Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)
Paxing All Over The World
Not at all ESG!! VERY sorry to hear about your Net connection.
To recap: it was related that the ravine was still open because environmentalists had required it, even after the last a/c to go into it. Links to that report and pics were posted.
The link to Engineered Materials Arresting System was posted but no airport would reduce the length of it's available runway to provide such a space. It was moi who then suggested that the ravine could be bridged to maintain it for whatever silly creatures want to live in in and then the EMAS could go across the top.
Overall, the thread gets more interesting from about Page 17 or 18!
To recap: it was related that the ravine was still open because environmentalists had required it, even after the last a/c to go into it. Links to that report and pics were posted.
The link to Engineered Materials Arresting System was posted but no airport would reduce the length of it's available runway to provide such a space. It was moi who then suggested that the ravine could be bridged to maintain it for whatever silly creatures want to live in in and then the EMAS could go across the top.
Overall, the thread gets more interesting from about Page 17 or 18!
Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :
2500m-1200m=1500m
2500m-1200m=1500m
4 In emergency, the crew is unable to override the lock-out and to operate
ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers.
ground spoilers and engine thrust reversers.
alex
Combine Operations
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quote:
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Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :
2500m-1200m=1500m
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Could that be why they crashed?
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Could anyone check out this very complicated piece of arithmetic :
2500m-1200m=1500m
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Could that be why they crashed?
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According to TF1 (French National broadcaster);
- 8th August 2005 -
"the aircraft landed long ... too long to stop before the tarmac ran out ..."
No prizes to all of you clever people who got that right ...
... just imagine the red faces ... thank whichever God you follow, there were no serious injuries ...
- 8th August 2005 -
"the aircraft landed long ... too long to stop before the tarmac ran out ..."
No prizes to all of you clever people who got that right ...
... just imagine the red faces ... thank whichever God you follow, there were no serious injuries ...
Monday TSB Briefing
Again caveat phone quality.
I'm beginning to think AF358 got a big push from Thor. Assuming a 50' TCH lands you 1000' down the rwy, the maximum extra 50' would put you an extra 1000' down, but they were pushed an extra 3000' down and once down had
for deceleration in spite of spoilers and full reverse. Earlier I was thinking the downburst would give them a headwind, but now it looks more like the inflow before the downburst.
- Transport Canada reviewing standards and emerging technologies (high density foam, arresting beds) to minimise damage/injuries in case of overrun
- Height above Threshold 50-100'
- Threshold a/s 146 kt; gs 164kt
- a/s at touchdown 148kt.
- engines good; idled at threshold; wheels down max reverse selected and obtained
- brake pressure to 3000 psi at td
- spoilers came up exactly as designed and supposed to
- TSB requesting pictures from pax or people on highway immediately after crash to research initial fire outbreak -- send to [email protected] or is it [email protected] ???
- mid to end .07% down slope
- No attempt to go around was made after touchdown
I'm beginning to think AF358 got a big push from Thor. Assuming a 50' TCH lands you 1000' down the rwy, the maximum extra 50' would put you an extra 1000' down, but they were pushed an extra 3000' down and once down had
for deceleration in spite of spoilers and full reverse. Earlier I was thinking the downburst would give them a headwind, but now it looks more like the inflow before the downburst.
Last edited by RatherBeFlying; 8th Aug 2005 at 20:25.
# Threshold a/s 146 kt; gs 164kt
# a/s at touchdown 148kt.
# a/s at touchdown 148kt.
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I found this interesting read !! Also, Tables 1 and 2 about brake friction reduction. Montreal Runway Excursion, Royal Air Maroc, Boeing 747
.....The test report for November 1999 indicates that the surface of runway 06L/24R had a poor texture and low friction starting about 3 300 feet east of the threshold of runway 06L, near the intersection of taxiway B2, and worsening in the touchdown area between 1 300 and 2 600 feet from the threshold of runway 24R. The test results for May 2000 exceeded the standard prescribed in TP312; the report notes, however, that these tests were conducted after a period of cold and rainy weather, which made for optimum runway surface conditions. According to the report, the average coefficient for the full runway and the coefficient for any 100-metre section degrade as summer approaches. The test results for 16 June 2000 and 21 July 2000 indicate friction coefficients requiring that remedial maintenance action be planned. The 21 July 2000 test results for the other two runways indicated average friction coefficients of 74 for runway 06R/24L and 82 for runway 10/28. These coefficients are 30 per cent and 43 per cent higher, respectively, than for runway 06L/24R......
