Lonewolf suggests two possibilities:
1. We are either dealing with a translation issue, or this reporter has no idea what he is talking about, and hasn't talked to any pilots or controllers to understand the system.
The original is article is ttp://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2010/05/brasileiro-que-viajava-no-legacy-conta-como-foi-acidente-com-boeing.html. I have rechecked the translation, it's accurate.
In fact, the reporter talked to a Roberto Peterka (whose name he then misspelled) or else read Peterka's report, a 70-page item which wanders back and forth across that line which separates the misleading from the flat-out false.
2. Why would one not turn on TCAS if one has it equipped?
Peterka's maintains that since the TCAS was off at the time of the collision, and can't be turned off by accident, it must have been off all the time. He also says that since the TCAS was never called up on the MFD before the collision, it was never turned on; and the Legacy not long after takeoof passed another plane without a Warning or Advisory being issued, so the TCAS must have been off then.
Peterka claims that it's impossible to turn off the Legacy's transponder unintentionally. Since the FAA database prior to the 2006 accident showed six cases in the of Legacy transponders inexplicably going off the air, and the tranponder goes (or at least used to) go into standby if the pilot took more than five seconds to change the transponder code, the ain't true. While the NTSB's contention that a pilot could do it by using the footrest requires a contortionist, it does again establish that two touches of a button are all it takes.
Peterka says that TCAS must be selected on the MFD in order for TA/RA to be selected, the transponder code to be changed, etc.
Pages 39-41 of the Peterka report state that the Legacy was held at FL310 from 6:05 to 6:10 to allow another plane to pass at FL320. Those levels are within 1000 feet of each other, and as no TA was issued, the TCAS was never turned on.
He avoids claiming the two planes passed the point where the paths crossed, at the same time. The copy I have of radar screen shots is too blurry to see the horizontal proximity.
Another of Peterka's arguments is that N600XL was carrying far more fuel than it needed, and that the only reason to do this would be that it was anticipated that the plane might be denied access to RVSM airspace, and have to fly lower where fuel consumption is higher, there being no other reason to carry extra fuel.
On page 47, he says Lepore did not have the minimum time in an EMB 135 to serve as PIC. Why? Because some of his hours were in SJC, aboard N600XL, only the FAA registration hadn’t been issues yet, and it had a temporary Brazilian registration of “PT SFN” so the hours don’t count for certification because they were not aboard an American-registered aircraft.
I am neither an air traffic controller or a pilot, but qualified people tell me that all these arguments are bunkum. Any reaction here?