Mid-air collision over Brasil
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I'm Brazilian and the only thing I pilot is Flight Simulator 2004, I've found this forum days ago as I was looking for more precise "rumors" than what we found in general media. If I may add my 1 cent contribution...
Looking to this whole accident in a objective viewpoint I couldn't care less wheter the american pilots did or didn't something wrong, what I really care is that 154 Brazilian lives where taken off because ATC didn't advise the 737-800 about the legacy being acting "strange" (to say the least)
I personally believe that the american pilots did something wrong (confusion between ICAO/FAA rules, shutting down transponder, acrobatics, negligence, it doesn't matter), but ATC must have contacted the 737-800 and told about it, or am I missing something here ?
Our "banana republic" (as someone said) cannot accept 154 deaths, and we must blame ATC too, why ? Because their lives were in the hands of the skilled pilots on the 737 (that didn't do anything wrong), and the ATC. They weren't in the hands of those american pilots.
And please, I'm not trying to save those american pilots, what I'm saying is that even if they are really wrong (what I personally believe they are), isn't ATC duty to alert other aircrafts about crazy pilots ? or even try to shut them down ?
Even if they are guilt, that won't take back those 154 deaths... What I'd like to have seen on the news was the legacy shut down for no obeying orders from ATC, not the 737 from Gol airlines.
Looking to this whole accident in a objective viewpoint I couldn't care less wheter the american pilots did or didn't something wrong, what I really care is that 154 Brazilian lives where taken off because ATC didn't advise the 737-800 about the legacy being acting "strange" (to say the least)
I personally believe that the american pilots did something wrong (confusion between ICAO/FAA rules, shutting down transponder, acrobatics, negligence, it doesn't matter), but ATC must have contacted the 737-800 and told about it, or am I missing something here ?
Our "banana republic" (as someone said) cannot accept 154 deaths, and we must blame ATC too, why ? Because their lives were in the hands of the skilled pilots on the 737 (that didn't do anything wrong), and the ATC. They weren't in the hands of those american pilots.
And please, I'm not trying to save those american pilots, what I'm saying is that even if they are really wrong (what I personally believe they are), isn't ATC duty to alert other aircrafts about crazy pilots ? or even try to shut them down ?
Even if they are guilt, that won't take back those 154 deaths... What I'd like to have seen on the news was the legacy shut down for no obeying orders from ATC, not the 737 from Gol airlines.
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Calm down my friend...no need to get hostile…we are all grown ups here, so lets act like one. Well, happens that this is a RUMUROUS forum, and as suggested, we are all SPECULATING. But one thing is for sure: someone was on the wrong FL, don’t you agree? We all know that an accident is a chain of events, bla, bla, bla...What I meant on my previous post is that ONE of that events was that the legacy didn’t comply with the ICAO standard rules, I am not blaming anyone alone, or specifically...In fact, I was replying to the previous post that said "don't think these pilots did anything out of the ordinary"...Saying that it is normal to lose comm and do nothing about that is absurdly wrong...Sure the ATC has a part on this terrible accident, I have never suggested otherwise. Agree with you in one point: lets wait and see the final report.
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Originally Posted by Scurvy.D.Dog;2904522.
[COLOR="Red"
[COLOR="Red"
.. from memory (do not have the H4 with me) the distance from the Brasilia VOR to the ATC boundary was around 157nm, then another 125nm to abeam the military base that N600XL landed at! ... I might be wrong, but given the NW'ly track of N600XL, the MAC would have occured somewhere within 120nm NW of the boundary waypoint NABOL (between the mil base and the ATC boundary) .. which if the '15min prior' is correct, mode C loss occured just prior to NABOL .. stand to be corrected though[/COLOR]
BRS - 282 - TERES - 157 - NABOL (UIR BDRY) -18 - ISTAR - 107 - TAROP
TAROP is abm Cachimbo where 600XL landed.
Total distance BRS-TAROP: 564 NM, MAC in the vicinity
Assuming the flight plan is true
DCT PCL UW2 BRS/N0450F360 UZ6 TERES/N0449F380 UZ6 MAN
The new note from above that SBBR ATC allowed 600XL to stay at 370 is common practice in order to avoid a descent before climbing again.
However in all fairness: a loss of comm in sparsely populated airspace would
a) be hardly realized by a pilot who is not familiar with the average sector loads in this airspace
b) not be realized by ATC at all before a compulsary waypoint is missed, if ever this report was expected ("position reports not required when in radar contact" is usual procedure)
A usual point in time where ATC would realize a comm loss would be a frequency transfer at a sector boundary - or - when calling a flight because of a loss of radar contact.
