Crash Concorde 'almost killed Chirac'

[Final 3 Greens]

Sir, this event was about insufficient, decreasing airspeed at 200 feet AGL...a scenario which required an immediate descent and landing to preclude imminent stall and uncontrolled crash. Captain Marty still had sufficient pitch and roll authority 1 minute after rotation to effect a controlled crash landing straight ahead unto one of several farmers' fields between CDG and LBG.

Farmers field, in a burning, delta wing jet with u/c extended?

I'm not an airline pilot, but I suspect I'm rather more current on forced landings into farmers fields than many ATPLs - and I don't underestimate the risks involved in an aircraft that weights only 1.5 tonnes and approaches at only 90kts. I would certainly prefer a gear up configuration into a rough field or even into a field where standing crop made assessment of the surface impossible (this was mid summer.)

In a Concorde, this course of action sounds like committing suicide to me, rather than trying to avoid the inevitable, until the inevitable happened, which I would have thought would be the professional pilots response.

The deceleration forces as the u/c hit rough ground would be pretty extreme and given that the aircraft was well ablaze, the subsequent and inevitable rending open of the wings and spilling of the fuel would have caused conflagration, well away from the assistance of the AFS at Le Bourget.

I'm sure that Cpt Marty was well aware of the options and made the best call that he could under the circumstances. RIP.

[norodnik]

Academic as it may be, given the aircraft's demise, but did anyone go into the simulator and try and re-create the event.

This would not be to point fingers of course, but to try and learn if there was another way should it happen again ?

I realise that the relevant AIB's make recomendations and that reports, including solutions, are circulated but have not heard any discussion based on re-creation that could have resulted in conclusions other than the one sadly witnessed.

[atakacs]

Just wondering

What readings are (where) available to the FE to determine the actual state of engine #2 ?

Turning off an engine at this very critical moment is not a small decision (especially in an overweight Concorde) so you really need absolute hard evidence that this is the right course of action...

[BOAC]

Link to the accident report which should answer some of the questions.

[atakacs]

Thanks for the pointer.

I have gone carefully through the report (again, fwiw) but I still fail to understand what readings are available to the FE.

Obviously there are various fire alarms indicators and some went off. Actually I'd say that there was little doubt about the fact that there was indeed a fire.

Now given the very timing of the event I would say that the FE was confronted with the question of the rifght course of action.

Typically, as others have mentioned, it is not common practice to shut down an engine at rotation... not even taking into account the very defavourable Concorde low speed flight caracteristics.

So unless ordered by the PIC (he was not) I'd say that the FE would not shut down an engine without having very hard evidence that this the right thing to do. Hence my quesion: what readings are available to the FE to assertain what's is really going on ?

(note that I believe that this flight was doomed no matter what)