"Trust this equipment" A310 Pilot
Okay, the FO expressed his unhappiness with the Captains decision, but did not press his opinion enough to prevent what would seem to an outsider to be an inevitable incident. I have not yet made it to a multi-crew flight deck so I would be interested to hear what experienced crews think about how culpable the FO is in this incident, despite apparately being the 'lone voice' of discent?
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Running out of fuel
<FX:Gulp>
Finally noticed that the Captain was working of the FMS fuel readings. Quite important for my personal wellbeing as I worked on a lot of the software on the A300/310 FQIS for Smiths in the early 80s and I'm not sure if my household insurance covers this sort of thing..........
Back breathing again....
Can't work out why the Captain would work just off the FMS when he would have clear FQIS read-outs showing fuel burning away at a hell of a rate (plus fuel flow readings to back this up if he got his pocket calculator out). While the landing sounds like great airmanship he does seem to have been "foolhardy" to get in that position in the first place. Can't believe anyone would use the "I'll make it to the next service station" technique I use on motorways at 25,000 ft!
The FO bit sounds more like 70s/80s flight deck management issues than what I'd expect to see now (well 5 years ago).
As for putting the guy through the courts - I can't see what it serves.
Still Joe Public likes a hanging
Finally noticed that the Captain was working of the FMS fuel readings. Quite important for my personal wellbeing as I worked on a lot of the software on the A300/310 FQIS for Smiths in the early 80s and I'm not sure if my household insurance covers this sort of thing..........
Back breathing again....
Can't work out why the Captain would work just off the FMS when he would have clear FQIS read-outs showing fuel burning away at a hell of a rate (plus fuel flow readings to back this up if he got his pocket calculator out). While the landing sounds like great airmanship he does seem to have been "foolhardy" to get in that position in the first place. Can't believe anyone would use the "I'll make it to the next service station" technique I use on motorways at 25,000 ft!
The FO bit sounds more like 70s/80s flight deck management issues than what I'd expect to see now (well 5 years ago).
As for putting the guy through the courts - I can't see what it serves.
Still Joe Public likes a hanging
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The Capitan of Hapag-Lloyd's A-310
The Capitan Hannover's Court
The Capitan of Hapag-Lloyd's A-310 who realized an emergency landing in July, 2000 on having remained without fuel in Vienna, has appeared before Hannover's court accused of a crime rash recklessness. In case of being condemned it faces a between six months and ten years.
Review of the flight
The flight 3378 went out from Khania, Greece, to them 10.59h with destination Hannover. In the moment to re-bring the landing gear they could not, due to a problem with the principal right train. The crew decided to continue the flight with the widespread landing gear and they requested to the control to turn to Munich. As the flight was advancing with the calculations of the FMS (computer of I approach that between other missions it calculates in real time the consumptions and requirements of fuel), there was adopted the decision to turn aside to the airport of Vienna since, according to these calculations there was no sufficient fuel to come to the second destination, Munich. In the approximation to Schwechat's airport (Vienna) to 4.000 ' of altitude, both engines stopped (due to the lack of fuel) not being able to reach the runway, and remaining to 500 meters of the threshold runway 34. For fortune, none was necessary to be sorry about human loss.
Better?
The Capitan of Hapag-Lloyd's A-310 who realized an emergency landing in July, 2000 on having remained without fuel in Vienna, has appeared before Hannover's court accused of a crime rash recklessness. In case of being condemned it faces a between six months and ten years.
Review of the flight
The flight 3378 went out from Khania, Greece, to them 10.59h with destination Hannover. In the moment to re-bring the landing gear they could not, due to a problem with the principal right train. The crew decided to continue the flight with the widespread landing gear and they requested to the control to turn to Munich. As the flight was advancing with the calculations of the FMS (computer of I approach that between other missions it calculates in real time the consumptions and requirements of fuel), there was adopted the decision to turn aside to the airport of Vienna since, according to these calculations there was no sufficient fuel to come to the second destination, Munich. In the approximation to Schwechat's airport (Vienna) to 4.000 ' of altitude, both engines stopped (due to the lack of fuel) not being able to reach the runway, and remaining to 500 meters of the threshold runway 34. For fortune, none was necessary to be sorry about human loss.
Better?
Last edited by peb; 8th May 2004 at 15:19.
