Mid-air collision over Brasil
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N600XL freed by courts
Legacy jet that collided with Gol Boeing will be returned to USA Aircraft remained at Serra do Cachimbo Air Base, in Pará, since 2006.
Parts that will be used in court cases on accident remain in country.
Glauco Araújo of G1, in São Paulo
28/10/2010 13h49 - Updated 28/10/2010 15h20
Legacy jet remianed at Serra do Cachimbo Air Base, in the south of Pará, since the accident with Gol Boeing (Photo: Release/FAB)
The Legacy jet involved in the accident with the Gol Boeing, on September 29, 2006, will be returned to the company Cloudscape, Inc, in the United States. The measure was authorized, on August 27 of this year, by judge Fábio Henrique Fiorenza, of the Federal Court of Sinop, in Mato Grosso. The aircraft's return will be done by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The airplane is at Serra do Cachimbo Air Base, in the south of the state of Pará, where it has been since the collision with the Gol aircraft. None of the 154 passengers and crew of the Gol aircraft survived.
According to the Federal Court of Mato Grosso, the pieces related to the cases on the accident, such as the black-box, the T-Cas and transponder, for example, will remain in the power of the Federal Police (PF).
The request for restitution of "seized object" was submitted by the American company on August 13, 2008 and sent to the Federal Prosecutor's Office (MPF) which gave a favorable opinion on the restitution on August 20 of this year.
After the Federal judge's authorization, a dispatch was sent to the Air Force to advise that the aircraft could be returned. The Air Force did not inform when the Legacy will be ready for flight.
[Repetition of news on controllers' conviction]
G1 - Jato Legacy que bateu no Boeing da Gol será devolvido aos EUA - notícias em Brasil
Parts that will be used in court cases on accident remain in country.
Glauco Araújo of G1, in São Paulo
28/10/2010 13h49 - Updated 28/10/2010 15h20
Legacy jet remianed at Serra do Cachimbo Air Base, in the south of Pará, since the accident with Gol Boeing (Photo: Release/FAB)
The Legacy jet involved in the accident with the Gol Boeing, on September 29, 2006, will be returned to the company Cloudscape, Inc, in the United States. The measure was authorized, on August 27 of this year, by judge Fábio Henrique Fiorenza, of the Federal Court of Sinop, in Mato Grosso. The aircraft's return will be done by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). The airplane is at Serra do Cachimbo Air Base, in the south of the state of Pará, where it has been since the collision with the Gol aircraft. None of the 154 passengers and crew of the Gol aircraft survived.
According to the Federal Court of Mato Grosso, the pieces related to the cases on the accident, such as the black-box, the T-Cas and transponder, for example, will remain in the power of the Federal Police (PF).
The request for restitution of "seized object" was submitted by the American company on August 13, 2008 and sent to the Federal Prosecutor's Office (MPF) which gave a favorable opinion on the restitution on August 20 of this year.
After the Federal judge's authorization, a dispatch was sent to the Air Force to advise that the aircraft could be returned. The Air Force did not inform when the Legacy will be ready for flight.
[Repetition of news on controllers' conviction]
G1 - Jato Legacy que bateu no Boeing da Gol será devolvido aos EUA - notícias em Brasil
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Offset
It’s a little bit off topic:
Every time I fly in a non-radar environment I prefer to set an offset to the right of the airway.
Just had an argument in the cockpit about it. The other guy believes that it is "to look for trouble" to set up even a quarter mile offset in non-radar environment flying over the East Africa's best: Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Yemen.
It is always good to add a layer of a Swiss cheese if you can.
BR
Every time I fly in a non-radar environment I prefer to set an offset to the right of the airway.
Just had an argument in the cockpit about it. The other guy believes that it is "to look for trouble" to set up even a quarter mile offset in non-radar environment flying over the East Africa's best: Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Yemen.
It is always good to add a layer of a Swiss cheese if you can.
BR
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OFF SET is not a 100% guarantie but
1/4 NM OFF Track setting should be used EVERYWHERE...
Even for 1 NM you'll never get any remark from any ATC all the way down to APP.
For those "robot" pilots who insist on absolutely on track all the time,
even perhaps Mr. 411,
1. I would ask them if they drive their cars over the middle of the two-lane opposite-direction road ??
2. What harm can be done by 1/4 NM Offset to anybody and anything ??
Even for 1 NM you'll never get any remark from any ATC all the way down to APP.
