TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
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Because Sao Paulo is I believe, almost the worlds most populated city. It's enormous. You are 30 miles out at about 12,000 on the approach flying over skyscrapers, and 30 miles later you land having flown all the way over skyscrapers. Quite a staggering sight. What has busy airports and being tight and unforgiving got to do with each other? There is no connection. Don't understand what your last line means.
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If I am not mistaken, Sao Paulo metropolitan area has around 12 million people. As all big cities, SP has a nasty traffic...sometimes around 100km during rush hours. Happens that CGH is in the middle of the city and GRU is far from the center, so it is more easy to get to where you have to be (home, meetings, etc...) landing at CGH. As any business, airlines follow passenger demand (supply X demand) and this is why it is one of the busiest airports in SA.
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I know the old axiom is "I would rather be real lucky than just good" but one does not plan on luck being the prime factor in a successful aviation career.
Again, we can rewrite the equation with unknowns but again, rational people do not knowingly make irrational decisions. People do not make mistakes on purpose. That is not a 'mistake' but rather a 'violation'. I have never heard in the cockpit, "Hey guys.. this is real stupid and dangerous but here goes." And the crew says, "Sure, let's try it."
Yes, people do act with insufficient information and I have heard more than one 'experience is what you get when you were expecting something else."
Here in the we have a number of paradox airports such as LGA and DCA where you do not have overruns, do not have long runways and have very complex weather systems which produce fog, snow and other significant 'threats', to use the jargon. The paradox is that since the margins are already reduced by the very physical nature of the airport and environment, most of the guys I know and flew with adopted a very tight attitude as to what was acceptable and what was not. Thus, it was the pilot that compensated for a less than stellar facility. Thus, also, the airport was not 'clearly dangerous'. Challenging maybe but not 'clearly dangerous'.
Again, we can rewrite the equation with unknowns but again, rational people do not knowingly make irrational decisions. People do not make mistakes on purpose. That is not a 'mistake' but rather a 'violation'. I have never heard in the cockpit, "Hey guys.. this is real stupid and dangerous but here goes." And the crew says, "Sure, let's try it."
Yes, people do act with insufficient information and I have heard more than one 'experience is what you get when you were expecting something else."
Here in the we have a number of paradox airports such as LGA and DCA where you do not have overruns, do not have long runways and have very complex weather systems which produce fog, snow and other significant 'threats', to use the jargon. The paradox is that since the margins are already reduced by the very physical nature of the airport and environment, most of the guys I know and flew with adopted a very tight attitude as to what was acceptable and what was not. Thus, it was the pilot that compensated for a less than stellar facility. Thus, also, the airport was not 'clearly dangerous'. Challenging maybe but not 'clearly dangerous'.
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A320 landing video, CGH
Came across this Youtube video on A.net, of an A320 arriving on the far end, 17R. As Rainboe points out above, you can see the sheer size of the metropolis in this footage. As the aircraft comes in on short finals, you can also just see a TAM building to the right of the picture, above the FO's glareshield; I assume this is where the 320 stopped?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ77mPgJ_Sk
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FZ77mPgJ_Sk
Last edited by akerosid; 18th Jul 2007 at 20:10. Reason: Additional comment
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you have, by your own comments, said it was conditions not known to the pilot that constitutes a 'surprise' and it is the 'surprise' that makes the airport 'clearly dangerous'. Again, no one charges into an accident on purpose and so I maintain that one does not knowingly fly into a 'clearly dangerous' airport.
And yes, everyone involved shares responsibility and yes the PIC is the final authority on whether or not the flight continues. And no doubt, every group can gather statistics to show what is 'normal' or 'routine' into an airport and use that data to support any position whether it be increased ops, limited ops, no ops and all could be argued on safety merits.
I have to wonder if TAM has a FOQA program and what data they have on actual ops into and out of the airport. My previous 'home' had FOQA and we found there was considerable difference between what was the assumed environment and the real environment.
