"Position and Hold" to disappear in US?
Trash du Blanc
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: KBHM
Posts: 1,185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All thru my 26 years of international (well, most of it was international!), whenever I was on or crossing any active runway, the strobes were always on!
Why not with your boys?
Why not with your boys?
My problem with it is - many of our old 727's don't have logo lights. Therefore the ONLY thing visible from directly behind is the navs and the strobes. The navs are close enough to the runway edge to be lost in the clutter, so that leaves strobes (same position, but a good deal easier to spot).
In a former life I was a heavy captain, and I never moved without the inspection/turn lights on. Same reason, only from the side - I witnessed a death one time of a ramper running a tug into the side of a moving aircraft in heavy rain. I guess the downside is blinding those taxiing around you.....
I disagree, the use of the word "hold" is ambiguous. Why use the verb (ie."hold") to describe an action when the aircraft is waiting at the noun (ie. "hold"). Use of the phrase "line-up and wait" is unambiguous.
Line up and hold was standard years ago. I've seen a near collision because a pilot not used to a controlled aerodrome misheard it as "Line up and roll".
The current phraseology design appears to be an attempt to make context-dependent phrases sound different, and I'm all for that.
Just by the way, the first day I used "line up and wait", some wag (having a go at the ever evolving phraseology changes) replied "lining up, we're a heavy"
Never had a problem with the belt-and-braces "behind behind". (except when first introduced it sounded dorky).
Very seldom use "line up and wait", preferring "line up." If there is a subsequent delay and the reason is not blindingly obvious, I'll tell the pilot what and why. IMO "wait" should be largely redundant, not because it's confusing; rather because it's usually not necessary. (Apart from Tenneriffe,) nobody rolls until they've heard and readback a takeoff clearance. If they do, it's not the phrase at fault.
Join Date: Dec 2001
Location: down-route
Posts: 413
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
... the reality of aviation English is that it's often spoken by people with English as a second language.
By the way, when did the word "weight" become an offiicial ATC word?
As per a previous post, don't know the JAR's anything similiar?
Obviously within the limits of good airmanship
Originally Posted by rigpiggy
Straight from the FAA edited for length
USE OF EXTERIOR AIRCRAFT LIGHTS TO MAKE AIRCRAFT MORE CONSPICUOUS.
b. Exterior Lights. To the extent possible and consistent with aircraft equipage, operating limitations, and flightcrew procedures, pilots should illuminate exterior lights as follows:
(1) Engines Running. Turn on the rotating beacon whenever an engine is running.
(2) Taxiing. Prior to commencing taxi, turn on navigation, position, anti-collision, and logo lights, if available. To signal intent to other pilots, consider turning on the taxi light when the aircraft is moving or intending to move on the ground, and turning it off when stopped, yielding, or as a consideration to other pilots or ground personnel. Strobe lights should not be illuminated during taxi if they will adversely affect the vision of other pilots or ground personnel.
(3) Crossing a Runway. All exterior lights should be illuminated when crossing a runway.
CAUTION: Flightcrews should consider any adverse effects to safety that illuminating the forward facing lights will have on the vision of other pilots or ground personnel during runway crossings.
(4) Entering the departure runway for takeoff or “position and hold.” When entering a runway either for takeoff, or when taxiing into “position and hold,” flightcrews should make their aircraft more conspicuous to aircraft on final behind them and to ATC by turning on lights (except for landing lights) that highlight the aircraft’s silhouette. Strobe lights should not be illuminated if they will adversely affect the vision of other pilots.
Page 14 Par 7
9/26/03 AC 120-74A (5) Takeoff. Turn on landing lights when takeoff clearance is received, or when commencing takeoff roll at an airport without an operating control tower.
NOTE: The SOP of turning on landing lights when takeoff clearance is received is a signal to other pilots, ATC, and ground personnel that the aircraft is moving down the runway for takeoff.
