AA MD82 Landing Incident?
Tsamaya sentle
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Few Cloudy has hit a vital point:
A number of recent incidents and accidents come to mind where "target fixation" played a major role. I have two in mind,
the Hapag Lloyd A310 and maybe the Crossair CFIT in 2001.
No doubt, an attitude of "We are a l m o s t there, surely we can make it" is something we all know from everyday non-aviation activities, too. "Pressing on" is a state of mind where other potential solutions are faded out (masked). It often involves a perception that it is "too late now to change a course of action once taken" - something which might be reflected in this case by, quote, "The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time" and of course "The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.".
As "target fixation" is an inherent element of the human mind, its dangers must be addressed in training.
(Iīm not blaming anyone here, just trying to add some points to a discussion which is too much focussed on "AA the good and the ugly".)
These guys should now make a tour of operators, explaining to other pilots first hand what thoughts go on in these situations - what makes us press on, even when warning signs are there, loud and clear.
the Hapag Lloyd A310 and maybe the Crossair CFIT in 2001.
No doubt, an attitude of "We are a l m o s t there, surely we can make it" is something we all know from everyday non-aviation activities, too. "Pressing on" is a state of mind where other potential solutions are faded out (masked). It often involves a perception that it is "too late now to change a course of action once taken" - something which might be reflected in this case by, quote, "The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time" and of course "The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach.".
As "target fixation" is an inherent element of the human mind, its dangers must be addressed in training.
(Iīm not blaming anyone here, just trying to add some points to a discussion which is too much focussed on "AA the good and the ugly".)
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Dallas Dude, in response
>While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.
Fair Enough..I was asking, not presuming.
>AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.
Well, the US says it follows the Geneva Conventions in Iraq, too, whilst managers (Rummy, etc) encourage flouting of same. Black-and-White directives mean little when "wink wink" management rules (still not presuming, just asking).
>It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.
>I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.
My call is to ask questions, not answer them. I don't know enough.
>While it's fair for non AA pilots to presume such an aura would exist, I can absolutely, unequivocally state that it's not the case. I'm not a management pilot either, BTW.
Fair Enough..I was asking, not presuming.
>AA has, in black and white in it's Ops Specs (Pt 1), a no fault go around statement. Basically, it says a go-around is also considered a successful conclusion to any approach.
Well, the US says it follows the Geneva Conventions in Iraq, too, whilst managers (Rummy, etc) encourage flouting of same. Black-and-White directives mean little when "wink wink" management rules (still not presuming, just asking).
>It must be noted that the disclaimer at the beginning of the NTSB prelim report defies the due process an accident investigator charged with finding the cause should administer.
>I.E. guilty until proven innocent etc. Are we better aviators for hanging these guys our for learning from their experience to avoid a repeat? Your call.
My call is to ask questions, not answer them. I don't know enough.
Wino,
Taken from the NTSB accident report, this is the public perception, I understand it is not the view of the AA pilots.
Point 16 below is interesting, as even "COORDINATED rudder" as you put it can lead to structural failure. What you have demostrated with your view of the training procedures hinting that "COORDINATED rudder" is okay all the time, no it is not. The NTSB have recognised this widespread fable that is in industry and has asked that the FAA look at changing the regulations to do with certification.
NTSB CONCLUSIONS
[list=1][*]The captain and the first officer (the flying pilot) were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical conditions that may have adversely affected the flight crews performance during the flight. Flight crew fatigue was not a factor in this accident.
[*]The accident airplane was properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with Federal regulations.
[*]The air traffic controllers who handled American Airlines flight 587 were properly trained and qualified. The local controller complied with Federal Aviation Administration wake turbulence spacing requirements when handling flight 587 and Japan Air Lines flight 47, which departed immediately before flight 587.
[*]The witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.
[*]Flight 587s cyclic rudder motions after the second wake turbulence encounter were the result of the first officers rudder pedal inputs.
[*]Flight 587s vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.
[*]The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence, erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques, and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.
