Airport Security (Merged) - Effects on Crew/Staff
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The two faces of Manchester security
I was had to fly from Manchester twice this week and the difference in the way I was treated by security was very marked.
The staff at the north gate security post could only be described as rude, arrogant and provocative with one of them barking orders at airline staff and clearly enjoying the power to order people about, the removal of items from a company issue first aid kit was no doubt the highlight of the day for one member of this gang.
It was quite easy to see that the name of the game was to prevoke a reaction from a member of airline staff, what fun it would be to get some one arrested was clearly the attitude.
Fortunatly dispite the aggressive and insulting treatment that the airline staff had to endure no one reacted, with the atmosphere at that security point just one spark would have set off a large amount of violence.
A day or two later as a passenger the treatment was very different security was strict but conducted in a civil and proper way.
I have raised a report about the conduct of the secuity staff at Manchester, I don't think that the management at Manchester airport will take any notice but it is on file and should something kick off reports like mine could be used as evidence of a cutlure of rude and provocative behavior by security staff that would be beond the endurance of a reasonable person day after day.
So please if you don't like the way security treat you raise some paperwork, there is nothing the management like less than having to answer for the bad treatment of there "customers"
The staff at the north gate security post could only be described as rude, arrogant and provocative with one of them barking orders at airline staff and clearly enjoying the power to order people about, the removal of items from a company issue first aid kit was no doubt the highlight of the day for one member of this gang.
It was quite easy to see that the name of the game was to prevoke a reaction from a member of airline staff, what fun it would be to get some one arrested was clearly the attitude.
Fortunatly dispite the aggressive and insulting treatment that the airline staff had to endure no one reacted, with the atmosphere at that security point just one spark would have set off a large amount of violence.
A day or two later as a passenger the treatment was very different security was strict but conducted in a civil and proper way.
I have raised a report about the conduct of the secuity staff at Manchester, I don't think that the management at Manchester airport will take any notice but it is on file and should something kick off reports like mine could be used as evidence of a cutlure of rude and provocative behavior by security staff that would be beond the endurance of a reasonable person day after day.
So please if you don't like the way security treat you raise some paperwork, there is nothing the management like less than having to answer for the bad treatment of there "customers"
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Brilliant thread..and one which provokes a lot of thought...
However I'd like to bring perhaps a different slant to it....and one which may not be welcome....
Jonny Jobsworth on security has a fairly limited remit...perhaps deliberately because of limited ability or because the rules are set up that way.
So along comes Captain Chaos and his merry men (or women), in full uniform and fully tooled up to fly. Now JJ has seen many CCs today...all of whom are accredited and hold ID which looks good...
Now I can go out and rent or purchase clothes that make me appear to be an airline pilot...and I can easily create ID which JJ would believe to be correct and legit...neither however would make me an airline pilot.
So here we have the heart of the matter. Pilots by and large are honest, law abiding and non suicidal people who love what they are doing. If they wanted to take a plane out, as has been expounded at length, they are more than able to do so without resort to explosives etc...
But are all people who look like pilots actually pilots?
So JJ and more to the point JJ's boss's boss's boss thinks that if pilots are excempt from the security rules then there is the potential for a breach of that security....So JJ is instructed to treat CC as just another person who may be a malfaisant, hell bent on destruction, carrying a lethal cocktail of mineral water and cell phone is his flight bag...
In reality the solution is very very simple (but costs money) ...have a security check point only for flight and cabin crew..with access to the airlines' crew roster to ensure the Captain Chaos is indeed going to fly Happy Airlines Flight 100 today..It would both speed up the process and remove the public's free show of seeing the crew being strip searched for lip stick....
Just a thought...
However I'd like to bring perhaps a different slant to it....and one which may not be welcome....
Jonny Jobsworth on security has a fairly limited remit...perhaps deliberately because of limited ability or because the rules are set up that way.
So along comes Captain Chaos and his merry men (or women), in full uniform and fully tooled up to fly. Now JJ has seen many CCs today...all of whom are accredited and hold ID which looks good...
Now I can go out and rent or purchase clothes that make me appear to be an airline pilot...and I can easily create ID which JJ would believe to be correct and legit...neither however would make me an airline pilot.
So here we have the heart of the matter. Pilots by and large are honest, law abiding and non suicidal people who love what they are doing. If they wanted to take a plane out, as has been expounded at length, they are more than able to do so without resort to explosives etc...
But are all people who look like pilots actually pilots?
So JJ and more to the point JJ's boss's boss's boss thinks that if pilots are excempt from the security rules then there is the potential for a breach of that security....So JJ is instructed to treat CC as just another person who may be a malfaisant, hell bent on destruction, carrying a lethal cocktail of mineral water and cell phone is his flight bag...
In reality the solution is very very simple (but costs money) ...have a security check point only for flight and cabin crew..with access to the airlines' crew roster to ensure the Captain Chaos is indeed going to fly Happy Airlines Flight 100 today..It would both speed up the process and remove the public's free show of seeing the crew being strip searched for lip stick....
Just a thought...
Mfaff,
The answer is even simpler. Forget all this PC c##p and introduce positive profiling as per El Al. Cheaper and quicker than all this nonsense we're having to put up with now!!!
The answer is even simpler. Forget all this PC c##p and introduce positive profiling as per El Al. Cheaper and quicker than all this nonsense we're having to put up with now!!!