A hypothetical but possible scenario would be:
- Pilots realizing loss of comm over TERES as position report is not acknowledged
- Pilots switching to 7600 and xpdr goes stby
- ATC watching target disappearing and calling flight, realizing loss of comm
Certainly still no reason for ATC not to get GOL1907 out of the path immediately after loss of comm was realized.
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Here is a map of the route from Manaus to Brasilia.
XINGU (not visible here due to scale) is in the exact center of the map.
You can see course numbers over various legs.
XINGU (not visible here due to scale) is in the exact center of the map.
You can see course numbers over various legs.
I'm in one of those moods
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threemiles... thanks ... omitted the BRS - 282 - TERES, and yes, I think frequency transfer/boundary position might be relevant
.. I wonder how a 'mid-route' change of FPL LVL is recorded on flight progress strips in Brazil ... might be relevant if the operators were not readily aware of the FPL change at TERES, particularly in radar airspace!
.
.. do they use electronic systems like Oz or paper strips??
.
duwde
.. with respect that is the key! unless ATC had cause to believe N600XL was not conforming to normal operations/procedures (for whatever reason) i.e. some sort of track divergence or excursion in altitude (neither has been indicated or confirmed), . despite the huge discussion here, it is still not clear if there was any 'unusual' activity on the part of anyone .... in fact I would be suprised if there was!!
.
.... NO RADIO/mode C would not in itself be a reason to take another aircraft off track!
.
.. as I indicated earlier, part of that ATC decision making may have been workload or other factors of which we know little (if you vector an aircraft there is more to watch/do particualrly near an ATC boundary)!
.
I am a little suprised that you would be prepared to blame your country's ATC's with little knowledge or understanding, of what really happened .... neither do we mind you, but we do this for a living so have some idea of the sorts of things that may have been at play!
.
.. regarding the GOL crew, It seems reasonably clear they are not at fault ... if your media is saying differently, I would like to know why!
.
Cheers!
DCT PCL UW2 BRS/N0450F360 UZ6 TERES/N0449F380 UZ6 MAN
.
.. do they use electronic systems like Oz or paper strips??
.
duwde
Looking to this whole accident in a objective viewpoint I couldn't care less wheter the american pilots did or didn't something wrong, what I really care is that 154 Brazilian lives where taken off because ATC didn't advise the 737-800 about the legacy being acting "strange" (to say the least)
.
.... NO RADIO/mode C would not in itself be a reason to take another aircraft off track!
.
.. as I indicated earlier, part of that ATC decision making may have been workload or other factors of which we know little (if you vector an aircraft there is more to watch/do particualrly near an ATC boundary)!
.
I am a little suprised that you would be prepared to blame your country's ATC's with little knowledge or understanding, of what really happened .... neither do we mind you, but we do this for a living so have some idea of the sorts of things that may have been at play!
.
.. regarding the GOL crew, It seems reasonably clear they are not at fault ... if your media is saying differently, I would like to know why!
.
Cheers!
Last edited by Scurvy.D.Dog; 13th Oct 2006 at 00:51. Reason: Addition
Update from O Globo
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286082347.asp
The first link in the article opens a photo gallery of the crash area. Which should give people a better idea of the difficulties involved in tracking the wreckage pattern. All but four or five bodies have been recovered and most identified. The missing CVR part hasn't. Portable hydraulic and inflatable jacks lent by Varig are being used to lift/shift large wreckage in search of both.
A comment, presumably recorded by Globo in an unguarded moment; the commentator was Secretary General of ICAO from 1997 to 2003, Brigadier Renato Claudio Costa Pereira. (free translation from another article (http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200...86076178.asp):
"What's the use of seven attempts to contact the Legacy? If you can't get through to the aircraft, contact others in the area and get everyone out of their way. That's the way it was done before, without radar..."
I think you can assume he means before the Brazilian Amazon had radar coverage via Sivam.
As comments like these and others filter in and hard knowlege from the more informed local sources spreads, one can feel the initial anger at the Legacy crew diminishing in the press and in aviation websites. The government, via the Minister of Defense, have said "we have no reason to hold the crew during the course of the investigation but neither can we countermand a court order". The court order to ensure the crew stay in Brazil having been issued by a judge in the state of Mato Grosso. You might compare that to a judge in Iowa impounding a foreign crews' passports during the first stages of a similar investigation into a midair over the cornfields.
