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Old 23rd Mar 2005, 20:14
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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594 March 23, 2005

UPDATE ON CHALLENGER JET CRASH IN TETERBORO, NEW JERSEY

The National Transportation Safety Board today
released the following update on its investigation into the
crash of a Bombardier Challenger CL-600 corporate jet on
February 2, 2005, in Teterboro, New Jersey. The airplane
overran the departure end of runway 6 during an aborted
takeoff attempt and crashed into a fence, two cars, and a
warehouse. A postcrash fire ensued. The pilot, copilot, and
two automobile occupants received serious injuries, and a
cabin aid and eight passengers received minor injuries.

The accident occurred about 7:17 a.m. The flight was
departing Teterboro Airport for Midway Airport, Chicago,
Illinois. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.

Preliminary evidence indicated that icing conditions
at Teterboro were minimal or non-existent on the morning of
the accident. Video surveillance recordings were obtained
from the Port Authority. These recordings corroborate
witness accounts and flight data recorder (FDR) data that
indicated that the airplane did not pitch up during takeoff,
even though the airplane was traveling at a high speed.
Upper wing ice contamination has not been associated with
the inability of an airplane to pitch up for takeoff;
rather, upper wing ice is typically associated with the
inability of an airplane to fly after it has pitched up to a
takeoff attitude.

The airplane wreckage was removed from the accident
site and was transferred to a nearby storage facility for
further inspection. The recovered contents of the airplane
were weighed. The center of gravity (CG) was found to be
well forward of the allowable limit. The initial findings
of the investigation have indicated that, the airplane, as
configured, could have a CG well forward of the forward
limit based on its cabin interior configuration combined
with full or nearly full fuel tanks, including the fuselage
tank, and a full or nearly full passenger load and minimum
passenger baggage. In addition, the horizontal stabilizer
trim position was documented in the middle of the green band
(which is the normal takeoff range). The operations and
performance groups have conducted tests using a simulator to
evaluate the airplane's takeoff characteristics based on the
trim settings and weight and balance data. The initial findings of
those simulations indicate the airplane would not rotate for take off
at the defined rotation speed.

The initial examination of the pitch control system
revealed no anomalies. The pitch control system and
autopilot will be further examined. Engine examination, FDR
data, and flight crew and eyewitness reports indicated that
the engines functioned as expected, including thrust
reverser deployment.

The FDR operated for only about 10 seconds, starting
when the airplane was decelerating through 153 knots and
ending when the airplane had slowed to 91 knots. The FDR
and systems groups will examine the FDR wiring and logic to
determine why only 10 seconds of data were recorded.

The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice
recorder (CVR). The CVR group has completed a transcript of
the recording, which will be released at a later date in
accordance with Federal law.

The operations group interviewed the pilot during his
stay in the hospital. The group is performing an extensive
review of flight logs and airplane handbooks. Members of
the operations and maintenance records groups traveled to
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Muscle Shoals, Alabama, to
interview personnel from Platinum Jet Management, the
operator of the airplane.

The investigative team will work with the manufacturer
of the airplane, Bombardier, to perform a detailed
examination of the performance of the airplane.
Documentation defining the relationship between the
operator, the certificate holder, and the FAA is also being
gathered.
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