For those "robot" pilots who insist on absolutely on track all the time,
even perhaps Mr. 411,
1. I would ask them if they drive their cars over the middle of the two-lane opposite-direction road ??
2. What harm can be done by 1/4 NM Offset to anybody and anything ??
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Green Guard:
Yes, good for oceanic and remote, non-radar land areas. But, most definately not good everywhere. In domestic, conjested airspace, if the equipment will support 1/10 of a mile offset, that would be far better for en route than 1/4.
I am not sure what you mean by "APP" in this context; initial approach segment? Intermediate segment up to the FAF? Offsets should not be used in any phase of an instrument approach procedure.
Apples and oranges.
1/4 NM OFF Track setting should be used EVERYWHERE...
Even for 1 NM you'll never get any remark from any ATC all the way down to APP.
For those "robot" pilots who insist on absolutely on track all the time,
even perhaps Mr. 411,
1. I would ask them if they drive their cars over the middle of the two-lane opposite-direction road ??
even perhaps Mr. 411,
1. I would ask them if they drive their cars over the middle of the two-lane opposite-direction road ??
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N600XL now in Manaus with new tail number N965LL
Folha de S. Paulo reports the Legacy is in Manaus on its way to Ft. Lauderdale.
Brazilian pilots' board says arrived Friday afternoon; scheduled to leave this afternoon but did not.
Still missing the left winglet and "very dirty" by report, parked far from where photographers can snap it.
Tomorrow is Brazil's presidential election, and Tuesday a holiday, a good moment to softly and silently vanish away.
Brazilian pilots' board says arrived Friday afternoon; scheduled to leave this afternoon but did not.
Still missing the left winglet and "very dirty" by report, parked far from where photographers can snap it.
Tomorrow is Brazil's presidential election, and Tuesday a holiday, a good moment to softly and silently vanish away.
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it will be auto canceled before you reach the first STAR or approach fix.
You cant select offset for SIDs either.
Last edited by Green Guard; 31st Oct 2010 at 09:18.
Pegase Driver
Green Guard :
Lateral offset has been discussed here before extensively in tech log, and in ICAO . IFALPA ATS past chairman went on a personal crusade with it but lost. because numbers show that with offset you mathematically increase the collision risk. (check ICAO doc if you want the details and the formulaes)
Wrong in RNP 5 and RNP 1 airspace, ( most of Europe dense continental, and I suspect parts of the US as well)
Offset make sense in areas with no surveillance ( parts of Africa, Oceanic, remote desertic, polar , etc..) but definitively not Everywhere.
For info the part of the Amazon where the collison occurred was declared a radar controlled airspace by the Brazilian airforce. The final reports says otherwise.
1/4 NM OFF Track setting should be used EVERYWHERE...
Even for 1 NM you'll never get any remark from any ATC all the way down to APP
Offset make sense in areas with no surveillance ( parts of Africa, Oceanic, remote desertic, polar , etc..) but definitively not Everywhere.
For info the part of the Amazon where the collison occurred was declared a radar controlled airspace by the Brazilian airforce. The final reports says otherwise.
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because numbers show that with offset you mathematically increase the collision risk. (check ICAO doc if you want the details and the formulaes)
Wrong in RNP 5 and RNP 1 airspace
PS. In any airspace where radar vectors, or direct to somewhere are flown, Off-Sets make no logic and are canceled anyway.
When I wrote "anywhere" I meant anywhere along AIRWAYs...
Every time I fly in a non-radar environment I prefer to set an offset to the right of the airway.
Just had an argument in the cockpit about it. The other guy believes that it is "to look for trouble" to set up even a quarter mile offset in non-radar environment flying over the East Africa's best: Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Yemen.
Just had an argument in the cockpit about it. The other guy believes that it is "to look for trouble" to set up even a quarter mile offset in non-radar environment flying over the East Africa's best: Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Yemen.
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ATC Watcher:
We can easily assess the result of applying this rule on the highway; My neighbor (bless her soul) drives down the centerline, and all the other cars are off in the ditch! 
Lateral offset has been discussed here before extensively in tech log, and in ICAO . IFALPA ATS past chairman went on a personal crusade with it but lost. because numbers show that with offset you mathematically increase the collision risk. (check ICAO doc if you want the details and the formulaes)
Pegase Driver
Relax, don’t shoot the messenger ! I am not against lateral offset , just telling you it won’t be mandated , and if you do it in controlled airspace where it is not authorized ( e.g RNP1-5) you are not legal. Now if you are above or in an area with no surveillance and are using GPS for nav,, I would recommend it .A few States do authorize it . But this is not what ICAO mandate and not something your insurance company will support.
