Ok, let's just try and calm this down a tad. No-one wants to insult the dead, but nor does it do a good man's memory to try to pretend that anyone is ever entirely immune from making mistakes. From what one hears of Captain Marty he may have been the first to admit to his own weaknesses.
And if he made errors of judgement in this case, do you think he'd rather they were ignored and swept under the carpet, or used productively and sympathetically to prevent others from getting into trouble. The man you describe was a 'top bloke' who would have had the courage to accept blame or praise with an equally strong heart.
But I'd apologise if I've been guilty of treating him as a 'component' in this tragic event, rather than as a real and perhaps heroic human being.
And he may have made no errors at all. The issue of take off weight may have been some-one else's responsibility. But to pretend that there is no question about the issue does his memory no favours.
And on just the same basis, nor should we condemn the FE, although to raise questions about his actions ought to be fine.
I hate the verdict of pilot or aircrew error - it's often applied when it shouldn't be - and I sometimes wonder whether there isn't some truth in the joke about the accident investigator's explanation: "It's always pilot error, if nothing else it was an error for him to get up and go to work that morning!"
But sometimes we all make mistakes, but even when we do, they may not be our fault. Even if Captain Marty made an error of judgement, that doesn't necessarily mean that he was to blame - hence the concerns as to whether his environment conditioned him to act as he did.
But let's keep an open mind. Let's ask the questions and wait for the answers. There's no need for pre-judgement or insult.
Nor should this become an anti-French/anti-English issue.
Kramer: You are either very stubborn, or something else. No-one's pretending that a forced landing is easy, or necessarily survivable. People have died trying to put Cessnas down into perfect fields. But it's clear that any aircraft (Concorde including) can pull off a forced landing as long as the pilot doesn't lose control. It's then a matter of not hitting an obstacle so hard that the deceleration kills everyone on board, or of being trapped in the wreckage and burning to death. Concorde's chances were never more than so-so. But the chances of surviving the classic low-speed-loss of control-stall-spin are non existant. And if you have a CPL you need to tell us you understand that, because no passenger deserves to fly with someone whose instinct will be to 'stretch the glide' rather than put down safely in a field.
Mglof: Please explain the mass of green and brown fields on the satellite photo of the area between Le Bourget and CDG See p.3, between the red 6 and the Le Bourget threshold. Please explain why my visual memory is playing such tricks, since whenever I've flown in that area, it's looked pretty open to me.
You asked how a lighter take off would have 'modified the fate of the fly'. The aircraft would have accelerated quicker, rotated earlier, and may not have veered off the centreline, with less weight on the tyre and FOD, the tyre may not have burst, there may have been no ignition source, the aircraft might have been able to reach safe flying speed and may not have departed from controlled flight when it did. Crucially though, a tyre is more likely to burst if the aircraft is overweight. Is that enough?
You also ask how long the No.2 engine would have provided thrust had it not been shut down. No-one knows for certain - but certainly for longer than it was given the chance to, and any thrust is useful, for the maximum possible time.
It doesn't matter whether or not the crew knew that another engine might fail, good practise dictated that they kept the No.2 going until they reached V2 and a safe height.
Wallabie,
I have enormous sympathy for your loss - Captain Marty was clearly a friend and an inspiration to you. You pay an eloquent tribute to his humanity and spirit - he sounds as though he was a great loss.
But I'm sorry you choose to write anyone who questions the accident report off as beer-drinking 'morons', and then choose to pour scorn on us collectively and individually. Yes, I am a journalist and only a PPL, so yes, I may not have been able to save the aircraft had I been in Marty's position (though some of the experienced heavy jet Captains responding here may never have accepted the jet in the first place), but let's keep calm, and, if possible, friendly. And rather than insulting us, collectively, and emptily questioning our 'qualifications' why not point out where our interpretations are in error. It's not just a journalist raising these questions and expressing concern, remember, it's a group of professional aviators - your peers and equals. (And even the journalist is trying to get expert input, rather than simply going off and writing a 'Shock! Horror! Exposé!' type of story). If you have an argument, then argue your case. Abuse really is not an acceptable substitute.
Ignoring your 'slippers and breakfast wisecrack' the point is that all pilots (PPLs onwards) should be trained to react to the unexpected not emotionally and calling upon their experience, but by applying the appropriate procedures and pre-planned emergency drills. Rigorous adherence to such procedures is never more vital than at these times of great stress, as you, as an ATPL yourself, must realise. When they throw an emergency at you in the sim, do you think back to how you tackled it that time in the Beech Baron, or do you go into 'mental autopilot' and apply the appropriate actions for the A320, or whatever?
With regard to a culture of rule breaking - it's just a theory, based on the fact that the crew that day patently ignored weight limits. You can't have it both ways, either they did it because of something within themselves, or because the company encouraged them to think that it was OK to cut that kind of corner. Or if you have an alternative explanation, then please put our minds at rest - everyone finds the original explanation extremely worrying and frightening.
I don't think your remark that Air France packs its tanks 'extra full' because of the 'couple of hundred extra miles to JFK' helps your argument. If a route can be flown with the aircraft operating within its agreed and certified limits, great. If it can't then you need a refuelling stop, or to offload some payload, and not ignore the limits and take off overweight. One can only hope that I'm misinterpreting your point (you don't mean that AF Concordes deliberately and routinely take off overweight or unsafe 'cos that's the only way to reach JFK, I know), and I hope and pray that other Air France personnel don't have a cavalier disregard for weight limits.
But the key point to you is that rather than stooping to insult and invective, why not calmly answer the genuine concerns that are being expressed here?
Why did the aircraft take off overweight?
Why was there no recalculation after the wind changed?
How about the C of G questions?
Why did the FE shut down the engine when he did, before he'd been asked to do so?
Why are these factors irrelevant? Why aren't they listed as being contributory factors in the accident?
How about the missing undercarriage spacer? How about the questions over the origin of the FOD, the effect of the runway light ingestion, the use of that runway, etc.
Why did this tyre/tank problem (the latest in a long list) end in tragedy? Why was there a fire in this case?
What was the ignition source?
Rather than insulting us, why not accept my apology for my unintended insult, and justify the simplistic conclusion that tyre failure alone caused all of this tragic carnage. Most of us would love to be proved wrong....