My reading re the Legacy crew situation is that they should be home within the week or fortnight, on call for further depositions but unlikely to have to return to Brazil for same.
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286082347.asp
The first link in the article opens a photo gallery of the crash area. Which should give people a better idea of the difficulties involved in tracking the wreckage pattern. All but four or five bodies have been recovered and most identified. The missing CVR part hasn't. Portable hydraulic and inflatable jacks lent by Varig are being used to lift/shift large wreckage in search of both.
A comment, presumably recorded by Globo in an unguarded moment; the commentator was Secretary General of ICAO from 1997 to 2003, Brigadier Renato Claudio Costa Pereira. (free translation from another article (http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200...86076178.asp):
"What's the use of seven attempts to contact the Legacy? If you can't get through to the aircraft, contact others in the area and get everyone out of their way. That's the way it was done before, without radar..."
I think you can assume he means before the Brazilian Amazon had radar coverage via Sivam.
As comments like these and others filter in and hard knowlege from the more informed local sources spreads, one can feel the initial anger at the Legacy crew diminishing in the press and in aviation websites. The government, via the Minister of Defense, have said "we have no reason to hold the crew during the course of the investigation but neither can we countermand a court order". The court order to ensure the crew stay in Brazil having been issued by a judge in the state of Mato Grosso. You might compare that to a judge in Iowa impounding a foreign crews' passports during the first stages of a similar investigation into a midair over the cornfields.
My reading re the Legacy crew situation is that they should be home within the week or fortnight, on call for further depositions but unlikely to have to return to Brazil for same.
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does anyone actually have a copy of the clearance that the legacy originally acknowledged?
and
why would the captain leave the flight deck with a loss of communication?
and even if the frequency for "lost com" was copied down wrong, wouldn't the chart have some frequencies listed to try?
and
why would the captain leave the flight deck with a loss of communication?
and even if the frequency for "lost com" was copied down wrong, wouldn't the chart have some frequencies listed to try?
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Disturbed
I am really disturbed just know. I´ve read posts and posts, from ATC, pilots, etc, etc, and nobody agrees with what are the applying rules in Brazilian airspace.
I think I will no longer fly through that airspace in my trips to Argentina, as the pilots do not know what they are supossed to do in such a situation...
Please!, someone be so kind to inform us, common mortals, of the real situation of the rules, as I´m really afraid just now, that everybody out there just rebate each other´s opinion.
THAT´S THE REAL POINT !!!
I think I will no longer fly through that airspace in my trips to Argentina, as the pilots do not know what they are supossed to do in such a situation...
Please!, someone be so kind to inform us, common mortals, of the real situation of the rules, as I´m really afraid just now, that everybody out there just rebate each other´s opinion.
THAT´S THE REAL POINT !!!
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Some interesting links
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Irrespective of filed flight plan en route altitude changes, ....Without ATC clearance a pilot is not at liberty to change Flight Level; it is not authorized, unless there is a necessity to clear high terrain. In case of lost communications, the pilot must maintain last assigned Flight Level. Under the circumstances of this collision, ATC was responsible to have contacted the 737 and orded it to vacate FL370, pending communications contact with the Legacy.
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Irrespective of filed flight plan en route altitude changes, ....Without ATC clearance a pilot is not at liberty to change Flight Level; it is not authorized, unless there is a necessity to clear high terrain. In case of lost communications, the pilot must maintain last assigned Flight Level. Under the circumstances of this collision, ATC was responsible to have contacted the 737 and orded it to vacate FL370, pending communications contact with the Legacy.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpos...&postcount=442
If an airplane looses radio communication in flight, say at FL370, how is it going to come down for a safe landing in the scenario you describe? Or would a radio failure mean, that the airplane will have to come down uncontrolled after fuel is exhausted?
You might also check my own post:
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showpos...&postcount=431
in which I raise quite some questions about ATC procedures in this case of lost radio and lost xpdr as well, as I too feel, it would have been prudent, if the B737 was vacated from FL370 and perhaps vectored around the Legacy.
Servus, Simon
Pegase Driver
Glueball you are adding to the confusion or the poor pax above . as far as we have heard Brazil fllows ICAO Comm loss procedure and not the FAA ( or Hong Kong) ones. That is one of the points. ( if indeed that played a role in the collision, we are still speculating here remember )
Something else, just saw that this morning :
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286099733.asp
Overworked ATC staff ? another hole in the Reason's cheese .
