Emirates emergency landing in JNB

[helen-damnation]

Cap 56,

In one of your previous post, now deleted, you stated you did not wish to attack the crew. However, you repeatedly do that with inane comments like:

'Either they completely crippled the gear on T/O, if not they must have done a very bad job on the return'
and
'The key issue on the return for landing is lack of situation awareness (aircraft performance capability) and very likely poor handling.'
and
'An approach followed by Go/Around was definitely an option (to asses the condition of the gear BEFORE making the decision on dumping.'

IT WAS NIGHT

Your quoting of figures may impress some but you have been shown to have got them all wrong as well.

You also don't know the EK sops:
'I am quite sure you do not brake alot on the A 340 unless on a very hot day.'
Bull$h!t!
We use autobrake, (FCOM 3: The use of autobrake is recommended) which, being the knowledgeable chap you are, gives a rate of deceleration. Therefore, other than to raise the ground spoilers etc, you could in theory, repeat, IN THEORY, not use reverse at all.

As my Grandfather would have said:
You're a Horses ar$e and talking less sense

[White Knight]

scanscanscan - all very well being legally responsible, but unless you as the skipper can personally weigh every item, and check the loading position of every container then what I say is correct. It is unfortunatley physically impossible to check what is placed in the aeroplane. I lilke the way you invested your allowances by the way

MC - considering you're sitting miles away from Dubai, you seem to be very knowledable as to what we need or don't need. I think not

Silberfuchs - my apologies old bean.

[411A]

From comments so far, it hardly seems likely that the loadsheet was incorrect, ie: the aircraft was more than likely properly loaded and in trim.

A more likely scenario is a poor rotation technique combined with a little too much (little) flex thrust.
One thing to 'improve engine longevity' only to have other bits take a beating.

[millerscourt]

Helen-d Surprised to hear that EK's SOP use Autobrakes as standard.

On the A340 you must have some very hot brakes on turnrounds requiring cooling.??

When we had these A340's in SQ we hardly ever used Autobrakes as not necessary unless on very short runways or doing an Autoland.

With the correct landing technique one could arrive on the ramp with cool brakes even with high ground temperatures in most cases.

[Cap 56]

helen-damnation

You are right; I should be writing crew/training department since there is a mutual responsibility.

Even at night I think it would have been wise to make an approach, down to a position reasonably close to the RWY with ATC representatives posted nearby and full intensity on.

This way the crew would have done everything possible to asses the situation, finally it would have been up to ATC to asses if they could make any assessment or not. As a crew you can not decide on your own.

My rule of thumb of TAS = IAS + FL/2 + ∆ IAS/2 is something we used on aircraft without TAS indicator onboard. It is fairly accurate above FL 100 were compressibility plays a mayor role and around SL for landing. (FL/2 basically equal to 0)

The issue is NOT this rule of thumb but the fact that you have to be aware that at these fields there can be a big difference in the first place.

You will however remember that I also stated that the crew only had to look at their screens while in the holding, to get a good idea of what he difference between IAS and TAS would have been. Now as a cultural value below FL 100 and at approach speeds TAS = IAS + FL/4 + ∆ISA/2 will give you a good idea.


Millerscourt

Thanks you only confirm my former statement. I would add that SOP are Standards Ops Proc, there was nothing standard in this approach. I just hope they didn’t use A/B 3 to blow up their tires as a result.

[Silky]

there is no autobrake 3 on an A340-300.... yet another detail you got wrong...............

[7x7]

Not sure of the exact wording that I blithely sign every day when the Load Sheet is presented to me, but I believe it is along these lines: “I confirm that the aircraft is correctly loaded…” etc.

I used to fly with a old captain who would always cross out “confirm” and insert “hope”. Wise old man that.

Cap56, I understand that you’ve deleted the post (along with all your other posts except your last one - now two) where you replied to my post asking why EK had sacked you. You replied that EK hadn’t sacked you, but that you’d

“Voted with my feet. Big difference.”

