Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
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I always wait during these discussions for someone to check my profile, and without knowing whether or not I am a pilot or have ever flown in a multi-crew environment, assume I am “just an IT consultant” and therefore devalue what I might have to say.
Okay, even if I had never set foot on an Aircraft before, I can tell you that blaming men who are dead and can not answer back is wrong. Two dead F/Es, one didn’t stop 4 engines and therefore killed 480 people, one did stop one engine and therefore killed 120 people. Don’t you think this is wrong?
This was an event that happened because many actions were and were not taken. If we are seeking one arse to kick then to me the more obvious arse is the Engineering department that allowed the undercarriage to be installed without the spacer. From what I have read here, even if the tyre had stayed intact we would still be reading and writing about this incident. The veer to the left, the subsequent hitting and ingesting of the edge lamp, the take-off below Vr to avoid the 747 on the taxi-way - all of these by themselves would have resulted in (at best) an emergency overweight landing at Bouget.
Okay, even if I had never set foot on an Aircraft before, I can tell you that blaming men who are dead and can not answer back is wrong. Two dead F/Es, one didn’t stop 4 engines and therefore killed 480 people, one did stop one engine and therefore killed 120 people. Don’t you think this is wrong?
This was an event that happened because many actions were and were not taken. If we are seeking one arse to kick then to me the more obvious arse is the Engineering department that allowed the undercarriage to be installed without the spacer. From what I have read here, even if the tyre had stayed intact we would still be reading and writing about this incident. The veer to the left, the subsequent hitting and ingesting of the edge lamp, the take-off below Vr to avoid the 747 on the taxi-way - all of these by themselves would have resulted in (at best) an emergency overweight landing at Bouget.
Thread Starter
Why only kick one arse, when many may (or may not) deserve it?
ADP for pi$$ poor FOD control?
ADP for compromising safety in the interests of using a 'quieter' runway?
Air France engineering for the reasons mentioned?
Air France management for allegedly allowing/encouraging a culture in which cavalier disregard of rules and regs was possible?
Air France for not incorporating existing ADs on tyres and tanks?
The Captain for taking an overweight aircraft, not rechecking the weight after the wind direction changed, and allowing himself to get slow enough to lose control, instead of force landing?
The FE for shutting down the engine
BAC/Aerospatiale for an inadequate original fuel tank design?
The tyre manufacturers?
Continental (or, if some reports are to be believed, airfield contractors) for the FOD?
The BEA for over-concentrating on one aspect in the report?
The CAA for rubber stamping it?
No-one's singling out the FE to shoulder all the blame, but in shutting down that engine when he did, his was probably the action which represents the 'final straw'.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
ADP for pi$$ poor FOD control?
ADP for compromising safety in the interests of using a 'quieter' runway?
Air France engineering for the reasons mentioned?
Air France management for allegedly allowing/encouraging a culture in which cavalier disregard of rules and regs was possible?
Air France for not incorporating existing ADs on tyres and tanks?
The Captain for taking an overweight aircraft, not rechecking the weight after the wind direction changed, and allowing himself to get slow enough to lose control, instead of force landing?
The FE for shutting down the engine
BAC/Aerospatiale for an inadequate original fuel tank design?
The tyre manufacturers?
Continental (or, if some reports are to be believed, airfield contractors) for the FOD?
The BEA for over-concentrating on one aspect in the report?
The CAA for rubber stamping it?
No-one's singling out the FE to shoulder all the blame, but in shutting down that engine when he did, his was probably the action which represents the 'final straw'.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
It needs to be stressed that it's not direct blame of an individual which is being sought in this thread. Everyone would, I am sure, respect the honourable aeronautical tradition of not laying direct blame at those who can never answer to their accusers.
What we really wish to know is whether a culture existed on that airline/fleet/crew which seemingly allowed them to ignore the fact that they were about to take-off overweight, which did not query the revised RTOW with the tailwind and which then allowed a critical engine shut down to go unchallenged?
Perhaps the alleged mis-aligned spacer would have been less of a problem if the aircraft had not been over its certificated structural take-off weight limit. Perhaps the tyre(s) would not have failed so dramatically after impact if they had not benn subjected to the stress of an overweight take-off........
There is more to this than just 'a tyre burst after an impact with runway FOD; the resulting fire caused catastrophic loss of thrust and the aircraft subsequently departed controlled flight'.
[ 26 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
What we really wish to know is whether a culture existed on that airline/fleet/crew which seemingly allowed them to ignore the fact that they were about to take-off overweight, which did not query the revised RTOW with the tailwind and which then allowed a critical engine shut down to go unchallenged?
Perhaps the alleged mis-aligned spacer would have been less of a problem if the aircraft had not been over its certificated structural take-off weight limit. Perhaps the tyre(s) would not have failed so dramatically after impact if they had not benn subjected to the stress of an overweight take-off........
There is more to this than just 'a tyre burst after an impact with runway FOD; the resulting fire caused catastrophic loss of thrust and the aircraft subsequently departed controlled flight'.
[ 26 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
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Jackonicko, BEagle and beaver eager
I guess you are missing my point, probable my fault becasue I am not good enough expressing what I mean in writing.
My oint about the FE was in relation to New Bloke's comments to the Teneriffe accident.
