Air France crash at YYZ (Merged)
RBF has, I think, said it in a nutshell.
20/20 hindsight is a bit like Kamm's theory, double the speed and you cube the drag. In this and other accidents that happened in iffy conditions, double the paxcount/US$/visibility and you cube the hindsight.
Trouble is that, in many ways, hindsight training serves more to bureaucratically circumscribe the right reactions. In any activity. One hopes it doesn't in this one.
20/20 hindsight is a bit like Kamm's theory, double the speed and you cube the drag. In this and other accidents that happened in iffy conditions, double the paxcount/US$/visibility and you cube the hindsight.
Trouble is that, in many ways, hindsight training serves more to bureaucratically circumscribe the right reactions. In any activity. One hopes it doesn't in this one.
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alf
Downloaded and perused the presentation about Managing Threats on Approaches with great interest. However, one omission strikes me: nowhere in this document is crew fatigue mentioned. Couldn't it be that after a long flight, the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling becomes a bit too strong ? If so, what can be done about it ?
Downloaded and perused the presentation about Managing Threats on Approaches with great interest. However, one omission strikes me: nowhere in this document is crew fatigue mentioned. Couldn't it be that after a long flight, the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling becomes a bit too strong ? If so, what can be done about it ?
172driver Fatigue is another parameter that is more easily seen after an event rather than at the time, we have very little self awareness of fatigue. Do not confuse fatigue with tiredness especially after a long flight as I understand that they are very different issues. See the thread on fatigue in this section.
For background info see Getting to grips with fatigue and alertness management , an excellent Airbus reference, but beware it is a very large file 12.1mb.
Also see the complementary guide Coping with long-range flying, 3.28mb.
Re “the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling, what can be done about it ?”
Self discipline. CRM training should have greater focus on thinking skills involving self awareness and self monitoring, the ability to question what you see or what you are told, and question your decision / choice of action. Airmanship consists of Discipline (self discipline), Skill and Proficiency (self monitoring is a skill), Knowledge (in this instance of human weakness), Situation Awareness (as discussed in previous posts), and Judgment – that final overview of a situation and choice of action, deciding where the line between success and failure is.
Joetom re your point - “would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft”. Take care, remember that every aircraft type has its own unique landing and stopping capability. It is most unwise to base your landing on a previous landing report. By all means use all of the available information in your assessment, but don’t bet your life on someone else stating ‘it will be OK’.
For background info see Getting to grips with fatigue and alertness management , an excellent Airbus reference, but beware it is a very large file 12.1mb.
Also see the complementary guide Coping with long-range flying, 3.28mb.
Re “the 'get-her-on-the-ground-and-go-home' feeling, what can be done about it ?”
Self discipline. CRM training should have greater focus on thinking skills involving self awareness and self monitoring, the ability to question what you see or what you are told, and question your decision / choice of action. Airmanship consists of Discipline (self discipline), Skill and Proficiency (self monitoring is a skill), Knowledge (in this instance of human weakness), Situation Awareness (as discussed in previous posts), and Judgment – that final overview of a situation and choice of action, deciding where the line between success and failure is.
Joetom re your point - “would ask previous landing aircraft/crew to have a cold look at conditions when they landed their aircraft”. Take care, remember that every aircraft type has its own unique landing and stopping capability. It is most unwise to base your landing on a previous landing report. By all means use all of the available information in your assessment, but don’t bet your life on someone else stating ‘it will be OK’.
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alf5071h
My point was more general, say 7 aircrafts land on same runway inside 15mins during very bad weather, last one has problem and gets stuck in the mud.
Aircraft waiting to land will review plans, but I guess the six aircraft that landed before stuck in the mud will review what they did.
I understand the different aircrafts point.
One big question I often ask when reading about aircraft in problems. why was aircraft at that location when other choices were open, like use another runway or airport.
Just of interest, I notice in recent times pilots are younger as an average, even with two well trained pilots things go wrong, but I like having an older pilot with lots of hours fly me about.
Remember the saying "you can't put an old head on young shoulders" ?
My point was more general, say 7 aircrafts land on same runway inside 15mins during very bad weather, last one has problem and gets stuck in the mud.
Aircraft waiting to land will review plans, but I guess the six aircraft that landed before stuck in the mud will review what they did.
I understand the different aircrafts point.
One big question I often ask when reading about aircraft in problems. why was aircraft at that location when other choices were open, like use another runway or airport.
Just of interest, I notice in recent times pilots are younger as an average, even with two well trained pilots things go wrong, but I like having an older pilot with lots of hours fly me about.
Remember the saying "you can't put an old head on young shoulders" ?