So if you did in fact “vote with your own feet” when you left EK, why the continuing, concerted campaign to smear an employer you left voluntarily all those years ago and who has (again to quote you from another of your deleted posts):

“…asked me to return – in writing.”

?

Perhaps you’d care to enlighten us all with what caused you to “vote with your own feet”? No aeronautical formulae required in the reply. And try not to make any montains out of molehills.

[Cap 56]

Silky


It does not matter if there is an A/B 1, 2 or 3 setting, it's irrelevant.

Even the use of the lowest setting would have, given the deceleration capability with reversers only, been unwise if it would sqeeze out a decelleration of more than 2 m/s*s out of the remaining tires.



7 x 7

I repeat that part of my post that you didn't quote: "get in touch with me outside this forum and I will give you what you want."

In order not to discredit those professionals at EK I will not do what you are trying to.

Maybe you should ask Capt Phil Smith why he refuses to reveal the truth. Probably because he is too busy on this one.

I used to fly with a old captain who would always cross out “confirm” and insert “hope”. Wise old man that

This captain may be wise in your opinion; in reality he states I do not thrust the system. Having a reasonable distrust is of course a healthy thing. Maybe he added a couple of knots to his approach speed or T/O N1 too. Maybe he thought, well...I have no PTI so I will make sure.....


I do not think that those professionals at EK would agree with you: "rolling of the runway and nearly killing all onboard is a minor issue."

Fact is that any pilot who sees that things may be wrong, illegal or improved they should speak up if only to discover their point of view may not be that accurate after all.

So maybe you should mention that EK had receive a fax from BOEING addressed in my name and that of the fleet manager confirming that they "Boeing" had recommended our SOP to other airlines and would issue 3 new aircraft operating limitations following our meeting.

It just happened to be me who got involved while asking some pertinent questions to my line trainers who answered; we do not know yet, it's all new to us too.

It could have been anyone else but it wasn't for one simple reason: "Others refused to get involved simply because they knew the upper management would not accept anything that did not come from their selves".

They were right in saying so but some of the locals suggested us to continue. So we biased ourselves by going directly to the chaps that had build the thing to force the upper management to listen. Maybe the locals had another agenda, we do not know, I do not think so, we were not into politics.

We all stuck out our neck and paid a price for it. And believe me or not, we didn’t do it for ourselves but for the whole pilot pool, instructors in the first place. In the end they have to answer the questions and it is better they get the answers from the builder of the schip.... that is all we did, nothing else.

It is not my problem that EK management got compromised after they asked me to have a look at the legal implication of their operations. I did not impose myself, I was asked. All the rest was a face loosing operation from their side.

So really, I would love to see that this crew gets treated fairly; this implicates a judgment on their performance and were the training department could/should have done better. It will make EK more interesting to work for.

If the UAE CAA treats them correctly then there is no problem is there?

[Chattanooga Choo Choo]

Seem to remember the last person who used ""get in touch with me outside this forum and I will give you what you want."" also claimed to be one of the great founts of aeronautical and aviation knowledge. I remember he used to claim to be a pilot as well as a CEO and would impress suitably gullible wannabees and pretenders with all sorts of distractions, especially when he was repeatedly shot down in flames on these forums. Liked to be known as The Guvnor.

Wonder if he has internet access in the pervs wing at Barlinnie?

[Preppy]

Not sure if I'm allowed to quote from today's copy of Flight International, page 9 (Crew Error led to A340 overrun):

AI Chief Test Pilot Jacques Rossay says that the pilot flying incorrectly believed that the sidestick position symbol could be used to select pitch attitude for rotation. This is thought to be an unprecented error, and Rossay cannot explain why the pilot thought it was a valid technique.

Preppy

[radnav]

The fact that certain persons have deleted all their previous libellous posts speaks volumes in itself, and highlights a huge shortcoming with PPRUNE.

There is NO accountability.

People can post all sorts of inaccurate, false and damaging statements then after all the hurt and harm has been done to the professional lives and reputations of colleagues and/or companies then those same persons can just delete their posts, deny all knowledge and just walk away.