I have to admit that I am no expert in jets, nor will I probably ever be. BUT from commen sense it's easy to deduct that large jet aircraft are not designed to land on rough fields (as opposed to light aircrafts and even some larger turboprops). They are certified to be able to keep flying, provided, a) procedures are followed and b) limitations are observed. Not downhill and no reason to consider an off field landing.
On the otherhand, if not complying with a) and b) there is almost certainly spelled disaster in case of an emergency. A crash, controlled or not, will most likely cause everyone to die. The Sioux city accident was not a crash but a very hard landing on paved surface and even then half of the died.
Observe limitations, comply with procedures, keep it flying and your fine. This also included that the FE should not have shut down an engine uncommanded, just to clear up that misunderstanding, that was not what I meant. What he (and/or the F/O) should have done was refused to fly, as should the F/O or FE in Teneriffe (using whatever means possible including mutiny).
I guess you are missing my point, probable my fault becasue I am not good enough expressing what I mean in writing.
My oint about the FE was in relation to New Bloke's comments to the Teneriffe accident.I have to admit that I am no expert in jets, nor will I probably ever be. BUT from commen sense it's easy to deduct that large jet aircraft are not designed to land on rough fields (as opposed to light aircrafts and even some larger turboprops). They are certified to be able to keep flying, provided, a) procedures are followed and b) limitations are observed. Not downhill and no reason to consider an off field landing.
On the otherhand, if not complying with a) and b) there is almost certainly spelled disaster in case of an emergency. A crash, controlled or not, will most likely cause everyone to die. The Sioux city accident was not a crash but a very hard landing on paved surface and even then half of the died.
Observe limitations, comply with procedures, keep it flying and your fine. This also included that the FE should not have shut down an engine uncommanded, just to clear up that misunderstanding, that was not what I meant. What he (and/or the F/O) should have done was refused to fly, as should the F/O or FE in Teneriffe (using whatever means possible including mutiny).
Thread Starter
BEagle is quite right, it's not about apportioning blame, it's about assessing whether the authorities are doing their jobs and exercising their responsibilities adequately with this report.
It's about asking whether (if there was more to it than a simple tyre failure) the true causes of the accident have been properly recognised, and what is being done to make sure it doesn't happen again.
I'm glad they grounded Concorde and beefed up tyres and tanks, but I'm beginning to think that grounding Air France and re-training everyone wouldn't be an even more appropriate step!
Kramer:
There are plenty of examples of people surviving crash landings (I'd prefer to call them forced landings) - Sioux City may have touched down on the runway, but it ended up on rough ground at the kind of speed you were talking about. And even though it touched down with damned near 70° angle of bank, half those on board walked away. Kegworth hit a slope while on final approach. Numerous other aircraft have survived excursions into the overrun on take off or landing. There is no reason to suppose that Concorde would not have fared just as well in the terrain around Le Bourget.
On the other hand, no-one ever survives the classic stall/spin accidents which result from fools trying to 'stretch the glide'.
It's about asking whether (if there was more to it than a simple tyre failure) the true causes of the accident have been properly recognised, and what is being done to make sure it doesn't happen again.
I'm glad they grounded Concorde and beefed up tyres and tanks, but I'm beginning to think that grounding Air France and re-training everyone wouldn't be an even more appropriate step!
Kramer:
There are plenty of examples of people surviving crash landings (I'd prefer to call them forced landings) - Sioux City may have touched down on the runway, but it ended up on rough ground at the kind of speed you were talking about. And even though it touched down with damned near 70° angle of bank, half those on board walked away. Kegworth hit a slope while on final approach. Numerous other aircraft have survived excursions into the overrun on take off or landing. There is no reason to suppose that Concorde would not have fared just as well in the terrain around Le Bourget.
On the other hand, no-one ever survives the classic stall/spin accidents which result from fools trying to 'stretch the glide'.
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if the runway had been swept correctly then nothing could have caused tire burst and fuel tank rupture...pure and simple.
the runway was not cleaned correctly and Concorde will next take to skies with better tires and better fuel tanks...an altogether better aircraft.
I would not wish that anyone had died that a safer aircraft would be flying again - I just hope those in Paris who should have done their jobs cleaning runway have really examined consciences and resolved to do better next time...
Sorry - a simple reaction but from the heart OK?
the runway was not cleaned correctly and Concorde will next take to skies with better tires and better fuel tanks...an altogether better aircraft.
I would not wish that anyone had died that a safer aircraft would be flying again - I just hope those in Paris who should have done their jobs cleaning runway have really examined consciences and resolved to do better next time...
Sorry - a simple reaction but from the heart OK?
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Cosmo:
An off airport landing/controlled crash does not automatically result in injuries or fatalities.
If you click on the link below you will see the photo of a 737 landed in a farmer's field. No injuries to passengers. The airplane sustained no damage and was subsequently flown off by Boeing test pilots.
http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/taca-msy/photo.shtml
An off airport landing/controlled crash does not automatically result in injuries or fatalities.
If you click on the link below you will see the photo of a 737 landed in a farmer's field. No injuries to passengers. The airplane sustained no damage and was subsequently flown off by Boeing test pilots.
http://www.airdisaster.com/photos/taca-msy/photo.shtml
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For the 3rd time I KNOW the place between CDG and Le Bourget, I LIVED HERE, and it's not the country, I'TS A TOWN, NO FARMER'S FIELD, NO PLACE TO LAND!!!
nowhere more than a few hundreds meters free, i'ts absolutely impossible to land a heavy jet here without crashing in a house...
nowhere more than a few hundreds meters free, i'ts absolutely impossible to land a heavy jet here without crashing in a house...
