the instruments properly?
- Autopilot malfunction combined with inadequate monitoring or timely manual intervention.
- Attempting Autoland outside cross-wind limits
- Accidental mis-setting of an identical but incorrect QDM by both pilots
- Failure/malfunction of the ground ILS installation (unlikely because monitoring & recording equipment alerts ATC).
- Human Interference with the ILS installation... Did someone report it was due for maintenance or replacement?
- Violation of the ILS protected area by a vehicle....now that would do it!
No I agree with you, below 1000', real CAT III conditions, critical failure...GO AROUND! However, if the problem isn't critical and a safe landing can be made. I like the option to be able to do so, I don’t think this is a macho thing. We are professional, skilled people and the notion we are incapable of sound decisions is more than a little offensive. I believe the current trend for aircraft design to take pilots out of the "loop" is not the way to improve flight safety.
The fact that you find might find your judgement questioned as being offensive is a broadly held view amongst many pilots..... and a common human failing. Unfortunately we still lose aeroplanes worldwide on a daily basis, often because pilots are convinced they are right about something ....when they were not!