Yes, it is fair to say that the lot of onshore charter pilots is more fraught with cultural pressures and often operationally challenging environments (unofficial weather measurements/assessments; off-field landings; ad hoc flights to new and perhaps unsurveyed environments) than that of offshore peers. But there has to be a line drawn when one or more decision points run up against better judgement. Gratitude for getting the job in critical conditions is perishable (at best); the consequences of a proper cock-up are severe and long-lasting. Ultimately, no one will thank you for killing them.

Well we do have the magnetic North Pole! Santa Claus lives here, not Lapland. Kids can mail letters to him using the Canadian Postal Code H0H 0H0 and they get answered!

If the commander is who I assume him to be from the report description, there is more than a little irony to this event, and potentially salient lessons for all, given his other roles and qualifications.

I think I know what you're trying to say, but to me it also shows how being in that seat and being in command is a great equaliser. At that point everything that's on your business card is suddenly irrelevant and you're just another pilot, having to deal with the situation and the pressures.

Is this the same Company that do the Royal Flights....?

No it isn’t.

FNW, TVM......

It's the same company that the report references as "the operator" in writing, yet names them directly in three of the eight safety recommendations.

I thought I would refresh my knowledge of the operator but reading the website of an operator at a time like this is an extremely strange experience with a whole range of emotions and thoughts. Just the company strapline “As a pilot you cannot buy experience; as our customer, you can” provokes a wide gamut of emotions but mainly sorrow.

Sorrow for those directly involved in this event, sorrow for the other employees in the company, sorrow for those in the industry that do a good job and feel sick to the core when reading of incidents such as 'LBAL, CRST, WIWI, N72EX, but most of all, sorrow that not all in our sector seem to have learnt from the numerous similar accidents that have happened in recent years. Thanks heavens no one lost their lives, but reading the report leaves me feeling almost as sad as if they had.

HS

Once again....we see a Report that read over Tea and Biscuits in the lounge with a soft fire behind the hearth makes one simply wonder how it could happen to such qualified, experienced, and decent people.

But, the other venue....in the hot seat on that miserable day with darkness approaching and a customer that of all appointments is running late.....that Tea is cold and bitter and the biscuits a bit stale.

Why is the hardest word in the Pilot's vocabulary to say....is the word "NO!",

The problem is when the weather is marginal but legal that we too often find ourselves wishing we had held onto discarded options. Most of us survive those less than stellar decisions but sadly too many of us do not survive.

When you see your options slithering away like folks owing you money that see you coming towards them with outstretched hand....perhaps it is time to opt for some fresh hot tea and biscuits and arrange ground transport for the Landed Gentry.

Mucking about in the dark and. murk over uneven terrain in what is arguably a very well kitted out aircraft with just about every kind of Gucci Kit you could reasonably ask for.....and then some....and not just filing IFR and going to the nearest Airfield with an approved IAP just has to make you wonder.

The very good news is no one got hurt, the aircraft was not damaged....some hat sizes got shrunk....and perhaps some real lessons learnt.

A for what it is worth.....an EMS Operator in my hometown lost a Bell 412 in Bluefield, West Virginia one afternoon....killed two pilots and the two Flight Nurses when they flew smack into a very hard mountain on the far side of the Airport while doing an Instrument Approach.

The Captain was the Base Manager, Training Captain, and Safety Officer all at one time. He was a good and decent Man, a well qualified pilot, married with children.

There is some wisdom in spreading the jobs around to different people so there is a widely exposure in the decision making. process....which done properly enhances safety.

We are all human with the vulnerabilities that entails.

Why oh why do we reject the automation and insist upon manipulating the flight controls ourselves when we could be seen as being rather dashing as we push buttons and twist plastic knobs.....and not get ourselves into the pickles we do that a properly managed Autopilot system would not.

Couldn’t agree more. So many lessons to learn from this that it needs to be re-read and digested numerous times. PinS won’t be the answer to everyone’s problems as many corporate variants of 92, 109, 76 aren’t appropriately equipped, and should they exist in the U.K. PinS would be expensive to implement and only useful to well frequented sites which makes up a small proportion of the overall charter market. Is any variant of S92 certified for PinS? However for that portion that does frequent the same landing site time and time again, in a fully RNP APCH certified modern machine like a 145/169, and is willing to invest in approach design and certification, it has to be said that the UK regulator have been far from helpful or progressive in approach. At this time the CAA are processing around 10 RNP approaches a year, mostly to airfields with an ILS. The DfT haven’t been overly forward thinking or helpful either, EGNOS SOL service participation ending in a weeks time. Expect the LPV option for U.K. approaches in your FMS to disappear in the next AIRAC cycle post 25/6/21 (15th July). To me it’s depressing that the technology is there to make life safer, but in the U.K. your hands are tied from using it. In continental Europe on the other hand numerous hospitals have PinS approaches and connecting networks. A real shame.

At least the co-pilot said and did something which may have averted a far less fortunate outcome. Plenty of times whilst I've instructed experienced crews in the simulator the co-pilot said nothing and did nothing and seemed perfectly happy to arrive at the scene of the accident sitting on his hands in silence.

Yes, credit where it's due....

I partly agree, but would also expect the greater knowledge to have led to more informed decision making. Hopefully the lessons learned will add to the quality and authenticity of the courses he teaches.

For clarity - I’m not having a dig

Point in Space approaches have been demonstrated by Sikorsky in the past.

The technology exists and is installed in many helicopters.

Low Level IFR route structure is within the capability of the Industry with the major hurdle being the Authorities around the World that seems to be the hardest nut to crack.

Many EMS operations in the United States have an IAP to the Hospital Landing Pad which are off airport and are such IAP's.

I attended a Safety Seminar in Raleigh, North Carolina at least ten years ago where Nick Lappos talked of that work by Sikorsky using an S-76 to do those Point in Space Approaches.

He was a very strong advocate for the expansion of Helicopter IFR flight in non-traditional IFR environments.....or in plain language....doing Helicopter IFR using the unique ability to land at places other than legacy airport facilities.

That is the hard task...getting the authorities to bless and embrace that change in thinking .

It can be done...and done safely with the right equipment and training, combined with a careful intiial survey of the intended approach and surveillance of that to ensure no changes occur....much as has to be done with current on-airport IAP's..

I’m a great fan of PiNs approaches and I have no doubt that they would bring huge safety benefits if they were embraced by the regulator in the U.K. However aren’t we missing the point here; it seems that (according to the AAIB report) the crew may have breached multiple rules and Company Procedures whilst attempting to carry out a VFR approach in a MP helicopter with what appears to be very poor MCC procedures. .

Some offshore operators mandate procedures for night VGA approaches including the use of automation, based on hard won experience. This seems like a procedure that is crying out for the same.

Was it Double Bogey that was involved in the improvements in Night Offshore Approaches?

One of the regulars was....and my fading memory tells me it might have been he that was involved.

Can you truly regulate a PiNs approach? Night offshore has a certain level of expectation that you are flying into a clear area and the destination will follow given rules, lighting, obstacle clearance etc. The weather radar will pick out other targets.

PiNs into private landing site at night - Doesn't that just give you a better level of comfort until you discover that Vodaphone have put up a new mast or the trees have grown taller over the last 7 years since it was last surveyed?

We do 2D & 3D approaches to low minima in environments that are either strictly regulated and surveyed, or checked on board by means of weather radar in the case of offshore. For ad hoc sites onshore all that is needed are higher minima to take account of near terrain, obstacles and navigation performance. Because no fool is going to fly down blind into an environment that has not been surveyed for currency, where another fool might be flying in conditions unsuitable for VFR flight. Surely.