And yes, everyone involved shares responsibility and yes the PIC is the final authority on whether or not the flight continues. And no doubt, every group can gather statistics to show what is 'normal' or 'routine' into an airport and use that data to support any position whether it be increased ops, limited ops, no ops and all could be argued on safety merits.
I have to wonder if TAM has a FOQA program and what data they have on actual ops into and out of the airport. My previous 'home' had FOQA and we found there was considerable difference between what was the assumed environment and the real environment.
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No. I watched the press conference and the VP of ops told the press that the rev #2 was inop (secured closed). The VP of engeneering didnt give much attention to that, replying that the reversers are not mandatory for CGH ops and that the landing weight was within safety margins (62.7 T)..in other words, aircraft was within flight envelope.
Here is a internal email from TAM's president (could someone translate???)
COMUNICADO DA PRESIDÊNCIA
É com muita tristeza que informo sobre o acidente com o nosso vôo JJ 3054, que deixou o aeroporto Salgado Filho, em Porto Alegre, às 17h16 de ontem, com destino ao aeroporto de Congonhas, em São Paulo.
Em meu nome, de toda a direção da TAM, de nossos acionistas e funcionários, quero manifestar nossa mais irrestrita solidariedade às famílias das vítimas. Nossa prioridade absoluta, neste momento de dor, é apoiar os familiares e amigos dos passageiros, funcionários e tripulantes. Estamos adotando todos os esforços para oferecer o amparo possível em face deste trágico acontecimento.
Desde os primeiros momentos, a TAM mobilizou todo o seu corpo funcional, equipes de médicos, psicólogos e assistentes sociais para as medidas necessárias. Já estamos providenciando o transporte de familiares das vítimas de outros estados para São Paulo e assegurando o atendimento por meio de nosso Programa de Assistência às Vítimas e Familiares.
Temos que aguardar os resultados das investigações para saber as causas que levaram a essa tragédia. Asseguramos que a tripulação (comandante, co-piloto e comissárias) era de grande competência, experiência, dedicação e absolutamente treinada dentro das recomendações da aviação mundial. A aeronave Airbus A320 prefixo MBK, incorporada a nossa frota em dezembro de 2006, estava em perfeitas condições de manutenção, de aeronavegabilidade e de operação.
O momento é de apoio às famílias dos 162 passageiros, 6 tripulantes, 18 funcionários da TAM que estavam a bordo da aeronave e também nossos colaboradores e clientes que se encontravam no nosso terminal de cargas, na avenida Washington Luiz, quando ocorreu o acidente: três vítimas fatais, cinco desaparecidos e 11 hospitalizados.
Nossa empresa está oferecendo total colaboração e acompanhará de perto as investigações conduzidas pelas autoridades aeronáuticas.
Mesmo em luto, asseguramos que nossas operações continuam regulares.
Marco Antonio Bologna
Presidente da TAM
Here is a internal email from TAM's president (could someone translate???)
COMUNICADO DA PRESIDÊNCIA
É com muita tristeza que informo sobre o acidente com o nosso vôo JJ 3054, que deixou o aeroporto Salgado Filho, em Porto Alegre, às 17h16 de ontem, com destino ao aeroporto de Congonhas, em São Paulo.
Em meu nome, de toda a direção da TAM, de nossos acionistas e funcionários, quero manifestar nossa mais irrestrita solidariedade às famílias das vítimas. Nossa prioridade absoluta, neste momento de dor, é apoiar os familiares e amigos dos passageiros, funcionários e tripulantes. Estamos adotando todos os esforços para oferecer o amparo possível em face deste trágico acontecimento.
Desde os primeiros momentos, a TAM mobilizou todo o seu corpo funcional, equipes de médicos, psicólogos e assistentes sociais para as medidas necessárias. Já estamos providenciando o transporte de familiares das vítimas de outros estados para São Paulo e assegurando o atendimento por meio de nosso Programa de Assistência às Vítimas e Familiares.
