Crash Concorde 'almost killed Chirac'
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two tun,
Now assuming that A/F had the flat tyre mod fitted, and it was mandatory, and that system was working, any flat tyre below 134 kts would have ben indicated to the crew and the T/OFF would have been abandoned. I believe the aircraft rotated early at about 185 kts so I assume the tyre was wrecked some where between 134 and 185 kts, which is not very big in the time scale of the event and an earlier tyre deflation not likely
If the aircraft had all 4 engines working an early rotation of that extent would have made it difficult to obtain correct flying speed in the total time of the flight, but yes it would have been more possible.
During the first 5 to 6 years of Concorde's operation BA and A/F had a lot of trouble with tyre burst during T/OFF [reason for flat tyre mod] and in the case of BA I do not remember one where the engine did not ingest the tyre. I have experienced three such incidents and in all cases ingestion took place, and the vibration whilst the tyre was being consumed was very bad, and the N2 dropped to 70 % before recovery. Now if the engine had a fire warning and the tower had said thare were large flames from the rear of the aircraft I too might have been tempted to shut the engine down.
Yes in the latter part of the flight controlability seemed to have been a problem and it is suggest that this was due to low airspeed, but just consider where the flames were and the proximity to the inboard powered flying control [ a point were all three hyds system came together], then if the flames melted the hyd pipes all three systems would be lost. On Concorde with no hyds the is NO control of the aircraft and it would pitch nose up and possibly with assymetric thrust turn over.
Yes I am sure that the A/F crew would if they could do things different if the situation repeated itself, but I am sure they adapted the SOPs to suit the situation they were in .No SOP no matter how well written fits every incident and sometimes they have to be modified.
In my opinion the crew could have done every thing correctly according to SOPs and the flight was still doomed once that fire started,and their only chance was to land straight ahead, but there they did not know that at the time and did the best they could
Regards Brit 312
Now assuming that A/F had the flat tyre mod fitted, and it was mandatory, and that system was working, any flat tyre below 134 kts would have ben indicated to the crew and the T/OFF would have been abandoned. I believe the aircraft rotated early at about 185 kts so I assume the tyre was wrecked some where between 134 and 185 kts, which is not very big in the time scale of the event and an earlier tyre deflation not likely
If the aircraft had all 4 engines working an early rotation of that extent would have made it difficult to obtain correct flying speed in the total time of the flight, but yes it would have been more possible.
During the first 5 to 6 years of Concorde's operation BA and A/F had a lot of trouble with tyre burst during T/OFF [reason for flat tyre mod] and in the case of BA I do not remember one where the engine did not ingest the tyre. I have experienced three such incidents and in all cases ingestion took place, and the vibration whilst the tyre was being consumed was very bad, and the N2 dropped to 70 % before recovery. Now if the engine had a fire warning and the tower had said thare were large flames from the rear of the aircraft I too might have been tempted to shut the engine down.
Yes in the latter part of the flight controlability seemed to have been a problem and it is suggest that this was due to low airspeed, but just consider where the flames were and the proximity to the inboard powered flying control [ a point were all three hyds system came together], then if the flames melted the hyd pipes all three systems would be lost. On Concorde with no hyds the is NO control of the aircraft and it would pitch nose up and possibly with assymetric thrust turn over.
Yes I am sure that the A/F crew would if they could do things different if the situation repeated itself, but I am sure they adapted the SOPs to suit the situation they were in .No SOP no matter how well written fits every incident and sometimes they have to be modified.
In my opinion the crew could have done every thing correctly according to SOPs and the flight was still doomed once that fire started,and their only chance was to land straight ahead, but there they did not know that at the time and did the best they could
Regards Brit 312
However, if they'd bothered to recompute RTOW and had subsequently refused to take-off with a wind condition putting them outside the legal requirements for a Passenger Transport aeroplane, perhaps the accident would never have happened?
They didn't - it did.
They didn't - it did.
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Brit312, you raise some interesting points.
