Bombardier Accident at Teterboro
“Being unable to physically pull the yoke back points to something having happened after they did their control checks.”
Following on from Belgique’s list, although not necessarily related to this accident; some aircraft have significant increases in stick force with anti-icing fluid on the control surfaces and / or flowing through the tail plane / elevator gap. In severe cases the manufacture publishes revised trim and take off speed settings for use after de-icing.
Following on from Belgique’s list, although not necessarily related to this accident; some aircraft have significant increases in stick force with anti-icing fluid on the control surfaces and / or flowing through the tail plane / elevator gap. In severe cases the manufacture publishes revised trim and take off speed settings for use after de-icing.
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: Dallas, Tx
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
fougapilot,
Thanks for the input. Sounds about right to me.
For the sake of adding to some of the data on this thread, I ran some numbers out of our previous aircraft data (the 600) and came up with about the same #'s. 37.5 TOW.
We'll just call it 38.0 for the sake of grabbing some quick #'s from the checklist:
V1 = 119
VR = 128
V2 = 138
DIST = 4460
Zero bleed takeoff, no A/I, elevation SL, temp 0C.
Not even close to being out of CG. I doubt that I would have had any fuel in the Aux for that trip.
CL
Thanks for the input. Sounds about right to me.
For the sake of adding to some of the data on this thread, I ran some numbers out of our previous aircraft data (the 600) and came up with about the same #'s. 37.5 TOW.
We'll just call it 38.0 for the sake of grabbing some quick #'s from the checklist:
V1 = 119
VR = 128
V2 = 138
DIST = 4460
Zero bleed takeoff, no A/I, elevation SL, temp 0C.
Not even close to being out of CG. I doubt that I would have had any fuel in the Aux for that trip.
CL
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 56
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Belgique,
I agree with you. Personally, my money is on the autopilot. As I have mentioned before, I have first hand knowledge of crews to whom an inadvertent autopilot engagement on their CL600 (or 601-1A) happened while taking position on the runway. I was simply providing numbers to disprove the CofG scenario. But the truth is we will all have to wait and see what the NTSB finds.
Cheers,
D
I agree with you. Personally, my money is on the autopilot. As I have mentioned before, I have first hand knowledge of crews to whom an inadvertent autopilot engagement on their CL600 (or 601-1A) happened while taking position on the runway. I was simply providing numbers to disprove the CofG scenario. But the truth is we will all have to wait and see what the NTSB finds.
Cheers,
D
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Amidst the polar bears
Posts: 71
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
411 ... I think that the Falcon family of jets use the flying tail approach to pitch control.
Also, ref the suggestion that the autopilot was ON at the time of take-off thrust application, a review of the Flight Safety manual for the aircraft states in a note that the autopilot cannot be selected ON during ground ops due to a WOW inhibit function.
Also, ref the suggestion that the autopilot was ON at the time of take-off thrust application, a review of the Flight Safety manual for the aircraft states in a note that the autopilot cannot be selected ON during ground ops due to a WOW inhibit function.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 56
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Red,
You must be looking at a 3A/R book. One of the main difference between the 600/601-1A and the 601-3A/3R variant of the CL600 is the autopilot. The 600/601-1A autopilot needs to be engaged on the ground for pre-flight test purposes and was therefore not connected to the WOW system. The 601-3A/R test is totaly internal and needs no engagement, so they connected it to the WOW system and prevented engagement on the ground.
D
You must be looking at a 3A/R book. One of the main difference between the 600/601-1A and the 601-3A/3R variant of the CL600 is the autopilot. The 600/601-1A autopilot needs to be engaged on the ground for pre-flight test purposes and was therefore not connected to the WOW system. The 601-3A/R test is totaly internal and needs no engagement, so they connected it to the WOW system and prevented engagement on the ground.
D
Last edited by fougapilot; 15th Feb 2005 at 12:33.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Amidst the polar bears
Posts: 71
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fouga,
Good catch. I rechecked my source and found that the reference was the Flight Safety Training manual dated Dec 94, page 16-82 and it does indeed refer to the 601-3R.
