Qantas B744 Total electrical failure?
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NSEU, good point about the cargo door, if memory serves me right, that UAL door problem was in 1989, door viewing windows were kept clean for a couple of years, guess it will take another UAL for the windows to kept clean all the time.
Back to the point of elec power, wind up radio's have been about for years, am sure a similar system could be used to power a few ess systems, am sure the passengers would be happy to operate the gadgets!
Back to the point of elec power, wind up radio's have been about for years, am sure a similar system could be used to power a few ess systems, am sure the passengers would be happy to operate the gadgets!
The Reverend
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Correct Striker, No relation to QF2s problems. Prior to engine start and push back, aircraft is powered by the APU generators. Should APU shut down before an engine driven generator is on the line, you'l be in the dark.
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NSEU: If you are in the middle of the Ocean why not descend down to say 10,000', head to the nearest airfield in VMC, advise ATC or another A/C of you plan and then to save power simply turn off the Battery switch.
The mag compass would work and the stby Alt.
Wouldn't that be ok? Navigation might be difficult I guess but you'd have some power left for later.
Isn't this better than pulling CB's?
The mag compass would work and the stby Alt.
Wouldn't that be ok? Navigation might be difficult I guess but you'd have some power left for later.
Isn't this better than pulling CB's?
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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I'm sorry but any suggestion of pulling CB's is out of line. CB's are there for Engineers not pilots. I remember some years ago a pilot had the idea of pulling a CB to restore some engine instruments on a 767 and the RAT came out.
By all means turn off the battery and hope there are no engine fires but getting involved in the internals of the electrical system could put you in deep trouble.
By all means turn off the battery and hope there are no engine fires but getting involved in the internals of the electrical system could put you in deep trouble.
It sounds horrendous to me. I was flying the 400 from 1989 - 2000. I don't remember ever practicing for anything like this on the sim. With all those long sectors over Siberia, The Pond and the North American Arctic it doesn't bear thinking about. It's not possible to lose all 4 generators we were told just like the Death Jet 1 ( DC10 Sioux City). I also flew the A320 88/89 and a similar situation. A fairly recent thread told the story of the Easyjet A319 from Alicante to Bristol that lost all power over Northern France. Apparentently if my memory serves me correct they couldn't deploy the RAT. Perhaps the days of the pilotless airliner will be delayed for a while. Beancounters take note. Well done to Quantas crew for landing the plane without any apparent drama.
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Originally Posted by sky9
I'm sorry but any suggestion of pulling CB's is out of line.
What seems to be getting lost from view, is that the pilots would know what happened (all four buses off-line), but would not have any idea about the why.
We now know, but that's 20/20 hindsight.
Thinking about and discussing what meager electrical resources are left is a valid exercise.
Starting to play with the CBs, on the basis of what may well be a wrong diagnosis in the first place, is more likely to aggravate the situation than anything else.
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Apologies if this point has been covered already, (I'm on someone else's computer and don't have the time to wade through the whole thread), but am I the only one to wonder whether this incident should cause the management of some airlines to think seriously about amending their current policy of mandatory use of the maximum level of automation at all times in line flying?
This policy, questionable in my opinion even before this incident, is still redeemable while there are enough older line pilots around who can still revert to hand flying or flying non precision or visual approaches in less that ideal conditions. However, if it continues, it won't be too many years from now where the majority of line pilots won't be able to revert to the basic skills because they will never have practised them except (maybe) for twice a year in a synthetic environment in their six monthly sim sessions.
To add icing to this dubious cake, some airlines have also opted for a crew rest area in the ULH widebodies that is quite literally as far away from the cockpit as it is possible to be - and are now crewing some flights with one Captain and two First Officers.
This incident brings home the shortcomings of this policy. Had the incident occurred while the captain was taking his rest in an aircraft where the crew rest area is so remote, the two FOs could have quite correctly followed the dazzling array of (many!!!) EICAS messages demanding their immediate attention and, following procedures, have painted themselves - and everyone on board - into an almost irredeemable corner before the captain even got back to the cockpit - that's if he could, without a major delay, wade through the darkened cabin past God only knows how many possibly panicked passengers demanding to know WTF's going on. (Or even be contacted in the crew rest area without a major delay with such limited electrics – if the FOs had time to call for him while juggling some many balls themselves.)
I know there'll be some FOs who'll take offence that I might suggest that they wouldn't have the nous and commonsense to handle a situation like this just as well as any captain, but the fact remains, there are some - many - flying the line who do not yet have the experience to see through a maze of EICAS/ECAM messages in an unusual situation such as this one and who would opt - some would argue not incorrectly - to stay safe and deal with all the pressing warning messages until the EICAS/ECAM messages were cleared before deciding that something totally outside the norm had to be done – and done now.
Well done to the crew involved in this particular incident. I hope and pray I’ll never be called upon to do something even remotely similar.