[*]Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplanes rudder travel limiter system operates.
[*]The A300-600 rudder control system couples a rudder travel limiter system that increases in sensitivity with airspeed, which is characteristic of variable stop designs, with the lightest pedal forces of all the transport-category aircraft evaluated by the National Transportation Safety Board during this investigation.
[*]The first officers initial control wheel input in response to the second wake turbulence encounter was too aggressive, and his initial rudder pedal input response was unnecessary to control the airplane.
[*]Certification standards are needed to ensure that future airplane designs minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling susceptibility and to better protect against high loads in the event of large rudder inputs.
[*]Because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds.
[*]To minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling events, transport-category pilots would benefit from training about the role that alternating full control inputs can play in such events and training that emphasizes that alternating full rudder inputs are not necessary to control a transport-category airplane.
[*]There is a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about the degree of structural protection that exists when full or abrupt flight control inputs are made at airspeeds below the maneuvering speed.
[*]Federal Aviation Administration standards for unusual attitude training programs that take into account industry best practices and are designed to avoid inaccurate or negative training would lead to improvement and standardization of industry training programs.
[*]The use of lower levels of automation, such as simulators without motion or simple computer screen displays, may be more appropriate to provide the necessary awareness training with less danger of introducing incorrect information. [/list=1]
I am not trying to bring the name of the airline or pilots in disrepute, just share some information in memory of those who lost their lives.
but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.
So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)
So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)
Point 16 below is interesting, as even "COORDINATED rudder" as you put it can lead to structural failure. What you have demostrated with your view of the training procedures hinting that "COORDINATED rudder" is okay all the time, no it is not. The NTSB have recognised this widespread fable that is in industry and has asked that the FAA look at changing the regulations to do with certification.
Modify 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 standards to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope, including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity. (A-04-XX)
Require the manufacturers and operators of transport-category airplanes to establish and implement pilot training programs that: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections. The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after takeoff or during strong or gusty crosswind takeoffs or landings. (A-02-01)
Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots of transport-category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure that flight crews are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters. (A-02-02)
Require the manufacturers and operators of transport-category airplanes to establish and implement pilot training programs that: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections. The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after takeoff or during strong or gusty crosswind takeoffs or landings. (A-02-01)
Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots of transport-category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure that flight crews are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters. (A-02-02)
[list=1][*]The captain and the first officer (the flying pilot) were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical conditions that may have adversely affected the flight crews performance during the flight. Flight crew fatigue was not a factor in this accident.
[*]The accident airplane was properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with Federal regulations.
[*]The air traffic controllers who handled American Airlines flight 587 were properly trained and qualified. The local controller complied with Federal Aviation Administration wake turbulence spacing requirements when handling flight 587 and Japan Air Lines flight 47, which departed immediately before flight 587.
[*]The witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.
[*]Flight 587s cyclic rudder motions after the second wake turbulence encounter were the result of the first officers rudder pedal inputs.
[*]Flight 587s vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.
[*]The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence, erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques, and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.
[*]Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplanes rudder travel limiter system operates.
[*]The A300-600 rudder control system couples a rudder travel limiter system that increases in sensitivity with airspeed, which is characteristic of variable stop designs, with the lightest pedal forces of all the transport-category aircraft evaluated by the National Transportation Safety Board during this investigation.
[*]The first officers initial control wheel input in response to the second wake turbulence encounter was too aggressive, and his initial rudder pedal input response was unnecessary to control the airplane.
[*]Certification standards are needed to ensure that future airplane designs minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling susceptibility and to better protect against high loads in the event of large rudder inputs.
[*]Because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds.
[*]To minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling events, transport-category pilots would benefit from training about the role that alternating full control inputs can play in such events and training that emphasizes that alternating full rudder inputs are not necessary to control a transport-category airplane.
[*]There is a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about the degree of structural protection that exists when full or abrupt flight control inputs are made at airspeeds below the maneuvering speed.
