Capt. P: I suspect you are mistaking an observation that RTOW did not cause this accident with an incorrectly inferred defence of the possible exceedance of RTOW. I suspect this because I have made the same observation before and been accused of supporting breach of RTOW - which I certainly do not.
The early rotation was made just before runway excursion, possibly to avoid just that. Proabably all that could be done, since runway excursion and inevitable retardation caused by undercarriage in the mud and/or collisions with off-runway objects would be definately conclusive, whereas an early rotation left a chance of survival, allbeit much reduced for the reasons you correctly point out. I would caution that the early rotation was not necessarily "mis-handling" for just that reason.
Combine the subsequent fire, consuming hydraulic systems and flying control systems, with engine failures and the end was, IMO, inevitable. I cannot explain the early uncommanded engine shut-down - that would not have happened in the Concorde operation I was a part of - but my opinion, from experience of operating the type, is that a) there was nothing which could have been done given the cards he was dealt on the day (raise the nose and die or lower the nose and die - some choice) b) the causes were properly addressed and the steps taken would ensure that that accident scenario would never occour again - and it was not an RTOW/PLTOW issue.
(PS: You say takeoff in a T/W was a critical factor, but analysis of the track & speed at liftoff showed the wind component to be zero, so it actually had no bearing on events: this does not, obviously, excuse ignoring the reported wind - just that it didn't affect the outcome....)