Some folks here still insist on my original response but, until I can quote the source more specifically, I remain uncommitted. Sorry folks for the bad input.
Fouga,
Further to my last, I just reviewed the Flight Safety Training Manual for the 600 dated Aug 86. It does imply that the AP can be engaged on the ground and that, with no modes selected, will lock in the current pitch attitude. It also states that the AP switchlight selector is adjacent to the YD switchlight selector. Not having flown the plane I wonder how difficult it would be to inadvertently select the AP ON vice the YD? In a second scenario, if you were in a hurry and were about to carry out the AP test on the ground (which, as you say, does require the AP to be engaged) it could be possible to be distracted and forget to carry out the test (split check scenario) and continue with the AP engaged. More questions than answers I suppose.
Good catch. I rechecked my source and found that the reference was the Flight Safety Training manual dated Dec 94, page 16-82 and it does indeed refer to the 601-3R.
Some folks here still insist on my original response but, until I can quote the source more specifically, I remain uncommitted. Sorry folks for the bad input.Fouga,
Further to my last, I just reviewed the Flight Safety Training Manual for the 600 dated Aug 86. It does imply that the AP can be engaged on the ground and that, with no modes selected, will lock in the current pitch attitude. It also states that the AP switchlight selector is adjacent to the YD switchlight selector. Not having flown the plane I wonder how difficult it would be to inadvertently select the AP ON vice the YD? In a second scenario, if you were in a hurry and were about to carry out the AP test on the ground (which, as you say, does require the AP to be engaged) it could be possible to be distracted and forget to carry out the test (split check scenario) and continue with the AP engaged. More questions than answers I suppose.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 56
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Red,
No sweat on the manual.
You are correct on the AP engaging on the ground will automaticaly go to the current pitch attitude, and in our specific case, will prevent the pilot from rotating the airplane for take off. The only indications of an autopilot engagement are: AP green light illuminated (it is located between the 2 pilote and not in the field of view during take off...), the fact that the Vbars are no longer in the Go-Around mode, but rather locked to the current pitch attitude of the airplane. It is very easy to inavertently engage the autopilot while engaging the YD.
One of the possible scenario goes as follow: Non flying pilot (NFP) goes trough the line-up check while the FP taxies on the active runway. Last item on the checklist is an "Annunciator recall" which will illuminate any remaining annunciator lights. Normal operation for the Challenger is to take off with the "Electrical" annunciator simply because we keep the APU running. In this scenario, the NFP noticed a "Flight controls" in addition of the "Electric" annunciator. Looking down, he notices the YD is disangage. Resets and engage it. Inavertently engaging the AP in the process. The FP was busy looking out, initiating the T/O roll to notice the Vbars were no longer in G/A mode and continuing with the AP engaged.
Reality is very few crew actualy complete the AP check and if completed, is quite early in checklist it would be almost impossible to carry the AP engaged for so long.
Cheers,
D
No sweat on the manual.
You are correct on the AP engaging on the ground will automaticaly go to the current pitch attitude, and in our specific case, will prevent the pilot from rotating the airplane for take off. The only indications of an autopilot engagement are: AP green light illuminated (it is located between the 2 pilote and not in the field of view during take off...), the fact that the Vbars are no longer in the Go-Around mode, but rather locked to the current pitch attitude of the airplane. It is very easy to inavertently engage the autopilot while engaging the YD.
One of the possible scenario goes as follow: Non flying pilot (NFP) goes trough the line-up check while the FP taxies on the active runway. Last item on the checklist is an "Annunciator recall" which will illuminate any remaining annunciator lights. Normal operation for the Challenger is to take off with the "Electrical" annunciator simply because we keep the APU running. In this scenario, the NFP noticed a "Flight controls" in addition of the "Electric" annunciator. Looking down, he notices the YD is disangage. Resets and engage it. Inavertently engaging the AP in the process. The FP was busy looking out, initiating the T/O roll to notice the Vbars were no longer in G/A mode and continuing with the AP engaged.