[*]Federal Aviation Administration standards for unusual attitude training programs that take into account industry best practices and are designed to avoid inaccurate or negative training would lead to improvement and standardization of industry training programs.
[*]The use of lower levels of automation, such as simulators without motion or simple computer screen displays, may be more appropriate to provide the necessary awareness training with less danger of introducing incorrect information. [/list=1]
I am not trying to bring the name of the airline or pilots in disrepute, just share some information in memory of those who lost their lives.
Union Goon
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Sten didn't really put in "Coordinated" rudder, because at 250 knots its just not an option on the aircraft.
I have read the report (as have you, obviously)
And the points that are necesary here is
10. I have a copy of the FCOM on CDROM(official factory manual from the aircraft) from which AA procedures were developed (because of the flight attendant accident in Miami that also called AA manuals into question) The Rudder load limiter described is actually the one from the b4 not the 600r. That was corrected in a revision later. The B4 Rudder load Limiter was a ratio changer system, like the rest of the industry, not the fixed ratio system in place on 587. Very poor manuals to say the least.
12 Under no circumstance do I believe that Sten INTENDED to get full rudder on the first (or an after) throw of the rudder. As to the controll wheel responses being to agressive, easy thing to say when the aircraft is rolling away from you and this particular aircraft has Tiny Tiny aillerons (inboard only) and some spoilers and can be down right ponderous on response in certain regimes (especially compared to 767 and 777 aircraft, which are similar or larger in size)
13. BINGO
14 BINGO
I have always been aware of the risk of a doublet. However, the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder.
The problem here is that the aircraft has a tendancy towards a POI and that needs to be corrected and can be corrected fairly easily. It is the same reason that we set AFT CG LIMITS on aircraft. The farther aft the CG goes on an aircraft the more efficient the aircraft gets (But less stable). There is a point at which stability becomes beyond the acceptable level. This aircraft has a stability problem in CERTAIN rarely seen regimes of flight.
It can easily be fixed one of two ways. One is to change the rudder load limiter back to a ratio changer system rather than a fixed ratio changer (somewhat expensive) The other is to further limit rudder travel at speeds of higher than say 180 knots so that the amount of rudder travel allowed would permit a full doublet. The second change would have no effect on performance and would simply be a software change in the FAC.
But as Airbus has never made a mistake, I don't expect to see it.
Cheers
Wino
I have read the report (as have you, obviously)
And the points that are necesary here is
10. I have a copy of the FCOM on CDROM(official factory manual from the aircraft) from which AA procedures were developed (because of the flight attendant accident in Miami that also called AA manuals into question) The Rudder load limiter described is actually the one from the b4 not the 600r. That was corrected in a revision later. The B4 Rudder load Limiter was a ratio changer system, like the rest of the industry, not the fixed ratio system in place on 587. Very poor manuals to say the least.
12 Under no circumstance do I believe that Sten INTENDED to get full rudder on the first (or an after) throw of the rudder. As to the controll wheel responses being to agressive, easy thing to say when the aircraft is rolling away from you and this particular aircraft has Tiny Tiny aillerons (inboard only) and some spoilers and can be down right ponderous on response in certain regimes (especially compared to 767 and 777 aircraft, which are similar or larger in size)
13. BINGO
14 BINGO
I have always been aware of the risk of a doublet. However, the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder.
The problem here is that the aircraft has a tendancy towards a POI and that needs to be corrected and can be corrected fairly easily. It is the same reason that we set AFT CG LIMITS on aircraft. The farther aft the CG goes on an aircraft the more efficient the aircraft gets (But less stable). There is a point at which stability becomes beyond the acceptable level. This aircraft has a stability problem in CERTAIN rarely seen regimes of flight.
It can easily be fixed one of two ways. One is to change the rudder load limiter back to a ratio changer system rather than a fixed ratio changer (somewhat expensive) The other is to further limit rudder travel at speeds of higher than say 180 knots so that the amount of rudder travel allowed would permit a full doublet. The second change would have no effect on performance and would simply be a software change in the FAC.
