Apologies if this point has been covered already, (I'm on someone else's computer and don't have the time to wade through the whole thread), but am I the only one to wonder whether this incident should cause the management of some airlines to think seriously about amending their current policy of mandatory use of the maximum level of automation at all times in line flying?
This policy, questionable in my opinion even before this incident, is still redeemable while there are enough older line pilots around who can still revert to hand flying or flying non precision or visual approaches in less that ideal conditions. However, if it continues, it won't be too many years from now where the majority of line pilots won't be able to revert to the basic skills because they will never have practised them except (maybe) for twice a year in a synthetic environment in their six monthly sim sessions.
To add icing to this dubious cake, some airlines have also opted for a crew rest area in the ULH widebodies that is quite literally as far away from the cockpit as it is possible to be - and are now crewing some flights with one Captain and two First Officers.
This incident brings home the shortcomings of this policy. Had the incident occurred while the captain was taking his rest in an aircraft where the crew rest area is so remote, the two FOs could have quite correctly followed the dazzling array of (many!!!) EICAS messages demanding their immediate attention and, following procedures, have painted themselves - and everyone on board - into an almost irredeemable corner before the captain even got back to the cockpit - that's if he could, without a major delay, wade through the darkened cabin past God only knows how many possibly panicked passengers demanding to know WTF's going on. (Or even be contacted in the crew rest area without a major delay with such limited electrics – if the FOs had time to call for him while juggling some many balls themselves.)
I know there'll be some FOs who'll take offence that I might suggest that they wouldn't have the nous and commonsense to handle a situation like this just as well as any captain, but the fact remains, there are some - many - flying the line who do not yet have the experience to see through a maze of EICAS/ECAM messages in an unusual situation such as this one and who would opt - some would argue not incorrectly - to stay safe and deal with all the pressing warning messages until the EICAS/ECAM messages were cleared before deciding that something totally outside the norm had to be done – and done now.
Well done to the crew involved in this particular incident. I hope and pray I’ll never be called upon to do something even remotely similar.
And a closing note to the Monday Morning Quarterbacks – with fanciful suggestions such as turning off the battery switch and flying extreme limited panel below 10,000’ – 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful gift. The three(?) men on that flight deck had to deal without 20/20 hindsight and, I’d be guessing, in an incredibly stressful situation, without knowing exactly what had gone wrong, so playing test pilot as some have suggested might well have made the situation immeasurably worse.