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Manchester security are the most rude out there.
They do the shoe thing
then sit on their arses on the two chairs that are there watching people do a balancing act to put there shoes on, oh, and don't try to hold the door open for your mate 3 feet behind ya....... Rules say nooooooooooo,
obviously incase a load of security checked airport workers with yoghurts try to 'rush' the metal hoop.
strange that since the passenger security has no doors !
They do the shoe thing
then sit on their arses on the two chairs that are there watching people do a balancing act to put there shoes on, oh, and don't try to hold the door open for your mate 3 feet behind ya....... Rules say nooooooooooo,obviously incase a load of security checked airport workers with yoghurts try to 'rush' the metal hoop.
strange that since the passenger security has no doors !
[QUOTE=mfaff;2859972]
So along comes Captain Chaos and his merry men (or women), in full uniform and fully tooled up to fly. But are all people who look like pilots actually pilots?
.[/QUOTE
One slight flaw mfaff.
It would not be possible for the "bad guys" to assemble two pilots and up to a dozen cabin crew, all dressed in authentic uniforms, carrying company ID's and bags etc and present them to security at the correct time/date to operate a specific flight. Could be fun if both "crews" turned up at the same time though!
So along comes Captain Chaos and his merry men (or women), in full uniform and fully tooled up to fly. But are all people who look like pilots actually pilots?
.[/QUOTE
One slight flaw mfaff.
It would not be possible for the "bad guys" to assemble two pilots and up to a dozen cabin crew, all dressed in authentic uniforms, carrying company ID's and bags etc and present them to security at the correct time/date to operate a specific flight. Could be fun if both "crews" turned up at the same time though!
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Brakedwell,
Hmmm... I'm pretty certain you are wrong...a couple of flight crew and two or three flight attendants.. trying it on as a say a 146 crew...
Not too much problem there...
As for ID.. a simple robbery would give me all the originals I needed.. a good forgery set up would allow me to make all the fake IDs required. Again not a mountain to climb in voew of what is wanted.
I'm sure that prior to the 11th September, 'we' would have said it was not possible to organise a simultaneous four airliner hijack and suicide mission either, let alone to knock down the Twin Towers or yet attack the Pentagon.. or a co-ordinated multi bomb attack in London either....
We were wrong on both counts...
They might have beliefs and attitudes which we do not agree with, but there are as many idiots here as there and likewise there are as many intelligent, organised and disciplined leaders....
Adrain,
Quite... until you realise that you need to set, maintain and police this profile; update it with new permutations and information and who makes those calls....again you will target specifics which can easily be avoided....I'm pretty certain that the London bombers would have slipped thro the net.. and the Police with their profiling managed to kill an innocent Brazilian.
Profiling relies far too much on compentence... a commodity in short supply in many areas. Basic security, such as searches, acts as a deterent and is far less reliant on judgement and ability. Multiple layers are possible fairly cheaply, so a single mistake is less likely to prove disasterous...If you rely on the profiling, get it wrong once and the results are potentially terrible...in a multi layer 'dumb' system one persons' slip up is likely to be picked up by the next layer.. Ok its not fool proof but it is more 'reliable'.
El Al makes it work not by being clever, but by being competent...and using very dedicated staff who are working less for an airline or airport operator and more for the nation...It stems from a different source, a different motivation. And they the security staff are very mobile, moving from nation to nation regularly to ensure that nobody gets 'stale' or worse compromised. All possible with a 'state' institution, less possible with commercial companies.
Certainly profiling would be a valid additional layer...but not a replacement.
But the issue here is not security at all, its the position of crew with respect to what ever security is in place. Therefore I maintain that it is not what is doen, but how it is done. The 'spectacle' of crrew being treated as 'SLF' is not accpetable...and separation would allow different process to be carried out without it being a publicity issue.
Hmmm... I'm pretty certain you are wrong...a couple of flight crew and two or three flight attendants.. trying it on as a say a 146 crew...
Not too much problem there...
As for ID.. a simple robbery would give me all the originals I needed.. a good forgery set up would allow me to make all the fake IDs required. Again not a mountain to climb in voew of what is wanted.
I'm sure that prior to the 11th September, 'we' would have said it was not possible to organise a simultaneous four airliner hijack and suicide mission either, let alone to knock down the Twin Towers or yet attack the Pentagon.. or a co-ordinated multi bomb attack in London either....
We were wrong on both counts...
They might have beliefs and attitudes which we do not agree with, but there are as many idiots here as there and likewise there are as many intelligent, organised and disciplined leaders....
Adrain,
Quite... until you realise that you need to set, maintain and police this profile; update it with new permutations and information and who makes those calls....again you will target specifics which can easily be avoided....I'm pretty certain that the London bombers would have slipped thro the net.. and the Police with their profiling managed to kill an innocent Brazilian.
Profiling relies far too much on compentence... a commodity in short supply in many areas. Basic security, such as searches, acts as a deterent and is far less reliant on judgement and ability. Multiple layers are possible fairly cheaply, so a single mistake is less likely to prove disasterous...If you rely on the profiling, get it wrong once and the results are potentially terrible...in a multi layer 'dumb' system one persons' slip up is likely to be picked up by the next layer.. Ok its not fool proof but it is more 'reliable'.