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...4/a00q0094.asp
.....The test report for November 1999 indicates that the surface of runway 06L/24R had a poor texture and low friction starting about 3 300 feet east of the threshold of runway 06L, near the intersection of taxiway B2, and worsening in the touchdown area between 1 300 and 2 600 feet from the threshold of runway 24R. The test results for May 2000 exceeded the standard prescribed in TP312; the report notes, however, that these tests were conducted after a period of cold and rainy weather, which made for optimum runway surface conditions. According to the report, the average coefficient for the full runway and the coefficient for any 100-metre section degrade as summer approaches. The test results for 16 June 2000 and 21 July 2000 indicate friction coefficients requiring that remedial maintenance action be planned. The 21 July 2000 test results for the other two runways indicated average friction coefficients of 74 for runway 06R/24L and 82 for runway 10/28. These coefficients are 30 per cent and 43 per cent higher, respectively, than for runway 06L/24R......
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...4/a00q0094.asp
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Thanks for the updates RatherBeFlying !
Assuming that the gs from threshold to touchdown was an average of 160 kts and touchdown happened 1200 meters after threshold, it means that the A340 flew over the runway for 15 seconds before touching down !!! Things did not happen in a couple of seconds...
Assuming that the gs from threshold to touchdown was an average of 160 kts and touchdown happened 1200 meters after threshold, it means that the A340 flew over the runway for 15 seconds before touching down !!! Things did not happen in a couple of seconds...
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It is interesting to see the coefficient of friction go down that much ... I wonder if the TSB was effective in communicating with its airports ??
Table 2 Results of Friction Coefficient Tests
57% - Average friction coefficient of full runway
34% - Lowest friction coefficient recorded for any individual 100-metre section
21 July 2000 Test date (Montreal)
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...4/a00q0094.asp
Table 2 Results of Friction Coefficient Tests
57% - Average friction coefficient of full runway
34% - Lowest friction coefficient recorded for any individual 100-metre section
21 July 2000 Test date (Montreal)
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/...4/a00q0094.asp
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greek-freak:
If you look back to page 19 of this thread, you'll find that Pegasus77 posted a detailed description of the 340-300 autospoiler logic parameters in response to my earlier question.
R1
Does anybody know if this sytem design has been changed in newer Airbus acft.
R1
If you look back to page 19 of this thread, you'll find that Pegasus77 posted a detailed description of the 340-300 autospoiler logic parameters in response to my earlier question.
But - unless I missed something - there is no mention of manual override should it be called by the crew.
I'm probably completely ignorant but some sort of "max deceleration panic button" (automatically providing the most aggressive settings of anti skid, spoiler and reverser, at the possible expense of their durability) would seem to be a useful option in cases such as this.
Paxing All Over The World
atakacs But - unless I missed something - there is no mention of manual override should it be called by the crew.
As I recall, one post did state categorically that the flight deck CANNOT override the defaults to obtain breaking unless the OLEOs are depressed. However, a later post reports the TSB as stating (for this flight) that full reverse was requested and obtained. If this is not the answer to your question, please ignore!)
As I recall, one post did state categorically that the flight deck CANNOT override the defaults to obtain breaking unless the OLEOs are depressed. However, a later post reports the TSB as stating (for this flight) that full reverse was requested and obtained. If this is not the answer to your question, please ignore!)
It's one thing to say the landing was "long" but quite another to establish why?
18 kts of tailwind is a lot to start off with and we should perhaps bear in mind that, broadly speaking, if you double the touchdown speed you quadruple the landing distance required (ie its a speed squared law due to kinetic energy).
Nobody has mentioned (potentially misleading) visual cues when landing in severe precipitation. I believe that heavy rain on the windscreen can change the refractive index significantly. For this and perhaps other reasons the tendency is to flare high in these conditions which additionally might lead to excessive float prior to touchdown.
Does anybody know the experience levels of the flight deck crew on type and total etc?
18 kts of tailwind is a lot to start off with and we should perhaps bear in mind that, broadly speaking, if you double the touchdown speed you quadruple the landing distance required (ie its a speed squared law due to kinetic energy).
Nobody has mentioned (potentially misleading) visual cues when landing in severe precipitation. I believe that heavy rain on the windscreen can change the refractive index significantly. For this and perhaps other reasons the tendency is to flare high in these conditions which additionally might lead to excessive float prior to touchdown.
Does anybody know the experience levels of the flight deck crew on type and total etc?
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No surprise that distance emerges as the key issue.
After a day of being saturated with the news, I posted:
armada
Instead of being 'just another number' I could order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
posted 5th August 2005 03:04
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broadreach: fine, but the first question to be asked must be WHERE on the runway (distance) did they touch down?
