Seeing Passenger9's hypothetical question to the passengers ("The gear wont go up and we may run out of fuel before we land. What do you all think, shall I divert and suffer big embarrassment or shall we crash with no risk of fire and I'll just say the FMS was wrong?") makes me think of a few others - e.g. Kegworth:
"We seem to have an engine on fire, not sure which, so we'll shut one down - no sir, please don't look out of the window and tell us it's the wrong one - and now we could divert to the nearest airport and do a high circuit and approach so we are within gliding range all the time, or we could fly on hopefully to East Midlands where it's much more convenient for maintenance, and when we get there go real low, out of gliding range, because a 3 degree approach is so much more comfortable".
And no doubt something along those lines could be constructed for what became the "Atlantic Glider" incident, Staines Trident, and some others.
Two things occur to me from such incidents, in addition to the CRM stuff etc. others have pointed to. One is, most people make mistakes sometimes, rarely on purpose, but we humans are fallible. I suppose we have to have some system which draws a crude and variable line between a slap on the wrist and being fired plus a prison sentence, and there is little point in fulminating over which is appropriate in this case. It's a tragedy for all concerned, whatever the legal process.
The other thing, however, is whether more could be done by aircraft and system designers, and their customers the airlines, to help avoid human errors or to spot them earlier and in many cases alert the person at the sharp end. After Kegworth, I was wondering why the reluctance to want or accept external CCTV to look at the plane from the outside and figure which engine is on fire (and if the wheels are really down or not, and other things which might be useful - make your own list). After the fire in the fuel tank caused by old wiring, why wasn't the technology in place to fill tanks with a mesh of wire wool or something (I saw a TV program demonstrating something, which largely or totally stopped fires - but the makers and airlines won't have it). After Manchester, why wont the airlines have bags for passengers to put over their heads while escaping to avoid being poisoned by smoke fumes? And why have poisonous plastic in the seats etc. anyway? Why does the RAF have rear facing seats which save many injuries in crashes, but makers/airlines won't because passenger comfort and appeal are thought to make forward facing preferable? Try constructing the hypothetical questions for these and putting them to passengers!
I guess I know the answers most of the time - short term profits are thought better than long term lawsuits and compensation that might not happen.
But are the cost/weight/passenger appeal decisions drawn in the right places vs compensation potential and (dare I say it) what is morally right? Are enough "what could go wrong - what could we do about it?" questions put, and correctly answered, in design and specification stages? (I.e., more FMEA - Failure Mode Effect and Analysis - with a bit wider brief that just the mechanical functioning of parts or systems.)
By the way, I am not sheltering behind anonymity - the N is for Nicholas, and I'm a BGA regional safety officer and easily contacted. No flames please, my questions are seriously meant, even if apparently stupid to some.
Chris N.
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