El Al makes it work not by being clever, but by being competent...and using very dedicated staff who are working less for an airline or airport operator and more for the nation...It stems from a different source, a different motivation. And they the security staff are very mobile, moving from nation to nation regularly to ensure that nobody gets 'stale' or worse compromised. All possible with a 'state' institution, less possible with commercial companies.
Certainly profiling would be a valid additional layer...but not a replacement.
But the issue here is not security at all, its the position of crew with respect to what ever security is in place. Therefore I maintain that it is not what is doen, but how it is done. The 'spectacle' of crrew being treated as 'SLF' is not accpetable...and separation would allow different process to be carried out without it being a publicity issue.
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mfaff
You clearly have not the faintest idea what you're talking about.
Brakedwell gave you just one example of where reality and your fantasy world differs, yet you persist with your ignorant rubbish.
Suffice to say you have no idea of a crew's progression from initial report to actual pushback - and I'm not about to enlighten you.
You have no knowledge of the details contained on a modern i/d card, or its properties. You fail to grasp even the most fundamental concepts of what a real crew does in preparation for departure. In case it hadn't occured to you, we don't just turn up, wander up the steps and 'switch on' as you might with your Mondeo.
At every stage in the process, the bogus crew would be spotted. Again, I'm not about to enlighten you. And if the aircraft really is due to depart, where do you think the real crew would be?
I'm waiting for your "they're all being held hostage" reply...
The trouble with ignorant posts such as yours is that (given time and monotonous repetition) they are in danger of gaining critical mass to the point where other naive people actually believe the scenario has merit. It hasn't.
I wouldn't dream of trying to tell you how to do your job in central London or pontificate the finer points of architectural design - the world which you inhabit.
I think you've been watching too many movies - I suggest a couple of early nights and a reality check.
You clearly have not the faintest idea what you're talking about.
Brakedwell gave you just one example of where reality and your fantasy world differs, yet you persist with your ignorant rubbish.
Suffice to say you have no idea of a crew's progression from initial report to actual pushback - and I'm not about to enlighten you.
You have no knowledge of the details contained on a modern i/d card, or its properties. You fail to grasp even the most fundamental concepts of what a real crew does in preparation for departure. In case it hadn't occured to you, we don't just turn up, wander up the steps and 'switch on' as you might with your Mondeo.
At every stage in the process, the bogus crew would be spotted. Again, I'm not about to enlighten you. And if the aircraft really is due to depart, where do you think the real crew would be?
I'm waiting for your "they're all being held hostage" reply...
The trouble with ignorant posts such as yours is that (given time and monotonous repetition) they are in danger of gaining critical mass to the point where other naive people actually believe the scenario has merit. It hasn't.
I wouldn't dream of trying to tell you how to do your job in central London or pontificate the finer points of architectural design - the world which you inhabit.
I think you've been watching too many movies - I suggest a couple of early nights and a reality check.
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El Al certainly have a high threat to deal with -but before we go too far in saying we should copy them, bear in mind some factors make their job easier. For a start a large proportion of their pax are Israeli citizens. This means they know a great deal about them. On top of that many of their flights are to or from Israel -in which case the pax is either visiting relatives or has some good reason for going. The remainder can then be grilled as descibed above. A colleague of mine had that pleasure and while the process was thorough, it certainly wasn't polite and indeed was highly intrusive. For instance he could see the relevance of being asked where he purchased his suitcase but not whether he had a sexual relationship with a female member of his dive party.
His interrogation took about 50 minutes, and definitely made him choose a different holiday destination in future. Even with tens of thousands of extra trained staff, we still wouldn't have the resources for such a process.
His interrogation took about 50 minutes, and definitely made him choose a different holiday destination in future. Even with tens of thousands of extra trained staff, we still wouldn't have the resources for such a process.
capitalism rules
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Desperate,
Thanks for a very insightful post… really helpful.
However I’d say you are merely looking at the problem from a different perspective.
The way I have read this thread, and perhaps I am wrong…the main issue is the way that aircraft crew have to deal with inconsistent, seemingly irrelevant and intrusive security as they go legitimately from landside to airside.
The use of false uniforms and fake ID was illustrative of a simple way of side- stepping the security barrier if the presence of a uniform and an ID were sufficient to gain a different treatment at this point.
Both Brakedwell and you then took a flying leap into conjecture that the fakes would then proceed to take over an aircraft. This is only one of a number of options open to them. Others exist and may satisfy their aims just as well.
So if we look at the relevance of the entire process a legit crew goes thro from first arrival to taking an aircraft in the light of getting thro security we can see if it is relevant.
Jonny Jobsworth deals with a crew as they appear at his or her security station. He has not observed them arrive so cannot vouch from whence they have come, he possibly does not care. Nor, I wager, does he or she really care where they are going. They are part of the crowd of people who have arrived from the uncontrolled landside section of the airport…no more; no less. They will be treated in the same fashion as everyone else. So whether they have just entered the terminal from a taxi or been given the once over by a company ID check is totally irrelevant. JJ is oblivious of this….Where the crew then goes does not matter to JJ. If the crew vanishes into thin air it is not his duty know or control.
