Wallabie - have just gone over the full seven pages of this thread and I can't see any attack on Capt Marty as a person.
There is however a great deal of questioning of the lack of CRM on board the aircraft - and that's a fact, as reflected in the BEA CVR transcripts.
This, as with every other disaster, is composed of a chain of events which principally seem to point at Air France as the main source of the problems.
To recap
Jackonicko's summary:
ADP for pi$$ poor FOD control?
ADP for compromising safety in the interests of using a 'quieter' runway?
Air France engineering for the reasons mentioned?
Air France management for allegedly allowing/encouraging a culture in which cavalier disregard of rules and regs was possible?
Air France for not incorporating existing ADs on tyres and tanks?
The Captain for taking an overweight aircraft, not rechecking the weight after the wind direction changed, and allowing himself to get slow enough to lose control, instead of force landing?
The FE for shutting down the engine
BAC/Aerospatiale for an inadequate original fuel tank design?
The tyre manufacturers?
Continental (or, if some reports are to be believed, airfield contractors) for the FOD?
The BEA for over-concentrating on one aspect in the report?
The CAA for rubber stamping it?
I'd say that's a fair reflection of all the issues at hand. Capt Marty might well have been a great guy - and he certainly sounds it - but at the end of the day it's the training and CRM that didn't cut the grade.
Would a BA Concorde in the same situation have got down in one piece? I'd like to think so. But the big difference is that in this particular situation, the BA training and maintenance - including full compliance with ADs, SBs and other safety issues - toghether with operational standards at LHR would have meant, in all probability, that such a chain of events wouldn't happen.
Touch wood.