But as Airbus has never made a mistake, I don't expect to see it.
Cheers
Wino
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Oh really...?
"I have always been aware of the risk of a doublet. However, the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder."
Ah, well actually Wino, this ain't true, at all.
Since the very early days of 707 certification flying, pilots
then had a proper well founded knowledge that large and particularly rapid rudder inputs at higher speeds can lead to severe problems....and this knowledge was passed down to respective carriers who ordered the aircraft, including American Airlines.
Now, one could ask, how come this knowledge is somehow forgotten now?
Plain and simply, the older guys have now retired, and young turks are in charge in the training department, so these folks have NO prior knowledge about the problems that can occur, and further, have NO inclanation to find out, either.
I suspect it is the AA idea of..."we know best, so shut up and do it this way."
Additionally, large jet transport aeroplanes can NOT be thrown around with wild abandon, as some light highly maneuverable aircraft can, at maneuvering speeds, without overstressing the structure.
Positively KNOWN a very long time ago, and American Airlines, and specifically their ill-informed training department, are sadly unable to grasp the facts.
AA mindset, demonstrated at its worst.
Ah, well actually Wino, this ain't true, at all.
Since the very early days of 707 certification flying, pilots
then had a proper well founded knowledge that large and particularly rapid rudder inputs at higher speeds can lead to severe problems....and this knowledge was passed down to respective carriers who ordered the aircraft, including American Airlines.
Now, one could ask, how come this knowledge is somehow forgotten now?
Plain and simply, the older guys have now retired, and young turks are in charge in the training department, so these folks have NO prior knowledge about the problems that can occur, and further, have NO inclanation to find out, either.
I suspect it is the AA idea of..."we know best, so shut up and do it this way."
Additionally, large jet transport aeroplanes can NOT be thrown around with wild abandon, as some light highly maneuverable aircraft can, at maneuvering speeds, without overstressing the structure.
Positively KNOWN a very long time ago, and American Airlines, and specifically their ill-informed training department, are sadly unable to grasp the facts.
AA mindset, demonstrated at its worst.
Wino,
I dont want to stir the pot, or cheapen the loss of life in that terrible accident.
I have posted some information on page 20 of the American Airlines flight 587 thread that deals with the the FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.
Some of the recommendations from the NTSB was for the FAA to change to the FARs.
Your comment "the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder" is common amongst the professional pilots, however it is not correct.
As many people have suggested, seasoned pilots get used to their equipment, the A300 may have more sensitive rudders than other types, however this would only be noticible if someone is changing fleets, not for experienced A300 operators, it would be just the way the aircraft handles. This was not a factor in this accident from my recollection.
I am sure you have flown aircraft with lighter rudders again than the A300 at some stage in your career, transferring the "feel" from one to the other is not something people do, they are essentially carbon based autopilot controllers, when hand flying you have a known outcome/flight path in mind and adjust the controls/attitude to meet the outcome/flight path. Similar to an electronic autopilot you dont go around using the control forces for an A300 in a small piper or vice versa. While its agreed its sensitive, its also agreed that these were seasoned operators, and as you said the sensitivity of the rudders are well known to all at AA.
I dont want to stir the pot, or cheapen the loss of life in that terrible accident.
I have posted some information on page 20 of the American Airlines flight 587 thread that deals with the the FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.
Some of the recommendations from the NTSB was for the FAA to change to the FARs.
Your comment "the aircraft is certified for a FULL input at all speeds (suitably limited by the RLL) just not a full input against a sideslip. So a full input should be allowed coordinated with the rudder" is common amongst the professional pilots, however it is not correct.
As many people have suggested, seasoned pilots get used to their equipment, the A300 may have more sensitive rudders than other types, however this would only be noticible if someone is changing fleets, not for experienced A300 operators, it would be just the way the aircraft handles. This was not a factor in this accident from my recollection.