Reality is very few crew actualy complete the AP check and if completed, is quite early in checklist it would be almost impossible to carry the AP engaged for so long.
Cheers,
D
On a previous a/c type, the yaw dampers keys were identical to those for the autopilots and all were on the centre console. The TPI setting was checked during taxying, but, if I recall correctly, before the yaw dampers were selected on...
I once engaged on yaw damper and the associated autopilot instead of both yaw dampers - as a result the tailplane incidence began to increase and moved way outside the take-off setting. This was only detected when the configuration warning sounded as the throttles were stood up for take-off; the take-off was then abandoned.
This was in the simulator and was quite deliberate to make the point to the trainee crew. Why? Because I knew from previous incident reports that it had actually happened to a crew in Gander whilst distracted. They too were saved by the configuration warning....
Personally I belive that the trim setting should be checked immediately prior to entering the RW - and a 'full and free' check carried out as well. I used to do such a check when I was new on the fleet - but was told that there was no need as it had already been performed during the after start checks.....
I once engaged on yaw damper and the associated autopilot instead of both yaw dampers - as a result the tailplane incidence began to increase and moved way outside the take-off setting. This was only detected when the configuration warning sounded as the throttles were stood up for take-off; the take-off was then abandoned.
This was in the simulator and was quite deliberate to make the point to the trainee crew. Why? Because I knew from previous incident reports that it had actually happened to a crew in Gander whilst distracted. They too were saved by the configuration warning....
Personally I belive that the trim setting should be checked immediately prior to entering the RW - and a 'full and free' check carried out as well. I used to do such a check when I was new on the fleet - but was told that there was no need as it had already been performed during the after start checks.....
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Amidst the polar bears
Posts: 71
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
With no config warning regarding the AP in T/O power on the 600 we may have found a probable scenario. However, with all respect to the crew though I think that I will stop my own speculation and wait for the NTSB results. Some interesting discussion though. Thanks. 
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Los Angeles
Age: 61
Posts: 223
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I also heard from an unofficial source that this aircraft was on a Charter for a company "A" who brokered it out to a company "B" who in turn brokered it out to a company "C".
Apparently company "C" had completed a trip in the accident aircraft late the previous night and when the request came in for the early morning trip to Chicago the "C" crew was unable due to duty time limits, so company "B" sent their crew (The accident crew) to complete the trip. The problem being that company B's crew was not on the operating certificate for Company "C" and said crew may not have been familiar with the CL 600.
Apparently company "C" had completed a trip in the accident aircraft late the previous night and when the request came in for the early morning trip to Chicago the "C" crew was unable due to duty time limits, so company "B" sent their crew (The accident crew) to complete the trip. The problem being that company B's crew was not on the operating certificate for Company "C" and said crew may not have been familiar with the CL 600.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Canada
Age: 56
Posts: 46
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ence the reason why the FAA requires "differences" training for all part 135 operators whom have more then one variant of the CL60.
But I agree with Red, lets wait for the "experts". Thanks for the systems review guys.
D
But I agree with Red, lets wait for the "experts". Thanks for the systems review guys.
D
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: North America
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
http://cbsnewyork.com/topstories/top...062165731.html
New Twist In Teterboro Plane Crash Investigation
Owner Of Plane Refuses To Hand Over Some Documents
Mar 3, 2005 5:39 pm US/Eastern
(CBS) The owner of the jet that crashed last month at Teterboro Airport won't turn over certain documents pertaining to the investigation, and that has a federal judge taking action. The Federal Aviation Administration has issued a rare emergency cease and desist order grounding the planes of Platinum Jet Management.
The Cl-600 jet crashed during takeoff from Teterboro on a flight bound for Chicago. Twenty people were hurt in the disaster, one critically.
A subpeona by the U.S. Attorney in Newark was issued to the jet's owner to obtain company records as part of the FAA's investigation into the crash. Certain document were turned over, but not all requested by the FAA.