And a closing note to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks – with fanciful suggestions such as turning off the battery switch and flying extreme limited panel below 10,000’ – 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful gift. The three(?) men on that flight deck had to deal without 20/20 hindsight and, I’d be guessing, in an incredibly stressful situation, without knowing exactly what had gone wrong, so playing test pilot as some have suggested might well have made the situation immeasurably worse.
This policy, questionable in my opinion even before this incident, is still redeemable while there are enough older line pilots around who can still revert to hand flying or flying non precision or visual approaches in less that ideal conditions. However, if it continues, it won't be too many years from now where the majority of line pilots won't be able to revert to the basic skills because they will never have practised them except (maybe) for twice a year in a synthetic environment in their six monthly sim sessions.
To add icing to this dubious cake, some airlines have also opted for a crew rest area in the ULH widebodies that is quite literally as far away from the cockpit as it is possible to be - and are now crewing some flights with one Captain and two First Officers.
This incident brings home the shortcomings of this policy. Had the incident occurred while the captain was taking his rest in an aircraft where the crew rest area is so remote, the two FOs could have quite correctly followed the dazzling array of (many!!!) EICAS messages demanding their immediate attention and, following procedures, have painted themselves - and everyone on board - into an almost irredeemable corner before the captain even got back to the cockpit - that's if he could, without a major delay, wade through the darkened cabin past God only knows how many possibly panicked passengers demanding to know WTF's going on. (Or even be contacted in the crew rest area without a major delay with such limited electrics – if the FOs had time to call for him while juggling some many balls themselves.)
I know there'll be some FOs who'll take offence that I might suggest that they wouldn't have the nous and commonsense to handle a situation like this just as well as any captain, but the fact remains, there are some - many - flying the line who do not yet have the experience to see through a maze of EICAS/ECAM messages in an unusual situation such as this one and who would opt - some would argue not incorrectly - to stay safe and deal with all the pressing warning messages until the EICAS/ECAM messages were cleared before deciding that something totally outside the norm had to be done – and done now.
Well done to the crew involved in this particular incident. I hope and pray I’ll never be called upon to do something even remotely similar.
And a closing note to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks – with fanciful suggestions such as turning off the battery switch and flying extreme limited panel below 10,000’ – 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful gift. The three(?) men on that flight deck had to deal without 20/20 hindsight and, I’d be guessing, in an incredibly stressful situation, without knowing exactly what had gone wrong, so playing test pilot as some have suggested might well have made the situation immeasurably worse.
Paxing All Over The World
DutchRoll
The British businessman, Sir John Harvey-Jones, who died this week, taken from the obit on the BBC website:
Sir John believed that the failings of any business or organisation should always be blamed on the people at the top.
"When you know something's wrong, nine times out of 10 it's the management - in truth, because people aren't being led right," he once said. "And bad leaders invariably blame the people."
"It is not your job to exploit your position of power," he said. "It's easy to do that. My experience of life is that you get the best out of people by encouraging their self belief."
Whilst I never met him, I had occasion to speak to him on the phone for about 35 minutes for a project I was doing in 1991. He was polite, amusing and helpful, giving me his time on the phone for free.
The same Borghetti who walked into a meeting with junior managers a while ago (according to one who was there) and stated: "If I hear any of you say one bad word about this company, I'll sack you. Now, what is the first item on the agenda?"
Sir John believed that the failings of any business or organisation should always be blamed on the people at the top.
"When you know something's wrong, nine times out of 10 it's the management - in truth, because people aren't being led right," he once said. "And bad leaders invariably blame the people."
"It is not your job to exploit your position of power," he said. "It's easy to do that. My experience of life is that you get the best out of people by encouraging their self belief."
Whilst I never met him, I had occasion to speak to him on the phone for about 35 minutes for a project I was doing in 1991. He was polite, amusing and helpful, giving me his time on the phone for free.
Thread Starter
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wiley
there are some seniority lists that have copilots with much more flying experience than captains
;-)
automation in flying...it is likely taking the escalator in a department store all the time...the minute it quits, you will be out of breath climbing the stilled stairs
there are some seniority lists that have copilots with much more flying experience than captains
;-)
automation in flying...it is likely taking the escalator in a department store all the time...the minute it quits, you will be out of breath climbing the stilled stairs
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NSEU: If you are in the middle of the Ocean why not descend down to say 10,000', head to the nearest airfield in VMC, advise ATC or another A/C of you plan and then to save power simply turn off the Battery switch.
And speaking of fuel.... Has anyone given any thought to fuel feed (during Standby Power or no power)? Mid Pacific/Indian Ocean... will suction/gravity feed be drawing the fuel out of the tanks in the way we want them to for max range and safe CG. You can't open valves with Standby Power... even if you knew which ones to open at the appropriate times ... no Fuel Quantity Indication either)
Another thought.. Yaw Damper. How does the 744 fly without this (if you start depowering IRU's and switching off Battery/Standby Power)? Does it become completely unstable or is it still flyable?
Rgds.
NSEU
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"I remember some years ago a pilot had the idea of pulling a CB to restore some engine instruments on a 767 and the RAT came out."
Of course, history is littered with "seemed like a good idea at the time" disasters... but if you're running out of choices.