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1) Do you know what is the normal reaction planned in the concorde book to react to a "engine failure warning" with a "fire alarm warning" ?
2) Do you know which were the informations in the hands of the crews and wich was the reactions booked to react?
3) Do you know how a lighter take off had modified the fate of the fly?
4) Do you know if , if not closed , the engine 2 had provided thrust and how long?
5) For the super landers, how could the crew have knew than engine 1 had to fail seconds laters?, knowing than a 3 engines fly is not an imminent crash scenario, and should have normally been made to Le Bourget
No, you don't know, you think, you thought, you believe, and then you conclude and you blame...
Now, the official investigation, whose work was not to sanctify the crew's memory, nor to try to sold any Concorde around, but to try to find the true reasons which have brouhted down the bird, have the answer to the questions 1 and 2, and stated than the crews had reacted perfectly, with the informations they had at the time.
2) Do you know which were the informations in the hands of the crews and wich was the reactions booked to react?
3) Do you know how a lighter take off had modified the fate of the fly?
4) Do you know if , if not closed , the engine 2 had provided thrust and how long?
5) For the super landers, how could the crew have knew than engine 1 had to fail seconds laters?, knowing than a 3 engines fly is not an imminent crash scenario, and should have normally been made to Le Bourget
No, you don't know, you think, you thought, you believe, and then you conclude and you blame...
Now, the official investigation, whose work was not to sanctify the crew's memory, nor to try to sold any Concorde around, but to try to find the true reasons which have brouhted down the bird, have the answer to the questions 1 and 2, and stated than the crews had reacted perfectly, with the informations they had at the time.
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Jackonicko
There is one major difference between Sioux city and the Concorde crash. The Sioux city had to land - one way or another - and their situation was never going to improve. They had no choice. Besides their speed must have been considerably slower when they went into the corn field. The speed would also be much slower on an overrun accident.
My guess would also be that Concorde pilot doesn't recieve any training in forced off runway landings. They are probable thought to have confidence in that the plane will keep flying (which would probable also have been correct if the limitations and procedures had been observed). Also the aircraft was on heavy fire and had loads of fuel. Landing off runway with no immediate fire service would probable have meant they would have died anyway, so I would have fought to keep it in the air as well.
GlueBall
I know. But there is a major difference between an almost uncrontrolable delta wing on flames going 200 kts, and a perfectly good and controlable B737 with a stall speed of 100-120 kts.
There is one major difference between Sioux city and the Concorde crash. The Sioux city had to land - one way or another - and their situation was never going to improve. They had no choice. Besides their speed must have been considerably slower when they went into the corn field. The speed would also be much slower on an overrun accident.
My guess would also be that Concorde pilot doesn't recieve any training in forced off runway landings. They are probable thought to have confidence in that the plane will keep flying (which would probable also have been correct if the limitations and procedures had been observed). Also the aircraft was on heavy fire and had loads of fuel. Landing off runway with no immediate fire service would probable have meant they would have died anyway, so I would have fought to keep it in the air as well.
GlueBall
I know. But there is a major difference between an almost uncrontrolable delta wing on flames going 200 kts, and a perfectly good and controlable B737 with a stall speed of 100-120 kts.
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Dear all
I started reading this thread thinking I " might " make it from page 1 to 6; how presumptious of me to think I could remain Mr Cool himself reading stuff coming from highly " qualified " Morons.
Good God, how is it we never thought about hiring the whole of you to fly this doomed Concorde, it would have spared us and 109 german pax a whole lot of sorrow.
On this however one thing I will not let you pompous and mean a......les do, is tarnish Christian Marty's memory and most of all profesionalism that I witnessed first hand for quite a few years flying with him on other aircraft types.
To compare him to Teneriffe KLM Captain is simply outrageaous to anyone who knew him and worked with him for he was the EXACT OPPOSITE !!! Seeing his name on your roster made you look foward to going to work as opposed to some other fellows and that's including a lot of major airlines I've been close to in my carreer. They actually sounded a lot like you Guvnor.
He never thought of himself as a hero but was just taking his various passions to the very limit,like crossing the Atlantic on a windsurf board at a time where there was no sponsoring and almost no publicity. It was the same with paragliging. Watching this event now dating more than 20 years you'll have to admit that the man had balls.
He wasn't the type like some of you to just reshape the world gulping one pint after another just watching their bellies grow as the years go by.
He was caring to his crew, he who ate like a rabbit because of his sports would show up at sign on with a bag of freshly baked croissants for his crew he had never met before when he himself didn't touch the stuff. As to CRM, being a young F/O then, I was coming back from work thinking what a great pilot I was. That's how Christian Marty made everyone who flew with him feel.But that may be a bit to human for you morrons so I'll go back to your technical rethoric.
In all the years where I've flown with him if I was to use one word to qualify him, it would be Mr Extra carefull and I remember on one occasion I wasn't happy with one of the options offered and he had no qualm at all going my way and making me feel it was the best decision in the world when there was undoubtly a million others. Pretty damn gratifying for a young F/O I tell you.
I also did fly with the F/E with whom I never was on the best speaking terms, but hey, that's life. As to the way he worked on the " whale " he was thoroughly pro.