That key variable will put all these other variables into perspective: speed, weather, aircraft performance, etc., to be properly compared with SOP etc.
/ends rant.
An interesting tidbit:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=19820525-0
"PROBABLE CAUSE: The pilot's misuse of rain repellent, causing an optical illusion"
After a day of being saturated with the news, I posted:
armada
Instead of being 'just another number' I could order a Personal Title and help support PPRuNe
posted 5th August 2005 03:04
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
broadreach: fine, but the first question to be asked must be WHERE on the runway (distance) did they touch down?
That key variable will put all these other variables into perspective: speed, weather, aircraft performance, etc., to be properly compared with SOP etc.
/ends rant.
An interesting tidbit:
http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=19820525-0
"PROBABLE CAUSE: The pilot's misuse of rain repellent, causing an optical illusion"
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Does anybody know the experience levels of the flight deck crew on type and total etc?
Co-pilot (43): 10700 hours total, 2500 on type
Although I am NOT suggesting that it was a crew mistake to attempt the approach and landing, there was a tragedy in an MD-82 years ago at Little Rock, where the Captain (who died) was a Chicago Chief Pilot and the FO was on probation (in his first year at the airline). As many of you know, the Captain and some pax died. Thunderstorms were all around the airport, and I doubt that either pilot verbalized the option of just avoiding the destination and waiting a short while nearby-but I can not remember. Their fuel status might have been a factor, and their long duty certainly was a factor.
Men, maybe more than women, find it hard to admit that they find a situation makes them uncomfortable, or factors are outside their "personal limits" and might be competitive with each other, wanting to face a challenge, i.e. a very gusty crosswind with heavy rain very close to the airport.
Again, I have no idea about the c0ckp1t options discussed before the Toronto accident, or whether the FO even stated the possibility of avoiding the airport for a while. But weather can change very fast, to the extent that none of us can realistically guess.
Men, maybe more than women, find it hard to admit that they find a situation makes them uncomfortable, or factors are outside their "personal limits" and might be competitive with each other, wanting to face a challenge, i.e. a very gusty crosswind with heavy rain very close to the airport.
Again, I have no idea about the c0ckp1t options discussed before the Toronto accident, or whether the FO even stated the possibility of avoiding the airport for a while. But weather can change very fast, to the extent that none of us can realistically guess.
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RatherBeFlying,
great info.
If AF358 got this "big push", then its airspeed would have decreased. But it actually increased by 2 knots between threshold and touchdown point (although we do not know how it may have fluctuated in between).
So if there was an increase in tailwind after the threshold, thrust must have been increased for the increase in airspeed to happen. But according to the TSB briefing, engines were idled at the threshold.
So, assuming thrust remained at idle after the threshold (not explicitly said in the TSB briefing ?), 148 knots at touchdown point is not consistent with an increased tailwind all along the 1st 4000 ft of the runway.
What do you think ?
great info.
If AF358 got this "big push", then its airspeed would have decreased. But it actually increased by 2 knots between threshold and touchdown point (although we do not know how it may have fluctuated in between).
So if there was an increase in tailwind after the threshold, thrust must have been increased for the increase in airspeed to happen. But according to the TSB briefing, engines were idled at the threshold.
So, assuming thrust remained at idle after the threshold (not explicitly said in the TSB briefing ?), 148 knots at touchdown point is not consistent with an increased tailwind all along the 1st 4000 ft of the runway.
What do you think ?
Rumet,
I got to the "big push" by elimination since if the engines were idled at threshold on an assumed stablised approach at Vref, what else would extend the touchdown 3000'?
Another poster pointed out that the time from THR to TD (4000') would be 15 seconds at a g/s of 160 kt.
That would make rod between 400 and 200 fpm given a TCH of 100-50'.
Contrast that to the normal rod on an ILS with a g/s of 160 kt. of some 850 fpm.
As to what happens to a/s as the tailwind increases in ground effect, we will have to wait for the FDR plot for that period.
I got to the "big push" by elimination since if the engines were idled at threshold on an assumed stablised approach at Vref, what else would extend the touchdown 3000'?
Another poster pointed out that the time from THR to TD (4000') would be 15 seconds at a g/s of 160 kt.
That would make rod between 400 and 200 fpm given a TCH of 100-50'.
Contrast that to the normal rod on an ILS with a g/s of 160 kt. of some 850 fpm.
As to what happens to a/s as the tailwind increases in ground effect, we will have to wait for the FDR plot for that period.