The moderators of this thread need to take a good look at themselves and what they have allowed to develop on this thread whilst a serious ongoing incident is under investigation coupled with a small matter of FACT that not all the FACTS are yet in the public domain.

Allowing the constant and continuing personal attack on the flightcrew and airline involved is quite frankly unacceptable. These guys have feelings and fears and are trying desperately to make sense of everything that has happened.

Put yourself in their shoes. Their unblemished lives and careers have been turned upside down since this most unfortunate incident. This I do know for a FACT.

Very, very little constructive, educative comment has come out of this entire thread which is well passed its "useby date" and which has itself become an unfortunate indictment on PPRUNE.

With the great power of PPRUNE comes great RESPONSIBILITY.

Best Regards.

PS: please stop deleting me.

[Cap 56]

radnav

I am all for a forum where posters post in their own name.

Every issue I addressed had an influence; all small ones make one big one.

The core issue here is; what do we learn from it and how would I have reacted myself.

The lessons in aviation are harsh and so is the verdict of the Airbus test pilot, that’s the way it is.

I have respect for the feelings of the crew but even more for those who dare to stand up and say "something is wrong".

I am sure if someone would have criticized the rotation technique as instructed at EK he would have been in trouble.

It is as simple as that.

[radnav]

One cannot have any respect for or confidence in any person who does not stand by all their posts and deletes them all without explanation or apology.

Best Regards.

[Cap 56]

radnav

My posts that are presently active are a summary of what I have stated before, including an explanation.

Some of the figures may not have been 100% exact for the A340-300 but that was not the issue.

My intention was to point out, the different factors that I would have taken into account or suggested that should be considered. Not out of the blue, but starting from a concise and coherent CRM model.

The response of the other posters provided more accurate data.

I accept these data, but that does not change anything, on the contrary it proves that working trough the CRM model that I suggest is a useful exercise.

You may not realise it but that’s exactly what this tread has led to.

Simple comme bonjour

[Danny]

My posts that are presently active are a summary of what I have stated before, including an explanation.

Not strictly true. I have been following this thread with interest since it first started as there was some very relevant information released on here which opened up the discussion and your comments Cap 56 were at times accusatory and often tried to convey knowledge which was evidently absent after other posters revealed the flaws in your argument. Also, you were very quick to make accusations against individuals based on your own, relaxed hindsight, but put forward as your own skill & superiority.

All those comments that were rebuked and shown as flawed have been edited or deleted by you which rather skews the debate. Because of this, I have decided to remove the option to edit or delete posts in the hope that the discussion can return to the technical and safety issues of the incident and that we can all learn something from it.

[Cerberus]

Mr Rossay's quote is interesting because, as I undestand it, the technique that was used by the pilot had evolved from an internal Airbus memo that had inadvertently found its way into the public domain.

Again, as I understand it; Airbus instructors were advised to use the Sidestick Position Indicator as a guide to whether or not the student had applied the right amount of back stick to ensure a correct rotation rate. Clearly, this was for the initial stick position, in the Airbus training configuration, at specific weights before the nose of the aircraft started to move.

With the nature of operators, it is perhaps easy to see how this memo might have been inadvertently misconstrued as providing a 'top tip' from those in the know. Perhaps, just perhaps, this lead to the inappropriate use of the iron cross in this particular incident.

Cerberus

[radnav]

A nice piece of info there Cerberus.

As has been stated before, irrespective of weight, flex etc. the Airbus FCOM recommended rotation technique is to apply " a positive backward stick input to the typical 2/3 backstick " position.

This is the same recommendation for the A332/A343/A345.

Finding that typical 2/3rds backstick position on a sidestick is not always that easy and yet it is infact pretty important given the vagueness of the sidestick, its inbuilt rotation protections particularly on the A345, and the various performance considerations / limitations which may not be quite so critical on other aircraft with higher power to weight ratios.

On the roll, PRIOR to rotation the SPI gives an accurate indication of just where that elusive 2/3 rds position is (obviously its at the same pitch angle on the PFD - pre rotate ), and I believe its still a perfectly valid AID to achieving the correct stick input PRIOR to the rotation commencing. Therafter, at least initially and within reason, just hold it there before transitioning to SRS and "seat of the pants".

