J.O.
I would be foolish to disagree totally with you. However whilst your comments address the overall issue as part of, as you say, a system it is not correct to say that architects are consulted along with other stakeholders. As the architect I am not a stakeholder.
The context of my post was that it is the architect who does the vast majority of that consulting with the stakeholders; in the main the operators and users, prior to beginning the design. The architect is often the one who spends the time talking to the pilots and the ground staff, etc as to what it is they need. From this research emerges a design which attempts to merge all of the requirements and desires into a single cohesive functioning whole. The architect is the one who proposes a system that is reasonably user friendly and effective (hopefully)…the stakeholders are the ones who then have the power to agree or disagree with the proposal. This includes the physical manifestation of the operational requirements of the security system.
In this thread, the issue as I read it, is that pilots are:
a) Upset that the system does not recognize their needs and role.
b) Incensed that the manifestation of that lack of recognition is to be subject to the same strictures as the travelling public.
If we look at what the security system is there to achieve: - to ensure that the fare- paying passengers and the crews who serve them are as safe as possible from deliberate harm, and to protect those on the ground and in buildings from being harmed, is the current security system working?
The treatment of the aircraft crew in the manner that has been described here and that I have seen recently serves no security purpose at all. It does not remove the risk that the real crew can, if they so chose, fly a fully laden aircraft into a building. Plus they do not need devices to do so, their skill is all that is required.
What has also been evident on this thread is the assumption, by air crew here, that the sight of the uniform and ID, as presented at the common security checkpoint; is sufficient to grant the crews immunity from these checks, in full view of the fare paying passengers who are being searched.
What I was trying, and seemingly failing to do, was to show that this assumption, namely that the use of uniforms and ID, was insufficiently robust to adequately provide the security required. It is a simplistic view of the issue and one which is all too easily defeated, an easy example of which was given.
I agree that crews should be treated differently. But that differentiation must be done on a number of levels; physically, by having separate, dedicated access points, and by a different level of security… checking the people are actually who they should be, where they should be and when they should be….Then the issue of ‘banned’ items becomes irrelevant.
This separation already exists to a certain degree for airside ground crew who use apron/ ramp level security checkpoints but is not available to aircrew.
Now, if this separation is what is needed to perform the task of providing security then it is not rocket science. It provides the security required to achieve the stated aims and the ability to ensure that crews are able to go to work without being treated like suspects. The belief however that uniforms and ID should be sufficient is however naive. That can only work as part of a wider solution.
The comment was ’not having the faintest idea’ is also interesting. In order to create the functional spaces for any system the designer needs to be understand it, to know its goals and priorities need to be known and defined.
In respect to security this manifests itself in two directions….that of the elements required…such as physical barriers to passage and limiting the number of weak points in any perimeter…and secondly the operation of those barriers; be they people at checkpoints, card access systems and so forth. The final level of information is that of actually creating the system... so I know how to design a physical barrier such as a 10 foot razor wire fence and how to create an access control system... including how the IDs are made to be compatible with that system, because I need to know where to put the kit that allows it to be used.
An analogy is for the pilot of an aircraft to know the aircrafts’ systems in detail, not only what they do, but how they do it and the means required to achieve it…unless that knowledge is there then the overall package cannot be used fully.
As the designer I do know exactly where a crew needs to go and why in the progression to their aircraft. I also need to explore and identify the weak points of that route and how to help maintain the integrity of the system so that it retains its stated performance.
So when somebody says ‘if only XYZ were being done it would all be better’ and it’s clear that this is incorrect then, as Desperate says, ignorant posts, if repeated often enough, gain a critical mass to the point where other naïve people actually believe them. In this case it is naïve air crew who may believe that a uniform and ID are sufficient, when presented, to be taken as absolute guarantees that they are the good guys…I wonder who needs to stop watching films and take a reality check?