Finally if the F/O hadn't been happy with what was going on during pre flight, trust me he would have just gone home. He was the most senior tech crew on the fleet and not some kind of wishie-washie yes man who accepts anything.
As to the way he should have flown the aircraft being a delta wing, you may have a point, that is sipping your coffee in your Garfield slippers while Mrs Buket is cooking you warm breakfast on your aniversary day.
In the real world in such a stressfull, out of the ordinary situation, you'll instinctively dig into your experience which in their case, like it would be in BA, was sub sonic airliners.
30 years of subsonic experience with no major call versus 1 year with on top of that the murkiest of situation ( 3 minutes flights all together explosion, fire etc ) that in my opinion sums it up.
Reading you you would think you guys recover a major situation every morning after breakie.
Now, Jackoro or who ever hides behind this maybe, since you're a journo, you'd like to make those accusations of encouraging the breaking of rules at Air France again, under your real name of course, I would enjoy seeing you sued, unless of course you can substantiate that. Get credentials and get your ass over here to have a look for yourself.
Why doesn't BA pack its tanks the way AF does ? Guess what, just a couple hundred miles more between CDG and JFK. Had you gotten your toosh on a Concorde, you'd want your tanks extra full.
That this led to the explosion through impact, that' s the official cause now isn't it ? Did BA have their tanks carpeted with Kevlar ? I think not.
Finally why didn't any current or former BA Concorde pilots contribute to your very valuable insights ??? I'm sure you'll find the answer yourself.
Forgive me for putting the lid back on the toilet bowl so soon but I need a breath of fresh air.
I started reading this thread thinking I " might " make it from page 1 to 6; how presumptious of me to think I could remain Mr Cool himself reading stuff coming from highly " qualified " Morons.
Good God, how is it we never thought about hiring the whole of you to fly this doomed Concorde, it would have spared us and 109 german pax a whole lot of sorrow.
On this however one thing I will not let you pompous and mean a......les do, is tarnish Christian Marty's memory and most of all profesionalism that I witnessed first hand for quite a few years flying with him on other aircraft types.
To compare him to Teneriffe KLM Captain is simply outrageaous to anyone who knew him and worked with him for he was the EXACT OPPOSITE !!! Seeing his name on your roster made you look foward to going to work as opposed to some other fellows and that's including a lot of major airlines I've been close to in my carreer. They actually sounded a lot like you Guvnor.
He never thought of himself as a hero but was just taking his various passions to the very limit,like crossing the Atlantic on a windsurf board at a time where there was no sponsoring and almost no publicity. It was the same with paragliging. Watching this event now dating more than 20 years you'll have to admit that the man had balls.
He wasn't the type like some of you to just reshape the world gulping one pint after another just watching their bellies grow as the years go by.
He was caring to his crew, he who ate like a rabbit because of his sports would show up at sign on with a bag of freshly baked croissants for his crew he had never met before when he himself didn't touch the stuff. As to CRM, being a young F/O then, I was coming back from work thinking what a great pilot I was. That's how Christian Marty made everyone who flew with him feel.But that may be a bit to human for you morrons so I'll go back to your technical rethoric.
In all the years where I've flown with him if I was to use one word to qualify him, it would be Mr Extra carefull and I remember on one occasion I wasn't happy with one of the options offered and he had no qualm at all going my way and making me feel it was the best decision in the world when there was undoubtly a million others. Pretty damn gratifying for a young F/O I tell you.
I also did fly with the F/E with whom I never was on the best speaking terms, but hey, that's life. As to the way he worked on the " whale " he was thoroughly pro.
Finally if the F/O hadn't been happy with what was going on during pre flight, trust me he would have just gone home. He was the most senior tech crew on the fleet and not some kind of wishie-washie yes man who accepts anything.
As to the way he should have flown the aircraft being a delta wing, you may have a point, that is sipping your coffee in your Garfield slippers while Mrs Buket is cooking you warm breakfast on your aniversary day.
In the real world in such a stressfull, out of the ordinary situation, you'll instinctively dig into your experience which in their case, like it would be in BA, was sub sonic airliners.
30 years of subsonic experience with no major call versus 1 year with on top of that the murkiest of situation ( 3 minutes flights all together explosion, fire etc ) that in my opinion sums it up.
Reading you you would think you guys recover a major situation every morning after breakie.
Now, Jackoro or who ever hides behind this maybe, since you're a journo, you'd like to make those accusations of encouraging the breaking of rules at Air France again, under your real name of course, I would enjoy seeing you sued, unless of course you can substantiate that. Get credentials and get your ass over here to have a look for yourself.
Why doesn't BA pack its tanks the way AF does ? Guess what, just a couple hundred miles more between CDG and JFK. Had you gotten your toosh on a Concorde, you'd want your tanks extra full.
That this led to the explosion through impact, that' s the official cause now isn't it ? Did BA have their tanks carpeted with Kevlar ? I think not.
Finally why didn't any current or former BA Concorde pilots contribute to your very valuable insights ??? I'm sure you'll find the answer yourself.
Forgive me for putting the lid back on the toilet bowl so soon but I need a breath of fresh air.
OK then, 'wallabie', two simple questions:
Why did 'Mr Extra Careful' apparently elect to exceed a known limit by commencing the take-off overweight? Why was there no crew discussion following the take-off clearance indicating a surface wind substantially different to that apparently used for calculation of RTOW?
Some might ponder the 'risk acceptance' of a commercial pilot whose other exploits you chronicle so vividly?