RRAAMJET,
It looks like a babelfish translation from Spanish or Portuguese. "Head Board" would be "Cabecera" or "Cabeceira" which also translates as "Threshold". "Track" is "Pista", which also means "Strip". And "Sorrow" is "Pena" which also means "Sentence". All of which I'm sure you already know
cheers
It looks like a babelfish translation from Spanish or Portuguese. "Head Board" would be "Cabecera" or "Cabeceira" which also translates as "Threshold". "Track" is "Pista", which also means "Strip". And "Sorrow" is "Pena" which also means "Sentence". All of which I'm sure you already know
cheers
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
Did the crew have a paper flight log, or was it all done via computer ? If it's all computerised, surely there must be some method of checking gross errors on fuel. If you go overhead point "A" with enough fuel, point "B" with a little less than you need, and point "C" with a lot less than you need, don't mental alarm bells start going off ? Presumably before the thing became a glider, there were fuel low level alerts. How much fuel remaining once they are displayed ?
As regards the F.O., I would hope that anyone I fly with would firstly stop me from getting even close to this position, and secondly, if I was "commanding" enough to force the issue, would take control. Not an easy decision I know, but better than being flown into a hole.
As regards the F.O., I would hope that anyone I fly with would firstly stop me from getting even close to this position, and secondly, if I was "commanding" enough to force the issue, would take control. Not an easy decision I know, but better than being flown into a hole.
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Hi, I am here too.
Well hallo all you professional pilot types out there.
Yes I am a pilot too.
BUT, when I am a passenger too, I DO expect to the two guys at the sharp end of the bus to get it right.
How many pilots out there think of the 1 to 350 or so passengers behind them when flying.
Please remember you are not just flying around in a nice plane.
Get up, walk back 10 or so meters to where the people who really pay you are sitting and have a look around, then in a loud voice say to them.
"The gear wont go up and we may run out of fuel before we land. What do you all think, shall I divert and suffer big embarrassment or shall we crash with no risk of fire and I'll just say the FMS was wrong?"
Get real guys, be professional aviators for a change.
Send him to jail. Thats what I say send him to jail.
Oh and promote the Copilot to Cpt. and then demote him for not being strong enough in expressing him point of view and averting the crash.
Oh and to all the rest of you out there, thanks for all the times you get it right.
Passenger 9 has spoken.
Yes I am a pilot too.
BUT, when I am a passenger too, I DO expect to the two guys at the sharp end of the bus to get it right.
How many pilots out there think of the 1 to 350 or so passengers behind them when flying.
Please remember you are not just flying around in a nice plane.
Get up, walk back 10 or so meters to where the people who really pay you are sitting and have a look around, then in a loud voice say to them.
"The gear wont go up and we may run out of fuel before we land. What do you all think, shall I divert and suffer big embarrassment or shall we crash with no risk of fire and I'll just say the FMS was wrong?"
Get real guys, be professional aviators for a change.
Send him to jail. Thats what I say send him to jail.
Oh and promote the Copilot to Cpt. and then demote him for not being strong enough in expressing him point of view and averting the crash.
Oh and to all the rest of you out there, thanks for all the times you get it right.
Passenger 9 has spoken.
"As these are anonymous forums the origins of the contributions may be opposite to what may be apparent. In fact the press may use it, or the unscrupulous, to elicit certain reactions."
I guess I'll leave passenger 9 post well alone then.
I guess I'll leave passenger 9 post well alone then.
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Captain has been found guilty today of "bringing the plane to a near-catastrophe" and "endangering the life of 150 passengers." He has been sentenced to 6 months jail on probation.
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with considerable time as a trainer on A310 i insist that despite the FMS fuel predictions must be checked against 'paper' values in normal circumstances, and basic data (FF, FQI) used during non std config.
on 'normal' flights there is a discrepancy between fuel predictions and flight plan values which null out as the flight progreses. this despite the perf factors being incorporated in the FMC, this for instance could cause problems when checking trip fuels for lower levels.
observing the fuel predictions during a long hold (1 hr +) can be quite instructive - the values keep changing, and much more than expected changes due to changes in holding altitude.
i do remember being told to trust the equipment' many aeons ago, i guess the manufacturer has probably moved away from the simplistic 'trust the equipment' statement especially on these early glass cockpit aircraft.
on 'normal' flights there is a discrepancy between fuel predictions and flight plan values which null out as the flight progreses. this despite the perf factors being incorporated in the FMC, this for instance could cause problems when checking trip fuels for lower levels.
observing the fuel predictions during a long hold (1 hr +) can be quite instructive - the values keep changing, and much more than expected changes due to changes in holding altitude.
i do remember being told to trust the equipment' many aeons ago, i guess the manufacturer has probably moved away from the simplistic 'trust the equipment' statement especially on these early glass cockpit aircraft.
