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TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil

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TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil

Old 31st Jul 2007, 09:35
  #741 (permalink)  
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SoaringTheSkies, please, not making fun of your post. From a pilot's point of view though, we are taught to reduce the power during landing no matter what aircraft we speak of, IMO this is not a computer problem, technology problem or company culture problem. My opinion is based on what still seems to be speculation of what happened, let's not forget that.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 09:43
  #742 (permalink)  
 
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Dreamland,
SoaringTheSkies, please, not making fun of your post. From a pilot's point of view though, we are taught to reduce the power during landing no matter what aircraft we speak of,
Understood, and from my, very limited, recreational only flying experience, it's the same thing.

IMO this is not a computer problem, technology problem or company culture problem.
Hmm... landing with one engine considerable above idle would be a problem in itself, clearly, but a system that then inhibits all means of deceleration? That I would call a technology problem.

My opinion is based on what still seems to be speculation of what happened, let's not forget that.
I've tried to make it very clear that anything I wrote is based upon the speculation and data we've had in this thread.

pj
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 09:44
  #743 (permalink)  
 
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What do I not understand?

Following most of the thread (admits not all of it, yet) and digging in the books has confused me sufficiently to produce the following thrust lever scenarios. This is an academic partial fact study and does not represent anything to do with the actual accident. Please feel free to tell me what the hell I do not understand at the moment. Warning: The following scenarios could be littered with errors and should not be relied upon in any way when flying the aircraft or for training pilots about landing with a reverser locked out.

These scenarios make no comment about crew cross check, quick reference handbook procedures, minimum equipment lists etc etc.... The purpose is to build an understanding in my mind and not to imply any criticism of Manufacturer "A" or any pilot.

The five roll out scenarios with autothrust engaged and number 2 engine reverse locked out are:

Option 1 TL1 Full Reverse, TL2 CL detent SELECTED

LVR ASYM message on PFD (Lever asymmetry)
No ground spoliers/no speed brake as inhibited with Flap config Full
No auto brake, but manual braking and anti-skid available

The autobrake selection would still show ON, which actually means ARMED and not ON, and the DECEL light would be unlit. The wheel page would show autobrake ON, which means armed....

Engine 1 receives FADEC reverse signal, both Main Landing Gears depressed and TL Reverse angle selected from at least one spoiler elevator computer. Attempts to provide the selected reverse thrust.

Engine 2 with autothrust selected will undergo a transient power change from bug speed power and increase towards "donut" power as the airspeed drops and then limits at CL detent power.

Option 2 TL1 Full Reverse TL2 above "at or near idle" SELECTED
No LVR ASYM message as the CL detent is not used for TL2.
No ground spoilers
No autobrake, but manual braking as above and autobrake displays as option 1

Engine 1 as option 1

Engine 2 with autothrust selected will undergo a transient power change from bug speed approach requirement to the limit of donut power

Option 3 TL1 Full Reverse TL2 "near idle" SELECTED
No LVR ASYM message
PARTIAL spoiler deflection, all come up to 10 degrees. FULL spoiler deflection shown on the wheel page.
Cannot work out what is happening with autobrake from the books, (help?) but manual brakes should be available. Displays as per option 1.

Engine 1 as option 1

Engine 2 will go to the near idle power

Option 4 TL1 Full Reverse TL2 "idle" SELECTED
No LVR ASYM message

Partial spoilers on first gear touchdown and then FULL spoilers on second main gear. Full spoilers shown on display from first gear touchdown.

Autobrake available and works

Engine 1 as option 1

Engine 2 goes to one of the three idle options. Is it ground idle, flight idle or reverse idle (which is higher than "forward" but forward is not defined...!) (Help?)

Option 5 TL1 Full Reverse TL2 "reverse" SELECTED
No LVR ASYM message
ENG 2 REVERSER FAULT
Partial spoilers on first gear touchdown and then FULL spoilers on second main gear
Autobrake activates on same logic as second main gear to work as requested (but limited by runway contamination etc).

