"Trust this equipment" A310 Pilot
Join Date: Feb 2001
Location: UK
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Lu Z, EDDNH, SeniorD, thanks for your postings - very informative.
Lu, maybe it's inevitable that FMEA's (or FMECA's if that is now the vogue terminology) will be done down to more detail by some design teams than others. I would expect some standardisation of approach to be sought by corporate policies, training, etc. and your post suggest that was aimed for but not delivered. The refusal of a contractor to comply seems bizarre, as does the prime manufacturer and subsequently presumably the certification authorities accepting that situation.
SeniorD, the USA version of dispatcher sounds like a positive contribution to the danger-risk-solution process crystallised by EDDNHopper. Seems to me a pity it is not more universal. I would guess (again) that it is perceived (if thought about at all) by others as another up-front cost with uncertain future returns.
So the issues seem to me still to be that danger/risk management is all too often imperfectly performed and with widely varying effectiveness (FME[C]A is a special case of this wider concept, I think); and some people - individuals, corporations, even regulatory bodies, exhibit this variable approach. I remain convinced that where technology (and now I would add some formal processes) could help, it is often resisted for short term cost reasons among others.
Lu, maybe it's inevitable that FMEA's (or FMECA's if that is now the vogue terminology) will be done down to more detail by some design teams than others. I would expect some standardisation of approach to be sought by corporate policies, training, etc. and your post suggest that was aimed for but not delivered. The refusal of a contractor to comply seems bizarre, as does the prime manufacturer and subsequently presumably the certification authorities accepting that situation.
SeniorD, the USA version of dispatcher sounds like a positive contribution to the danger-risk-solution process crystallised by EDDNHopper. Seems to me a pity it is not more universal. I would guess (again) that it is perceived (if thought about at all) by others as another up-front cost with uncertain future returns.
So the issues seem to me still to be that danger/risk management is all too often imperfectly performed and with widely varying effectiveness (FME[C]A is a special case of this wider concept, I think); and some people - individuals, corporations, even regulatory bodies, exhibit this variable approach. I remain convinced that where technology (and now I would add some formal processes) could help, it is often resisted for short term cost reasons among others.
Mistrust in Management
TyroPicard
Quite agree my friend,
The beancounters decided to remove the 3rd set of eyes (and ears!) from the flight deck, and no doubt produced reams of statistics on paper to prove that the cost saving was worthwhile.
Anybody who has flown with a professional Flight Engineer, or with a 3 Pilot flight deck, will know that those statistics were flawed.
Just my opinion of course.
Regards
Exeng
The beancounters decided to remove the 3rd set of eyes (and ears!) from the flight deck, and no doubt produced reams of statistics on paper to prove that the cost saving was worthwhile.
Anybody who has flown with a professional Flight Engineer, or with a 3 Pilot flight deck, will know that those statistics were flawed.
Just my opinion of course.
Regards
Exeng
Iconoclast
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: The home of Dudley Dooright-Where the lead dog is the only one that gets a change of scenery.
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To: chrisN
There are FMEAs and FMECAs depending on the contract. The C in FMECA means Criticality. In the FMECA the analyst determines the criticality of the failure and if it will migrate upwards to the top level. The criticality level can range from I to IV with I being the most critical or from IV to I with IV being the most critical depending on if you are working a civil program or a military program. In the case of the A-310 program it was a specification requirement that the FMEA be taken to the very lowest level. All level 2 contractors complied with this requirement except the manufacturer of the Flap/Slat computer, which was the most critical component in the secondary flight control system.
Another requirement of the contract was that when a problem was uncovered relative to reliability, maintainability or systems safety Airbus had to be notified. I uncovered two major problems and carried them up to my management, the next level and then up to BAe. At the two lower levels the management would not tell Airbus of the problems because they did not want to incur the cost of the modification. The top level (BAe) said they sympathized with my problem but they could not help. They were responsible for the certification of the wing. The two lower levels of management felt that if Airbus discovered the problem they would write a change order paying for the change. Airbus never discovered the problem because they never tested for it.
I worked on another program where the department manager in a pique decided that there would be no catastrophic failures in the FMECA. This meant that the Safety Hazards Analyses did not consider catastrophic failures. This aircraft was certified in the USA, Italy, Canada and the UK and it has suffered several catastrophic failures all of which had been removed from the FMEAs.
Shall I continue?
There are FMEAs and FMECAs depending on the contract. The C in FMECA means Criticality. In the FMECA the analyst determines the criticality of the failure and if it will migrate upwards to the top level. The criticality level can range from I to IV with I being the most critical or from IV to I with IV being the most critical depending on if you are working a civil program or a military program. In the case of the A-310 program it was a specification requirement that the FMEA be taken to the very lowest level. All level 2 contractors complied with this requirement except the manufacturer of the Flap/Slat computer, which was the most critical component in the secondary flight control system.
Another requirement of the contract was that when a problem was uncovered relative to reliability, maintainability or systems safety Airbus had to be notified. I uncovered two major problems and carried them up to my management, the next level and then up to BAe. At the two lower levels the management would not tell Airbus of the problems because they did not want to incur the cost of the modification. The top level (BAe) said they sympathized with my problem but they could not help. They were responsible for the certification of the wing. The two lower levels of management felt that if Airbus discovered the problem they would write a change order paying for the change. Airbus never discovered the problem because they never tested for it.
I worked on another program where the department manager in a pique decided that there would be no catastrophic failures in the FMECA. This meant that the Safety Hazards Analyses did not consider catastrophic failures. This aircraft was certified in the USA, Italy, Canada and the UK and it has suffered several catastrophic failures all of which had been removed from the FMEAs.
Shall I continue?
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
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And to think it could all have been avoided with some choice words in the Captain's ear from a professional Flight Engineer
I grant it would have been easier to overpower him and restrain him in his seat with 2
To the experts: Whatever 'exotic' programmes there beasties do or do not have, and regardless of whether it was working on 'programmed fuel burn' or 'actual', would it not have shown a decreasing amount at planned destination and eventually 'not enough'? That surely is the change that focusses our minds.