Something else, just saw that this morning :
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286099733.asp
Overworked ATC staff ? another hole in the Reason's cheese .
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Coworker had TCAS failure. Had to descend below RSVM altitudes to continue flight. Talked with controller - "what if I had a radio failure and you had no transponder data from me. What would you expect me to do(ie follow lost comm or loss of transponder rules)?
"I'd get everyone out of your way just in case."
********************************************************
Regardless of which altitude they should have been at I find it disturbing that ATC allowed an aircraft last known to be at FL370 to head directly at an aircraft flying the opposite direction at FL370.
"Is he still at FL370?"
"I don't know, let's find out."
Is that the way we want to run the ATC system? (not saying it happened this way, just trying to make the point)
I've had a similar event. VFR Traffic at unknown altitude but suspected to be close to ours. I asked for vector away from traffic. Why head towards a bad situation when a slight turn precludes any possibility of danger?
"I'd get everyone out of your way just in case."
********************************************************
Regardless of which altitude they should have been at I find it disturbing that ATC allowed an aircraft last known to be at FL370 to head directly at an aircraft flying the opposite direction at FL370.
"Is he still at FL370?"
"I don't know, let's find out."
Is that the way we want to run the ATC system? (not saying it happened this way, just trying to make the point)
I've had a similar event. VFR Traffic at unknown altitude but suspected to be close to ours. I asked for vector away from traffic. Why head towards a bad situation when a slight turn precludes any possibility of danger?
Pegase Driver
I doubt any Controller in his right mind would do such a thing," my guess ( and it is only a guess ) is that someone beleived the 737 was a 390 .
Why it was maintaining 37 or passing 37 climbing to 390 , or whatever , is one of the key points the ATC tapes/CVR/FDR will reveal .
I would also not be surprised if more holes in the cheese pop up, like a guy alone on the position ( like in Ueberlingen) or a bad shift change, or a system outage ot some kind, or a system decorrolation, or a wong ACT/estimate passed/received , that sort of things.
And unless I know more of the facts, and one or the other scenario is confirmed, I will not put words on the mouth of anyone and certainly presume blame .
Even if ATC did fail, it could even be the system ( similar to the Honeywell Xponder going to SBY on its own.. ) and not necessarily people.
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Glueball you are adding to the confusion or the poor pax above . as far as we have heard Brazil fllows ICAO Comm loss procedure and not the FAA ( or Hong Kong) ones. That is one of the points. ( if indeed that played a role in the collision, we are still speculating here remember )
Something else, just saw that this morning :
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286099733.asp
Overworked ATC staff ? another hole in the Reason's cheese .
Something else, just saw that this morning :
http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286099733.asp
Overworked ATC staff ? another hole in the Reason's cheese .
But, the Commission of Investigation of the accident would have concluded that the controllers should have deviated the 737.
Source: http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/200.../286105679.asp
About the Honeywell, 3 interesting links.
http://www.skyguide.ch/en/Dossiers/D...5_internet.pdf
http://www.ifatca.org/safetyalert/CRD.pdf
http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Certifica...Honey_XPDR.pdf
Good evening from Rio,
Having been out here on and off on biz for the last few months I have naturally been taking an interest in this thread right from the start - especially as I don't speak Portuguese and as local English newspapers & TV are thin on the ground here.
But I have not posted thus far (being an engineer not a pilot; and having no "inside info") I've not had anything worthwhile to say. But like many of you I too have been concerned by some of the more, shall we say "from the hip" posts here, especially as we're all professionals (of one sort or another) on here.
Anyway, to cut to the chase, quite by chance I got the following newspaper article through an Internet trigger function today. It's from "Newsday" of Long Island NY. I repeat it in full here WITHOUT any comments of my own except to say that to me, the tone seems remarkably restrained for a journalistic piece, QUOTE:
Gaps exist in Amazon communications
BY MARTIN C. EVANS
Newsday Staff Correspondent
October 12, 2006, 9:46 PM EDT
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil -- Elnio Borges, who flies jets for Brazil's Varig Airlines, says he becomes uncomfortable when he hears government officials here insist that there are no problems with the country's air traffic control system.
He is one of a number of commercial airline pilots, both American and Brazilian, who say the air traffic control system over the vast, remote Amazon River basin remains riddled with communication gaps that leave pilots unable to ask for warning information from controllers on the ground.