The notion that aircrew should have a separate security area, to which only air and ground crew have access means more specific checks can be made.. more about making sure the people are who they say they are and are supposed to be there, rather than checking to see if the lens fluid is explosive, the sandwich poisoned or the toothpick is dangerous. This may be achieved either by ensuring the crews arrive at this security checkpoint as the result of either passing thro company spaces, access to which is gained only by company ID checks, or by another access controlled landside section, where IDs can be checked against user company databases.
So whilst I would agree that the chances of using fake crew; with fake IDs to gain control of an aircraft is remote (although it exists) this was not the issue. The issue is the use of fake ID and uniforms to get thro security.
Aside from this you may wish to devote your considerable knowledge and intelligence to another issue…..even if only for a few seconds.
Airports are buildings. They are designed by people. Those people need to learn, understand and know how these buildings work, how these ‘people machines’ function. In order to do so the designers need to be able to define the routes people take thro the airport as they use it as passengers, as landside staff, as airside users, as users of both sides, as cleaners, as security staff, as maintenance men and as even as aircrew. Those designers need to know what the sequence of events and spaces is that these users need at every stage of their use of the building. They need to know what those spaces are, what they are used for, how big, how many doors and windows they need. They need to know who can go thro that door, this door, where those users are going and what they are doing.
In order to gain this knowledge and understanding those designers spend a lot of time experiencing these for themselves, in existing airports and in working with the people who use them, who run them. And here’s the really interesting bit…a large percentage of those designers are architects.
So, if I can ask you to make another of your mental leaps…there is a possibility that as an architect, my knowledge of how and airport works is extensive and detailed; that my knowledge of how the people, both SLF and professional users go thro an airport may be equally extensive and detailed. And shock horror I may even know how the security of an airport works.
To add to the unimaginable I may know in detail the route a crew needs to take from the moment they arrive at the airport until they close the door of the plane they are rostered to…I may know what the sequence of spaces they need to use is before venturing across the security barrier and beyond to their rostered craft. I may, perish the thought, know exactly which doors; both airside and landside; are on an access control system… and on which systems… I might even know what that system is... and what makes it work... let alone what the ID is that activates it…and oh the humanity, where to get the machine that makes the ID card that activates the door that allows access to the inner sanctums of the airport. I might even have discussed this with an airport operator and an airline rep…or better yet taken specialist advice on the matter so that my proposed designs work or even have as a member of the architectural team a designer who has worked these systems first hand as a security agent for a major airline renowned of its security profile.
I’m glad that you pointed out that I do not have the faintest idea of what I am talking about. It reassures me that you experience this first hand every time you use certain airports both here and overseas. It makes me realise that if all it takes is ignorance, then truly, it is the way forward.
I tell you what Desperate…lets make a deal; I’ll come and tell you how to fly an airplane a large complex multi-engined passenger jet say... based only on several thousand flights as a passenger and a handful of hours in a light plane and fast jets (I'm assuming here you are a pilot).. And then you can come and tell me how to design an airport because you use one often as a pilot…Sound good to you?
Thanks for a very insightful post… really helpful.
However I’d say you are merely looking at the problem from a different perspective.
The way I have read this thread, and perhaps I am wrong…the main issue is the way that aircraft crew have to deal with inconsistent, seemingly irrelevant and intrusive security as they go legitimately from landside to airside.
The use of false uniforms and fake ID was illustrative of a simple way of side- stepping the security barrier if the presence of a uniform and an ID were sufficient to gain a different treatment at this point.
Both Brakedwell and you then took a flying leap into conjecture that the fakes would then proceed to take over an aircraft. This is only one of a number of options open to them. Others exist and may satisfy their aims just as well.
So if we look at the relevance of the entire process a legit crew goes thro from first arrival to taking an aircraft in the light of getting thro security we can see if it is relevant.
Jonny Jobsworth deals with a crew as they appear at his or her security station. He has not observed them arrive so cannot vouch from whence they have come, he possibly does not care. Nor, I wager, does he or she really care where they are going. They are part of the crowd of people who have arrived from the uncontrolled landside section of the airport…no more; no less. They will be treated in the same fashion as everyone else. So whether they have just entered the terminal from a taxi or been given the once over by a company ID check is totally irrelevant. JJ is oblivious of this….Where the crew then goes does not matter to JJ. If the crew vanishes into thin air it is not his duty know or control.
The notion that aircrew should have a separate security area, to which only air and ground crew have access means more specific checks can be made.. more about making sure the people are who they say they are and are supposed to be there, rather than checking to see if the lens fluid is explosive, the sandwich poisoned or the toothpick is dangerous. This may be achieved either by ensuring the crews arrive at this security checkpoint as the result of either passing thro company spaces, access to which is gained only by company ID checks, or by another access controlled landside section, where IDs can be checked against user company databases.
So whilst I would agree that the chances of using fake crew; with fake IDs to gain control of an aircraft is remote (although it exists) this was not the issue. The issue is the use of fake ID and uniforms to get thro security.
Aside from this you may wish to devote your considerable knowledge and intelligence to another issue…..even if only for a few seconds.
Airports are buildings. They are designed by people. Those people need to learn, understand and know how these buildings work, how these ‘people machines’ function. In order to do so the designers need to be able to define the routes people take thro the airport as they use it as passengers, as landside staff, as airside users, as users of both sides, as cleaners, as security staff, as maintenance men and as even as aircrew. Those designers need to know what the sequence of events and spaces is that these users need at every stage of their use of the building. They need to know what those spaces are, what they are used for, how big, how many doors and windows they need. They need to know who can go thro that door, this door, where those users are going and what they are doing.