Less of the jingoism appearing in this thread would be of benefit. It is both the true facts of the accident and the lessons learned from the accident which matter.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Why did 'Mr Extra Careful' apparently elect to exceed a known limit by commencing the take-off overweight? Why was there no crew discussion following the take-off clearance indicating a surface wind substantially different to that apparently used for calculation of RTOW?
Some might ponder the 'risk acceptance' of a commercial pilot whose other exploits you chronicle so vividly?
Less of the jingoism appearing in this thread would be of benefit. It is both the true facts of the accident and the lessons learned from the accident which matter.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
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Wallabie - have just gone over the full seven pages of this thread and I can't see any attack on Capt Marty as a person.
There is however a great deal of questioning of the lack of CRM on board the aircraft - and that's a fact, as reflected in the BEA CVR transcripts.
This, as with every other disaster, is composed of a chain of events which principally seem to point at Air France as the main source of the problems.
To recap Jackonicko's summary:
I'd say that's a fair reflection of all the issues at hand. Capt Marty might well have been a great guy - and he certainly sounds it - but at the end of the day it's the training and CRM that didn't cut the grade.
Would a BA Concorde in the same situation have got down in one piece? I'd like to think so. But the big difference is that in this particular situation, the BA training and maintenance - including full compliance with ADs, SBs and other safety issues - toghether with operational standards at LHR would have meant, in all probability, that such a chain of events wouldn't happen.
Touch wood.
There is however a great deal of questioning of the lack of CRM on board the aircraft - and that's a fact, as reflected in the BEA CVR transcripts.
This, as with every other disaster, is composed of a chain of events which principally seem to point at Air France as the main source of the problems.
To recap Jackonicko's summary:
ADP for pi$$ poor FOD control?
ADP for compromising safety in the interests of using a 'quieter' runway?
Air France engineering for the reasons mentioned?
Air France management for allegedly allowing/encouraging a culture in which cavalier disregard of rules and regs was possible?
Air France for not incorporating existing ADs on tyres and tanks?
The Captain for taking an overweight aircraft, not rechecking the weight after the wind direction changed, and allowing himself to get slow enough to lose control, instead of force landing?
The FE for shutting down the engine
BAC/Aerospatiale for an inadequate original fuel tank design?
The tyre manufacturers?
Continental (or, if some reports are to be believed, airfield contractors) for the FOD?
The BEA for over-concentrating on one aspect in the report?
The CAA for rubber stamping it?
ADP for compromising safety in the interests of using a 'quieter' runway?
Air France engineering for the reasons mentioned?
Air France management for allegedly allowing/encouraging a culture in which cavalier disregard of rules and regs was possible?
Air France for not incorporating existing ADs on tyres and tanks?
The Captain for taking an overweight aircraft, not rechecking the weight after the wind direction changed, and allowing himself to get slow enough to lose control, instead of force landing?
The FE for shutting down the engine
BAC/Aerospatiale for an inadequate original fuel tank design?
The tyre manufacturers?
Continental (or, if some reports are to be believed, airfield contractors) for the FOD?
The BEA for over-concentrating on one aspect in the report?
The CAA for rubber stamping it?
Would a BA Concorde in the same situation have got down in one piece? I'd like to think so. But the big difference is that in this particular situation, the BA training and maintenance - including full compliance with ADs, SBs and other safety issues - toghether with operational standards at LHR would have meant, in all probability, that such a chain of events wouldn't happen.
Touch wood.
Thread Starter
Ok, let's just try and calm this down a tad. No-one wants to insult the dead, but nor does it do a good man's memory to try to pretend that anyone is ever entirely immune from making mistakes. From what one hears of Captain Marty he may have been the first to admit to his own weaknesses.
And if he made errors of judgement in this case, do you think he'd rather they were ignored and swept under the carpet, or used productively and sympathetically to prevent others from getting into trouble. The man you describe was a 'top bloke' who would have had the courage to accept blame or praise with an equally strong heart.
But I'd apologise if I've been guilty of treating him as a 'component' in this tragic event, rather than as a real and perhaps heroic human being.
And he may have made no errors at all. The issue of take off weight may have been some-one else's responsibility. But to pretend that there is no question about the issue does his memory no favours.
And on just the same basis, nor should we condemn the FE, although to raise questions about his actions ought to be fine.
I hate the verdict of pilot or aircrew error - it's often applied when it shouldn't be - and I sometimes wonder whether there isn't some truth in the joke about the accident investigator's explanation: "It's always pilot error, if nothing else it was an error for him to get up and go to work that morning!"
But sometimes we all make mistakes, but even when we do, they may not be our fault. Even if Captain Marty made an error of judgement, that doesn't necessarily mean that he was to blame - hence the concerns as to whether his environment conditioned him to act as he did.
But let's keep an open mind. Let's ask the questions and wait for the answers. There's no need for pre-judgement or insult.
Nor should this become an anti-French/anti-English issue.
Kramer: You are either very stubborn, or something else. No-one's pretending that a forced landing is easy, or necessarily survivable. People have died trying to put Cessnas down into perfect fields. But it's clear that any aircraft (Concorde including) can pull off a forced landing as long as the pilot doesn't lose control. It's then a matter of not hitting an obstacle so hard that the deceleration kills everyone on board, or of being trapped in the wreckage and burning to death. Concorde's chances were never more than so-so. But the chances of surviving the classic low-speed-loss of control-stall-spin are non existant. And if you have a CPL you need to tell us you understand that, because no passenger deserves to fly with someone whose instinct will be to 'stretch the glide' rather than put down safely in a field.