The lawyer for Platinum Jet Management argues the requests are more than necessary for the investigation. The attorney added that the National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the cause of the crash is leaning toward mechanical problems.
The NTSB has refused to comment on the investigation.
(© MMV, CBS Broadcasting Inc., All Rights Reserved.)
New Twist In Teterboro Plane Crash Investigation
Owner Of Plane Refuses To Hand Over Some Documents
Mar 3, 2005 5:39 pm US/Eastern
(CBS) The owner of the jet that crashed last month at Teterboro Airport won't turn over certain documents pertaining to the investigation, and that has a federal judge taking action. The Federal Aviation Administration has issued a rare emergency cease and desist order grounding the planes of Platinum Jet Management.
The Cl-600 jet crashed during takeoff from Teterboro on a flight bound for Chicago. Twenty people were hurt in the disaster, one critically.
A subpeona by the U.S. Attorney in Newark was issued to the jet's owner to obtain company records as part of the FAA's investigation into the crash. Certain document were turned over, but not all requested by the FAA.
The lawyer for Platinum Jet Management argues the requests are more than necessary for the investigation. The attorney added that the National Transportation Safety Board investigation into the cause of the crash is leaning toward mechanical problems.
The NTSB has refused to comment on the investigation.
(© MMV, CBS Broadcasting Inc., All Rights Reserved.)
Not entirely disimilar:
NTSB Identification: ATL05FA061
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 09, 2005 in Tupelo, MS
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600, registration: N660RM
Injuries: 7 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 9, 2005, at 1312 central standard time, a Canadair CL-600, N660RM, registered to Romeo Mike Aviation Company Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, aborted takeoff from runway 36 and went off the departure end of the runway. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot-in-command, (PIC) airline transport rated co-pilot, and five passengers reported no injuries. The flight was departing Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, Mississippi, en route to Teterboro, New Jersey on March 9, 2005.
The PIC stated they were cleared for takeoff from runway 36. The flaps were set at 20-degrees and the trim was set for takeoff. The PIC advanced the thrust levers to 93 percent and started the takeoff roll. The takeoff run and acceleration were normal. The airplane reached V1 (128 knots) and VR (134 knots) and the PIC attempted to rotate the airplane with the control column. The control column would not move aft from the neutral position. The forward movement of the control column was normal. The aft movement beyond the neutral position felt as if it was locked against a stop. The airplane was about 4,000 feet down the runway between 140 to 145 knots. No annunciator's lights were illuminated. The PIC commanded the abort, extended the spoilers, applied maximum braking, and maximum reverse thrust, and maintained centerline down the runway. After the abort was initiated the PIC stated he continued to apply rearward pressure on the control column and he was not sure if he felt or heard a "crunch." He further stated, something may have given and the control column may have moved aft of the neutral position. The PIC stated the "crunch" was felt or heard after or at the abort procedure. The noise or the crunch may have come from below the flight deck. The airplane went off the end of the runway and the nose wheel collapsed in the mud.
NTSB Identification: ATL05FA061
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Wednesday, March 09, 2005 in Tupelo, MS
Aircraft: Canadair CL-600, registration: N660RM
Injuries: 7 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
On March 9, 2005, at 1312 central standard time, a Canadair CL-600, N660RM, registered to Romeo Mike Aviation Company Inc., operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 business flight, aborted takeoff from runway 36 and went off the departure end of the runway. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The airline transport rated pilot-in-command, (PIC) airline transport rated co-pilot, and five passengers reported no injuries. The flight was departing Tupelo Regional Airport, Tupelo, Mississippi, en route to Teterboro, New Jersey on March 9, 2005.