In order to gain this knowledge and understanding those designers spend a lot of time experiencing these for themselves, in existing airports and in working with the people who use them, who run them. And here’s the really interesting bit…a large percentage of those designers are architects.
So, if I can ask you to make another of your mental leaps…there is a possibility that as an architect, my knowledge of how and airport works is extensive and detailed; that my knowledge of how the people, both SLF and professional users go thro an airport may be equally extensive and detailed. And shock horror I may even know how the security of an airport works.
To add to the unimaginable I may know in detail the route a crew needs to take from the moment they arrive at the airport until they close the door of the plane they are rostered to…I may know what the sequence of spaces they need to use is before venturing across the security barrier and beyond to their rostered craft. I may, perish the thought, know exactly which doors; both airside and landside; are on an access control system… and on which systems… I might even know what that system is... and what makes it work... let alone what the ID is that activates it…and oh the humanity, where to get the machine that makes the ID card that activates the door that allows access to the inner sanctums of the airport. I might even have discussed this with an airport operator and an airline rep…or better yet taken specialist advice on the matter so that my proposed designs work or even have as a member of the architectural team a designer who has worked these systems first hand as a security agent for a major airline renowned of its security profile.
I’m glad that you pointed out that I do not have the faintest idea of what I am talking about. It reassures me that you experience this first hand every time you use certain airports both here and overseas. It makes me realise that if all it takes is ignorance, then truly, it is the way forward.
I tell you what Desperate…lets make a deal; I’ll come and tell you how to fly an airplane a large complex multi-engined passenger jet say... based only on several thousand flights as a passenger and a handful of hours in a light plane and fast jets (I'm assuming here you are a pilot).. And then you can come and tell me how to design an airport because you use one often as a pilot…Sound good to you?
mfaff:
Granted, you are an expert in designing buildings, including airport terminals. I believe you would agree that a building is a system, comprised of a series of elements that work together to perform a particular function or functions. Would it not be safe to say that when a building is being designed, that there are many stakeholders, including plumbers, electricians, carpenters, and the end users of said building, who are consulted along with architects to ensure that the building (as in a system) is designed to be reasonable user friendly and effective?
The pilots are not just criticising buildings, they are criticising the security system. The buildings are but a part of that system. The pilots are stakeholders in that system, and they have noted some serious design flaws, not only in that said stakeholders are being treated as criminal suspects on their way to work, but in that the system is not adequately performing its' desired function. There are water stains on the walls and ceilings, and yet no one weems willing to consult a plumber or a roofer before trying to fix them.
The security system in fact should be there to serve the pilots and all other stakeholders in the aviation system, in the same way that the police are there to serve the citizens of a community to ensure it is properly protected from crime. If in performing that function, the police treated the stakeholders (i.e. innocent citizens) as criminal suspects every time they entered their home or place of business, I believe there would be some significant hell-raising.
Granted, you are an expert in designing buildings, including airport terminals. I believe you would agree that a building is a system, comprised of a series of elements that work together to perform a particular function or functions. Would it not be safe to say that when a building is being designed, that there are many stakeholders, including plumbers, electricians, carpenters, and the end users of said building, who are consulted along with architects to ensure that the building (as in a system) is designed to be reasonable user friendly and effective?
The pilots are not just criticising buildings, they are criticising the security system. The buildings are but a part of that system. The pilots are stakeholders in that system, and they have noted some serious design flaws, not only in that said stakeholders are being treated as criminal suspects on their way to work, but in that the system is not adequately performing its' desired function. There are water stains on the walls and ceilings, and yet no one weems willing to consult a plumber or a roofer before trying to fix them.
The security system in fact should be there to serve the pilots and all other stakeholders in the aviation system, in the same way that the police are there to serve the citizens of a community to ensure it is properly protected from crime. If in performing that function, the police treated the stakeholders (i.e. innocent citizens) as criminal suspects every time they entered their home or place of business, I believe there would be some significant hell-raising.
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J.O.
I would be foolish to disagree totally with you. However whilst your comments address the overall issue as part of, as you say, a system it is not correct to say that architects are consulted along with other stakeholders. As the architect I am not a stakeholder.
The context of my post was that it is the architect who does the vast majority of that consulting with the stakeholders; in the main the operators and users, prior to beginning the design. The architect is often the one who spends the time talking to the pilots and the ground staff, etc as to what it is they need. From this research emerges a design which attempts to merge all of the requirements and desires into a single cohesive functioning whole. The architect is the one who proposes a system that is reasonably user friendly and effective (hopefully)…the stakeholders are the ones who then have the power to agree or disagree with the proposal. This includes the physical manifestation of the operational requirements of the security system.
In this thread, the issue as I read it, is that pilots are:
a) Upset that the system does not recognize their needs and role.
b) Incensed that the manifestation of that lack of recognition is to be subject to the same strictures as the travelling public.
If we look at what the security system is there to achieve: - to ensure that the fare- paying passengers and the crews who serve them are as safe as possible from deliberate harm, and to protect those on the ground and in buildings from being harmed, is the current security system working?
The treatment of the aircraft crew in the manner that has been described here and that I have seen recently serves no security purpose at all. It does not remove the risk that the real crew can, if they so chose, fly a fully laden aircraft into a building. Plus they do not need devices to do so, their skill is all that is required.