Temos que aguardar os resultados das investigações para saber as causas que levaram a essa tragédia. Asseguramos que a tripulação (comandante, co-piloto e comissárias) era de grande competência, experiência, dedicação e absolutamente treinada dentro das recomendações da aviação mundial. A aeronave Airbus A320 prefixo MBK, incorporada a nossa frota em dezembro de 2006, estava em perfeitas condições de manutenção, de aeronavegabilidade e de operação.
O momento é de apoio às famílias dos 162 passageiros, 6 tripulantes, 18 funcionários da TAM que estavam a bordo da aeronave e também nossos colaboradores e clientes que se encontravam no nosso terminal de cargas, na avenida Washington Luiz, quando ocorreu o acidente: três vítimas fatais, cinco desaparecidos e 11 hospitalizados.
Nossa empresa está oferecendo total colaboração e acompanhará de perto as investigações conduzidas pelas autoridades aeronáuticas.
Mesmo em luto, asseguramos que nossas operações continuam regulares.
Marco Antonio Bologna
Presidente da TAM
NW1
I appreciate differences in interpretation being discussed openly on this board. At this time this discussion may be highly relavant for general A320operations into and out of CGH.
If you may could you explain the significance of reverser placarded operations in these circumstances?
gnadirs: You really shouldn't introduce a posting with an arrogant title such as "performance lesson" and then produce incorrect information. a) it makes you look silly and b) it might mislead those wanting to learn.
If you may could you explain the significance of reverser placarded operations in these circumstances?
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Rough translation:
No expert on Portuguese, but I'll make a stab at it:
With much sadness, we report an accident to our flight JJ 3054, which left Salgado Filho Airport, Porto Alegre, at 17.16 local time, bound for Sao Paolo Congonhas.
On my behalf and from all directors of TAM, from our employees, we express our strongest solidarity with the families of the victims. Our absolute priority right now is with the families and friends of the passengers, employees and crew. We hope to do everything we can to help in the face of this tragedy.
From the first moments (after the crash), TAM mobilised its entire corporation, teams of doctors, psychologists and social assistance as required.We hope to provide transport for families of victims from outside Sao Paolo, as part of our Program of Assistance for the Families of Victims. We await the results (?) of the investigation of the circumstances leading to this tragedy. Be assured that the crew (captain, co pilot and cabin crew) had great competence, experience and dedication and were trained to the highest world standards. The aircraft, registered MBK (PT-MBK) was incorporated into our fleet in December 2006 and was in perfect condition of maintenance, navigation (?) and operation.
(?) ... 162 passengers, 6 crew, 18 TAM employees on board our aircraft, together with clients and colleagues in our cargo terminal on Avenue Washington Luiz, where the accident took place, 3 victims dead, 5 missing (?) and 11 hospitalised.
We promise our total cooperation with the civil aviation authorities in the course of the investigation.
Meanwhile, our operations continue as normal.
Respectfully,
M A Bologna
President of TAM
With much sadness, we report an accident to our flight JJ 3054, which left Salgado Filho Airport, Porto Alegre, at 17.16 local time, bound for Sao Paolo Congonhas.
On my behalf and from all directors of TAM, from our employees, we express our strongest solidarity with the families of the victims. Our absolute priority right now is with the families and friends of the passengers, employees and crew. We hope to do everything we can to help in the face of this tragedy.
From the first moments (after the crash), TAM mobilised its entire corporation, teams of doctors, psychologists and social assistance as required.We hope to provide transport for families of victims from outside Sao Paolo, as part of our Program of Assistance for the Families of Victims. We await the results (?) of the investigation of the circumstances leading to this tragedy. Be assured that the crew (captain, co pilot and cabin crew) had great competence, experience and dedication and were trained to the highest world standards. The aircraft, registered MBK (PT-MBK) was incorporated into our fleet in December 2006 and was in perfect condition of maintenance, navigation (?) and operation.
(?) ... 162 passengers, 6 crew, 18 TAM employees on board our aircraft, together with clients and colleagues in our cargo terminal on Avenue Washington Luiz, where the accident took place, 3 victims dead, 5 missing (?) and 11 hospitalised.