The PIC stated they were cleared for takeoff from runway 36. The flaps were set at 20-degrees and the trim was set for takeoff. The PIC advanced the thrust levers to 93 percent and started the takeoff roll. The takeoff run and acceleration were normal. The airplane reached V1 (128 knots) and VR (134 knots) and the PIC attempted to rotate the airplane with the control column. The control column would not move aft from the neutral position. The forward movement of the control column was normal. The aft movement beyond the neutral position felt as if it was locked against a stop. The airplane was about 4,000 feet down the runway between 140 to 145 knots. No annunciator's lights were illuminated. The PIC commanded the abort, extended the spoilers, applied maximum braking, and maximum reverse thrust, and maintained centerline down the runway. After the abort was initiated the PIC stated he continued to apply rearward pressure on the control column and he was not sure if he felt or heard a "crunch." He further stated, something may have given and the control column may have moved aft of the neutral position. The PIC stated the "crunch" was felt or heard after or at the abort procedure. The noise or the crunch may have come from below the flight deck. The airplane went off the end of the runway and the nose wheel collapsed in the mud.
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: May 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 109
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting development - just had a missive from our CAA surveyor to be aware of unofficial local (ie in-house) mods done to control column.
Particularly where the hand mike stowage is mounted either too low or more likely the jack plug mounting is mounted too low and fouls the floor when controls pulled back.
Another good reason to have 'Full and Free' before launch!!
Particularly where the hand mike stowage is mounted either too low or more likely the jack plug mounting is mounted too low and fouls the floor when controls pulled back.
Another good reason to have 'Full and Free' before launch!!
It would not be the first time a mis-placed microphone caused an accident.
Join Date: Jul 1999
Location: 58-33N. 00-18W. Peterborough UK
Posts: 3,040
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594 March 23, 2005
UPDATE ON CHALLENGER JET CRASH IN TETERBORO, NEW JERSEY
The National Transportation Safety Board today
released the following update on its investigation into the
crash of a Bombardier Challenger CL-600 corporate jet on
February 2, 2005, in Teterboro, New Jersey. The airplane
overran the departure end of runway 6 during an aborted
takeoff attempt and crashed into a fence, two cars, and a
warehouse. A postcrash fire ensued. The pilot, copilot, and
two automobile occupants received serious injuries, and a
cabin aid and eight passengers received minor injuries.
The accident occurred about 7:17 a.m. The flight was
departing Teterboro Airport for Midway Airport, Chicago,
Illinois. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.
Preliminary evidence indicated that icing conditions
at Teterboro were minimal or non-existent on the morning of
the accident. Video surveillance recordings were obtained
from the Port Authority. These recordings corroborate
witness accounts and flight data recorder (FDR) data that
indicated that the airplane did not pitch up during takeoff,
even though the airplane was traveling at a high speed.
Upper wing ice contamination has not been associated with
the inability of an airplane to pitch up for takeoff;
rather, upper wing ice is typically associated with the
inability of an airplane to fly after it has pitched up to a
takeoff attitude.
The airplane wreckage was removed from the accident
site and was transferred to a nearby storage facility for
further inspection. The recovered contents of the airplane
were weighed. The center of gravity (CG) was found to be
well forward of the allowable limit. The initial findings
of the investigation have indicated that, the airplane, as
configured, could have a CG well forward of the forward
limit based on its cabin interior configuration combined
with full or nearly full fuel tanks, including the fuselage
tank, and a full or nearly full passenger load and minimum
passenger baggage. In addition, the horizontal stabilizer
trim position was documented in the middle of the green band
(which is the normal takeoff range). The operations and
performance groups have conducted tests using a simulator to
evaluate the airplane's takeoff characteristics based on the
trim settings and weight and balance data. The initial findings of
those simulations indicate the airplane would not rotate for take off
at the defined rotation speed.
The initial examination of the pitch control system
revealed no anomalies. The pitch control system and
autopilot will be further examined. Engine examination, FDR
data, and flight crew and eyewitness reports indicated that
the engines functioned as expected, including thrust
reverser deployment.
The FDR operated for only about 10 seconds, starting
when the airplane was decelerating through 153 knots and
ending when the airplane had slowed to 91 knots. The FDR
and systems groups will examine the FDR wiring and logic to
determine why only 10 seconds of data were recorded.
