Comair CRJ crash in Kentucky
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A7700
ICAO DOC4444
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7.1.1.2 Aerodrome controllers shall maintain a
continuous watch on all flight operations on and in the vicinity
of an aerodrome....Watch shall be maintained by visual
observation
ICAO DOC4444
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7.1.1.2 Aerodrome controllers shall maintain a
continuous watch on all flight operations on and in the vicinity
of an aerodrome....Watch shall be maintained by visual
observation
Australian CASR Part 172 Manual of Standards
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10.10.2.5 ATC must maintain, as far as possible, a continuous visual watch to detect and determine the position, and ensure the safety of, aircraft.
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10.10.2.5 ATC must maintain, as far as possible, a continuous visual watch to detect and determine the position, and ensure the safety of, aircraft.
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.. all of that Quote from 4444 may well have been complied with to the letter (in a reasonable and practical sense)!
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.. a clue might be that (apparently from an earlier post) ATC did not say anything during the takeoff attempt and (one assumes) the subsequent accident sequence!
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……seems to this observer that ATC were unaware of the problem (for reasons unknown to us at this point) … otherwise an alert/warning/stop instruction could have been issued!
edited for grammar
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http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/15385913.htm
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….hmmm
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Hersman said yesterday that one person was on duty in the control tower Sunday morning, which she said was not unusual on the midnight shift at Blue Grass Airport.
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The Patriot News in Harrisburg, Pa., reported last November that the FAA sent a directive advising smaller airports to schedule two controllers on the midnight shift. An FAA spokeswoman yesterday denied the existence of such a directive.
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But David Katzman, the Michigan pilot and attorney, said that a single controller on duty essentially would be doing the work of three people -- communicating with other air controllers, coordinating movements on the taxiways, and directing airspace around the airport.
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It would be easy to become distracted, Katzman said.
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According to FAA spokeswoman Kathleen Bergen, Lexington once had two controllers working the weekend overnight shift. But the FAA reduced that to one four or five months ago after an unexpected drop in air traffic at Lexington, she said.
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Bergen said the FAA will return to a two-controller overnight shift at Lexington this weekend. She declined to say whether that is because of Sunday's accident.
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The Patriot News in Harrisburg, Pa., reported last November that the FAA sent a directive advising smaller airports to schedule two controllers on the midnight shift. An FAA spokeswoman yesterday denied the existence of such a directive.
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But David Katzman, the Michigan pilot and attorney, said that a single controller on duty essentially would be doing the work of three people -- communicating with other air controllers, coordinating movements on the taxiways, and directing airspace around the airport.
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It would be easy to become distracted, Katzman said.
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According to FAA spokeswoman Kathleen Bergen, Lexington once had two controllers working the weekend overnight shift. But the FAA reduced that to one four or five months ago after an unexpected drop in air traffic at Lexington, she said.
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Bergen said the FAA will return to a two-controller overnight shift at Lexington this weekend. She declined to say whether that is because of Sunday's accident.
….hmmm
ATC = School Crossing Guard ????
An airport is a big place and an ATCO has several duties; so, may not be watching a particular a/c if/when the crew screws up.
We can be sure that the ATCO on duty dearly wishes s/he spotted the mistaken lineup in time to prevent the accident.
But pilots are big boys and girls who are expected to know their way around and ATCOs are not school crossing guards.
We can be sure that the ATCO on duty dearly wishes s/he spotted the mistaken lineup in time to prevent the accident.
But pilots are big boys and girls who are expected to know their way around and ATCOs are not school crossing guards.
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An airport is a big place and an ATCO has several duties; so, may not be watching a particular a/c if/when the crew screws up.
We can be sure that the ATCO on duty dearly wishes s/he spotted the mistaken lineup in time to prevent the accident.
But pilots are big boys and girls who are expected to know their way around and ATCOs are not school crossing guards.
We can be sure that the ATCO on duty dearly wishes s/he spotted the mistaken lineup in time to prevent the accident.
But pilots are big boys and girls who are expected to know their way around and ATCOs are not school crossing guards.