However, it is a matter of fact that neither No 1 nor No 2 engine ingested any tyre material. The engine surges that they experienced were due to a disruption of the airflow caused by the hot gasses from the fire. No 2 engine subsequently recovered and was producing useful thrust when the crew shut it down at the point of rotation.
Regarding shutting down No 2 engine, in my 33 years of aviation (30 of them flying) no aircraft that I have flown, or airline that I have worked for, allows for the shutting down of an engine because of a fire warning between V1 and Vr.
It's just simply not done. In my experience, if you suffer an engine fire after V1 but before Vr, you always wait until you are climbing away at a safe speed, and the undercarriage has been selected up, BEFORE you shut down a failed engine.
regards
However, it is a matter of fact that neither No 1 nor No 2 engine ingested any tyre material. The engine surges that they experienced were due to a disruption of the airflow caused by the hot gasses from the fire. No 2 engine subsequently recovered and was producing useful thrust when the crew shut it down at the point of rotation.
Regarding shutting down No 2 engine, in my 33 years of aviation (30 of them flying) no aircraft that I have flown, or airline that I have worked for, allows for the shutting down of an engine because of a fire warning between V1 and Vr.
It's just simply not done. In my experience, if you suffer an engine fire after V1 but before Vr, you always wait until you are climbing away at a safe speed, and the undercarriage has been selected up, BEFORE you shut down a failed engine.
regards
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Glueball: If it became custom and practice to land in a "farmer's field" in a jet transport following a fire warning or similar engine failure / thrust loss on takeoff then many lives would be needlessly lost. There is a world of difference between 180 tonnes at 160kts+ and 1.5 Tonnes at 60kts-ish - that's why a PA28 demands a different approach to a B747. Capt. Marty did the best he could with what he had - the fire consumed the aircraft's ability to fly, and that is why the aircraft was lost. Landing in a "farmer's field" (or Le Bourget, or even an attempt at an RTO for that matter) would have made only a small detail change to the accident report.
BEagle: If they had not taken off the accident would not have happened. Well done. But take note: RTOW was not a factor in this accident, if they had been at RTOW minus 10 tonnes the fire would have been no less unforgiving, and the end result the same.
BEagle: If they had not taken off the accident would not have happened. Well done. But take note: RTOW was not a factor in this accident, if they had been at RTOW minus 10 tonnes the fire would have been no less unforgiving, and the end result the same.
You don't get the point. If they'd checked RTOW and, as a result had stuck to the legal requirements, they wouldn't have taken off and there wouldn't have been any fire.
It's the culture which led to their total failure to consider the change in RTOW which I cannot accept.
It's the culture which led to their total failure to consider the change in RTOW which I cannot accept.
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If you think RTOW had any part to play in that accident, then you don't get the point.
They could have waited 10 minutes, they could have used the reciprocal. A tyre failure of that exact pattern would have been just as disasterous, that day or any other. At any weight.
I fully agree that to turn a blind eye to limitations is unprofessional and unforgivable - but it did not cause this accident in this case. I am not saying that they were right to ignore a last minute change to RTOW (they were not) - just that this did not cause the accident and to place so much emphasis on this is to divert attention from the actual causes and the solutions.
They could have waited 10 minutes, they could have used the reciprocal. A tyre failure of that exact pattern would have been just as disasterous, that day or any other. At any weight.
I fully agree that to turn a blind eye to limitations is unprofessional and unforgivable - but it did not cause this accident in this case. I am not saying that they were right to ignore a last minute change to RTOW (they were not) - just that this did not cause the accident and to place so much emphasis on this is to divert attention from the actual causes and the solutions.
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Boeing has a little line that says ...in the event of a failure after V1, there'll be no recall until 400 feet. Curious if AF had something like that, and why the crew deviated from it. I know it's easy afterward with time on our side to speculate, but something obviously went grossly wrong if all crew members were calling and doing different things and no one was running the show so to speak. Engine fire in itself over a short period of time is not that big a deal, plus if she's burning she's turning, might as well use the power until things are under control.