USE OF EXTERIOR AIRCRAFT LIGHTS TO MAKE AIRCRAFT MORE CONSPICUOUS.
b. Exterior Lights. To the extent possible and consistent with aircraft equipage, operating limitations, and flightcrew procedures, pilots should illuminate exterior lights as follows:
(1) Engines Running. Turn on the rotating beacon whenever an engine is running.
(2) Taxiing. Prior to commencing taxi, turn on navigation, position, anti-collision, and logo lights, if available. To signal intent to other pilots, consider turning on the taxi light when the aircraft is moving or intending to move on the ground, and turning it off when stopped, yielding, or as a consideration to other pilots or ground personnel. Strobe lights should not be illuminated during taxi if they will adversely affect the vision of other pilots or ground personnel.
(3) Crossing a Runway. All exterior lights should be illuminated when crossing a runway.
CAUTION: Flightcrews should consider any adverse effects to safety that illuminating the forward facing lights will have on the vision of other pilots or ground personnel during runway crossings.
(4) Entering the departure runway for takeoff or “position and hold.” When entering a runway either for takeoff, or when taxiing into “position and hold,” flightcrews should make their aircraft more conspicuous to aircraft on final behind them and to ATC by turning on lights (except for landing lights) that highlight the aircraft’s silhouette. Strobe lights should not be illuminated if they will adversely affect the vision of other pilots.
Page 14 Par 7
9/26/03 AC 120-74A (5) Takeoff. Turn on landing lights when takeoff clearance is received, or when commencing takeoff roll at an airport without an operating control tower.
NOTE: The SOP of turning on landing lights when takeoff clearance is received is a signal to other pilots, ATC, and ground personnel that the aircraft is moving down the runway for takeoff.
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: 38N
Posts: 356
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Position and Hold" has long been a sweet sound for me...especially after grinding through a line of departures ahead.
Problem with P&H is that it puts the PIC in a situation where he/she has no clear authority to proceed withut further instruction. In the air, this is not a disabling issue, on the ground it is much more ambiguous. In the P&H position, any trouble that is coming is likely going to be invisible to the PIC; the only indirect information available is from radio trafic and 'gut feel', and authority to deviate from P&H is not well defined, even when intuition says something has gone badly wrong.
From the P&H position, the PIC has a short list of options: a) Take off - hardly likely without a clearance, b) Clear the runway - also unlikely without some external advisory...and often difficult for larger aircraft because the 'on-runway' hold position is typically ahead of a convenient taxi-back position, so a slow and careful and possibly impossible turn is required to 'undo' the on-runway hold, or the alternative is a taxi down the runway to the next intersection. These things are also not normally achievable without tower communication. Or C) stay there and suffer.
SO - the worst problem is - what the HF to do if one is Position/Hold and then the music stops.. zero feedback. No further clearance.. time passes.. sweat trickles down the collar.
I would suggest the fix for this is NOT to eliminate P&H, but to put a time limit on the hold duration, in some unambiguous manner. Either specify a hold duration, or let the hold automatically expire into a departure after, for example, 120 seconds -- unless HOLD is renewed --, or at least define the situation as 'all bets are off' 120 seconds after the clearance, so aircraft holding must take the initative to obtain further info, and failing success in that...clear the runway in the best manner possible.
Useful procedure. Needs some procedural disambiguation.
Problem with P&H is that it puts the PIC in a situation where he/she has no clear authority to proceed withut further instruction. In the air, this is not a disabling issue, on the ground it is much more ambiguous. In the P&H position, any trouble that is coming is likely going to be invisible to the PIC; the only indirect information available is from radio trafic and 'gut feel', and authority to deviate from P&H is not well defined, even when intuition says something has gone badly wrong.
From the P&H position, the PIC has a short list of options: a) Take off - hardly likely without a clearance, b) Clear the runway - also unlikely without some external advisory...and often difficult for larger aircraft because the 'on-runway' hold position is typically ahead of a convenient taxi-back position, so a slow and careful and possibly impossible turn is required to 'undo' the on-runway hold, or the alternative is a taxi down the runway to the next intersection. These things are also not normally achievable without tower communication. Or C) stay there and suffer.