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alf
Thanks for these links - that'll take care of reading matter for a while
Seriously - very well said re self discipline and CRM. It can just be damn hard to tear yourself away from a preconceived idea. Something to work on. Perhaps approaching every landing mentally as half a go-around might help. Although in this particular case it appears the mistake was made earlier, i.e. deciding to attempt the landing at all. But, as has been said here many times, hindsight is always 20:20
Thanks for these links - that'll take care of reading matter for a while
Seriously - very well said re self discipline and CRM. It can just be damn hard to tear yourself away from a preconceived idea. Something to work on. Perhaps approaching every landing mentally as half a go-around might help. Although in this particular case it appears the mistake was made earlier, i.e. deciding to attempt the landing at all. But, as has been said here many times, hindsight is always 20:20
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For those that are interested in the last overrun down this dropoff, look at...
http://www.avsaf.org/reports/CANADA/...Canada_189.pdf
The DC-9 was taking off with slats extende but zero flap with a high rotation speed. A main wheel tire tread came off at high speed but below V1 leading to vibration, along with a main gear unsafe light from tire debris and a decrease in engine power due to tire ingestion. After rejecting the takeoff, not nearly enough braking was used possibly due to distraction from difficulty in spoiler operation and the aircraft went over the embankment but at a high enough speed to actually get airborne leading to high vertical G-load on impact. The report only briefly discusses the overrun area staing that it was within accepted international standards.
http://www.avsaf.org/reports/CANADA/...Canada_189.pdf
The DC-9 was taking off with slats extende but zero flap with a high rotation speed. A main wheel tire tread came off at high speed but below V1 leading to vibration, along with a main gear unsafe light from tire debris and a decrease in engine power due to tire ingestion. After rejecting the takeoff, not nearly enough braking was used possibly due to distraction from difficulty in spoiler operation and the aircraft went over the embankment but at a high enough speed to actually get airborne leading to high vertical G-load on impact. The report only briefly discusses the overrun area staing that it was within accepted international standards.
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Manual thrust and autopilot off
Excellent posts and links Alf.
As part of the chain and a contributing factor .....
Autothrust and autopilot were disconnected at 350ft.
Correct under
How often does a A-340 pilot FO perform and practise approaches with Autothrust off ? I bet you the Air France FO had not done too many approaches with the Autothrust off.
As part of the chain and a contributing factor .....
Autothrust and autopilot were disconnected at 350ft.
Correct under
How often does a A-340 pilot FO perform and practise approaches with Autothrust off ? I bet you the Air France FO had not done too many approaches with the Autothrust off.
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YYZ
I don't know everything about the crash but I can tell you that performing the approach without the autothrust is not uncommon at AF. One sure thing though is that the F/O hadn't done many approaches in those conditions but from what I heard about that day not many pilots have . About fuel, they had enough fuel to divert! Another thing, someone earlier said that the crew was aware of the comments made by the 2 previous landing aircraft ( Breaking action poor). Is that a fact? Because one thing I know is that no one from ATC told them ( did they even know?) what the runway was like. Wet for sure, but how much water? Because that has a big impact on the decision, landing or going around.
Happy flights
Happy flights
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Back to basics:
- If possible you avoid to land with a tailwind unless landing performance is sure to be adequate. A runway into the wind was available.
- Runway conditions are reported, but ATC can not be expected to check them every 5 min.
- If you see that you will have a significant lateral drift during the flare,land deep or too much speed to control touchdownpoint accurately......you make a go-around. Being in slot at 500 feet is not always a guarantee.
- If conditions are difficult the fittest and most experienced pilot should land.
- Pull speedbrakes manually on contaminated runways…. Waiting for auto deployment takes too much time.
- Know your performance based on reversers only, to bring her under 100 kts, all the rest is a bonus when landing on contaminated.
- If you fly an Airbus, remember the Lufthasa going off the Runway in Warshaw
Last edited by EK Shadow; 15th Mar 2006 at 12:01.
"One year after the Air France flight 358 accident at the Toronto Lester B. Pearson International Airport, the team of Transportation Safety Board (TSB) investigators has produced an initial draft investigation report (A05H0002) that will be reviewed by the Board for approval or amendments.
Once the draft report is approved, a confidential draft report will be sent to persons and corporations whose interests may be affected by the report and who are most qualified to comment on its accuracy. This process is intended to ensure procedural fairness and the accuracy of the Board's final report. The Board will consider all representations and comments, amend the report if required, and may make recommendations to address any safety deficiencies. Once the final report is approved by the Board, it will be released to the public."
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/commun...2_20060801.asp
Once the draft report is approved, a confidential draft report will be sent to persons and corporations whose interests may be affected by the report and who are most qualified to comment on its accuracy. This process is intended to ensure procedural fairness and the accuracy of the Board's final report. The Board will consider all representations and comments, amend the report if required, and may make recommendations to address any safety deficiencies. Once the final report is approved by the Board, it will be released to the public."
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/media/commun...2_20060801.asp
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Today's Toronto Star:
According to published reports, there were some irregularities, including a civilian passenger in the cockpit, who was a relative of an Air France employee. That's against the rules.
Questions remain:
Why was the co-pilot, not the more-experienced captain, landing the plane?
Why was the co-pilot, not the more-experienced captain, landing the plane?
captains).
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Originally Posted by MarkD
Really....does anyone remember this thread I started?
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=194867
And this was after the Toronto accident. By the way, I flew on them again on the upper deck and this time I noticed that purses and handbags were allowed on the floor but not under the seats. Is this normal?