What has also been evident on this thread is the assumption, by air crew here, that the sight of the uniform and ID, as presented at the common security checkpoint; is sufficient to grant the crews immunity from these checks, in full view of the fare paying passengers who are being searched.
What I was trying, and seemingly failing to do, was to show that this assumption, namely that the use of uniforms and ID, was insufficiently robust to adequately provide the security required. It is a simplistic view of the issue and one which is all too easily defeated, an easy example of which was given.
I agree that crews should be treated differently. But that differentiation must be done on a number of levels; physically, by having separate, dedicated access points, and by a different level of security… checking the people are actually who they should be, where they should be and when they should be….Then the issue of ‘banned’ items becomes irrelevant.
This separation already exists to a certain degree for airside ground crew who use apron/ ramp level security checkpoints but is not available to aircrew.
Now, if this separation is what is needed to perform the task of providing security then it is not rocket science. It provides the security required to achieve the stated aims and the ability to ensure that crews are able to go to work without being treated like suspects. The belief however that uniforms and ID should be sufficient is however naive. That can only work as part of a wider solution.
The comment was ’not having the faintest idea’ is also interesting. In order to create the functional spaces for any system the designer needs to be understand it, to know its goals and priorities need to be known and defined.
In respect to security this manifests itself in two directions….that of the elements required…such as physical barriers to passage and limiting the number of weak points in any perimeter…and secondly the operation of those barriers; be they people at checkpoints, card access systems and so forth. The final level of information is that of actually creating the system... so I know how to design a physical barrier such as a 10 foot razor wire fence and how to create an access control system... including how the IDs are made to be compatible with that system, because I need to know where to put the kit that allows it to be used.
An analogy is for the pilot of an aircraft to know the aircrafts’ systems in detail, not only what they do, but how they do it and the means required to achieve it…unless that knowledge is there then the overall package cannot be used fully.
As the designer I do know exactly where a crew needs to go and why in the progression to their aircraft. I also need to explore and identify the weak points of that route and how to help maintain the integrity of the system so that it retains its stated performance.
So when somebody says ‘if only XYZ were being done it would all be better’ and it’s clear that this is incorrect then, as Desperate says, ignorant posts, if repeated often enough, gain a critical mass to the point where other naïve people actually believe them. In this case it is naïve air crew who may believe that a uniform and ID are sufficient, when presented, to be taken as absolute guarantees that they are the good guys…I wonder who needs to stop watching films and take a reality check?
I would be foolish to disagree totally with you. However whilst your comments address the overall issue as part of, as you say, a system it is not correct to say that architects are consulted along with other stakeholders. As the architect I am not a stakeholder.
The context of my post was that it is the architect who does the vast majority of that consulting with the stakeholders; in the main the operators and users, prior to beginning the design. The architect is often the one who spends the time talking to the pilots and the ground staff, etc as to what it is they need. From this research emerges a design which attempts to merge all of the requirements and desires into a single cohesive functioning whole. The architect is the one who proposes a system that is reasonably user friendly and effective (hopefully)…the stakeholders are the ones who then have the power to agree or disagree with the proposal. This includes the physical manifestation of the operational requirements of the security system.
In this thread, the issue as I read it, is that pilots are:
a) Upset that the system does not recognize their needs and role.
b) Incensed that the manifestation of that lack of recognition is to be subject to the same strictures as the travelling public.
If we look at what the security system is there to achieve: - to ensure that the fare- paying passengers and the crews who serve them are as safe as possible from deliberate harm, and to protect those on the ground and in buildings from being harmed, is the current security system working?
The treatment of the aircraft crew in the manner that has been described here and that I have seen recently serves no security purpose at all. It does not remove the risk that the real crew can, if they so chose, fly a fully laden aircraft into a building. Plus they do not need devices to do so, their skill is all that is required.
What has also been evident on this thread is the assumption, by air crew here, that the sight of the uniform and ID, as presented at the common security checkpoint; is sufficient to grant the crews immunity from these checks, in full view of the fare paying passengers who are being searched.
What I was trying, and seemingly failing to do, was to show that this assumption, namely that the use of uniforms and ID, was insufficiently robust to adequately provide the security required. It is a simplistic view of the issue and one which is all too easily defeated, an easy example of which was given.
I agree that crews should be treated differently. But that differentiation must be done on a number of levels; physically, by having separate, dedicated access points, and by a different level of security… checking the people are actually who they should be, where they should be and when they should be….Then the issue of ‘banned’ items becomes irrelevant.
This separation already exists to a certain degree for airside ground crew who use apron/ ramp level security checkpoints but is not available to aircrew.
Now, if this separation is what is needed to perform the task of providing security then it is not rocket science. It provides the security required to achieve the stated aims and the ability to ensure that crews are able to go to work without being treated like suspects. The belief however that uniforms and ID should be sufficient is however naive. That can only work as part of a wider solution.
The comment was ’not having the faintest idea’ is also interesting. In order to create the functional spaces for any system the designer needs to be understand it, to know its goals and priorities need to be known and defined.