SO - the worst problem is - what the HF to do if one is Position/Hold and then the music stops.. zero feedback. No further clearance.. time passes.. sweat trickles down the collar.
I would suggest the fix for this is NOT to eliminate P&H, but to put a time limit on the hold duration, in some unambiguous manner. Either specify a hold duration, or let the hold automatically expire into a departure after, for example, 120 seconds -- unless HOLD is renewed --, or at least define the situation as 'all bets are off' 120 seconds after the clearance, so aircraft holding must take the initative to obtain further info, and failing success in that...clear the runway in the best manner possible.
Useful procedure. Needs some procedural disambiguation.
Two simple rules come to mind.
Landiing clearance should not be given until the active runway is free of ALL taking off and landing traffic.
'Position and hold' or 'line up and wait' should not be allowed, aircraft should only be cleared for departure from the #1 position at the holding point short of the runway.
If it slows thing's down, so be it.
I would prefer to run the risk of 'blinding' other pilots with strobe lights than being on the runway at any time without using them and 'disappearing'
If they bother you, look away, you are being noticed and that is a good thing.
Landiing clearance should not be given until the active runway is free of ALL taking off and landing traffic.
'Position and hold' or 'line up and wait' should not be allowed, aircraft should only be cleared for departure from the #1 position at the holding point short of the runway.
If it slows thing's down, so be it.
I would prefer to run the risk of 'blinding' other pilots with strobe lights than being on the runway at any time without using them and 'disappearing'
If they bother you, look away, you are being noticed and that is a good thing.
"Position and hold" is a useful clearance that benefits the expeditious flow of departing aircraft. The safety problems related to this clearance usually have something to do with a controller forgetting that there is an aircraft on the runway after having cleared another aircraft to land on that same runway. However, the same problem seems likely when aircraft are cleared to cross or take off from that runway even if no P&H clearance was ever issued. A recent incident of this second variety occured at LAX.
It seems to me that the problem would be more effectively addressed by witholding landing clearance to arriving aircraft until safe runway separation standards are assured than by eliminating "position and hold", which would address only one of the problems. Concentrating the safety effort on assuring a clear runway prior to issuance of landing clearance would probably provide a greater safety benefit without the negative effects upon traffic flow that will be associated with the elimination of P&H clearances.
All FAA towers were recently required to draft and submit their reasons why these clearances should be retained at their airports or else the clearance would be banned. Nearly all towers did so. Now we see this subject come up again. Without wanting to sound too much like a conspiracy theorist, I must say that it looks very much as though the highest levels of US government want ATC to be perceived by the public as a failed organization so that they can get on with privatizing it. It worked once with flight service. The reduction in runway capacity which would result from elimination of P&H would facilitate this perception. Dovetails nicely with the NATCA contract issues currently being fought over. I wouldn't be very shocked if it came to light that some "supporters" and "friends" of the current administration were ready to step in and "clean up" ATC for a profit. Cronies compensated. Rant over.
I hope this is all wrong.
Best regards,
Westhawk
It seems to me that the problem would be more effectively addressed by witholding landing clearance to arriving aircraft until safe runway separation standards are assured than by eliminating "position and hold", which would address only one of the problems. Concentrating the safety effort on assuring a clear runway prior to issuance of landing clearance would probably provide a greater safety benefit without the negative effects upon traffic flow that will be associated with the elimination of P&H clearances.
All FAA towers were recently required to draft and submit their reasons why these clearances should be retained at their airports or else the clearance would be banned. Nearly all towers did so. Now we see this subject come up again. Without wanting to sound too much like a conspiracy theorist, I must say that it looks very much as though the highest levels of US government want ATC to be perceived by the public as a failed organization so that they can get on with privatizing it. It worked once with flight service. The reduction in runway capacity which would result from elimination of P&H would facilitate this perception. Dovetails nicely with the NATCA contract issues currently being fought over. I wouldn't be very shocked if it came to light that some "supporters" and "friends" of the current administration were ready to step in and "clean up" ATC for a profit. Cronies compensated. Rant over.