The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice
recorder (CVR). The CVR group has completed a transcript of
the recording, which will be released at a later date in
accordance with Federal law.
The operations group interviewed the pilot during his
stay in the hospital. The group is performing an extensive
review of flight logs and airplane handbooks. Members of
the operations and maintenance records groups traveled to
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to
interview personnel from Platinum Jet Management, the
operator of the airplane.
The investigative team will work with the manufacturer
of the airplane, Bombardier, to perform a detailed
examination of the performance of the airplane.
Documentation defining the relationship between the
operator, the certificate holder, and the FAA is also being
gathered.
Washington, DC 20594 March 23, 2005
UPDATE ON CHALLENGER JET CRASH IN TETERBORO, NEW JERSEY
The National Transportation Safety Board today
released the following update on its investigation into the
crash of a Bombardier Challenger CL-600 corporate jet on
February 2, 2005, in Teterboro, New Jersey. The airplane
overran the departure end of runway 6 during an aborted
takeoff attempt and crashed into a fence, two cars, and a
warehouse. A postcrash fire ensued. The pilot, copilot, and
two automobile occupants received serious injuries, and a
cabin aid and eight passengers received minor injuries.
The accident occurred about 7:17 a.m. The flight was
departing Teterboro Airport for Midway Airport, Chicago,
Illinois. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.
Preliminary evidence indicated that icing conditions
at Teterboro were minimal or non-existent on the morning of
the accident. Video surveillance recordings were obtained
from the Port Authority. These recordings corroborate
witness accounts and flight data recorder (FDR) data that
indicated that the airplane did not pitch up during takeoff,
even though the airplane was traveling at a high speed.
Upper wing ice contamination has not been associated with
the inability of an airplane to pitch up for takeoff;
rather, upper wing ice is typically associated with the
inability of an airplane to fly after it has pitched up to a
takeoff attitude.
The airplane wreckage was removed from the accident
site and was transferred to a nearby storage facility for
further inspection. The recovered contents of the airplane
were weighed. The center of gravity (CG) was found to be
well forward of the allowable limit. The initial findings
of the investigation have indicated that, the airplane, as
configured, could have a CG well forward of the forward
limit based on its cabin interior configuration combined
with full or nearly full fuel tanks, including the fuselage
tank, and a full or nearly full passenger load and minimum
passenger baggage. In addition, the horizontal stabilizer
trim position was documented in the middle of the green band
(which is the normal takeoff range). The operations and
performance groups have conducted tests using a simulator to
evaluate the airplane's takeoff characteristics based on the
trim settings and weight and balance data. The initial findings of
those simulations indicate the airplane would not rotate for take off
at the defined rotation speed.
The initial examination of the pitch control system
revealed no anomalies. The pitch control system and
autopilot will be further examined. Engine examination, FDR
data, and flight crew and eyewitness reports indicated that
the engines functioned as expected, including thrust
reverser deployment.
The FDR operated for only about 10 seconds, starting
when the airplane was decelerating through 153 knots and
ending when the airplane had slowed to 91 knots. The FDR
and systems groups will examine the FDR wiring and logic to
determine why only 10 seconds of data were recorded.
The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice
recorder (CVR). The CVR group has completed a transcript of
the recording, which will be released at a later date in
accordance with Federal law.
The operations group interviewed the pilot during his
stay in the hospital. The group is performing an extensive
review of flight logs and airplane handbooks. Members of
the operations and maintenance records groups traveled to
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to
interview personnel from Platinum Jet Management, the
operator of the airplane.
The investigative team will work with the manufacturer
of the airplane, Bombardier, to perform a detailed
examination of the performance of the airplane.
Documentation defining the relationship between the
operator, the certificate holder, and the FAA is also being
gathered.
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: North America
Posts: 165
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Weight, Balance May Be Factors in NJ Plane Crash
Wed Mar 23, 7:11 PM ET
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A possible miscalculation of aircraft weight and balance may have prevented takeoff and caused a corporate jet to run off a runway and crash through a building in New Jersey, investigators suggested on Wednesday.