As for it missing a tall plastered-hair Frenchman, some one might say....too bad!
As for it missing a tall plastered-hair Frenchman, some one might say....too bad!
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Those who defend the operation of this aircraft above the maximum take off weight for the conditions should consider this.
Concorde, as a delta wing aircraft is unlike any other airliner with which we are familiar. Lift is provided by the generation of vortices, and the lift (and hence drag) generated is proportional to the angle of attack. If you need more lift, you need more angle of attack, and so you also need thrust to go with it.
A delta does not ‘stall’, you can have ninety degrees angle of attack if you like, as long as you have the thrust to go with it. At slow speeds, a high angle of attack is necessary, and so also a high thrust.
Hence Concorde has additional characteristic speeds called Vzrc and Vzrc3 (V zero rate of climb) which corresponds to an airspeed that you need to have to maintain level flight with four (three) power units operating at rated thrust. V2 for the aircraft is defined as 1.125 Vzrc. If you are below this speed for the number of power units specified, gravity takes over, and you WILL descend.
The accident report specifies that for a Concorde operating at maximum certificated weight (185t) Vzrc3 and Vzrc2 are 205kt and >300kts for flight with the gear down.
The flight crew were using Vr of 198 and a V2 of 220kts.
The aircraft was rotated at 188kt and left the ground at 201kt. The aircraft was below a speed to safely suffer a single engine failure.
The pilot continued to increase the pitch attitude and the speed reduced further. By the time engine 2 was shut down, the airspeed was 199kt. By the time control was lost the angle of attack had been increased to 25 degrees and the speed reduced to 136kt.
In a normal aircraft, speed is important, in Concorde it is vital. The aircraft was above its maximum weight, the take-off in a tail wind was a critical factor, and the aircraft was mishandled during a critical failure.
Those are the facts, they are taken straight form the BEA report.
Concorde, as a delta wing aircraft is unlike any other airliner with which we are familiar. Lift is provided by the generation of vortices, and the lift (and hence drag) generated is proportional to the angle of attack. If you need more lift, you need more angle of attack, and so you also need thrust to go with it.
A delta does not ‘stall’, you can have ninety degrees angle of attack if you like, as long as you have the thrust to go with it. At slow speeds, a high angle of attack is necessary, and so also a high thrust.
Hence Concorde has additional characteristic speeds called Vzrc and Vzrc3 (V zero rate of climb) which corresponds to an airspeed that you need to have to maintain level flight with four (three) power units operating at rated thrust. V2 for the aircraft is defined as 1.125 Vzrc. If you are below this speed for the number of power units specified, gravity takes over, and you WILL descend.
The accident report specifies that for a Concorde operating at maximum certificated weight (185t) Vzrc3 and Vzrc2 are 205kt and >300kts for flight with the gear down.
The flight crew were using Vr of 198 and a V2 of 220kts.
The aircraft was rotated at 188kt and left the ground at 201kt. The aircraft was below a speed to safely suffer a single engine failure.
The pilot continued to increase the pitch attitude and the speed reduced further. By the time engine 2 was shut down, the airspeed was 199kt. By the time control was lost the angle of attack had been increased to 25 degrees and the speed reduced to 136kt.
In a normal aircraft, speed is important, in Concorde it is vital. The aircraft was above its maximum weight, the take-off in a tail wind was a critical factor, and the aircraft was mishandled during a critical failure.
Those are the facts, they are taken straight form the BEA report.
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Let them rest in PEACE!
IF IF and IFs are so easy..even the best of the best could never say that in these circumstances they would have reacted the correct way..
Please read their CVs..CRM is certainly the problem,human error..the left seat(as both are captains) had very little experience on the Concorde but once again please guys what happened happened and no one can bring the dead back.
As this thread becomes more and more,i feel,a judgement on the crews,this will be my last time here.It gives me the nausea.
As much as I have nothing against brits in general,maybe more against the few writing posts to put fire on gasoline.I would like to tell them the comment a french rugby analyst said about the difference between brits and french.