”The guys who fly expect to lose contact on routes between Brasilia and northwest Brazil,” said Borges, 53, who has flown for Varig since 1980. “It’s amazing that they are trying to establish that these spots are not there. That’s what worries us, because it’s not in the interest of safety.”
Statements like his support depositions made by the American pilots -- Joseph Lepore of Bay Shore and Jan Paladino of Westhampton Beach -- that they were unable to make potentially life-saving contact with air traffic controllers in the minutes before their Sept. 29 collision with a Gol Airlines Boeing 737-800 airliner. The pilots have not been charged, but their passports were confiscated. All 154 people aboard the Brazilian jet were killed.
An American pilot said controllers sometimes can he heard over the air speaking in Portuguese, rather than in English, the standard language used by controllers worldwide, making it difficult to determine whom the controller is talking to.
The contention that Brazil's air traffic control is lacking has been strongly contradicted by Brazilian authorities, as well as by pilots who have said equipment introduced three years ago has made the system as good as any elsewhere in the world.
"At normal flight levels for commercial aircraft we have full radar and radio communications everywhere," said Brig. Gen. Alvaro Pinheiro Costa, who led the construction of the Amazon's new air traffic control system. He said tests by an inspection aircraft that flew the fatal route shortly after the crash confirmed that radio and navigational aids along the way were operating normally.
Brazil unveiled its upgraded system as part of a $1.4 billion array of ground and air sensors designed to allow radar monitors to track aircraft over all of Brazil -- a giant, often roadless expanse of forests and rivers slightly arger than the lower 48 United States. The ambitious project, much of which was developed by the American aerospace technology firm Raytheon, was completed in July 2005.
But some pilots have said areas of radio quiet still exist, which can leave them out of contact with controllers for harrowing minutes at a time.
Doug Churchill, vice president of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations, said commercial aircraft routinely fly though areas without radio contact -- including the North Atlantic route between New York and Europe, one of the world's busiest.
But to do so safely, he said, pilots must follow specific flight plans, holding to agreed-upon speeds and altitudes.
Quoted in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Defense Minister Waldir Pires said the American pilots, who were able to land their damaged Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet, had been flying at an altitude reserved for traffic heading in the opposite direction. The U.S. pilots maintained in their depositions that they were given clearance by controllers to be at that altitude.
The Legacy lost contact with controllers shortly after passing Brasilia, the nation's capital, and heading northwest over the Amazon basin toward Manaus. It also was not sending signals from its transponder, an electronic device that broadcasts the plane's location to traffic controllers and to oncoming planes.
The crash occurred over a remote rainforest near the Chachimbo mountains, an area that according to the British aerospace magazine Flight International is near the limit of radar coverage between Manaus and Brasilia. The area is one in which radio communication can be especially unreliable, according to pilots who fly the region.
The Legacy pilots reportedly told Brazilian investigators that that they had tried but failed to make radio contact with Brasilia in the 10 minutes before their aircraft is believed to have gone under the Boeing, breaking off part of its wing and sending it into a 21/2-minute plunge to the ground.
UNQUOTE.
Whether or not this piece adds anything to our overall "knowledge" of this particular tragedy I'm not really sure, but like many others, my concern, to put it at it's simplest, is "how can this happen with all the marvellous stuff we've got in modern aircraft - and on the ground - today?"
AES
Like us all, finding out the "how" should/will go a long way to preventing such accidents again.
Having been out here on and off on biz for the last few months I have naturally been taking an interest in this thread right from the start - especially as I don't speak Portuguese and as local English newspapers & TV are thin on the ground here.
But I have not posted thus far (being an engineer not a pilot; and having no "inside info") I've not had anything worthwhile to say. But like many of you I too have been concerned by some of the more, shall we say "from the hip" posts here, especially as we're all professionals (of one sort or another) on here.
Anyway, to cut to the chase, quite by chance I got the following newspaper article through an Internet trigger function today. It's from "Newsday" of Long Island NY. I repeat it in full here WITHOUT any comments of my own except to say that to me, the tone seems remarkably restrained for a journalistic piece, QUOTE:
Gaps exist in Amazon communications
BY MARTIN C. EVANS
Newsday Staff Correspondent
October 12, 2006, 9:46 PM EDT
RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil -- Elnio Borges, who flies jets for Brazil's Varig Airlines, says he becomes uncomfortable when he hears government officials here insist that there are no problems with the country's air traffic control system.
He is one of a number of commercial airline pilots, both American and Brazilian, who say the air traffic control system over the vast, remote Amazon River basin remains riddled with communication gaps that leave pilots unable to ask for warning information from controllers on the ground.