Best Regards.

[Cap 56]

Danny I think you are overdoing it a bit.

I have, as “none A 340 driver”, highlighted some factors that have an influence on every approach and have put some numbers “cultural Boeing values” on them. If these values combine adversely then; “as a crew” you are in trouble.

I stated that the combination of:

1. The increased speed due to the high density altitude would be an important factor, the value of which can be read straight from the instruments. I estimated it to be around 38 kts.

Using a rule of thumb, that is fairly accurate above FL 100 and well within compressibility.

The error seemed to be around 10 kts due to the drop-off in compressibility error below FL 100 and I adjusted my rule of thumb of:
TAS = IAS + FL/2 + ∆ISA/2 FL/2 in TAS = CAS (IAS) + FL/4 + ∆ISA/2 a useful value to have in mind at TOD or before starting an approach.


2. I made an estimation of 25 kts increase in V ref between T/O Flaps and Landing Flaps with Vref = 1.3 Vs.
25 kts is a very conservative value indeed, since values up to 40 kts are very common.


3. An estimate of the max tire speed of 195 Kts a fair value.

The result was that some A 340 drivers finally came up with some facts from the QRH.

1. ∆ TAS-IAS = 23 kts (Error of 15kts)

2. Increment of only 10 kts between T/O flaps and Landing Flaps (Error of 15 kts)

3. Vref of around 1.2 Vs iso 1.3 Vs a margin of 10 kt (Error of 10 kts)

4. Max tire speed of 205 kts iso 195 kts (Error of 10 kts)

A difference of 50 kts between Airbus technology and my “Boeing cultural” numbers, and a difference of about 32 kts in actual approach speeds.

I have no problem with the fact that, using the Airbus data this error margin came forward.

There have been many discussions on this forum regarding Airbus and Boeing technology. This incident and the numbers discussed highlight some of these differences.

You may argue that my comments are hindsight but I have to disagree with that statement. I referred to some factors that are relevant, not only to this approach but to any approach, one can hardly argue this to be hindsight. I have also suggested a CRM model that may show useful in managing non-normals, not out of hidsight but amodel that has proved it's value for many years.

As far as EK is concerned, I refer to the tread regarding the dismissal of their head of operations and the fact that you removed one of the posters “FUBAAR” from this forum and believe you know why you did so.

[bonajet]

I agree with you Cerebus. That technique of supervising the PF input was being used in HK.

As far as using it whilst PF, as advised by radnav, that has never been taught and is not a good idea for two reasons.

1) the PF should be looking outside at rotate and selecting the first stick input by feel. This feel can be calibrated by practising with the SPI on the taxiway or just pulling to a certain stick force position, as the stick force gradient conveniently increases just before the 2/3 rd stick position.
2) The validity of a stick angle selected on the PFD with the SPI changes really quickly during the rotate and it is very difficult to accurately get your target of say 8 degrees SPI. The danger with this has been demonstrated recently, in that the PF may be tempted to track his target with the SPI and lower the nose back onto the runway. In particular if not looking outside and struggling with a video game exercise on the PFD.

[cargo boy]

Unless there was a fire that couldn't be extinguished I would hope that the crew were referring to their QRH and not trying to outguess the manufacturers test pilots with abstract mathematical formulae before deciding on the appropriate action and which airport to use.

In this case, the crew were dealing with an 'abnormal' situation (of their own making). The suggestion that all this faffing about with trying to work out the TAS and density altitude vs max tyre speed with all these nice mathematical formuale is nothing but smoke and mirrors. The QRH will have the figures. You refer to them and if they say you have enough LDA then you can commit to that runway and carry on dealing with the abnormal situation.

You can be sure that the accident investigators will have the luxury of time and hindsight to come up with the precise numbers. In this case everyone walked away physically unhurt, ergo... a successful landing. The debate should be concentrating on the avoidance of the error that caused the problem in the first place.