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... and, more seriously, the DC10 (or was it a Tristar?) which suffered an engine separation when pilots thought it might be a good idea to see what happens if you cycle a breaker for one of the engine speed sensors in flight.
Wikipedia summary and it's detailed in Macarthur Job's Air Disaster 1.
I've been amazed and disappointed to read this and the D&G thread on the QF2 incident. I hope the flight crew are recognised by the company and that some notice is taken of how close they (the company) came to a far worse outcome.
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NSEU
Whooaa there boy!
It was a National Airlines DC-10-10 on Nov 3 1973. #3 engine fan disc exploded in cruise. Disc, blades, fan cowls and inlet cowls seperated as a result. One person killed due to being "sucked" out a hole in the fuselage caused by flying debris from the engine. Aircraft de-pressurised but subsequentely landed safely.
Failure of the number 3 engine caused by high vibration/tip rub. A known problem at the time (two previous failures in test cells) The failures were caused by fan tip rub and subsequent vibration with the onset being precipitated by a rapid fan acceleration.
In this incidence the flight crew had been "experimenting" with the autothrottle via repeated pulling/resetting of autothrottle CB's, movement of the throttle levers and adjustment of the autothrottle command speed bug and then seeing what response the engines made. All engines eventually accelerated hard with #3 going through 110% before the fan disc exploded.
The book "Air Disaster Volume 1" by Macarthur Job has a great story of this incident.
All important quote from this incident:-
ChistiaanJ said:-
Agree 1000%!
and, more seriously, the DC10 (or was it a Tristar?) which suffered an engine separation when pilots thought it might be a good idea to see what happens if you cycle a breaker for one of the engine speed sensors in flight. Can't recall if all were killed in that accident
It was a National Airlines DC-10-10 on Nov 3 1973. #3 engine fan disc exploded in cruise. Disc, blades, fan cowls and inlet cowls seperated as a result. One person killed due to being "sucked" out a hole in the fuselage caused by flying debris from the engine. Aircraft de-pressurised but subsequentely landed safely.
Failure of the number 3 engine caused by high vibration/tip rub. A known problem at the time (two previous failures in test cells) The failures were caused by fan tip rub and subsequent vibration with the onset being precipitated by a rapid fan acceleration.
In this incidence the flight crew had been "experimenting" with the autothrottle via repeated pulling/resetting of autothrottle CB's, movement of the throttle levers and adjustment of the autothrottle command speed bug and then seeing what response the engines made. All engines eventually accelerated hard with #3 going through 110% before the fan disc exploded.
The book "Air Disaster Volume 1" by Macarthur Job has a great story of this incident.
All important quote from this incident:-
"Regardless of the precise cause of the high fan speed at the time of its failure however, the investigators found that the flightcrew were in effect performing an un-tested failure analysis of the autothrottle system. Such an experiment, without the benefit of training or specific guidelines, should never be conducted during normal airline flying,the investigators commented. In concluding it's official report the NTSB stressed that aircraft operators and pilots-in-command should be fully cognizant of their operational responsibilities for conducting flights in a professional manner.They should never undertake experiments on aircraft systems for which they have not received specific training"
ChistiaanJ said:-
Thinking about and discussing what meager electrical resources are left is a valid exercise.
Starting to play with the CBs, on the basis of what may well be a wrong diagnosis in the first place, is more likely to aggravate the situation than anything else.
Starting to play with the CBs, on the basis of what may well be a wrong diagnosis in the first place, is more likely to aggravate the situation than anything else.
Last edited by Spanner Turner; 13th Jan 2008 at 03:28.
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Yes, you must pull circuit breakers to preserve battery power!
Well, if you're mid pacific at night in IMC you'll need your SAI to maintain hand-flown wings level attitude. You don't need to power the VHF and emergency lights, inverter, etc and run your battery dead!
Without the SAI you'll spiral into the ocean, that's for sure. Under the circumstances you have no choice but to keep the SAI powered for as long as you can, and in order to do that you'll have to get creative and pull circuit breakers of everything that the battery powers except the SAI. There simply is no other option if you are to survive in IMC at night!
The packs will keep running and the outflow valves will maintain position. So you keep on trucking; maintain your altitude, fly headings with your wet compass according to the headings on your flight plan until you reach the coast. Your wristwatch will tell you when you get close to the coast. Then put the circuit breakers back, and talk to somebody.
Without the SAI you'll spiral into the ocean, that's for sure. Under the circumstances you have no choice but to keep the SAI powered for as long as you can, and in order to do that you'll have to get creative and pull circuit breakers of everything that the battery powers except the SAI. There simply is no other option if you are to survive in IMC at night!
The packs will keep running and the outflow valves will maintain position. So you keep on trucking; maintain your altitude, fly headings with your wet compass according to the headings on your flight plan until you reach the coast. Your wristwatch will tell you when you get close to the coast. Then put the circuit breakers back, and talk to somebody.
Last edited by GlueBall; 13th Jan 2008 at 04:30.