I have not the will nor the time to look for the old paperwork, if you are really interested contact ICAO or IFALPA. The IFALPA ATS Comm chairman at the time ( Capt Foreman, a brilliant guy) started the discussion this after the mid-air collision in Sioux look out (Canada) in 1995, they aimed first at voluntary off set, then FMS-embedded. Both did not work for various reasons , but the final blow was given by the “mathematicians group report “ of ICAO which demonstrated that with offs set especially on crossing tracks you increased risk.(using rather basic geometry if my memory serves me well) This combined with the fact that not 100% of aircraft will ever be able to offset automatically, and the very complex transition from off-set airspace to precision APP, killed the project.
Now you can take my word for it, or look for the Working papers and reports for yourself .
Now for the ½ or ¼ NM that ATC will not see : in RNP 1 or 5 , many tracks are separated by 5 NM and you are expected to be on centerline, if not you will set off a lot of alarms , STCAs, etc.. on the ground. Read the RNP guidelines.
Lastly, this is at thread about the Brazil collision, not about offset, If you want to reopen the investigation , read first all the relevant posts here, then read the final report ( 266 pages plus the annexes) Then we can discuss if there is something new. I’d love it . But even if offset would have been mandated in 2006 , it would have been only in remote areas with no surveillance ( radar or ADS). It would not have been mandated above the Amazon, because this was (still is afaik) declared radar controlled airspace. So in fact not really relevant to discuss it here.
I have not the will nor the time to look for the old paperwork, if you are really interested contact ICAO or IFALPA. The IFALPA ATS Comm chairman at the time ( Capt Foreman, a brilliant guy) started the discussion this after the mid-air collision in Sioux look out (Canada) in 1995, they aimed first at voluntary off set, then FMS-embedded. Both did not work for various reasons , but the final blow was given by the “mathematicians group report “ of ICAO which demonstrated that with offs set especially on crossing tracks you increased risk.(using rather basic geometry if my memory serves me well) This combined with the fact that not 100% of aircraft will ever be able to offset automatically, and the very complex transition from off-set airspace to precision APP, killed the project.
Now you can take my word for it, or look for the Working papers and reports for yourself .
Now for the ½ or ¼ NM that ATC will not see : in RNP 1 or 5 , many tracks are separated by 5 NM and you are expected to be on centerline, if not you will set off a lot of alarms , STCAs, etc.. on the ground. Read the RNP guidelines.
Lastly, this is at thread about the Brazil collision, not about offset, If you want to reopen the investigation , read first all the relevant posts here, then read the final report ( 266 pages plus the annexes) Then we can discuss if there is something new. I’d love it . But even if offset would have been mandated in 2006 , it would have been only in remote areas with no surveillance ( radar or ADS). It would not have been mandated above the Amazon, because this was (still is afaik) declared radar controlled airspace. So in fact not really relevant to discuss it here.
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ATC Watcher:
Do you know of something more stringent than ANP being within 1xRNP 95% of the time?
Now for the ½ or ¼ NM that ATC will not see : in RNP 1 or 5 , many tracks are separated by 5 NM and you are expected to be on centerline, if not you will set off a lot of alarms , STCAs, etc.. on the ground. Read the RNP guidelines.
The T-CAS is an anticollision system and the pilot's sight. At velocities and high velocities, the pilot's vision can't manage to see another plane coming. And the T-CAS does this in 360 degrees, from any position that the airplane is coming, that could signify a risk of collision.
2. Why would one not turn on TCAS if one has it equipped?
3. Interesting to see an issue arising out of a communication failure (the "maintain" bit referring to altitude or flight plan ... which). I had thought that the terminology for altitude changes and assignments was standardized, as well as clearances. Also, clearance changes are usually presented in a standardized language.
I'd be grateful for explanation on that, in terms of variations in terminology.
Edited to fix silly spelling errors.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 1st Nov 2010 at 17:28.
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Lonewolf suggests two possibilities:
The original is article is ttp://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2010/05/brasileiro-que-viajava-no-legacy-conta-como-foi-acidente-com-boeing.html. I have rechecked the translation, it's accurate.
In fact, the reporter talked to a Roberto Peterka (whose name he then misspelled) or else read Peterka's report, a 70-page item which wanders back and forth across that line which separates the misleading from the flat-out false.
