G-LAWX S92 Incident AAIB
14 Oct 2019G-LAWXSIKORSKY S-92A High rate of decent on landing,Under Investigation
Anyone able to share anymore info? "High Rate of Decent on Landing" - would that not just be a "heavy landing" or is there more to this if we read between the lines? As this is simply a rumour network: Was this a case of failing to "practice what you preach"? Or a lack of recency and credible experience 'on-type'? Was it another 'Paul McCartney-esque' incident? Cant wait years for the official report so need to speculate now ........... On a more serious note - just thankful that everyone got away this time |
High RoD n landing and heavy landing are 2 very different things
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Originally Posted by JulieAndrews
(Post 10639102)
14 Oct 2019G-LAWXSIKORSKY S-92A High rate of decent on landing,Under Investigation
Anyone able to share anymore info? "High Rate of Decent on Landing" - would that not just be a "heavy landing" or is there more to this if we read between the lines? As this is simply a rumour network: Was this a case of failing to "practice what you preach"? Or a lack of recency and credible experience 'on-type'? Was it another 'Paul McCartney-esque' incident? Cant wait years for the official report so need to speculate now ........... On a more serious note - just thankful that everyone got away this time |
QUOTE=helicrazi;10639116]High RoD n landing and heavy landing are 2 very different th
Helicrazi,
Would you mind sharing your wisdom on this matter with us then? HS |
Wasn't this the one that lost too much height on the approach to an oli rig, had an overtorque and heading deviation upon recovering?
I couldn't find the thread here nor the link, sorry. |
Originally Posted by Jimmy.
(Post 10639241)
Wasn't this the one that lost too much height on the approach to an oli rig, had an overtorque and heading deviation upon recovering?
I couldn't find the thread here nor the link, sorry. |
Wasn't this the one that lost too much height on the approach to an oli rig, had an overtorque and heading deviation upon recovering? I couldn't find the thread here nor the link, sorry. 1700fpm ROD, 10 KTS, 30’ off the water and pulled 145% torque drooping to 78% NR, both ACs off line and that S-92 still flew home. It’s one tough aircraft. |
Originally Posted by industry insider
(Post 10639360)
No, that one was in Canada. Regardless of the circumstances the parameters were approximately: 1700fpm ROD, 10 KTS, 30’ off the water and pulled 145% torque drooping to 78% NR, both ACs off line and that S-92 still flew home. It’s one tough aircraft. The incident I mentioned was this year, during approach, "sudden" loss of height and then NR drop combined with heading change (probably rapid collective increase), but I couldn't find the source. Agree with you, very tough aircraft. |
Originally Posted by Jimmy.
(Post 10639391)
Insider, I think you are talking about the Cougar incident after takeoff from a rig some years ago. IMC after takeoff, too much pitch up, FD coupled with airspeed dropping (and decoupled), descent IMC at very low airspeed at high rate and then VMC, overtorque...
The incident I mentioned was this year, during approach, "sudden" loss of height and then NR drop combined with heading change (probably rapid collective increase), but I couldn't find the source. Agree with you, very tough aircraft. |
Originally Posted by helicrazi
(Post 10639520)
no, Insider was referring to the much more recent incident, which occurred on approach.
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Originally Posted by Jimmy.
(Post 10639668)
Thanks! Do you have a link, please?
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Thank you, 212man.
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Originally Posted by helicrazi
(Post 10639116)
High RoD n landing and heavy landing are 2 very different things
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Explored the linked sites data.....came away thinking the Canadians must have some serious problems with excessive gravity with all the "Collided With Terrain" investigations.
The other thing that posed some interest was the "Collided With Trees" as compared to "Collided With Terrain"......whats the difference I wonder? |
Originally Posted by pilotmike
(Post 10640309)
Well go on then, we're all ears. Sounds crazi.
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Julie
From your wording it's fairly plain that you think you know more about this than you're letting on. There was a serious incident - that much is plain otherwise AAIB would not be looking into it. It was reported by the crew - it's being investigated. I'm not invloved with the operator and never have been. Nor am I going to suggest people don't speculate - this is, as you say a rumour network. You however are not speculating - you're clearly trolling and one has to consider your motivation. OH |
TOH Not sure if I know anything more than anyone else in the UK Onshore Industry whom uses Pprune, waiting to see.......... Also - waiting to see how this incident fits within the scope of CAA’s recent report of the industry and it’s safety levels. I’ve attended various seminars, briefings and functions where a lot of back slapping goes on but the old spectre of commercial pressure remains. Couple that with the helicopter pilots’ natural eagerness to ‘push on’ and we get the repeat headlines - irregardless of how many CAA Industry Reports are published. Personally, I will be disappointed if it turns out to be another case of a crew thinking they did not require a dynamic risk assessment and ‘pushed on’, leading to an incident, further CAA restrictions and bad press for the industry. Maybe if you hear more details you can share them with us in a timely manner, rather than having to wait for the investigation report etc etc - which is the whole purpose of the thread; which, to be frank, I thought was fairly obvious? From what I have learnt since starting the thread is that there are various accounts of the information you have shared already. |
And WHOOPEE!! CAA SOC16 arrives in your in-box, to be completed by 31 December detailing how you conduct night off-airfield landings.