Mglof: Please explain the mass of green and brown fields on the satellite photo of the area between Le Bourget and CDG See p.3, between the red 6 and the Le Bourget threshold. Please explain why my visual memory is playing such tricks, since whenever I've flown in that area, it's looked pretty open to me.
You asked how a lighter take off would have 'modified the fate of the fly'. The aircraft would have accelerated quicker, rotated earlier, and may not have veered off the centreline, with less weight on the tyre and FOD, the tyre may not have burst, there may have been no ignition source, the aircraft might have been able to reach safe flying speed and may not have departed from controlled flight when it did. Crucially though, a tyre is more likely to burst if the aircraft is overweight. Is that enough?
You also ask how long the No.2 engine would have provided thrust had it not been shut down. No-one knows for certain - but certainly for longer than it was given the chance to, and any thrust is useful, for the maximum possible time.
It doesn't matter whether or not the crew knew that another engine might fail, good practise dictated that they kept the No.2 going until they reached V2 and a safe height.
Wallabie,
I have enormous sympathy for your loss - Captain Marty was clearly a friend and an inspiration to you. You pay an eloquent tribute to his humanity and spirit - he sounds as though he was a great loss.
But I'm sorry you choose to write anyone who questions the accident report off as beer-drinking 'morons', and then choose to pour scorn on us collectively and individually. Yes, I am a journalist and only a PPL, so yes, I may not have been able to save the aircraft had I been in Marty's position (though some of the experienced heavy jet Captains responding here may never have accepted the jet in the first place), but let's keep calm, and, if possible, friendly. And rather than insulting us, collectively, and emptily questioning our 'qualifications' why not point out where our interpretations are in error. It's not just a journalist raising these questions and expressing concern, remember, it's a group of professional aviators - your peers and equals. (And even the journalist is trying to get expert input, rather than simply going off and writing a 'Shock! Horror! Exposé!' type of story). If you have an argument, then argue your case. Abuse really is not an acceptable substitute.
Ignoring your 'slippers and breakfast wisecrack' the point is that all pilots (PPLs onwards) should be trained to react to the unexpected not emotionally and calling upon their experience, but by applying the appropriate procedures and pre-planned emergency drills. Rigorous adherence to such procedures is never more vital than at these times of great stress, as you, as an ATPL yourself, must realise. When they throw an emergency at you in the sim, do you think back to how you tackled it that time in the Beech Baron, or do you go into 'mental autopilot' and apply the appropriate actions for the A320, or whatever?
With regard to a culture of rule breaking - it's just a theory, based on the fact that the crew that day patently ignored weight limits. You can't have it both ways, either they did it because of something within themselves, or because the company encouraged them to think that it was OK to cut that kind of corner. Or if you have an alternative explanation, then please put our minds at rest - everyone finds the original explanation extremely worrying and frightening.
I don't think your remark that Air France packs its tanks 'extra full' because of the 'couple of hundred extra miles to JFK' helps your argument. If a route can be flown with the aircraft operating within its agreed and certified limits, great. If it can't then you need a refuelling stop, or to offload some payload, and not ignore the limits and take off overweight. One can only hope that I'm misinterpreting your point (you don't mean that AF Concordes deliberately and routinely take off overweight or unsafe 'cos that's the only way to reach JFK, I know), and I hope and pray that other Air France personnel don't have a cavalier disregard for weight limits.
But the key point to you is that rather than stooping to insult and invective, why not calmly answer the genuine concerns that are being expressed here?
Why did the aircraft take off overweight?
Why was there no recalculation after the wind changed?
How about the C of G questions?
Why did the FE shut down the engine when he did, before he'd been asked to do so?
Why are these factors irrelevant? Why aren't they listed as being contributory factors in the accident?
How about the missing undercarriage spacer? How about the questions over the origin of the FOD, the effect of the runway light ingestion, the use of that runway, etc.
Why did this tyre/tank problem (the latest in a long list) end in tragedy? Why was there a fire in this case?
What was the ignition source?
Rather than insulting us, why not accept my apology for my unintended insult, and justify the simplistic conclusion that tyre failure alone caused all of this tragic carnage. Most of us would love to be proved wrong....
And if he made errors of judgement in this case, do you think he'd rather they were ignored and swept under the carpet, or used productively and sympathetically to prevent others from getting into trouble. The man you describe was a 'top bloke' who would have had the courage to accept blame or praise with an equally strong heart.
But I'd apologise if I've been guilty of treating him as a 'component' in this tragic event, rather than as a real and perhaps heroic human being.
And he may have made no errors at all. The issue of take off weight may have been some-one else's responsibility. But to pretend that there is no question about the issue does his memory no favours.
And on just the same basis, nor should we condemn the FE, although to raise questions about his actions ought to be fine.
I hate the verdict of pilot or aircrew error - it's often applied when it shouldn't be - and I sometimes wonder whether there isn't some truth in the joke about the accident investigator's explanation: "It's always pilot error, if nothing else it was an error for him to get up and go to work that morning!"
But sometimes we all make mistakes, but even when we do, they may not be our fault. Even if Captain Marty made an error of judgement, that doesn't necessarily mean that he was to blame - hence the concerns as to whether his environment conditioned him to act as he did.