We promise our total cooperation with the civil aviation authorities in the course of the investigation.
Meanwhile, our operations continue as normal.
Respectfully,
M A Bologna
President of TAM
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I just finished my type-rating A320, so could someone please explain what's wrong with the following calculation:
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
NigelOnDraft;
If I want to know how much runway the aircraft is actually going to take to come to a full stop from a height of 50ft, I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" to get an idea of what a very aggressive approach/touchdown would produce - (the landing is, as you know, practically no flare and max braking to a full stop, engines in forward idle thrust the whole time). Then I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance with Autobrake - Config FULL or Config 3" to see the effects of Brakes LOW and MED and the reduced flap configuration. Neither chart takes into account or requires the use of reverse thrust.
I fully agree with you that these are the charts, rather, more specifically, the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" charts, which are used in ECAM work and other abnormalities covered by the QRH and in that work, wet and contaminated runway factors do indeed assume the use of maximum reverse on the operating engines/reversers.
But the raw charts in and of themselves present useful, practical and actual test-flight data that can be used independantly of factors applied in abnormalities and as such these raw distances are not affected by the use (or lack) of reverse thrust. The effects of maximum reverse are incorporated in the factors presented in the QRH abnormalities, (QRH Ch.2) under the WET and CONTAM columns.
The charts you refer to for planning purposes are indeed for Dispatch only and carry the x1.67 factor along with an additional 15% because the runway is always assumed to be wet. These numbers are not intended for use once in flight but are to check academic legalities for dispatch in re the above 1.67 and 1.15 factors. The actual landing distance charts have no such factors incorporated.
If I want to know how much runway the aircraft is actually going to take to come to a full stop from a height of 50ft, I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" to get an idea of what a very aggressive approach/touchdown would produce - (the landing is, as you know, practically no flare and max braking to a full stop, engines in forward idle thrust the whole time). Then I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance with Autobrake - Config FULL or Config 3" to see the effects of Brakes LOW and MED and the reduced flap configuration. Neither chart takes into account or requires the use of reverse thrust.
I fully agree with you that these are the charts, rather, more specifically, the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" charts, which are used in ECAM work and other abnormalities covered by the QRH and in that work, wet and contaminated runway factors do indeed assume the use of maximum reverse on the operating engines/reversers.
But the raw charts in and of themselves present useful, practical and actual test-flight data that can be used independantly of factors applied in abnormalities and as such these raw distances are not affected by the use (or lack) of reverse thrust. The effects of maximum reverse are incorporated in the factors presented in the QRH abnormalities, (QRH Ch.2) under the WET and CONTAM columns.
The charts you refer to for planning purposes are indeed for Dispatch only and carry the x1.67 factor along with an additional 15% because the runway is always assumed to be wet. These numbers are not intended for use once in flight but are to check academic legalities for dispatch in re the above 1.67 and 1.15 factors. The actual landing distance charts have no such factors incorporated.
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I just finished my type-rating A320, so could someone please explain what's wrong with the following calculation:
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
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Quote:
I just finished my type-rating A320, so could someone please explain what's wrong with the following calculation:
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
You have assumed the RWY was contaminated. Was it? a 1/4 of a inch is 5.5 milimeters. A RWY can be WET without being contaminated provided the standing water is less than 3 milimeters.
This is my understanding.
I just finished my type-rating A320, so could someone please explain what's wrong with the following calculation:
Approx. LDW 140.000 Lbs
Airport elevation approx. 2500 feet (ISA)
According to the met. report in a post above: 10 kts tailwind
water on the runway approx 1/4 inch
actual landing distance:
5430 feet (config full)
543 feet correction (4% per 1000ft above SL)
1140 feet correction (21% per 10 kts tail wind)
-----
7113 feet
LDA according to Jeppesen chart 10-9 (9 sep 05) 5938 feet
You have assumed the RWY was contaminated. Was it? a 1/4 of a inch is 5.5 milimeters. A RWY can be WET without being contaminated provided the standing water is less than 3 milimeters.