In respect to security this manifests itself in two directions….that of the elements required…such as physical barriers to passage and limiting the number of weak points in any perimeter…and secondly the operation of those barriers; be they people at checkpoints, card access systems and so forth. The final level of information is that of actually creating the system... so I know how to design a physical barrier such as a 10 foot razor wire fence and how to create an access control system... including how the IDs are made to be compatible with that system, because I need to know where to put the kit that allows it to be used.
An analogy is for the pilot of an aircraft to know the aircrafts’ systems in detail, not only what they do, but how they do it and the means required to achieve it…unless that knowledge is there then the overall package cannot be used fully.
As the designer I do know exactly where a crew needs to go and why in the progression to their aircraft. I also need to explore and identify the weak points of that route and how to help maintain the integrity of the system so that it retains its stated performance.
So when somebody says ‘if only XYZ were being done it would all be better’ and it’s clear that this is incorrect then, as Desperate says, ignorant posts, if repeated often enough, gain a critical mass to the point where other naïve people actually believe them. In this case it is naïve air crew who may believe that a uniform and ID are sufficient, when presented, to be taken as absolute guarantees that they are the good guys…I wonder who needs to stop watching films and take a reality check?
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Qualifications and Experience you will find the following:
Qualifications:
None. Full training in accordance with DfT and BAA guidelines will be given.
So the fact is that to become a security guard at a BAA airport you don't require any qualifications from our (or any other nation's) education system.
I am making no judgement here, just offering some FACTS.
The reason why aircrew should be subject to security is to ensure they are who they are claiming to be going airside. It is all about risk assessment. If we are deemed an acceptable risk to be employable flying aeroplanes then we should be deemed acceptable enough to carry a Lipsyl or some toothpaste. And don't start about the carrying of an illegal substance airside whilst our family is being held hostage, because your family will be dead if you do or if you don't so why would I NOT contact the authorities?
Problem is that many airport security personnel DO NOT check my ID correctly, therefore they have no idea who I am. At one staff checkpoint that I use regularly there is a 'grill' in the glass to allow your voice to be heard. It is right in between the eyeline of the person being checked and the security person. I have handed my ID, had it 'checked' and handed back on numerous occassions without them being able to see my face. They have made no attempt to move or get me to move to see me.
I go to many airports that are not my base and it appears that the security staff have little if any idea what my pass represents. I have had them try to take my pass out of the holder and try to swipe it through their scanner, when it clearly is not an ID from their airport/ group and will therefore not swipe. They then turn to me as though I have a problem and ask why it won't swipe!
It has often been clear to me that they have not checked my ID properly. At one airport recently I could see the person did not recognise the pass. They looked at it in a blank sort of way and said nervously 'that's fine'. I then covered it up and asked what aiport it came from. The person was dumbfounded and obviously didn't have a clue.
This is where the threat lies of someone getting airside with an illegal substance and the DfT could do a lot to make the system better by having UK IDs that all aiports in the UK can recognise/ swipe, biometric data that will help to verify who the holder is and training EFFECTIVE security personnel, and possibly reviewing their recruitment process.
I accept that foreign crews may have to subjected to greater scrutiny as they will not be part of that system, and equally accept that when abroad I will be subjected to their local regulations and checks.
This and other 'weaknesses' are where the RISK needs to be reduced, not pilots carrying toothpaste.
The fire-axe has been mentioned a number of times and rightly so, but it is simpler than that; I just wait for my colleague to go to take a leak and then I have uninterrupted control, no toothpaste, gel, lotion, potion, liquid, timer, detonator, mobile phone or Lipsyl required. We live with RISK and it is down to the powers that be to reduce that risk to an acceptable level. At the moment they have gone over the top and it is NOT reducing the risk effectively in all areas, only making people's jobs harder and more frustrating, which, as has been pointed out is a safety risk increase in itself. PP
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Mentally toxic
An apt description of your own attitute autoglide; You more than most are in a position to offer a voice of reason and balance. And yet alas, you take yet another opportunity to have a pop at pilots...perhaps because they represent something you once aspired too? perhaps its because you dont like the way we dress? or maybe its just that you dont particularly like pilots as a professional body of employees...
In any case, your comments are typical of someone with an axe to grind, or worse..someone with such inflated opinions of your own ideas, you have singularly failed to grasp the basis, and tenants of this discussion.
Whatever the reason, and I suspect I know the reason....your comments are vindictive and spiteful, they fail spectacularly to contribute anything worthwhile to this thread
An apt description of your own attitute autoglide; You more than most are in a position to offer a voice of reason and balance. And yet alas, you take yet another opportunity to have a pop at pilots...perhaps because they represent something you once aspired too? perhaps its because you dont like the way we dress? or maybe its just that you dont particularly like pilots as a professional body of employees...
In any case, your comments are typical of someone with an axe to grind, or worse..someone with such inflated opinions of your own ideas, you have singularly failed to grasp the basis, and tenants of this discussion. Whatever the reason, and I suspect I know the reason....your comments are vindictive and spiteful, they fail spectacularly to contribute anything worthwhile to this thread
I don't care any more or less about Pilots than anybody else, never aspired to fly a 'plane, though I would aspire to something interesting, intellectually challenging and technical such as system design. Certainly never though about the way you dress, so can only wonder about that one, do you have a uniform 'thing'? The thing is that I don't see many posts from other airport worker groups who have taken it upon themselves to insult the intelligence of the security people doing their job. You have no right to do so. If you want to be treated with respect (as a group) then show some towards others. I've spent years dealing with non-existent technical faults caused by Pilot's not knowing how to operate systems properly, should I go on a public forum and say you're all stupid? For those posters who believe that security staff are being aggresive or rude, perhaps it's simply a reflection of your own, or the attitude of weeks of rude crew who've passed before you. As is often said, the attitude of others is often a reflection of your own. If you have a problem with the current madness take it up with the Department For Transport, don't insult people doing their (thankless) job. In other words, act like the professional you yourself want to be treated as.