But let's keep an open mind. Let's ask the questions and wait for the answers. There's no need for pre-judgement or insult.
Nor should this become an anti-French/anti-English issue.
Kramer: You are either very stubborn, or something else. No-one's pretending that a forced landing is easy, or necessarily survivable. People have died trying to put Cessnas down into perfect fields. But it's clear that any aircraft (Concorde including) can pull off a forced landing as long as the pilot doesn't lose control. It's then a matter of not hitting an obstacle so hard that the deceleration kills everyone on board, or of being trapped in the wreckage and burning to death. Concorde's chances were never more than so-so. But the chances of surviving the classic low-speed-loss of control-stall-spin are non existant. And if you have a CPL you need to tell us you understand that, because no passenger deserves to fly with someone whose instinct will be to 'stretch the glide' rather than put down safely in a field.
Mglof: Please explain the mass of green and brown fields on the satellite photo of the area between Le Bourget and CDG See p.3, between the red 6 and the Le Bourget threshold. Please explain why my visual memory is playing such tricks, since whenever I've flown in that area, it's looked pretty open to me.
You asked how a lighter take off would have 'modified the fate of the fly'. The aircraft would have accelerated quicker, rotated earlier, and may not have veered off the centreline, with less weight on the tyre and FOD, the tyre may not have burst, there may have been no ignition source, the aircraft might have been able to reach safe flying speed and may not have departed from controlled flight when it did. Crucially though, a tyre is more likely to burst if the aircraft is overweight. Is that enough?
You also ask how long the No.2 engine would have provided thrust had it not been shut down. No-one knows for certain - but certainly for longer than it was given the chance to, and any thrust is useful, for the maximum possible time.
It doesn't matter whether or not the crew knew that another engine might fail, good practise dictated that they kept the No.2 going until they reached V2 and a safe height.
Wallabie,
I have enormous sympathy for your loss - Captain Marty was clearly a friend and an inspiration to you. You pay an eloquent tribute to his humanity and spirit - he sounds as though he was a great loss.
But I'm sorry you choose to write anyone who questions the accident report off as beer-drinking 'morons', and then choose to pour scorn on us collectively and individually. Yes, I am a journalist and only a PPL, so yes, I may not have been able to save the aircraft had I been in Marty's position (though some of the experienced heavy jet Captains responding here may never have accepted the jet in the first place), but let's keep calm, and, if possible, friendly. And rather than insulting us, collectively, and emptily questioning our 'qualifications' why not point out where our interpretations are in error. It's not just a journalist raising these questions and expressing concern, remember, it's a group of professional aviators - your peers and equals. (And even the journalist is trying to get expert input, rather than simply going off and writing a 'Shock! Horror! Exposé!' type of story). If you have an argument, then argue your case. Abuse really is not an acceptable substitute.
Ignoring your 'slippers and breakfast wisecrack' the point is that all pilots (PPLs onwards) should be trained to react to the unexpected not emotionally and calling upon their experience, but by applying the appropriate procedures and pre-planned emergency drills. Rigorous adherence to such procedures is never more vital than at these times of great stress, as you, as an ATPL yourself, must realise. When they throw an emergency at you in the sim, do you think back to how you tackled it that time in the Beech Baron, or do you go into 'mental autopilot' and apply the appropriate actions for the A320, or whatever?
With regard to a culture of rule breaking - it's just a theory, based on the fact that the crew that day patently ignored weight limits. You can't have it both ways, either they did it because of something within themselves, or because the company encouraged them to think that it was OK to cut that kind of corner. Or if you have an alternative explanation, then please put our minds at rest - everyone finds the original explanation extremely worrying and frightening.
I don't think your remark that Air France packs its tanks 'extra full' because of the 'couple of hundred extra miles to JFK' helps your argument. If a route can be flown with the aircraft operating within its agreed and certified limits, great. If it can't then you need a refuelling stop, or to offload some payload, and not ignore the limits and take off overweight. One can only hope that I'm misinterpreting your point (you don't mean that AF Concordes deliberately and routinely take off overweight or unsafe 'cos that's the only way to reach JFK, I know), and I hope and pray that other Air France personnel don't have a cavalier disregard for weight limits.
But the key point to you is that rather than stooping to insult and invective, why not calmly answer the genuine concerns that are being expressed here?
Why did the aircraft take off overweight?
Why was there no recalculation after the wind changed?
How about the C of G questions?
Why did the FE shut down the engine when he did, before he'd been asked to do so?
Why are these factors irrelevant? Why aren't they listed as being contributory factors in the accident?
How about the missing undercarriage spacer? How about the questions over the origin of the FOD, the effect of the runway light ingestion, the use of that runway, etc.
Why did this tyre/tank problem (the latest in a long list) end in tragedy? Why was there a fire in this case?
What was the ignition source?
Rather than insulting us, why not accept my apology for my unintended insult, and justify the simplistic conclusion that tyre failure alone caused all of this tragic carnage. Most of us would love to be proved wrong....
Thread Starter
Sick Squid,
I was moved myself by the obvious sincerity and loyalty expressed by Wallabie.
But his rudeness, and his refusal to engage in reasoned debate tempered my admiration for his post.
I'm astonished and disappointed that a forum moderator (moderate?) should go on public record as saying that this was:
one of the best posts I have seen on PPRuNe in years
Can I remind you of some of Wallabies bon mots?