I am sure you have flown aircraft with lighter rudders again than the A300 at some stage in your career, transferring the "feel" from one to the other is not something people do, they are essentially carbon based autopilot controllers, when hand flying you have a known outcome/flight path in mind and adjust the controls/attitude to meet the outcome/flight path. Similar to an electronic autopilot you dont go around using the control forces for an A300 in a small piper or vice versa. While its agreed its sensitive, its also agreed that these were seasoned operators, and as you said the sensitivity of the rudders are well known to all at AA.
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Me too, as apparently those "old turks" or turkeys such as 411a have no inclination to learn the correct spelling of 'inclination'. Apparently some people never learn, blah blah blah.....
Oh, by the way, PanAm's history with rudder overcontrol and pylon failure isn't too grand either....
We're not all young turks here, mate, and my offer to challenge you to a flight test of any kind, independently examined, still stands.....
Cheers,
Back to blocking out 411a in PPRUNE, ahhhh, bliss.....
Back to topic, these guys were bloody lucky, and so were the folks landing behind them not to trample wreckage. For those unfamiliar, the right seat of the older 80's has particularly poor positional info if you are cross-referencing the GPS cross-track error, etc. This still doesn't explain why a CATIIIa was not briefed and flown in these conditions, but I'm sure 'all in good time'....
Bottom line: unstable - throw it away
Oh, by the way, PanAm's history with rudder overcontrol and pylon failure isn't too grand either....
We're not all young turks here, mate, and my offer to challenge you to a flight test of any kind, independently examined, still stands.....
Cheers,
Back to blocking out 411a in PPRUNE, ahhhh, bliss.....
Back to topic, these guys were bloody lucky, and so were the folks landing behind them not to trample wreckage. For those unfamiliar, the right seat of the older 80's has particularly poor positional info if you are cross-referencing the GPS cross-track error, etc. This still doesn't explain why a CATIIIa was not briefed and flown in these conditions, but I'm sure 'all in good time'....
Bottom line: unstable - throw it away
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ABRUPT inputs are NOT what I am talking about SWH and 411a, and certification REQUIRES demontration or calculation that max angle rudder can be achieved including the steady state yaw that would be achieved without harming the aircaft. You SHOULD be able to smoothly apply the ENTIRE amount of Yaw that the Rudder load limiter allows to you.
411a, has chosen again not to read what I posted and chose instead just to go for teh gratuious slam of AA. Oh lord it must be hard to be humble when you are perfect in every way
You should be able to use the full input if required. (Roll is not protected exactly, but crossover speed and a few other aerodynamic details will keep you somewhat safe,)
Again I am not advocating hammering away at the controlls. And I don't think it was sten's INTENTION to do that either, and therein lies the problem with the A300.
Cheers
Wino
411a, has chosen again not to read what I posted and chose instead just to go for teh gratuious slam of AA. Oh lord it must be hard to be humble when you are perfect in every way
You should be able to use the full input if required. (Roll is not protected exactly, but crossover speed and a few other aerodynamic details will keep you somewhat safe,)
Again I am not advocating hammering away at the controlls. And I don't think it was sten's INTENTION to do that either, and therein lies the problem with the A300.
Cheers
Wino
"Oh lord it must be hard to be humble when you are perfect in every way"
Wino, consider this is the same pilot who said in all is years of flying he never made mistake that a FO caught, he's that good I guess.
Wino, consider this is the same pilot who said in all is years of flying he never made mistake that a FO caught, he's that good I guess.
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Spelling mistakes, a few..usually pointed out by folks with no other valid argument
But OTOH, I would much prefer 296 spelling mistakes, than 296 very dead bodies, such was the outcome of the AA A300-600 totally preventable accident.
An accident, by the way, that can be directly laid at the front door of American Airlines, for their complete failure to properly train and supervise their A300-600 line pilots.
An accident, by the way, that can be directly laid at the front door of American Airlines, for their complete failure to properly train and supervise their A300-600 line pilots.
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411a
You can't have it both ways.
Either the JFK crew DID fly as they were trained with the resulting outcome or the DIA crew DIDN'T fly as trained with the resulting outcome.