No warnings on the engine page
No warnings on the wheel page
No aural warning
No master warning light
No system displays called
No local warnings

The amber REV lights on the EPR display go to green on Engine 1 and stay amber on Engine 2.

Engine 1 gives selected reverse thrust, engine 2 provides slightly higher than idle but which one...

Many thanks for your consideration of this scenario. Once I have got this lot sorted out in my mind, then I will look as the psychological error modes for the slip, lapse, rule based and knowledge based mistake classifications.

Discount
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 10:02
  #744 (permalink)  
 
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discountinvestigator:

This has been posted a couple of times in this thread:

"Airbus has developed a specific warning when one throttle is set to reverse
while the other is above idle. This warning generates an ECAM warning "ENG
x THR LEVER ABV IDLE", a continuous repetitive chime (CRC), and lights the
red master warning light. This new warning is implemented in the FWC
standard "H2F3".
A Service bulletin will be issued very soon on this subject. "

This should happen in Option 1, a bit of a stronger warning than just a message on the PFD.

I've understood it to be the case that Autothrust cancels when EITHER TL is moved to idle. (The supposition being that Eng 2 then accelerates to somewhere near climb power, based on TL position). Is this not the case?

Option 5 seems ideal.

Last edited by Sl4yer; 31st Jul 2007 at 11:02.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 10:09
  #745 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by discountinvestigator
Option 3 TL1 Full Reverse TL2 "near idle" SELECTED
No LVR ASYM message
PARTIAL spoiler deflection, all come up to 10 degrees. FULL spoiler deflection shown on the wheel page.
Cannot work out what is happening with autobrake from the books, (help?) but manual brakes should be available. Displays as per option 1.
My book says, automatic braking activates when it is armed and the ground spoilers extend. (FCOM 1.32.30, P3)

The ground spoiler extension logic has been beaten to death here, but as to where TLA "at or near idle" is, The Book (FCOM 1.27.10, P13) says:

Less than 4 degress above 10ft RA, or less than 15 degrees below 10ft RA.

So your Option 3 will have autobrake available.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 10:32
  #746 (permalink)  
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I wonder if Airbus is monitoring this thread.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:01
  #747 (permalink)  
 
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Scurvy,
if you have 2 captains in the flight deck, one must be instructor because he is certified to operate in both seats, so he can seat on the right. The other captain was a new hire and had to seat on the left once he was not an instructor.From what I know the new hire had already completed his training but the instructor was in the flight because of a F/O shortage for that flight.
Regards,
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:12
  #748 (permalink)  
 
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Discountinvestigator,
from what I've heard from friends in TAM, we are talking about "option 1". Apparently this information was leaked to some senators who are peforming a parallel investigation and had access to the FDR.
Sao Paulo is known for its slippery RWY and this landing is totally different to the previous one in Porto Alegre because the stress in Sao Paulo with rain is much greater than in Porto Alegre. In Sao Paulo you want to set everything as fast as you can because each meter is valuable. I'm not saying that this is intentional, but I believe it plays an important factor in the pilot's behavior when landing in Sao Paulo. The RWY in Porto Alegre is much longer, sea level and does not bring any concern to the crew, so MAYBE, the Pilot Flying has more time to do the procedures in a more timely way or even may have considerer not to use the reverser there.
It's important for me to make it clear that I'm a Boeing guy, so don't have deep knowledge about Airbus systems.
Regards,
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:16
  #749 (permalink)  
 
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You guys can update me on this, but from what I understood, the Airbus Buletim about selecting both thrust levers to reverse even with one reverser inoperative was released after the accident, At least this was what the Brazilian TV said.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:24
  #750 (permalink)  
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A330 test flight crash

atakacs,

The A330 flight test crash doesn't say anything useful to me about this thread.

There are a number of causal factors which have not been mentioned. First, the test was an "engine-out" TOGA test.
Second, the PF rotated to above 27 degrees in pitch. 25 degrees is the protected limit in normal flight. Above 25 degrees, certain attitudinal information disappeared from the PFD. When the aircraft started slowing, the CRW allowed the situation to develop until the AC was very nose high. Any line pilot would have been held automatically to 25 degrees pitch. It is presumed (the participants are all dead and they didn't say anything much on the CVR) that the commander allowed the situation to develop so that the engineers could reap telemetry data. But out the window of a high-pitching A330 you can't see much except sky, and there lacked attitude info on the PFD.