I hope this is all wrong.
Best regards,
Westhawk
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Looks like they might be changing their mind......for now.
FAA won't force airports to change takeoff procedures
BY JON HILKEVITCH
Chicago Tribune
CHICAGO - The Federal Aviation Administration on Tuesday eased up on imminent plans to revise airport procedures aimed at reducing the risk of an arriving airplane flying over or landing on top of another plane waiting on a runway to depart.
The changes, which the National Transportation Safety Board had recommended to the FAA over the past six years, were announced last week and had been set to begin March 20, during the peak of the spring-break travel period.
The proposed tightening of rules governing how planes line up at airports for takeoff would appear to help prevent a rare type of accident that could cause hundreds of deaths in a single collision.
The FAA notice to airport air-traffic control towers last week said mistakes are continuing to occur involving planes taxiing onto an active runway when an approaching plane is about to land on the same runway or an intersecting runway.
On Feb. 17, a controller at Los Angeles International Airport directed three aircraft to use the same runway, the FAA said. A departing SkyWest turboprop was cleared to use a runway on which a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 was about to land. The controller also cleared an Air Canada jet to cross the other end of the same runway.
Other incidents have occurred in recent years in Salt Lake City, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., and at Midway Airport in Chicago, officials said.
But the FAA, reacting to related safety issues and concerns about flight delays ballooning, on Tuesday told the airlines and air-traffic controllers' and pilots' unions that it would grant at least temporary waivers from the new rules, starting with the nation's 35 busiest airports.
The FAA won't force airports to change their takeoff procedures, "but by March 20 airport towers will have to explain to us why they want to continue using it," said Russell Chew, the FAA's chief operating officer.
As a result, no immediate changes are expected to occur at O'Hare International Airport, Midway Airport or Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee, officials said. But several hundred medium-sized and smaller airports could lose an air-traffic tool they have used to keep flights bound for the larger airports on schedule.
The controllers union said the FAA's planned change would add to congestion at already crowded airports, reducing arrival and departure rates by as much as 20 percent.
Under existing rules, a plane that is No. 2 in line for departure is permitted to taxi onto the runway and stop as soon as the plane in front starts its takeoff roll. Once the first plane is airborne and at least 6,000 feet down the runway, the second plane begins its takeoff roll and the next plane in line on the taxiway moves into takeoff position on the runway.
Air-traffic controllers call the procedure "locked and loaded," because it facilitates launching planes at tight intervals and keeps airports running efficiently.
Under the revisions the FAA was set to impose, planes in the No. 2 departure position would not be permitted to begin taxiing onto the runway until after the plane taking off in front is airborne.
The controllers' union, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, contends the FAA over-reacted to a small number of high-profile cases in which human error caused arriving and departing planes to get perilously close to each other.
Controllers said the FAA's fix could unintentionally intensify risks on runways that are used for landings and takeoffs. Such a scenario would involve a controller directing a plane waiting on a taxiway to proceed to the runway for takeoff while an approaching plane is still five miles from touching down. A miscommunication between controller and pilot, or a delay in the plane entering the runway, could lead to a close call between the arriving and departing planes, potentially even a fly-over incident that could lead to a crash.
"You almost must already have the pilot on the runway in position so he is ready to roll when you tell him to," said Doug Fralick, director of safety and technology at the controllers union. "If the plane is still sitting on the taxiway, you lose your predictability because it takes time for the engines to spool up power and the plane to get into position."
FAA won't force airports to change takeoff procedures
BY JON HILKEVITCH
Chicago Tribune
CHICAGO - The Federal Aviation Administration on Tuesday eased up on imminent plans to revise airport procedures aimed at reducing the risk of an arriving airplane flying over or landing on top of another plane waiting on a runway to depart.