The chartered twin-engine aircraft with 11 people on board and bound for Chicago zoomed off the 6,000-foot runway at Teterboro airport on Feb. 2, crossed a six-lane highway and slammed into a warehouse.
While the National Transportation Safety Board (news - web sites) will not reach a conclusion for months on the accident that injured 20 people, preliminary results confirmed eyewitness reports and other information that the Canadian-made Challenger CL-600 never got its nose off the ground.
The safety board said in an update of its investigation that simulator tests based on the plane's actual aircraft weight and balance data and flight control settings would not permit liftoff even though the plane topped 153 mph during its takeoff roll.
Investigators said the plane's load was out of balance -- too far forward -- but that displacement should not have disrupted takeoff if all weight and balance measurements, flight control settings, and the corresponding aircraft speed needed for lift were properly calculated.
Initial examination showed no problems with the autopilot, the flight control system that controls takeoff lift or the engines.
The safety board said more information was necessary to confirm whether the initial findings are accurate and, if so, what prompted any miscalculation.
The Federal Aviation Administration (news - web sites) has grounded the operator of the plane, Florida-based Platinum Jet Management, saying it may not have been certified to operate the Challenger series made by Montreal-based Bombardier Inc.
Investigators have interviewed the crew and are reviewing flight logs and aircraft handbooks.
The safety board discounted icing as a potential cause after strong speculation immediately after the crash.
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=stor...dc_1&printer=1
Wed Mar 23, 7:11 PM ET
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A possible miscalculation of aircraft weight and balance may have prevented takeoff and caused a corporate jet to run off a runway and crash through a building in New Jersey, investigators suggested on Wednesday.
The chartered twin-engine aircraft with 11 people on board and bound for Chicago zoomed off the 6,000-foot runway at Teterboro airport on Feb. 2, crossed a six-lane highway and slammed into a warehouse.
While the National Transportation Safety Board (news - web sites) will not reach a conclusion for months on the accident that injured 20 people, preliminary results confirmed eyewitness reports and other information that the Canadian-made Challenger CL-600 never got its nose off the ground.
The safety board said in an update of its investigation that simulator tests based on the plane's actual aircraft weight and balance data and flight control settings would not permit liftoff even though the plane topped 153 mph during its takeoff roll.
Investigators said the plane's load was out of balance -- too far forward -- but that displacement should not have disrupted takeoff if all weight and balance measurements, flight control settings, and the corresponding aircraft speed needed for lift were properly calculated.
Initial examination showed no problems with the autopilot, the flight control system that controls takeoff lift or the engines.
The safety board said more information was necessary to confirm whether the initial findings are accurate and, if so, what prompted any miscalculation.
The Federal Aviation Administration (news - web sites) has grounded the operator of the plane, Florida-based Platinum Jet Management, saying it may not have been certified to operate the Challenger series made by Montreal-based Bombardier Inc.
Investigators have interviewed the crew and are reviewing flight logs and aircraft handbooks.
The safety board discounted icing as a potential cause after strong speculation immediately after the crash.
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=stor...dc_1&printer=1
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: Obvious
Age: 78
Posts: 301
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can understand how a forward Center of Gravity might require a much higher speed than rotate to get airborne.
However why would it stop the pilot from pulling back-stick? (this being both his story and that of his copilot). It seems to be also the claim of the 09 Mar 05 N660RM overrun of a Challenger at Tupelo MS.
We've heard the microphone physical interference and the autopilot inadvertently disengaged theory (both viable), but this NTSB explanation is convenient only in the absence of the FDR data.
Bellcheek
However why would it stop the pilot from pulling back-stick? (this being both his story and that of his copilot). It seems to be also the claim of the 09 Mar 05 N660RM overrun of a Challenger at Tupelo MS.
We've heard the microphone physical interference and the autopilot inadvertently disengaged theory (both viable), but this NTSB explanation is convenient only in the absence of the FDR data.
Bellcheek