"French and English are arrogant,the only difference is that French know it"
Solong,
M.85
IF IF and IFs are so easy..even the best of the best could never say that in these circumstances they would have reacted the correct way..
Please read their CVs..CRM is certainly the problem,human error..the left seat(as both are captains) had very little experience on the Concorde but once again please guys what happened happened and no one can bring the dead back.
As this thread becomes more and more,i feel,a judgement on the crews,this will be my last time here.It gives me the nausea.
As much as I have nothing against brits in general,maybe more against the few writing posts to put fire on gasoline.I would like to tell them the comment a french rugby analyst said about the difference between brits and french.
"French and English are arrogant,the only difference is that French know it"
Solong,
M.85
The criticism is not so much aimed at the crew members themselves as their airline's culture which failed them when they needed to perform at their best.
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Capt. P: I suspect you are mistaking an observation that RTOW did not cause this accident with an incorrectly inferred defence of the possible exceedance of RTOW. I suspect this because I have made the same observation before and been accused of supporting breach of RTOW - which I certainly do not.
The early rotation was made just before runway excursion, possibly to avoid just that. Proabably all that could be done, since runway excursion and inevitable retardation caused by undercarriage in the mud and/or collisions with off-runway objects would be definately conclusive, whereas an early rotation left a chance of survival, allbeit much reduced for the reasons you correctly point out. I would caution that the early rotation was not necessarily "mis-handling" for just that reason.
Combine the subsequent fire, consuming hydraulic systems and flying control systems, with engine failures and the end was, IMO, inevitable. I cannot explain the early uncommanded engine shut-down - that would not have happened in the Concorde operation I was a part of - but my opinion, from experience of operating the type, is that a) there was nothing which could have been done given the cards he was dealt on the day (raise the nose and die or lower the nose and die - some choice) b) the causes were properly addressed and the steps taken would ensure that that accident scenario would never occour again - and it was not an RTOW/PLTOW issue.
(PS: You say takeoff in a T/W was a critical factor, but analysis of the track & speed at liftoff showed the wind component to be zero, so it actually had no bearing on events: this does not, obviously, excuse ignoring the reported wind - just that it didn't affect the outcome....)
The early rotation was made just before runway excursion, possibly to avoid just that. Proabably all that could be done, since runway excursion and inevitable retardation caused by undercarriage in the mud and/or collisions with off-runway objects would be definately conclusive, whereas an early rotation left a chance of survival, allbeit much reduced for the reasons you correctly point out. I would caution that the early rotation was not necessarily "mis-handling" for just that reason.
Combine the subsequent fire, consuming hydraulic systems and flying control systems, with engine failures and the end was, IMO, inevitable. I cannot explain the early uncommanded engine shut-down - that would not have happened in the Concorde operation I was a part of - but my opinion, from experience of operating the type, is that a) there was nothing which could have been done given the cards he was dealt on the day (raise the nose and die or lower the nose and die - some choice) b) the causes were properly addressed and the steps taken would ensure that that accident scenario would never occour again - and it was not an RTOW/PLTOW issue.
(PS: You say takeoff in a T/W was a critical factor, but analysis of the track & speed at liftoff showed the wind component to be zero, so it actually had no bearing on events: this does not, obviously, excuse ignoring the reported wind - just that it didn't affect the outcome....)
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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NW1
With the aircraft drifting left for so long, do you have any feel for why full rudder was never applied to try and keep straight?
JF
With the aircraft drifting left for so long, do you have any feel for why full rudder was never applied to try and keep straight?
JF
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John,
I don't know. The trace I have shows a sharp right rudder application, followed by modulating right rudder use. From experience I do know that too much nosewheel deflection can cause tramping and loss of NWS effectiveness depending on surfae conditions (probably not a factor on a dry r/w), but the rudder is a much more effective aerodynamic control on the ground above about 50kts than any other conventional type I have flown, but as to why full scale deflection wasn't used - I cannot guess.