The changes, which the National Transportation Safety Board had recommended to the FAA over the past six years, were announced last week and had been set to begin March 20, during the peak of the spring-break travel period.
The proposed tightening of rules governing how planes line up at airports for takeoff would appear to help prevent a rare type of accident that could cause hundreds of deaths in a single collision.
The FAA notice to airport air-traffic control towers last week said mistakes are continuing to occur involving planes taxiing onto an active runway when an approaching plane is about to land on the same runway or an intersecting runway.
On Feb. 17, a controller at Los Angeles International Airport directed three aircraft to use the same runway, the FAA said. A departing SkyWest turboprop was cleared to use a runway on which a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 was about to land. The controller also cleared an Air Canada jet to cross the other end of the same runway.
Other incidents have occurred in recent years in Salt Lake City, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., and at Midway Airport in Chicago, officials said.
But the FAA, reacting to related safety issues and concerns about flight delays ballooning, on Tuesday told the airlines and air-traffic controllers' and pilots' unions that it would grant at least temporary waivers from the new rules, starting with the nation's 35 busiest airports.
The FAA won't force airports to change their takeoff procedures, "but by March 20 airport towers will have to explain to us why they want to continue using it," said Russell Chew, the FAA's chief operating officer.
As a result, no immediate changes are expected to occur at O'Hare International Airport, Midway Airport or Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee, officials said. But several hundred medium-sized and smaller airports could lose an air-traffic tool they have used to keep flights bound for the larger airports on schedule.
The controllers union said the FAA's planned change would add to congestion at already crowded airports, reducing arrival and departure rates by as much as 20 percent.
Under existing rules, a plane that is No. 2 in line for departure is permitted to taxi onto the runway and stop as soon as the plane in front starts its takeoff roll. Once the first plane is airborne and at least 6,000 feet down the runway, the second plane begins its takeoff roll and the next plane in line on the taxiway moves into takeoff position on the runway.
Air-traffic controllers call the procedure "locked and loaded," because it facilitates launching planes at tight intervals and keeps airports running efficiently.
Under the revisions the FAA was set to impose, planes in the No. 2 departure position would not be permitted to begin taxiing onto the runway until after the plane taking off in front is airborne.
The controllers' union, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, contends the FAA over-reacted to a small number of high-profile cases in which human error caused arriving and departing planes to get perilously close to each other.
Controllers said the FAA's fix could unintentionally intensify risks on runways that are used for landings and takeoffs. Such a scenario would involve a controller directing a plane waiting on a taxiway to proceed to the runway for takeoff while an approaching plane is still five miles from touching down. A miscommunication between controller and pilot, or a delay in the plane entering the runway, could lead to a close call between the arriving and departing planes, potentially even a fly-over incident that could lead to a crash.
"You almost must already have the pilot on the runway in position so he is ready to roll when you tell him to," said Doug Fralick, director of safety and technology at the controllers union. "If the plane is still sitting on the taxiway, you lose your predictability because it takes time for the engines to spool up power and the plane to get into position."
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: EU
Posts: 644
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"line up and wait behind"
In this incident I believe it was a factor: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...ghlight=Munich .
I can't find a link to an official report but as I understand here were 3 parties involved: KLM, Air Dolomiti and a third.
Dolomiti was waiting for line-up at an intersection, KLM was on final but first there was a departure from the full length. As I understand it happened the Dolomiti was cleared to lineup behind (the landing KLM), but what it saw passing first was the departure from the beginning so it lined up behind that one, resulting in a near miss on the runway.
Again I haven't found any official publication about it, this is what I heard, thus not neccesarily true; however an interesting example of what can go wrong.
BTW: isn't it mandatory for controllers (and pilots to read back) to include some sort of identification in the clearance: f.i. "ABC behind DEF B737 on final line up and wait behind" i.s.o. "ABC behind landing aircraft line up and ..."?
I can't find a link to an official report but as I understand here were 3 parties involved: KLM, Air Dolomiti and a third.