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So, I agree but explain to me ( 30 years of OPS ATC business at a major european airport) why not a single ICAO state member has requested the Air navigation council to modify in a more realistic way this "quite impossible procedure" along the last 50 years....
ATCO having several duties,perhaps,surely even,but what are their priorities,handle the phones or watch outside?
I agree with the previous comments about confirmation bias as a contributing factor. This affects everybody at some point (e.g. taking a wrong turn in a car).
The 747-400 has software that warns of runway misalignment when takeoff thrust is applied and aircraft heading is different from FMGC runway (the runway the aircraft thinks it will takeoff on). If the CRJ had that I think this accident could have been avoided.
We need a systems approach to prevent similar accidents in the future as I think this could have happened to most. Lets start with mandating this software in all large RPT aircraft.
The 747-400 has software that warns of runway misalignment when takeoff thrust is applied and aircraft heading is different from FMGC runway (the runway the aircraft thinks it will takeoff on). If the CRJ had that I think this accident could have been avoided.
We need a systems approach to prevent similar accidents in the future as I think this could have happened to most. Lets start with mandating this software in all large RPT aircraft.
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This is, in no way, an attempt to prempt the results of the ongoing investigation. However (and in the meantime) ....
No doubt someone will flame me for stating the obvious but, perhaps, it really does need to be stated (or re-stated) in the light of this tragic accident.
- It would be a relatively easy thing for airport operators to ensure that the runway numbers are painted in a position that is visible from the flight deck AFTER the aircraft has lined up. Looking at the available photos of 22 and 26 at KLEX I'm not at all sure that this is so today.
- All airlines as part of their SOP's should make it mandatory that crews check the DI with the Magnetic Compass and against the known runway direction BEFORE committing to takeoff.
No doubt someone will flame me for stating the obvious but, perhaps, it really does need to be stated (or re-stated) in the light of this tragic accident.
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Quote - 'The 747-400 has software that warns of runway misalignment when takeoff thrust is applied and aircraft heading is different from FMGC runway (the runway the aircraft thinks it will takeoff on). If the CRJ had that I think this accident could have been avoided'.
Modifying aircraft takes year - and $$$$. If getting positional information direct to pilots is the goal then modify the airfields - and be done with it. Cessna 150 to 777, and everything in between.
Hear Taxiway Message at
http://www.groundmarker.com/info.asp
Modifying aircraft takes year - and $$$$. If getting positional information direct to pilots is the goal then modify the airfields - and be done with it. Cessna 150 to 777, and everything in between.
Hear Taxiway Message at
http://www.groundmarker.com/info.asp
Xeque,
I totally agree. Look at this photo. When taxiing from the apron and turning left to cross 26 and enter the next taxiway to runway 22, one can easily miss the big 26 on the beginning of the runway. If you accidentally turn too far to the left and line up on runway 26, the big number is behind you....
You know how it goes...busybusybusy, oh yeah a left turn, and here is the runway. Let's go.....
I totally agree. Look at this photo. When taxiing from the apron and turning left to cross 26 and enter the next taxiway to runway 22, one can easily miss the big 26 on the beginning of the runway. If you accidentally turn too far to the left and line up on runway 26, the big number is behind you....
You know how it goes...busybusybusy, oh yeah a left turn, and here is the runway. Let's go.....
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A7700
So, I agree but explain to me ( 30 years of OPS ATC business at a major european airport) why not a single ICAO state member has requested the Air navigation council to modify in a more realistic way this "quite impossible procedure" along the last 50 years....
So, I agree but explain to me ( 30 years of OPS ATC business at a major european airport) why not a single ICAO state member has requested the Air navigation council to modify in a more realistic way this "quite impossible procedure" along the last 50 years....
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Assuming that the runways were clearly visible!... the number of eyes might also be considered causal ….. I guess the number of eyes at ‘a major European airport’ might be different? ….
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.. IMHO the threshold number position is relevant! …. from the photos, both runway threshold identifiers would not be taxied over and therefore not immediately apparent!
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... I am curious about this taxi clearance issue ..... can someone confirm (in a standard operating sense) that runway crossings are not necessarily issued if part of the intented taxi route .. and therfore presumably not readback also? ..... is this a US procedure to minimise R/T loading?? .... if so, is it ICAO compliant? ..A7700 .. anyone?