I cannot think why full rudder would not be appropriate (the aeroplane had the distinct advantage of having virtually no yaw->roll couple).
I don't know. The trace I have shows a sharp right rudder application, followed by modulating right rudder use. From experience I do know that too much nosewheel deflection can cause tramping and loss of NWS effectiveness depending on surfae conditions (probably not a factor on a dry r/w), but the rudder is a much more effective aerodynamic control on the ground above about 50kts than any other conventional type I have flown, but as to why full scale deflection wasn't used - I cannot guess.
I cannot think why full rudder would not be appropriate (the aeroplane had the distinct advantage of having virtually no yaw->roll couple).
Gnome de PPRuNe
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I seem to recall reading a UK broadsheet "account" subsequent to the accident some time ago - perhaps Spring 2001 - which claimed that a "spacer" was missing from the port undercarriage assembly, causing the aircraft to progressively veer left, thereby impacting the DC-10 debris, etc, etc...
Anyone know for sure whether this was fact or fiction? The observations about overweight and wind mentioned above were also included in that account so far as I remember.
Anyone know for sure whether this was fact or fiction? The observations about overweight and wind mentioned above were also included in that account so far as I remember.
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I have just registered to this forum after reading M.85's post, I have these comments.
God forbid that any of us ever have to cope with the circumstances that caused this accident. I don't think anyone on this forum is trying to hang this crew out to dry.
What we are hoping to do as pilots is to try and learn something out of this tragedy and it is entirely correct IMHO that professionals should be able to dabate this accident.
We all want to fly more safely and we all hope to learn by studing the circumstances surrounding any accident. I am sure that there are professionals that contribute to this forum that are involved in Crew Licencing and SOP reviews. If this kind of debate ultimately leads to safer flying, then we should embrace it.
God forbid that any of us ever have to cope with the circumstances that caused this accident. I don't think anyone on this forum is trying to hang this crew out to dry.
What we are hoping to do as pilots is to try and learn something out of this tragedy and it is entirely correct IMHO that professionals should be able to dabate this accident.
We all want to fly more safely and we all hope to learn by studing the circumstances surrounding any accident. I am sure that there are professionals that contribute to this forum that are involved in Crew Licencing and SOP reviews. If this kind of debate ultimately leads to safer flying, then we should embrace it.
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Runway 23
Agree, no-one wants to besmirch the crew here, the accumulation of negative strikes that day left little hope for them, nor would anyone else have had much chance after brake release I reckon. The trouble is that once you start ignoring certain regulations, you can develop the infamous “I am exempt” mindset and are inclined to end up ignoring more and more rules and regs. Whether or not this attitude is common in one or more airlines could be debated elsewhere, but it won’t do anyone any good to witter on about it.
I stronglybelieve this type of discussion is greatly beneficial to us all and might just save a life or two one day, when a crew is faced with the sort of pre-take-off decision that Caption Marty‘s faced that day. Maybe they were in a situation where use of the other runway would have meant going back for more fuel ? Commercial pressure ? slots ? weather ? VIPs on board ? Plenty of us have been there …
Agree, no-one wants to besmirch the crew here, the accumulation of negative strikes that day left little hope for them, nor would anyone else have had much chance after brake release I reckon. The trouble is that once you start ignoring certain regulations, you can develop the infamous “I am exempt” mindset and are inclined to end up ignoring more and more rules and regs. Whether or not this attitude is common in one or more airlines could be debated elsewhere, but it won’t do anyone any good to witter on about it.
I stronglybelieve this type of discussion is greatly beneficial to us all and might just save a life or two one day, when a crew is faced with the sort of pre-take-off decision that Caption Marty‘s faced that day. Maybe they were in a situation where use of the other runway would have meant going back for more fuel ? Commercial pressure ? slots ? weather ? VIPs on board ? Plenty of us have been there …
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NW1
Thanks for that. I reckon most pilots try quite hard to keep straight so I am puzzled by how early the aircraft started to leave the centreline. If we accept he would have liked to have got back parallel (no need to get back to centre unless you are on a check ride etc) then it is interesting to think about what might have made him give up on that - by give up I mean use less than full control.