Dolomiti was waiting for line-up at an intersection, KLM was on final but first there was a departure from the full length. As I understand it happened the Dolomiti was cleared to lineup behind (the landing KLM), but what it saw passing first was the departure from the beginning so it lined up behind that one, resulting in a near miss on the runway.
Again I haven't found any official publication about it, this is what I heard, thus not neccesarily true; however an interesting example of what can go wrong.
BTW: isn't it mandatory for controllers (and pilots to read back) to include some sort of identification in the clearance: f.i. "ABC behind DEF B737 on final line up and wait behind" i.s.o. "ABC behind landing aircraft line up and ..."?
GYS,
It is mandatory to read back the terms of a conditional clearance. At least in lil ol' NZ. There are other guidelines/requirements relating to zero risk of misidentifying the a/c concerned.
Also we have a (minor) difference in the required phraseology for a line up behind an arriving a/c, vs lining up after a departure. In the first case it's "Behind the Boeing short final line up behind." And inthe second it's "After the departing Boeing line up behind" . Small difference;questionable effectiveness; perhaps a bit subtle for many, but it's something.
It is also not permitted to offer a conditional line up unless it is behind the next a/c to use the runway. Eg: "Behind the 2nd Boeing at five mile final line up behind" is not on (nor would it ever be necessary). It is not necessary to identify the aircraft by airline/colour etc unless there is a risk of confusion.
There are (at least) two issues in this thread, The safety (or not) of conditional clearances, and the issue of the FAA withdrawing a useful and usually perfectly safe tool. Additional nclude the choice of phraseologies around the world to express the same idea, and whether phraseology use or misuse actually contributes to runway incursions. Sorry to state the bleedin obvious, but if an a/c is lined up waiting its turn to go, and the controller then clears someone to land on that runway, its not the phraseology at fault. And if it happens more than once, error tolerant systems need to be put in place tout sweet. (In our place it only took 3yr to get a more error tolerant system after a critical deficiency was identified
It is mandatory to read back the terms of a conditional clearance. At least in lil ol' NZ. There are other guidelines/requirements relating to zero risk of misidentifying the a/c concerned.
Also we have a (minor) difference in the required phraseology for a line up behind an arriving a/c, vs lining up after a departure. In the first case it's "Behind the Boeing short final line up behind." And inthe second it's "After the departing Boeing line up behind" . Small difference;questionable effectiveness; perhaps a bit subtle for many, but it's something.
It is also not permitted to offer a conditional line up unless it is behind the next a/c to use the runway. Eg: "Behind the 2nd Boeing at five mile final line up behind" is not on (nor would it ever be necessary). It is not necessary to identify the aircraft by airline/colour etc unless there is a risk of confusion.
There are (at least) two issues in this thread, The safety (or not) of conditional clearances, and the issue of the FAA withdrawing a useful and usually perfectly safe tool. Additional nclude the choice of phraseologies around the world to express the same idea, and whether phraseology use or misuse actually contributes to runway incursions. Sorry to state the bleedin obvious, but if an a/c is lined up waiting its turn to go, and the controller then clears someone to land on that runway, its not the phraseology at fault. And if it happens more than once, error tolerant systems need to be put in place tout sweet. (In our place it only took 3yr to get a more error tolerant system after a critical deficiency was identified
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Lausanne
Age: 47
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
@ golfyankeesierra
I just checked, at www.bfu-web.de, the german accident investigation board, a report about this incident has not been published yet.
But if you check the accident bulletin of May 2004 you will find it.
Translation from german "The ATR42 entered RWY08R without clearance, during the landing of a B737. The ATR was on the left part of the RWY while the 737 passed it with 110KT on the right side of the RWY".
That is all the information there is right now. You have a very good point though about issuing conditional clearances for intersection take-offs due to potential mis-identification of acft.
What should be done?
1. don't issue conditional clearances for intersection take offs?
2. prohibit intersection take-offs?