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.. would that be an additional 'jogger' i.e. '........ cross Rwy 26 ... Rwy 22 Clear for take off'
Last edited by Scurvy.D.Dog; 29th Aug 2006 at 14:02.
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A7700 and Scurvy:
The accepted practice has been that the State regulations can differ from the ICAO Convention and Annexes but you are supposed to file a difference with ICAO. Not real familiar with Annex 3 (airports) that Doc 4444 contributes to, but wouldn't hang my hat on it and depend on it.
May come as a surprise to some but many times States do not file differences, and from what I've seen in the other volumes I deal with the States that are the most prolific and punctual on this papperwork are the ones that have the least differences.
Usual practice/rule in US for a taxi clearance is to identify any runways that are to be crossed (ACME 123 taxi to the active 34 via bravo, cross 27" or "ACME 123 taxi to the active 34 via bravo, hold short of 27" and then the a/c reads back...tends to reduce runway incursions. Rule says that when you are cleared to taxi to some runway via some taxiway you are (implicitly) cleared to cross any intermediate runways.
The accepted practice has been that the State regulations can differ from the ICAO Convention and Annexes but you are supposed to file a difference with ICAO. Not real familiar with Annex 3 (airports) that Doc 4444 contributes to, but wouldn't hang my hat on it and depend on it.
May come as a surprise to some but many times States do not file differences, and from what I've seen in the other volumes I deal with the States that are the most prolific and punctual on this papperwork are the ones that have the least differences.
Usual practice/rule in US for a taxi clearance is to identify any runways that are to be crossed (ACME 123 taxi to the active 34 via bravo, cross 27" or "ACME 123 taxi to the active 34 via bravo, hold short of 27" and then the a/c reads back...tends to reduce runway incursions. Rule says that when you are cleared to taxi to some runway via some taxiway you are (implicitly) cleared to cross any intermediate runways.
Last edited by Iron City; 29th Aug 2006 at 14:29. Reason: spelling and add
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Iron City .... quite right and agreed! 
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.... does 26 have those reflective 'cats eyes' on the edges adjacent the runway edge lights (I believe they are used in some locations in case of lighting failure at a critical phase of flight)??
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.... does 26 have those reflective 'cats eyes' on the edges adjacent the runway edge lights (I believe they are used in some locations in case of lighting failure at a critical phase of flight)??
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I've no idea how they come up with 3539 feet...
100 knots for VR does not sound possible to me in a CRJ200
100 knots for VR does not sound possible to me in a CRJ200
On aircraft with very good braking in an RTO (or on a long runway), V1 and Vr are often the same and many operators only call "Rotate".
Pegase Driver
It is quite amazing to see a lot of people here which have registered here as ATPL holders having such a poor knowledge on a Tower Controller responsibilities.
The list of those responsibilities and duties is very long in some airports, and can be a challenge for a single person but I can assure you that confirming in which runway aircraft are lined up before issuing a take off clearance is not of that list.
I am also 99% sure that if the controller had seen it or had a doubt he would have said something. No controller in his right mind would have done otherwise.
As to judge on the priorities ( e.g. telephone versus looking out ) you have to be on the spot to do that . It is very cheap afterwards to say you did not have your priorities in order, should have done this instead of that and it would have saved 50 lives...I have heard that argument before in court on another accident and frankly, this made me sick just to watch the controller listening to that.
The list of those responsibilities and duties is very long in some airports, and can be a challenge for a single person but I can assure you that confirming in which runway aircraft are lined up before issuing a take off clearance is not of that list.
I am also 99% sure that if the controller had seen it or had a doubt he would have said something. No controller in his right mind would have done otherwise.
As to judge on the priorities ( e.g. telephone versus looking out ) you have to be on the spot to do that . It is very cheap afterwards to say you did not have your priorities in order, should have done this instead of that and it would have saved 50 lives...I have heard that argument before in court on another accident and frankly, this made me sick just to watch the controller listening to that.
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From CNN. FAA acknowledges it violated staffing policies with only one air traffic controller on duty at airport when Comair jet crashed Sunday, killing 49 people.