This is my understanding.
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PJ2
Our charts must be different to yours 
We only have "A320 Ldg Dist without Autobrake" which state "..assume max Manual Braking and maximum reverse thrust".
We then have some "Autoland" charts and correction factors...
NigelOnDraft;
If I want to know how much runway the aircraft is actually going to take to come to a full stop from a height of 50ft, I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" to get an idea of what a very aggressive approach/touchdown would produce - (the landing is, as you know, practically no flare and max braking to a full stop, engines in forward idle thrust the whole time). Then I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance with Autobrake - Config FULL or Config 3" to see the effects of Brakes LOW and MED and the reduced flap configuration. Neither chart takes into account or requires the use of reverse thrust.
If I want to know how much runway the aircraft is actually going to take to come to a full stop from a height of 50ft, I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance without Autobrake - Config FULL" to get an idea of what a very aggressive approach/touchdown would produce - (the landing is, as you know, practically no flare and max braking to a full stop, engines in forward idle thrust the whole time). Then I would consult the "Actual Landing Distance with Autobrake - Config FULL or Config 3" to see the effects of Brakes LOW and MED and the reduced flap configuration. Neither chart takes into account or requires the use of reverse thrust.
We only have "A320 Ldg Dist without Autobrake" which state "..assume max Manual Braking and maximum reverse thrust".We then have some "Autoland" charts and correction factors...
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I think we are all in danger here of quoting SOME of the rules but missing the obvious rules of how the regulations are achieved.
All aircraft I believe have to demonstrate that they can land safely on runways when they are slippery for whatever reasons.
But they achieve the numbers by applying correct techniques which most of us are trying to avoid. They put it down on the correct area (not trying to show how clever we are with a smooth arrival); apply maximum retardation with reverse and brakes (so hell with passenger comfort lets stop it when in doubt). They then factor the numbers to allow an allowance for us not getting it right.
So where is the problem?
I suspect it is in our jaundiced view that we wish to show passengers how smooth our operation is - big deal 200 die as a result?
I relate all this as a pilot who found it very difficult to put the aircraft down firmly on suspected contaminated runways. You have been warned!
All aircraft I believe have to demonstrate that they can land safely on runways when they are slippery for whatever reasons.
But they achieve the numbers by applying correct techniques which most of us are trying to avoid. They put it down on the correct area (not trying to show how clever we are with a smooth arrival); apply maximum retardation with reverse and brakes (so hell with passenger comfort lets stop it when in doubt). They then factor the numbers to allow an allowance for us not getting it right.
So where is the problem?
I suspect it is in our jaundiced view that we wish to show passengers how smooth our operation is - big deal 200 die as a result?
I relate all this as a pilot who found it very difficult to put the aircraft down firmly on suspected contaminated runways. You have been warned!
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PJ2- I almost agree with you:
the charts for actual landing distance are produced as you discribe - the only problem is: they are produced by test pilots, who have several tries to achieve the best possible performance. I don't know about you, but I am no test pilot. I am what you call in Germany a "line-swine". And I have pax in the back who do not appreciate being slammed onto a RWY at 600 fpm. All this influences my habbits of landing a plane, and I do land harder in the winter on a 2000m RWY than in summer on a 4000m. But I am a victim of my habbits. Do you get what I mean? I always try to consider the weaknesses I have - not being a test pilot, being tired, fatigued, no new brakes, tyres... and add my 30% to what the chart gives.
Nic
the charts for actual landing distance are produced as you discribe - the only problem is: they are produced by test pilots, who have several tries to achieve the best possible performance. I don't know about you, but I am no test pilot. I am what you call in Germany a "line-swine". And I have pax in the back who do not appreciate being slammed onto a RWY at 600 fpm. All this influences my habbits of landing a plane, and I do land harder in the winter on a 2000m RWY than in summer on a 4000m. But I am a victim of my habbits. Do you get what I mean? I always try to consider the weaknesses I have - not being a test pilot, being tired, fatigued, no new brakes, tyres... and add my 30% to what the chart gives.