Peterka's maintains that since the TCAS was off at the time of the collision, and can't be turned off by accident, it must have been off all the time. He also says that since the TCAS was never called up on the MFD before the collision, it was never turned on; and the Legacy not long after takeoof passed another plane without a Warning or Advisory being issued, so the TCAS must have been off then.
Peterka claims that it's impossible to turn off the Legacy's transponder unintentionally. Since the FAA database prior to the 2006 accident showed six cases in the of Legacy transponders inexplicably going off the air, and the tranponder goes (or at least used to) go into standby if the pilot took more than five seconds to change the transponder code, the ain't true. While the NTSB's contention that a pilot could do it by using the footrest requires a contortionist, it does again establish that two touches of a button are all it takes.
Peterka says that TCAS must be selected on the MFD in order for TA/RA to be selected, the transponder code to be changed, etc.
Pages 39-41 of the Peterka report state that the Legacy was held at FL310 from 6:05 to 6:10 to allow another plane to pass at FL320. Those levels are within 1000 feet of each other, and as no TA was issued, the TCAS was never turned on.
He avoids claiming the two planes passed the point where the paths crossed, at the same time. The copy I have of radar screen shots is too blurry to see the horizontal proximity.
Another of Peterka's arguments is that N600XL was carrying far more fuel than it needed, and that the only reason to do this would be that it was anticipated that the plane might be denied access to RVSM airspace, and have to fly lower where fuel consumption is higher, there being no other reason to carry extra fuel.
On page 47, he says Lepore did not have the minimum time in an EMB 135 to serve as PIC. Why? Because some of his hours were in SJC, aboard N600XL, only the FAA registration hadn’t been issues yet, and it had a temporary Brazilian registration of “PT SFN” so the hours don’t count for certification because they were not aboard an American-registered aircraft.
I am neither an air traffic controller or a pilot, but qualified people tell me that all these arguments are bunkum. Any reaction here?
1. We are either dealing with a translation issue, or this reporter has no idea what he is talking about, and hasn't talked to any pilots or controllers to understand the system.
In fact, the reporter talked to a Roberto Peterka (whose name he then misspelled) or else read Peterka's report, a 70-page item which wanders back and forth across that line which separates the misleading from the flat-out false.
2. Why would one not turn on TCAS if one has it equipped?
Peterka claims that it's impossible to turn off the Legacy's transponder unintentionally. Since the FAA database prior to the 2006 accident showed six cases in the of Legacy transponders inexplicably going off the air, and the tranponder goes (or at least used to) go into standby if the pilot took more than five seconds to change the transponder code, the ain't true. While the NTSB's contention that a pilot could do it by using the footrest requires a contortionist, it does again establish that two touches of a button are all it takes.
Peterka says that TCAS must be selected on the MFD in order for TA/RA to be selected, the transponder code to be changed, etc.
Pages 39-41 of the Peterka report state that the Legacy was held at FL310 from 6:05 to 6:10 to allow another plane to pass at FL320. Those levels are within 1000 feet of each other, and as no TA was issued, the TCAS was never turned on.
He avoids claiming the two planes passed the point where the paths crossed, at the same time. The copy I have of radar screen shots is too blurry to see the horizontal proximity.
Another of Peterka's arguments is that N600XL was carrying far more fuel than it needed, and that the only reason to do this would be that it was anticipated that the plane might be denied access to RVSM airspace, and have to fly lower where fuel consumption is higher, there being no other reason to carry extra fuel.
On page 47, he says Lepore did not have the minimum time in an EMB 135 to serve as PIC. Why? Because some of his hours were in SJC, aboard N600XL, only the FAA registration hadn’t been issues yet, and it had a temporary Brazilian registration of “PT SFN” so the hours don’t count for certification because they were not aboard an American-registered aircraft.
I am neither an air traffic controller or a pilot, but qualified people tell me that all these arguments are bunkum. Any reaction here?
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Pages 39-41 of the Peterka report state that the Legacy was held at FL310 from 6:05 to 6:10 to allow another plane to pass at FL320. Those levels are within 1000 feet of each other, and as no TA was issued, the TCAS was never turned on.
Richard: thanks, I think I better understand what was being discussed in that regard.
Not a pilot anymore, but I preferred the boxes with switches and detents over the computer MFD + menus system for changing freqs and transponder codes. Call me a Luddite if you must ...
I am also disappointed in noting that the "reply" light feature that I was so used to seeing isn't the norm ... or so I think I read earlier in the thread. Doubtless there is a good reason for that based on distraction or light pollution or ... but then, how the heck do you know your IFF isn't responding to interrogation? 