Last edited by AUTOGLIDE; 19th Sep 2006 at 18:53.
Stress?
I am somewhat surprised that nobody has seemed to directly mention the word "stress" and the potential effects that this has on the ability of flight deck crew to perform their duties safely and efficiently.
Nobody is suggesting that flight crew should not be subject to some form of security screening but if they arrive at the aircraft feeling that they have been "unfairly treated" then, I would suggest, this must have an adverse effect on flight safety even for the most "laid back" individual. Pilots are in the front line of aviation safety and, in extremis, the feeling that they are not being correctly dealt with could lead to an aircraft accident.
I say this against a background of pilots having a longer and more arduous commute to and from work, often working right up to the legal limits and also at a time where other terms and conditions have been eroded. Not to mention the information in the "datasphere" feeding their psyches the idea that they may themselves have to deal directly with terrorism.
Nobody is suggesting that flight crew should not be subject to some form of security screening but if they arrive at the aircraft feeling that they have been "unfairly treated" then, I would suggest, this must have an adverse effect on flight safety even for the most "laid back" individual. Pilots are in the front line of aviation safety and, in extremis, the feeling that they are not being correctly dealt with could lead to an aircraft accident.
I say this against a background of pilots having a longer and more arduous commute to and from work, often working right up to the legal limits and also at a time where other terms and conditions have been eroded. Not to mention the information in the "datasphere" feeding their psyches the idea that they may themselves have to deal directly with terrorism.
At my last airline employer in the '80s, crew would report to dispatch and be taken airside in a crew bus or maybe even walk to the hangar and taxi over to the gate. Airside passes would have to be worn.
It would take quite some doing to put aboard an imposter crew on a scheduled flight and I'm not about to make helpful suggestions on how this could be accomplished. But assuming the imposter crew got control of a scheduled flight, they would not need any weapons or explosive devices to do serious damage.
The problem for security posed by crews of several different operators, especially foreign, arriving landside is that they really have little means to know for sure that said person in a uniform is a genuine crew member or somebody on a secret mission to accumulate a critical mass of explosive toothpaste
Better would be a crew reporting office equipped to properly identify operating crew and send them on their way once properly identified.
Flight crew especially needs to be focussing on the coming flight and not being gotten into a stew over the umpteenth tedious discussion over the hazardous nature of tookits, toothpaste etc
Perhaps the Comair investigation needs to check on how the crew fared going through security.
In fact, aviation accident investigation methodology does address human factors and should add possible rankling encounters with security as a factor to be included in the investigation.
It would take quite some doing to put aboard an imposter crew on a scheduled flight and I'm not about to make helpful suggestions on how this could be accomplished. But assuming the imposter crew got control of a scheduled flight, they would not need any weapons or explosive devices to do serious damage.
The problem for security posed by crews of several different operators, especially foreign, arriving landside is that they really have little means to know for sure that said person in a uniform is a genuine crew member or somebody on a secret mission to accumulate a critical mass of explosive toothpaste
Better would be a crew reporting office equipped to properly identify operating crew and send them on their way once properly identified.
Flight crew especially needs to be focussing on the coming flight and not being gotten into a stew over the umpteenth tedious discussion over the hazardous nature of tookits, toothpaste etc
Perhaps the Comair investigation needs to check on how the crew fared going through security.
In fact, aviation accident investigation methodology does address human factors and should add possible rankling encounters with security as a factor to be included in the investigation.
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nice one penko 
but i am sure you missed something that said hours type etc not to worry these are small details
and to mfaff i have to agree here with desperate,it is like i been to many buildings and i have done diy building works in my gaff, but my question is does that qualify me as a building designer .just to let you know what i am about
quote from you kind sir/madam,mfaff
"I tell you what Desperate…lets make a deal; I’ll come and tell you how to fly an airplane a large complex multi-engined passenger jet say... based only on several thousand flights as a passenger and a handful of hours in a light plane and fast jets (I'm assuming here you are a pilot).. And then you can come and tell me how to design an airport because you use one often as a pilot…Sound good to you?"
you know some times i wondered who is the person who designed this airport now i know so i think it is time for me to grin and bear it
but i am sure you missed something that said hours type etc not to worry these are small details
and to mfaff i have to agree here with desperate,it is like i been to many buildings and i have done diy building works in my gaff, but my question is does that qualify me as a building designer .just to let you know what i am about
quote from you kind sir/madam,mfaff
"I tell you what Desperate…lets make a deal; I’ll come and tell you how to fly an airplane a large complex multi-engined passenger jet say... based only on several thousand flights as a passenger and a handful of hours in a light plane and fast jets (I'm assuming here you are a pilot).. And then you can come and tell me how to design an airport because you use one often as a pilot…Sound good to you?"
you know some times i wondered who is the person who designed this airport now i know so i think it is time for me to grin and bear it