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Seeing Passenger9's hypothetical question to the passengers ("The gear wont go up and we may run out of fuel before we land. What do you all think, shall I divert and suffer big embarrassment or shall we crash with no risk of fire and I'll just say the FMS was wrong?") makes me think of a few others - e.g. Kegworth:
"We seem to have an engine on fire, not sure which, so we'll shut one down - no sir, please don't look out of the window and tell us it's the wrong one - and now we could divert to the nearest airport and do a high circuit and approach so we are within gliding range all the time, or we could fly on hopefully to East Midlands where it's much more convenient for maintenance, and when we get there go real low, out of gliding range, because a 3 degree approach is so much more comfortable".
And no doubt something along those lines could be constructed for what became the "Atlantic Glider" incident, Staines Trident, and some others.
Two things occur to me from such incidents, in addition to the CRM stuff etc. others have pointed to. One is, most people make mistakes sometimes, rarely on purpose, but we humans are fallible. I suppose we have to have some system which draws a crude and variable line between a slap on the wrist and being fired plus a prison sentence, and there is little point in fulminating over which is appropriate in this case. It's a tragedy for all concerned, whatever the legal process.
The other thing, however, is whether more could be done by aircraft and system designers, and their customers the airlines, to help avoid human errors or to spot them earlier and in many cases alert the person at the sharp end. After Kegworth, I was wondering why the reluctance to want or accept external CCTV to look at the plane from the outside and figure which engine is on fire (and if the wheels are really down or not, and other things which might be useful - make your own list). After the fire in the fuel tank caused by old wiring, why wasn't the technology in place to fill tanks with a mesh of wire wool or something (I saw a TV program demonstrating something, which largely or totally stopped fires - but the makers and airlines won't have it). After Manchester, why wont the airlines have bags for passengers to put over their heads while escaping to avoid being poisoned by smoke fumes? And why have poisonous plastic in the seats etc. anyway? Why does the RAF have rear facing seats which save many injuries in crashes, but makers/airlines won't because passenger comfort and appeal are thought to make forward facing preferable? Try constructing the hypothetical questions for these and putting them to passengers!
I guess I know the answers most of the time - short term profits are thought better than long term lawsuits and compensation that might not happen.
But are the cost/weight/passenger appeal decisions drawn in the right places vs compensation potential and (dare I say it) what is morally right? Are enough "what could go wrong - what could we do about it?" questions put, and correctly answered, in design and specification stages? (I.e., more FMEA - Failure Mode Effect and Analysis - with a bit wider brief that just the mechanical functioning of parts or systems.)
By the way, I am not sheltering behind anonymity - the N is for Nicholas, and I'm a BGA regional safety officer and easily contacted. No flames please, my questions are seriously meant, even if apparently stupid to some.
Chris N.
====================
"We seem to have an engine on fire, not sure which, so we'll shut one down - no sir, please don't look out of the window and tell us it's the wrong one - and now we could divert to the nearest airport and do a high circuit and approach so we are within gliding range all the time, or we could fly on hopefully to East Midlands where it's much more convenient for maintenance, and when we get there go real low, out of gliding range, because a 3 degree approach is so much more comfortable".
And no doubt something along those lines could be constructed for what became the "Atlantic Glider" incident, Staines Trident, and some others.
Two things occur to me from such incidents, in addition to the CRM stuff etc. others have pointed to. One is, most people make mistakes sometimes, rarely on purpose, but we humans are fallible. I suppose we have to have some system which draws a crude and variable line between a slap on the wrist and being fired plus a prison sentence, and there is little point in fulminating over which is appropriate in this case. It's a tragedy for all concerned, whatever the legal process.