I just checked, at www.bfu-web.de, the german accident investigation board, a report about this incident has not been published yet.
But if you check the accident bulletin of May 2004 you will find it.
Translation from german "The ATR42 entered RWY08R without clearance, during the landing of a B737. The ATR was on the left part of the RWY while the 737 passed it with 110KT on the right side of the RWY".
That is all the information there is right now. You have a very good point though about issuing conditional clearances for intersection take-offs due to potential mis-identification of acft.
What should be done?
1. don't issue conditional clearances for intersection take offs?
2. prohibit intersection take-offs?
Join Date: Mar 2002
Location: EU
Posts: 644
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry, when reading the thread again, I see the "behind-behind" clearance has offcourse nothing to do with the subject off the thread "TIPH".
Well: a lot of airports (in europe at least) use seperate runways for takeoffs and landings; this makes it much less risky, so here I see no problems.
As for single runway ops: the sequence should be absolutely clear, therefore include an unmistakable identification of the aircraft concerned: f.i.: "Behind landing Lufthansa A320 line up ......." i.s.o. "behind aircraft on final....."
This applies to TIPH as well
Originally Posted by greek-freak
What should be done?
1. don't issue conditional clearances for intersection take offs?
2. prohibit intersection take-offs?
1. don't issue conditional clearances for intersection take offs?
2. prohibit intersection take-offs?
As for single runway ops: the sequence should be absolutely clear, therefore include an unmistakable identification of the aircraft concerned: f.i.: "Behind landing Lufthansa A320 line up ......." i.s.o. "behind aircraft on final....."
This applies to TIPH as well
Join Date: Mar 2005
Location: Lausanne
Age: 47
Posts: 74
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Still, if you take the Munich example there is a risk of misidentification, since there are typically lots of LH A320s around.
The problem is also that the intersection take-offs at EDDM are usually conducted from the high-speed turn-off twys for the opposite direction rwy, in this case 26L. This means that acft holding for an intesrection take off are at an angle of 25-30 degrees to the rwy in use and it might be hard for
them to see what is happening back there at the rwy threshold, epsecially
when the sun is setting. So in that particular case situational awareness
is certainly reduced.
Just some thoughts.
Do you have any information what the visibility was the day this incident happened?
The problem is also that the intersection take-offs at EDDM are usually conducted from the high-speed turn-off twys for the opposite direction rwy, in this case 26L. This means that acft holding for an intesrection take off are at an angle of 25-30 degrees to the rwy in use and it might be hard for
them to see what is happening back there at the rwy threshold, epsecially
when the sun is setting. So in that particular case situational awareness
is certainly reduced.
Just some thoughts.
Do you have any information what the visibility was the day this incident happened?
I used to fly a PA31 into YVR several times a day on a bag run. Once I was given a Taxi to position and hold clearance with a 747 on what looked like a pretty close in final. I must say he sure looked big
. I sat in position for about 30 sec before TO clearance but it felt like an eternity. I guess the controller heard the concern in my voice because his last words were " cleared for takeoff... and I bet you thought you were going to get squashed like a bug"
. I sat in position for about 30 sec before TO clearance but it felt like an eternity. I guess the controller heard the concern in my voice because his last words were " cleared for takeoff... and I bet you thought you were going to get squashed like a bug"
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: near EGTR UK
Posts: 33
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As I only fly "spamcans" (as some of you professional pilots like to call them - by the way, what DID you start flying in?), I have never had any problem with the expression or its meaning, hence my choice of it as a logon name. Surely the key is ATC demanding a clear and complete readback? There is a serious risk of over-engineering here - with almost every alternative which has been suggested.
Even with the dreadful accidents described, the suggested alternative phrasing may just as easily have been misunderstood. We have all heard people readback what they wanted to hear, rather than what was actually said.
P&H
Even with the dreadful accidents described, the suggested alternative phrasing may just as easily have been misunderstood. We have all heard people readback what they wanted to hear, rather than what was actually said.
P&H