A previous post of yours talked about "old hands". These were the same (now retired) "old hands" who initiated many of the training procedures in place at AA you now criticize.
Per your claimed training at Pan Am, did you learn anything from the guys in a PA B747, who ran into the departure end lights on takeoff at SFO (a result of a runway switch without recourse to the appropriate performance data with a different TO flap setting) and the subsequent evacuation cluster? I know I did!
Did you learn anything from the Tenerife accident? I know I did!
dd
still learning and still far from knowing it all.
You can't have it both ways.
Either the JFK crew DID fly as they were trained with the resulting outcome or the DIA crew DIDN'T fly as trained with the resulting outcome.
A previous post of yours talked about "old hands". These were the same (now retired) "old hands" who initiated many of the training procedures in place at AA you now criticize.
Per your claimed training at Pan Am, did you learn anything from the guys in a PA B747, who ran into the departure end lights on takeoff at SFO (a result of a runway switch without recourse to the appropriate performance data with a different TO flap setting) and the subsequent evacuation cluster? I know I did!
Did you learn anything from the Tenerife accident? I know I did!
dd
still learning and still far from knowing it all.
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you all,
mistake happen. AA has so many planes out there, now we all play the monday morning QB.
I just wish to see their attitude (AA pilots) adjusted a little more Lord I hate to jump seat with those SKYNAZI!!!!!!!!!
mistake happen. AA has so many planes out there, now we all play the monday morning QB.
I just wish to see their attitude (AA pilots) adjusted a little more Lord I hate to jump seat with those SKYNAZI!!!!!!!!!
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: phoenix, AZ, USA
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The GPWS should not have given a glideslope warning inside of 100' agl , should it?
We had an incident years ago in DFW where one of our 737s clipped the approach lights at 4am after breaking out on the ILS with 2 miles and fog. The crew were tired after flying multiple legs and the F/O dipped below the G/S going visual. I think the VASIs were out as well. The Captain called for a go-around inside of 50'. We changed our procedures to reemphasize a FAF gate and a 500' gate (in VMC). I would like to know if this crew had been on duty for a long time and if this was the first day of their pairing and if they had flown together before. Those are the key factors in an accident. By the way, our crew diverted to HOU after their go-around. The plane flew fine with a few scrapes.
We had an incident years ago in DFW where one of our 737s clipped the approach lights at 4am after breaking out on the ILS with 2 miles and fog. The crew were tired after flying multiple legs and the F/O dipped below the G/S going visual. I think the VASIs were out as well. The Captain called for a go-around inside of 50'. We changed our procedures to reemphasize a FAF gate and a 500' gate (in VMC). I would like to know if this crew had been on duty for a long time and if this was the first day of their pairing and if they had flown together before. Those are the key factors in an accident. By the way, our crew diverted to HOU after their go-around. The plane flew fine with a few scrapes.
There seems to be a debate between the older generation(s) of retired pilots and the younger people, maybe never quite hidden on Pprune forums ('fora' for "martinets" and those well-versed in "living Latin"). Even though CRM was begun due to some hard-headed "solo pilot" decisions made years ago by some 'Superior Generation' Captains in 'flightdecks' (i.e. the United DC-8 crash in Portland and Western DC-10 at Mexico City) and other specific accidents many years ago (excluding those involving the then-unknown concept of microbursts), no pilot generation can justify being so smug that it can claim superiority in terms of flight safety.
Another aspect of flight safety is the political environment which, combined with deregulation since '78, has permanently changed everything. One of the books by attorney and C-141/B-727 pilot John Nance was able to prove to a degree how much US deregulation helped contribute to numerous accidents. The rubber-stamp approval of almost any flight manual and operating certificate during rapid airline growth in the 80s, by our over-worked (GOP-appointed) friends at the FAA was planned in order to meet the expectations of their bosses in the GOP-controlled Executive Branch. Don't get me all wrong, the GOP has some good points, I suppose. We know that the FAA, DOT, never mind the signals to the business community during the reckless ATC controller strike, were to support the laissez-faire (screw the employees all you want, declare Chapter 11 if needed..."Upstream [steal]" most of the operating cash while implying that LABOR is always the main problem....
