Wino,
but I have the training materials from AAMP infront of me right here and the only thing it says about rudders is COORDINATED rudder.
So you are WAY off base in saying Sten was taught to do that. THe A300 has a KNOWN problems with oversensitivity of the rudder that is unique throughout aviation. Though a POI may be INDUCED by a pilot's action, that doesn't make it the pilots fault. It is a DESIGN problem that should have been corected after the several other airlines had their POIs as well. (and none of those airlines when through AAMP, so you can't blame it on that class)
Taken from the
NTSB accident report, this is the public perception, I understand it is not the view of the AA pilots.
Point 16 below is interesting, as even "COORDINATED rudder" as you put it can lead to structural failure. What you have demostrated with your view of the training procedures hinting that "COORDINATED rudder" is okay all the time, no it is not. The NTSB have recognised this widespread fable that is in industry and has asked that the FAA look at changing the regulations to do with certification.
Modify 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 standards to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope, including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity. (A-04-XX)
Require the manufacturers and operators of transport-category airplanes to establish and implement pilot training programs that: (1) explain the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer on transport-category airplanes; (2) explain that a full or nearly full rudder deflection in one direction followed by a full or nearly full rudder deflection in the opposite direction, or certain combinations of sideslip angle and opposite rudder deflection can result in potentially dangerous loads on the vertical stabilizer, even at speeds below the design maneuvering speed; and (3) explain that, on some aircraft, as speed increases, the maximum available rudder deflection can be obtained with comparatively light pedal forces and small pedal deflections. The FAA should also require revisions to airplane and pilot operating manuals that reflect and reinforce this information. In addition, the FAA should ensure that this training does not compromise the substance or effectiveness of existing training regarding proper rudder use, such as during engine failure shortly after takeoff or during strong or gusty crosswind takeoffs or landings. (A-02-01)
Carefully review all existing and proposed guidance and training provided to pilots of transport-category airplanes concerning special maneuvers intended to address unusual or emergency situations and, if necessary, require modifications to ensure that flight crews are not trained to use the rudder in a way that could result in dangerous combinations of sideslip angle and rudder position or other flight parameters. (A-02-02)
NTSB CONCLUSIONS
[list=1][*]The captain and the first officer (the flying pilot) were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical conditions that may have adversely affected the flight crew’s performance during the flight. Flight crew fatigue was not a factor in this accident.
[*]The accident airplane was properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with Federal regulations.
[*]The air traffic controllers who handled American Airlines flight 587 were properly trained and qualified. The local controller complied with Federal Aviation Administration wake turbulence spacing requirements when handling flight 587 and Japan Air Lines flight 47, which departed immediately before flight 587.
[*]The witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.
[*]Flight 587’s cyclic rudder motions after the second wake turbulence encounter were the result of the first officer’s rudder pedal inputs.
[*]Flight 587’s vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.
[*]The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.
[*]The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence, erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques, and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.
[*]Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplane’s rudder travel limiter system operates.
[*]The A300-600 rudder control system couples a rudder travel limiter system that increases in sensitivity with airspeed, which is characteristic of variable stop designs, with the lightest pedal forces of all the transport-category aircraft evaluated by the National Transportation Safety Board during this investigation.
[*]The first officer’s initial control wheel input in response to the second wake turbulence encounter was too aggressive, and his initial rudder pedal input response was unnecessary to control the airplane.
[*]Certification standards are needed to ensure that future airplane designs minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling susceptibility and to better protect against high loads in the event of large rudder inputs.
[*]Because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds.
[*]To minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling events, transport-category pilots would benefit from training about the role that alternating full control inputs can play in such events and training that emphasizes that alternating full rudder inputs are not necessary to control a transport-category airplane.
[*]There is a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about the degree of structural protection that exists when full or abrupt flight control inputs are made at airspeeds below the maneuvering speed.
[*]Federal Aviation Administration standards for unusual attitude training programs that take into account industry best practices and are designed to avoid inaccurate or negative training would lead to improvement and standardization of industry training programs.
[*]The use of lower levels of automation, such as simulators without motion or simple computer screen displays, may be more appropriate to provide the necessary awareness training with less danger of introducing incorrect information. [/list=1]
I am not trying to bring the name of the airline or pilots in disrepute, just share some information in memory of those who lost their lives.