Even so, with 2-3 m more altitude, it seemed as though he would have recovered anyway.

This whole incident is so remote from anything that would happen in line flying that I don't think it can shed any light on aspects of this discussion.

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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:34
  #751 (permalink)  
 
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@PBL

The A330 flight test crash doesn't say anything useful to me about this thread.

To me as well as to others it does......

http://www.airdisaster.com/cgi-bin/v...rbus+Industrie

Accident Description:The aircraft crashed during a flight test in which the crew was simulating an engine failure on takeoff. Pilor error, misunderstanding of auto-flight systems.


Many discussions in this thread and several others showed the complexity of A320 Autoflight Systems. Pilots with many hours are still surprised what's behind. Plenty of modifications by AB made the situation even more confuseing.

Last edited by hetfield; 31st Jul 2007 at 11:46.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 11:57
  #752 (permalink)  
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hetfield,

If you and others think the A3320 flight test accident says useful things, then a link to the Rapport Preliminaire might help:

http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publ...e/Rapport.html

For the record, I don't necessarily agree with you that complexity of automation played a role in this accident.

Let's not talk about the A330 accident on this thread, though?

PBL
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 12:03
  #753 (permalink)  
 
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@PBL

The point is, many accidents with AB happened 'cause the pilots did not fully know/understand the aircrafts systems. You can't wipe this away, it's a fact.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 12:33
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Nor can you wipe away that the systems were changed to minimise the chance of similar mode-confusion happening. The Cali 757 accident was a fatal incident primarily caused by human interface confusion on a B type.

It happens.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 12:35
  #755 (permalink)  
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And what about the KAL crew that stalled the 74?
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 12:43
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Even being an airbus driver myself, I'm afraid A would lose the battle with any other big manufactor concerning accident rate due to overcomplex system design leading to "Pilot's Error".

Last edited by hetfield; 31st Jul 2007 at 13:15.
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 13:18
  #757 (permalink)  
 
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Hi James7, thanks for the comments. You are right regarding the old generation (737-2, 727, 737-3, etc...), but I currently fly the B777 and the A/T stays ON ALL the TIME up to touchdown, the same with the B747-400 in my last company. Another example is the MD11 that also lands with the A/T ON all the time. In all the mentioned aircrafts, the A/T system retards the thrust levers to idle at around 27Ft RA. I may be wrong regarding the 757 and 767.
Regards
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 13:47
  #758 (permalink)  
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2 questions please for AB folk:

1) What is 'config full', what is it for, and why:
'No ground spoliers/no speed brake as inhibited with Flap config Full
No auto brake, but manual braking and anti-skid available'? (#767)

2) There appears to be a drift here, correct or not, towards Option1 in that post. What indications would be available to alert the crew that the above are 'missing' and that power is increasing on No2 (apart, of course, from the lack of speed reduction and the swing)? Do I understand that only an increase in RPM towards a 'donut' will show?
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 13:50
  #759 (permalink)  
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Tam decided

TAM has decided that the A320s no longer will land in short runways if they have one reverser locked off. Here is how "Veja" reputable weekly magazine describes what went wrong when the pilots set the throtle levers during landing (clique in portuguese mean click).
http://veja.abril.com.br/idade/exclu...p_manetes.html
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Old 31st Jul 2007, 14:42
  #760 (permalink)  
 
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Angel aututhrust disconnection

Please for all u B types who are again and again raising irrelevant issues which you do not understand,
Autothrust DOES get disengaged at landing. Now if you do not keep your TLs to idle, where will the thrust go?
Take an example of any other aircraft. You flare and DO NOT bring throttle to idle (which has been taught to us all on the basic aircraft we all flew in the flying schools), what will happen? Will the thrust not build up to the value demanded by TLs? THAT is what happened here if it happened at all the way it is being projected. If you forget the basics of flying, what can airbus or automation do?
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