The other thing, however, is whether more could be done by aircraft and system designers, and their customers the airlines, to help avoid human errors or to spot them earlier and in many cases alert the person at the sharp end. After Kegworth, I was wondering why the reluctance to want or accept external CCTV to look at the plane from the outside and figure which engine is on fire (and if the wheels are really down or not, and other things which might be useful - make your own list). After the fire in the fuel tank caused by old wiring, why wasn't the technology in place to fill tanks with a mesh of wire wool or something (I saw a TV program demonstrating something, which largely or totally stopped fires - but the makers and airlines won't have it). After Manchester, why wont the airlines have bags for passengers to put over their heads while escaping to avoid being poisoned by smoke fumes? And why have poisonous plastic in the seats etc. anyway? Why does the RAF have rear facing seats which save many injuries in crashes, but makers/airlines won't because passenger comfort and appeal are thought to make forward facing preferable? Try constructing the hypothetical questions for these and putting them to passengers!
I guess I know the answers most of the time - short term profits are thought better than long term lawsuits and compensation that might not happen.
But are the cost/weight/passenger appeal decisions drawn in the right places vs compensation potential and (dare I say it) what is morally right? Are enough "what could go wrong - what could we do about it?" questions put, and correctly answered, in design and specification stages? (I.e., more FMEA - Failure Mode Effect and Analysis - with a bit wider brief that just the mechanical functioning of parts or systems.)
By the way, I am not sheltering behind anonymity - the N is for Nicholas, and I'm a BGA regional safety officer and easily contacted. No flames please, my questions are seriously meant, even if apparently stupid to some.
Chris N.
====================
Tsamaya sentle
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ChrisN,
Although a bit off the core topic of this thread, I don´t find your questions stupid at all.
Most of your questions touch one of the major aspects of my current work. "Why won´t..?", "Why does not...?" etc., all these whys have a lot to do with the way a given society, or a system of experts for that matter, translates potential dangers into risk. Now note: there is a difference between danger and risk. The concept is as follows: Only when a given danger is "decoded" or "deciphered" into risk, it can be calculated, handled, coped with, avoided, etc. The culture of this "risk translation" is, therefore, crucial to avoid or cope with dangers/hazards in the first place. Disaster will occur when this translation or decoding process goes wrong, or does not take place. So much for the theory.
Now you are argueing that "short term profits are thought better than long term lawsuits". You might be right, but the main problem is: it ain´t so simple. In order to have a successful danger-risk-translation, you need "transmitters" = people or institutions powerful enough to
a) notice a potential hazard
b) initiate danger-risk-translation
c) thereby find a code that is
....... i) understood
....... ii) accepted by a given society or expert system
d) enforce adequate danger-avoiding measures which are based on that translation process.
Who and where are these institutions, and are they powerful enough? Rhetorical question!
(However, in the aviation sector (I don´t want to use the fashionable term "industry") and its expert system it is at least reassuring to know that some of the world´s most efficient danger-avoiding-systems are in place.)
It´s interesting that the general danger-risk-concept can also be applied to what apparently happened in the cockpit of that ill-fated flight. Danger-risk decoding went wrong, and no powerful tool/institution/process/procedure was available in time to alter the outcome.
All, please excuse this long post and its rather general contents. Thought that discussing that concept might stimulate some new ideas...
No flames please, my questions are seriously meant, even if apparently stupid to some.
Most of your questions touch one of the major aspects of my current work. "Why won´t..?", "Why does not...?" etc., all these whys have a lot to do with the way a given society, or a system of experts for that matter, translates potential dangers into risk. Now note: there is a difference between danger and risk. The concept is as follows: Only when a given danger is "decoded" or "deciphered" into risk, it can be calculated, handled, coped with, avoided, etc. The culture of this "risk translation" is, therefore, crucial to avoid or cope with dangers/hazards in the first place. Disaster will occur when this translation or decoding process goes wrong, or does not take place. So much for the theory.
Now you are argueing that "short term profits are thought better than long term lawsuits". You might be right, but the main problem is: it ain´t so simple. In order to have a successful danger-risk-translation, you need "transmitters" = people or institutions powerful enough to
a) notice a potential hazard
b) initiate danger-risk-translation
c) thereby find a code that is
....... i) understood
....... ii) accepted by a given society or expert system
d) enforce adequate danger-avoiding measures which are based on that translation process.
Who and where are these institutions, and are they powerful enough? Rhetorical question!
(However, in the aviation sector (I don´t want to use the fashionable term "industry") and its expert system it is at least reassuring to know that some of the world´s most efficient danger-avoiding-systems are in place.)