Thanks. What an odd design feature ... doubtless software driven for what seemed like a good reason at the time as they were considering human/machine interface and task elements.
Heh, nothing is sailor-proof, we used to say in the Navy, so it is probably true that nothing in a cockpit is pilot-proof. 
There are a variety of things in cockpits that one discovers can be inadvertently be switched on or off, which I suppose gives the ergonomics and interface engineers no end of work to do.
What I get from this tragic accident is that neither small error, the clearance 370 / 360 hitch, nor the "it's in standby" by itself is a fatal error, but their being in combination had a non-linear outcome, in terms of severity ... as to many swiss cheese alignments.
As to the many radio calls with no reply, by both ATC and the aircraft ... haven't all of us run into that once or twice in our flying days? It can take a while to get sorted out.
Not a pilot anymore, but I preferred the boxes with switches and detents over the computer MFD + menus system for changing freqs and transponder codes. Call me a Luddite if you must ...
I am also disappointed in noting that the "reply" light feature that I was so used to seeing isn't the norm ... or so I think I read earlier in the thread. Doubtless there is a good reason for that based on distraction or light pollution or ... but then, how the heck do you know your IFF isn't responding to interrogation?
Peterka claims that it's impossible to turn off the Legacy's transponder unintentionally. Since the FAA database prior to the 2006 accident showed six cases in the of Legacy transponders inexplicably going off the air, and the tranponder goes (or at least used to) go into standby if the pilot took more than five seconds to change the transponder code, the ain't true.
While the NTSB's contention that a pilot could do it by using the footrest requires a contortionist, it does again establish that two touches of a button are all it takes.
There are a variety of things in cockpits that one discovers can be inadvertently be switched on or off, which I suppose gives the ergonomics and interface engineers no end of work to do.
What I get from this tragic accident is that neither small error, the clearance 370 / 360 hitch, nor the "it's in standby" by itself is a fatal error, but their being in combination had a non-linear outcome, in terms of severity ... as to many swiss cheese alignments.
As to the many radio calls with no reply, by both ATC and the aircraft ... haven't all of us run into that once or twice in our flying days? It can take a while to get sorted out.
Pegase Driver
but qualified people tell me that all these arguments are bunkum. Any reaction here?
The contra arguments to these wrong statements and asumptions are all in the final report , and in the NTSB annex.
For info , the TCAS was not off, the transponder was set on stand-by inadvertantly , and by consequence inhibited the TCAS. Whether setting the SSR on SBY was due to wrong manipulation by the crew, the corner of the laptop they were using or the foot rest , is the only question mark here.This combined to a stupid HMI showing TCAS "ON" but referring to the display and not the system did not help the crew realising the error. For me Honneywell has as much responsibility in this SSR/TCAS "failure" as the crew.
But the real and major causes of this collision were not with TCAS, they lay on the ground, in Brazil.
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Excellent article on the human factors in this crash
Earlier in this thread is a reference to an article in Vanity Fair written by William Langewiesche about this crash. It describes chillingly how multiple human factors lined the holes up in the cheese, and an accident equivalent to two arrows hitting each other in flight took place. Vanity Fair magazine is not readily accessible but the article is now reproduced in a new book by Langewiesche entitled Aloft which is published by Penguin. Folks may wish to read it.
PS I have no interest in either publishing or selling!
PS I have no interest in either publishing or selling!
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Langewiesche article
Take the Langewiesche article with a grain of salt, or perhaps a pillar of salt.
He did not bother to speak to Joe Sharkey, the NY Times columnist who was aboard the Legacy. Joe was pissed about the article, the Brazilian Air Force phoned me about it, also pissed.
He manages to misspell an extremely common Brazilian name, Perreira if I recall, and that's like misspelling "Smith".
He also places a solemn emphasis on the native wisdom of local Indian chief Megaron. I have neighbors who do cultural documentaries. They know Megaron - they've got his email, for example - and inform me when they first met him, fifteen years ago, he tried to steal their canoe.
He did not bother to speak to Joe Sharkey, the NY Times columnist who was aboard the Legacy. Joe was pissed about the article, the Brazilian Air Force phoned me about it, also pissed.
He manages to misspell an extremely common Brazilian name, Perreira if I recall, and that's like misspelling "Smith".
He also places a solemn emphasis on the native wisdom of local Indian chief Megaron. I have neighbors who do cultural documentaries. They know Megaron - they've got his email, for example - and inform me when they first met him, fifteen years ago, he tried to steal their canoe.