At the start of any take off run there is no handling involved other than keeping straight. Your type specific comments re steering are interesting and could be a reason for an initial reaction being on the tentative side. But talking generally, I feel that if you try and keep straight but find the aircraft response is not what you are used to (for whatever reason) then that is quite a distraction in itself while you mentally ask yourself ‘What is going on here?’ In my experience pilots don’t talk (intercom or R/T) about an unexpected handling problem until they have given up on trying to sort it out just because trying to deal with it uses up spare personal capacity in huge chunks.
I don’t know if any handling tests were carried out at Istres post accident re the effect of the missing spacer, but unless they were, one would have a nagging feeling that the effect could have been underestimated in the BEA report.
Having witnessed several crashes (too many actually but that is beside the point) I have more than once been left with a lasting feeling that the accident started with a trigger ‘event X’. After X there may have been (and usually were) several other things that also had to happen before the accident became inevitable, but with hindsight X was trigger. For me event X in this accident was not keeping straight before other things went wrong.
JF
Thanks for that. I reckon most pilots try quite hard to keep straight so I am puzzled by how early the aircraft started to leave the centreline. If we accept he would have liked to have got back parallel (no need to get back to centre unless you are on a check ride etc) then it is interesting to think about what might have made him give up on that - by give up I mean use less than full control.
At the start of any take off run there is no handling involved other than keeping straight. Your type specific comments re steering are interesting and could be a reason for an initial reaction being on the tentative side. But talking generally, I feel that if you try and keep straight but find the aircraft response is not what you are used to (for whatever reason) then that is quite a distraction in itself while you mentally ask yourself ‘What is going on here?’ In my experience pilots don’t talk (intercom or R/T) about an unexpected handling problem until they have given up on trying to sort it out just because trying to deal with it uses up spare personal capacity in huge chunks.
I don’t know if any handling tests were carried out at Istres post accident re the effect of the missing spacer, but unless they were, one would have a nagging feeling that the effect could have been underestimated in the BEA report.
Having witnessed several crashes (too many actually but that is beside the point) I have more than once been left with a lasting feeling that the accident started with a trigger ‘event X’. After X there may have been (and usually were) several other things that also had to happen before the accident became inevitable, but with hindsight X was trigger. For me event X in this accident was not keeping straight before other things went wrong.
JF
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NW1 said:..."If it became custom and practice to land in a "farmer's field" in a jet transport following a fire warning or similar engine failure / thrust loss on takeoff then many lives would be needlessly lost..."
Sir, this event was about insufficient, decreasing airspeed at 200 feet AGL...a scenario which required an immediate descent and landing to preclude imminent stall and uncontrolled crash. Captain Marty still had sufficient pitch and roll authority 1 minute after rotation to effect a controlled crash landing straight ahead unto one of several farmers' fields between CDG and LBG.
Sir, this event was about insufficient, decreasing airspeed at 200 feet AGL...a scenario which required an immediate descent and landing to preclude imminent stall and uncontrolled crash. Captain Marty still had sufficient pitch and roll authority 1 minute after rotation to effect a controlled crash landing straight ahead unto one of several farmers' fields between CDG and LBG.
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As for it missing a tall plastered-hair Frenchman, some one might say....too bad!
What about the crew and passengers who were also on board (probably some US citizens ) ? Collateral damage ?
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John,
I understand your point of view. I don't know if he had given up on directional control, or if that had any part to play in subsequent event. I suspect not - in this case. I think that the result was inevitable given the massive and multiple system failures which the fuel leak and fire was causing. I don't believe the cause of the accident was directional control on takeoff.
I understand your point of view. I don't know if he had given up on directional control, or if that had any part to play in subsequent event. I suspect not - in this case. I think that the result was inevitable given the massive and multiple system failures which the fuel leak and fire was causing. I don't believe the cause of the accident was directional control on takeoff.