It´s interesting that the general danger-risk-concept can also be applied to what apparently happened in the cockpit of that ill-fated flight. Danger-risk decoding went wrong, and no powerful tool/institution/process/procedure was available in time to alter the outcome.
All, please excuse this long post and its rather general contents. Thought that discussing that concept might stimulate some new ideas...
Iconoclast
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FMECA and to what level.
To: chrisN
The requirements for the Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA) set down in the product assurance section of the A-310 specification required the vendors to examine their respective elements down to the smallest element within the component including screws and lock wire. This was done to get Canadian certification.
Not all of the vendors complied with this requirement and one major supplier of a critical unit in the flap slat system didn’t even bother to perform an FMECA because it was too time consuming and it cost too much. This unit failed on the first revenue flight of the A-310. This same manufacturer did not properly support the manufacturer and supplier of the flap drive system and as such the flaps were certified on the basis of inadequate testing. BAe was fully aware of all of this but did nothing.
So much for ‘Pilots trust your equipment”.
in design and specification stages? (I.e., more FMEA - Failure Mode Effect and Analysis - with a bit wider brief that just the mechanical functioning of parts or systems.)
Not all of the vendors complied with this requirement and one major supplier of a critical unit in the flap slat system didn’t even bother to perform an FMECA because it was too time consuming and it cost too much. This unit failed on the first revenue flight of the A-310. This same manufacturer did not properly support the manufacturer and supplier of the flap drive system and as such the flaps were certified on the basis of inadequate testing. BAe was fully aware of all of this but did nothing.
So much for ‘Pilots trust your equipment”.
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When all else fails use the FMC, In my book, that stands for Frickin Mental Calculation. You know, the ole number 2 pencil and arithmatic still works pretty well!
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>>>If they didn't then what is the point of having dispatch? Is it not to have a second set of eyes looking over the flight crews shoulder? Well if that second set of eyes was pushing them, then it would be better not to have them at all!
I've been intentionally staying out of this thread (up until now) as I wanted to wait until the final accident report was released, but the gent's questions above from a couple of pages back in the thread require a couple of comments and observations.
All airline dispatch schemes are NOT alike. Certainly, every airline operation has individuals that work their computers to produce computer flight plans, and also file with ATC and handle W+B issues, but the names for these individuals can be varied. Assuming they may be called "dispatchers" at some places, their functionality is often viewed as "clerical" in the context of initiating the flight. In many places, that's where the dispatcher's involvement ends, and the aircraft essentially becomes a "fire-and-forget" instrument.
In the USA, FAR Part 1 defines "operational control" as the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, and terminating a flight. Under Part 121 Domestic/Flag rules here, the aircraft dispatcher plans the flight in the customary ways, generating a flight release signed by both the dispatcher and PIC, with the signatures indicating their joint concurrence that the flight can be accomplished safely as planned. Deviation from the plan requires that concurrence be re-established.
All the above covers the "initiating" aspect of operational control here, but the policies, procedures, and authorities dealing with the "conducting" and "terminating" aspects of operational control are not widely used outside the USA. Here, a dispatcher keeps the PIC updated, and should a problem arise, is also there as a crew resource in dealing with the problem itself. If, in the rare event, that a PIC's plan of action handling a problem is deemed unsafe by the dispatcher, the dispatcher also has an ability to independently declare an emergency and terminate the flight short of the original destination, if need be. Anyone is interested can check out FAR 121.557(b) -AND- 121.627(a).
As far as "pushing" a PIC/crew to do something, the scheme here in the USA under FAR 65 dictates that aircraft dispatchers be trained and licensed by the FAA, and the dispatcher certificate here is about 98% common to the PIC's ATP, the difference being purely flying-related items. The license is a requirement to work, just as the pilot needs their ATP to fly.
Whether someone is a dispatcher "over there" under whatever non-US Part 121 rules, or over here, operating under Part 121, "pushing" a PIC/crew is unacceptable, and has the added risk of license sanctions here, which the dispatcher here needs to work. Not saying that it -never- happens, even here, but there is less incentive to do so than in non-licensure situations because of the potential sanctions.