”The guys who fly expect to lose contact on routes between Brasilia and northwest Brazil,” said Borges, 53, who has flown for Varig since 1980. “It’s amazing that they are trying to establish that these spots are not there. That’s what worries us, because it’s not in the interest of safety.”
Statements like his support depositions made by the American pilots -- Joseph Lepore of Bay Shore and Jan Paladino of Westhampton Beach -- that they were unable to make potentially life-saving contact with air traffic controllers in the minutes before their Sept. 29 collision with a Gol Airlines Boeing 737-800 airliner. The pilots have not been charged, but their passports were confiscated. All 154 people aboard the Brazilian jet were killed.
An American pilot said controllers sometimes can he heard over the air speaking in Portuguese, rather than in English, the standard language used by controllers worldwide, making it difficult to determine whom the controller is talking to.
The contention that Brazil's air traffic control is lacking has been strongly contradicted by Brazilian authorities, as well as by pilots who have said equipment introduced three years ago has made the system as good as any elsewhere in the world.
"At normal flight levels for commercial aircraft we have full radar and radio communications everywhere," said Brig. Gen. Alvaro Pinheiro Costa, who led the construction of the Amazon's new air traffic control system. He said tests by an inspection aircraft that flew the fatal route shortly after the crash confirmed that radio and navigational aids along the way were operating normally.
Brazil unveiled its upgraded system as part of a $1.4 billion array of ground and air sensors designed to allow radar monitors to track aircraft over all of Brazil -- a giant, often roadless expanse of forests and rivers slightly arger than the lower 48 United States. The ambitious project, much of which was developed by the American aerospace technology firm Raytheon, was completed in July 2005.
But some pilots have said areas of radio quiet still exist, which can leave them out of contact with controllers for harrowing minutes at a time.
Doug Churchill, vice president of the Federation of Air Traffic Controllers Associations, said commercial aircraft routinely fly though areas without radio contact -- including the North Atlantic route between New York and Europe, one of the world's busiest.
But to do so safely, he said, pilots must follow specific flight plans, holding to agreed-upon speeds and altitudes.
Quoted in the Brazilian newspaper O Globo, Defense Minister Waldir Pires said the American pilots, who were able to land their damaged Embraer Legacy 600 executive jet, had been flying at an altitude reserved for traffic heading in the opposite direction. The U.S. pilots maintained in their depositions that they were given clearance by controllers to be at that altitude.
The Legacy lost contact with controllers shortly after passing Brasilia, the nation's capital, and heading northwest over the Amazon basin toward Manaus. It also was not sending signals from its transponder, an electronic device that broadcasts the plane's location to traffic controllers and to oncoming planes.
The crash occurred over a remote rainforest near the Chachimbo mountains, an area that according to the British aerospace magazine Flight International is near the limit of radar coverage between Manaus and Brasilia. The area is one in which radio communication can be especially unreliable, according to pilots who fly the region.
The Legacy pilots reportedly told Brazilian investigators that that they had tried but failed to make radio contact with Brasilia in the 10 minutes before their aircraft is believed to have gone under the Boeing, breaking off part of its wing and sending it into a 21/2-minute plunge to the ground.
UNQUOTE.
Whether or not this piece adds anything to our overall "knowledge" of this particular tragedy I'm not really sure, but like many others, my concern, to put it at it's simplest, is "how can this happen with all the marvellous stuff we've got in modern aircraft - and on the ground - today?"
AES
Like us all, finding out the "how" should/will go a long way to preventing such accidents again.
Last edited by AES; 14th Oct 2006 at 22:57. Reason: Additional point.
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ICA 100-12
RULES OF THE AIR AND SERVICES OF AIR TRAFFIC 2006
(Brazilian Rules)
7.14 FLAW OF LAND AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS
7.14.1 when the organs ATC could not maintain bilateral communication with an aircraft in flight, they should take the following measures:
a) to verify the aircraft can receive the transmissions of the organ, asking him/her that it executes specific maneuvers that you/they can be observed in the presentation radar or that it transmits, if possible, a specified sign with the purpose of accusing the reception of the message; and
b) if the aircraft nothing to accuse, the controller should maintain the separation among the aircraft with communication flaw and the others, supposing that the aircraft will adopt the established procedures for flaw of communications.
Source: http://www.clubeceu.com.br/download/ICA_100-12.pdf in portuguese.