Nic
eagle21;
It looks to me like the "Autoland Landing Distance with Autobrake" chart has been used by Capt. Inop. Using this chart the numbers, correcting for the headwind/tailwind item already mentioned by BOAC and taking your comment into account that the runway was just wet but not flooded (I would agree given the wx above), the calculation (using my own Airbus QRH which may differ slightly due different manufacture weights), would be closer to:
Autoland Landing Distance with Autobrake
62,700kg approx
Config FULL with Autobrakes MED distance WET = 5200ft approx
Altitude correction, 3%/1000 = 7.5% x 5200 = 5600 approximately
2 Reversers operative = 0% - no credit, no liability.
Minus Headwind of 8kts or so, (-3% approx) = 5600 - 3% = 5400ft approx
The tables take into account speed increments linked to headwind and autoland. Any further speed increment of 5 knots increases landing distance by 7% for all runways.
The Landing Distance Without Autobrake Config FULL is much shorter because of the landing technique assumed - hardly any flare, immediate maximum manual braking until stopped, no reverse accounted for:
62,000kg
Wet distance = 3760ft (compared to 2690ft DRY)
4%/1000ft ASL = 10% x 3760 = 4100ft approx
No credit for headwind
- 6% for 2 Reversers Operative = 4100ft - 6% = 3900ft approx.
E&OE...
We must be very cautious with these numbers however - a great many assumptions are made and we're working with practically no information and as such the exercise is an academic one. Also, no pilot fully expects to "slam" his/her aircraft onto the runway and execute maximum braking when, in the moment, there is no emergency or abnormality. Thus drawing conclusions from this exercise would be folly. The investigation does this for real.
To the family, friends of all passengers and to compatriots of the operating and deadheading crew and to all Brazillians who must endure this tragedy so soon after another, I extend my heartfelt sympathies. Your pain is shared by many, including airline crews the world over. RIP.
It looks to me like the "Autoland Landing Distance with Autobrake" chart has been used by Capt. Inop. Using this chart the numbers, correcting for the headwind/tailwind item already mentioned by BOAC and taking your comment into account that the runway was just wet but not flooded (I would agree given the wx above), the calculation (using my own Airbus QRH which may differ slightly due different manufacture weights), would be closer to:
Autoland Landing Distance with Autobrake
62,700kg approx
Config FULL with Autobrakes MED distance WET = 5200ft approx
Altitude correction, 3%/1000 = 7.5% x 5200 = 5600 approximately
2 Reversers operative = 0% - no credit, no liability.
Minus Headwind of 8kts or so, (-3% approx) = 5600 - 3% = 5400ft approx
The tables take into account speed increments linked to headwind and autoland. Any further speed increment of 5 knots increases landing distance by 7% for all runways.
The Landing Distance Without Autobrake Config FULL is much shorter because of the landing technique assumed - hardly any flare, immediate maximum manual braking until stopped, no reverse accounted for:
62,000kg
Wet distance = 3760ft (compared to 2690ft DRY)
4%/1000ft ASL = 10% x 3760 = 4100ft approx
No credit for headwind
- 6% for 2 Reversers Operative = 4100ft - 6% = 3900ft approx.
E&OE...
We must be very cautious with these numbers however - a great many assumptions are made and we're working with practically no information and as such the exercise is an academic one. Also, no pilot fully expects to "slam" his/her aircraft onto the runway and execute maximum braking when, in the moment, there is no emergency or abnormality. Thus drawing conclusions from this exercise would be folly. The investigation does this for real.
To the family, friends of all passengers and to compatriots of the operating and deadheading crew and to all Brazillians who must endure this tragedy so soon after another, I extend my heartfelt sympathies. Your pain is shared by many, including airline crews the world over. RIP.