IMHO, the US Part 121 Domestic/Flag type of dispatch system provides the highest level of decisionmaking cross-checks possible. The fact that other individuals around the globe are called "dispatchers" but are possibly not operating with any legal authorities or responsibilities in the "conducting" or "terminating" realms of operational control is a more systemic problem, and as such don't accurately lend themselves to such statements as "what is the point of having dispatch? Is it not to have a second set of eyes looking over the flight crews shoulder?"
Currently, it's an apples and oranges comparison. If the standards were the same, one could indeed make a direct comparison. Until then, no...
Personally, I think the issue of improved operational control standards will be an issue discussed in the final Hapag-Lloyd report, but I guess we'll know soon enough..
I've been intentionally staying out of this thread (up until now) as I wanted to wait until the final accident report was released, but the gent's questions above from a couple of pages back in the thread require a couple of comments and observations.
All airline dispatch schemes are NOT alike. Certainly, every airline operation has individuals that work their computers to produce computer flight plans, and also file with ATC and handle W+B issues, but the names for these individuals can be varied. Assuming they may be called "dispatchers" at some places, their functionality is often viewed as "clerical" in the context of initiating the flight. In many places, that's where the dispatcher's involvement ends, and the aircraft essentially becomes a "fire-and-forget" instrument.
In the USA, FAR Part 1 defines "operational control" as the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, and terminating a flight. Under Part 121 Domestic/Flag rules here, the aircraft dispatcher plans the flight in the customary ways, generating a flight release signed by both the dispatcher and PIC, with the signatures indicating their joint concurrence that the flight can be accomplished safely as planned. Deviation from the plan requires that concurrence be re-established.
All the above covers the "initiating" aspect of operational control here, but the policies, procedures, and authorities dealing with the "conducting" and "terminating" aspects of operational control are not widely used outside the USA. Here, a dispatcher keeps the PIC updated, and should a problem arise, is also there as a crew resource in dealing with the problem itself. If, in the rare event, that a PIC's plan of action handling a problem is deemed unsafe by the dispatcher, the dispatcher also has an ability to independently declare an emergency and terminate the flight short of the original destination, if need be. Anyone is interested can check out FAR 121.557(b) -AND- 121.627(a).
As far as "pushing" a PIC/crew to do something, the scheme here in the USA under FAR 65 dictates that aircraft dispatchers be trained and licensed by the FAA, and the dispatcher certificate here is about 98% common to the PIC's ATP, the difference being purely flying-related items. The license is a requirement to work, just as the pilot needs their ATP to fly.
Whether someone is a dispatcher "over there" under whatever non-US Part 121 rules, or over here, operating under Part 121, "pushing" a PIC/crew is unacceptable, and has the added risk of license sanctions here, which the dispatcher here needs to work. Not saying that it -never- happens, even here, but there is less incentive to do so than in non-licensure situations because of the potential sanctions.
IMHO, the US Part 121 Domestic/Flag type of dispatch system provides the highest level of decisionmaking cross-checks possible. The fact that other individuals around the globe are called "dispatchers" but are possibly not operating with any legal authorities or responsibilities in the "conducting" or "terminating" realms of operational control is a more systemic problem, and as such don't accurately lend themselves to such statements as "what is the point of having dispatch? Is it not to have a second set of eyes looking over the flight crews shoulder?"
Currently, it's an apples and oranges comparison. If the standards were the same, one could indeed make a direct comparison. Until then, no...
Personally, I think the issue of improved operational control standards will be an issue discussed in the final Hapag-Lloyd report, but I guess we'll know soon enough..
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How complete, how detailed and how effective?
To: chrisN
I just pulled the FMEA for the Command Sensor Unit (CSU) and it consists of 234 A size pages not including the cover sheet. If I remember correctly the FMEA for the Power Control Unit (PCU) was twice that of the CSU FMEA.
By contrast the FMEA for the Flap Slat Computer was ten pages or somewhere near that amount.
The Flap Slat Computer is a thousand times more complex than the CSU and they crammed the FMEA into ten or so pages. That Flap Slat Computer is riding on every A-310.
I just pulled the FMEA for the Command Sensor Unit (CSU) and it consists of 234 A size pages not including the cover sheet. If I remember correctly the FMEA for the Power Control Unit (PCU) was twice that of the CSU FMEA.
By contrast the FMEA for the Flap Slat Computer was ten pages or somewhere near that amount.
The Flap Slat Computer is a thousand times more complex than the CSU and they crammed the FMEA into ten or so pages. That Flap Slat Computer is riding on every A-310.