"how presumptious of me to think I could remain Mr Cool himself reading stuff coming from highly " qualified " Morons."
"Good God, how is it we never thought about hiring the whole of you to fly this doomed Concorde, it would have spared us and 109 german pax a whole lot of sorrow."
"On this however one thing I will not let you pompous and mean a......les do,"
"like some of you to just reshape the world gulping one pint after another just watching their bellies grow as the years go by."
"that may be a bit too human for you morrons"
"you may have a point, that is sipping your coffee in your Garfield slippers while Mrs Buket is cooking you warm breakfast on your aniversary day."
"Forgive me for [/b]putting the lid back on the toilet bowl so soon but I need a breath of fresh air[/b]."
I know we get pretty robust on PPRuNe, but I'd have thought that while Wallabie may not have over-stepped the mark, praising this sort of juvenile, scatalogical, illogical nonsense has made you sir, look like a fool.
Bad show!
I was moved myself by the obvious sincerity and loyalty expressed by Wallabie.
But his rudeness, and his refusal to engage in reasoned debate tempered my admiration for his post.
I'm astonished and disappointed that a forum moderator (moderate?) should go on public record as saying that this was:
one of the best posts I have seen on PPRuNe in years
Can I remind you of some of Wallabies bon mots?
"how presumptious of me to think I could remain Mr Cool himself reading stuff coming from highly " qualified " Morons."
"Good God, how is it we never thought about hiring the whole of you to fly this doomed Concorde, it would have spared us and 109 german pax a whole lot of sorrow."
"On this however one thing I will not let you pompous and mean a......les do,"
"like some of you to just reshape the world gulping one pint after another just watching their bellies grow as the years go by."
"that may be a bit too human for you morrons"
"you may have a point, that is sipping your coffee in your Garfield slippers while Mrs Buket is cooking you warm breakfast on your aniversary day."
"Forgive me for [/b]putting the lid back on the toilet bowl so soon but I need a breath of fresh air[/b]."
I know we get pretty robust on PPRuNe, but I'd have thought that while Wallabie may not have over-stepped the mark, praising this sort of juvenile, scatalogical, illogical nonsense has made you sir, look like a fool.
Bad show!
'Sick squid'
I agree wih Jackonicko, whose journalistic efforts seek no more than the truth and accuracy in this tragedy, and ask you to clarify your perceived support for the somewhat emotional prose posted by 'wallabie'. No-one has criticised the efforts of the late Capt Marty and his crew for their attempts to recover their aircraft from an impossible situation nor belittled them in any other way.
There is, however, great concern at the CRM culture apparently evident from the CVR transcript which may have given rise to a take-off outside Scheduled Performance regulations and which may have contributed to an uncommanded engine shut-down at a critical phase of flight.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
I agree wih Jackonicko, whose journalistic efforts seek no more than the truth and accuracy in this tragedy, and ask you to clarify your perceived support for the somewhat emotional prose posted by 'wallabie'. No-one has criticised the efforts of the late Capt Marty and his crew for their attempts to recover their aircraft from an impossible situation nor belittled them in any other way.
There is, however, great concern at the CRM culture apparently evident from the CVR transcript which may have given rise to a take-off outside Scheduled Performance regulations and which may have contributed to an uncommanded engine shut-down at a critical phase of flight.
[ 27 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
Controversial, moi?
Jackonicko
Well said. I have followed this thread with interest. It is unfortunate that emotion keeps clouding the issues that you and BEagle, among others, so eloquently raise in order that we all learn from the whole tragedy.
Sick Squid
Sorry, I have to say that your post was not only inappropriate but also plain wrong, if that was the one of the best posts you have seen then I would hate to see the one of the worst!
Well said. I have followed this thread with interest. It is unfortunate that emotion keeps clouding the issues that you and BEagle, among others, so eloquently raise in order that we all learn from the whole tragedy.
Sick Squid
Sorry, I have to say that your post was not only inappropriate but also plain wrong, if that was the one of the best posts you have seen then I would hate to see the one of the worst!
Having operated quite a few "fuel critical" sectors in (subsonic) aircraft, it can be very tempting to "gild the lily" when it comes to fuel on board and observance of the RTOW rather than risk an enroute fuel stop or being on minimums at destination. Had this become a common practice?
What was the weather/delays like in JFK on the day in question?
How was the Zero Fuel Weight (sorry Mass) of the aircraft computed. Were assumed weights for pax and handbaggage used?
On one aircraft I flew we made regular flights to a destination which was critically landing weight limited. We decided to weigh all hold AND hand baggage to ensure compliance, rather than using assumed weights.
Were the passengers on the AF Concorde "normal" in terms of weight, etc?
This would be yet another factor to add to the issue of being, allegedly, over the RTOW.
None of my comments are intended to cast any aspersions on the crew who must RIP.
What was the weather/delays like in JFK on the day in question?
How was the Zero Fuel Weight (sorry Mass) of the aircraft computed. Were assumed weights for pax and handbaggage used?
On one aircraft I flew we made regular flights to a destination which was critically landing weight limited. We decided to weigh all hold AND hand baggage to ensure compliance, rather than using assumed weights.
Were the passengers on the AF Concorde "normal" in terms of weight, etc?
This would be yet another factor to add to the issue of being, allegedly, over the RTOW.
None of my comments are intended to cast any aspersions on the crew who must RIP.