As we all know and cannot pretend to ignore, airline (and much military aviation) training is now different, not just simulator realism, along with the progress in aircraft technology, procedures which requires less flight crew staffing (often 2 instead of 3 in the 'front office') and other changes which have taken place involving the hub and spoke networks. Lessons and procedures/policies are incorporated from previous and recent accidents-this helps explain why they keep changing.
Airlines still allegedly alter/misplace aircraft maintenance logbook pages to avoid severe problems with insurance and liability. Much better to cost the Captain his/her career than for all of the evidence to come out.
Another aspect of flight safety is the political environment which, combined with deregulation since '78, has permanently changed everything. One of the books by attorney and C-141/B-727 pilot John Nance was able to prove to a degree how much US deregulation helped contribute to numerous accidents. The rubber-stamp approval of almost any flight manual and operating certificate during rapid airline growth in the 80s, by our over-worked (GOP-appointed) friends at the FAA was planned in order to meet the expectations of their bosses in the GOP-controlled Executive Branch. Don't get me all wrong, the GOP has some good points, I suppose. We know that the FAA, DOT, never mind the signals to the business community during the reckless ATC controller strike, were to support the laissez-faire (screw the employees all you want, declare Chapter 11 if needed..."Upstream [steal]" most of the operating cash while implying that LABOR is always the main problem....
As we all know and cannot pretend to ignore, airline (and much military aviation) training is now different, not just simulator realism, along with the progress in aircraft technology, procedures which requires less flight crew staffing (often 2 instead of 3 in the 'front office') and other changes which have taken place involving the hub and spoke networks. Lessons and procedures/policies are incorporated from previous and recent accidents-this helps explain why they keep changing.
Airlines still allegedly alter/misplace aircraft maintenance logbook pages to avoid severe problems with insurance and liability. Much better to cost the Captain his/her career than for all of the evidence to come out.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 30th Nov 2004 at 04:03.
"Lord I hate to jump seat with those SKYNAZI!!!!!!!!!"
Funny, I've JS'ed on them before and found them to be nothing less than professional and personable. From checking to see if I have a place for my bags, to checking on a leather seat and finished up friendly smile on the way out. Never heard of anyone who has had problems with AA. I'm a commuter and have a circle of friends who are also, we shop talk and I never get any negative feedback on AA/AE. A lot of the way a negative JS experience is the way one approaches the crew. If you think its your God given right to be there, yup your gonna have problems. If you approach it as a privilege you might have better luck. There is some canned etiquette. Introduce yourself, and ask for the privilege of the JS, shake hands and for gods sake, acknowledge the FO's existence by saying hi to him/her as well. Have your license/medical/company ID ready to go without having to be asked. Use these tried and true steps and see if your experience improves. If not, do a little soul searching.
Funny, I've JS'ed on them before and found them to be nothing less than professional and personable. From checking to see if I have a place for my bags, to checking on a leather seat and finished up friendly smile on the way out. Never heard of anyone who has had problems with AA. I'm a commuter and have a circle of friends who are also, we shop talk and I never get any negative feedback on AA/AE. A lot of the way a negative JS experience is the way one approaches the crew. If you think its your God given right to be there, yup your gonna have problems. If you approach it as a privilege you might have better luck. There is some canned etiquette. Introduce yourself, and ask for the privilege of the JS, shake hands and for gods sake, acknowledge the FO's existence by saying hi to him/her as well. Have your license/medical/company ID ready to go without having to be asked. Use these tried and true steps and see if your experience improves. If not, do a little soul searching.
Last edited by West Coast; 29th Nov 2004 at 05:59.
Thanks RRAAMJET. As I said, I've never had anything less than a positive experience with y'awl. When Baseball season rolls around, I'll be taking you up on that offer.