SND |
SASless, about twenty to thirty feet I'd guess :8
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Originally Posted by Sir Niall Dementia
(Post 10641184)
And WHOOPEE!! CAA SOC16 arrives in your in-box, to be completed by 31 December detailing how you conduct night off-airfield landings.
SND |
8-months since G-LAWX Incident - has anyone seen a report of findings / lesson learnt ?
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Originally Posted by EESDL
(Post 10800111)
8-months since G-LAWX Incident - has anyone seen a report of findings / lesson learnt ?
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Beggars belief that such a single-aircraft incident could take so long.
I guess we’re back to AAIB struggling to promulgate safety-related Information in a timely fashion. I wonder if this is another COVID casualty or simply down to a lack of resources? |
Some news at least
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/s..._content=daily |
sounds vaguely similar to the Harrods Paul McCartney S76 incident a few years ago...
...an update on the ongoing AAIB investigation into a serious incident involving Sikorsky S-92A, G-LAWX, near Shipston-on-Stour, Warwickshire on 14 October 2019. Whilst making an approach to a private landing site in conditions of reduced visibility the helicopter descended to within 28 ft of rising terrain close to a house. During the subsequent missed approach, at low indicated airspeed, engine torque increased to 131% and the pitch attitude of the helicopter was unstable. The helicopter then made a successful approach to the landing site without damage or injury. To date no pre-existing mechanical defects have been identified that might have contributed to the occurrence. The AAIB investigation of the occurrence has explored the operation of the helicopter, flight planning, organisational supervision, the regulatory requirements related to non-commercial complex helicopter operations in visual meteorological conditions, and the provision and effectiveness of terrain awareness and warning systems in the onshore helicopter environment. A full report of the investigation will be published in due course. |
Originally Posted by heli14
(Post 10905194)
sounds vaguely similar to the Harrods Paul McCartney S76 incident a few years ago...
I know they are not the AOC operator but are Harrods are still involved in the management/private operation of G-LAWX (they were a few years ago) or have all operations switched to the current AOC holder? |
Harrods have had nothing to do with the operation of GLAWX for at least 5 years.
The only Harrods input is the maintenance and hangarage |
operator
Starspeed me thinks
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S-92A G-LAWX Anniversary Statement AAIB
UPDATE - NOT ABLE TO POST URL as have not posted at least 10 times. !
GOV.UK SIKORSKY S-92A G-LAWX ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT |
Don’t worry, Boney. The link was posted 5 posts above your’s. ;)
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Originally Posted by Reflex
(Post 10905527)
Harrods have had nothing to do with the operation of GLAWX for at least 5 years.
The only Harrods input is the maintenance and hangarage |
ok - this is ridiculous - still nuffink! negates the point of an investigation if timing is not an issue........
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The AAIB Serious Incident report into G-LAWX has now been published on the AAIB website. I am afraid I am not allowed to post any links yet so google will have to be your friend. Suffice to say that it makes some pretty eye-watering reading!
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That report is one of the most comprehensive I’ve read since I began flying, over forty five years ago.
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Oh my.. Got lucky when luck wasn’t needed; just better decision-making and robust procedures. Simply astounding that a second approach was attempted after the first was so badly managed; and that one was also then badly managed.
The decision to fly manually seems suggestive of a lack of familiarity and confidence in using the automatics. With less than 500 on type and few hours on-type in the period pre-incident, versatility and confidence in using the AFCS to full advantage may have been lacking. This was also accepted by the more experienced pilot on type, who was also a commander. Given the seniority in the company of the commander on the day, it is hard to escape the impression that the P2 went along with a lot more that they should have. In fairness, irrespective of culture and hierarchy, SOPs on challenge and intervention are often not very comprehensive, specifying a very narrow set of deviation parameters, which offer little help for a broader set of circumstances which can be implicitly dangerous and need action. The flight read anything but safe and well-judged. Glad all came out of it safely and provided us with things to learn from. |
As a fixed wing pilot with corporate experience this reads to me frighteningly close to the N303GA accident in Aspen
Very lucky indeed. |
I think the Safety Recommendation 2021-027 stands out and I believe that PinS approaches should be widely developed and be available for civil onshore helicopter operations. Planning and flying IFR en-route and provides a black & white 'visual, landing' or 'go around' decision at the end of an instrument procedure, which offers easier decision making than scud running and saying "I'm just going to try one more mile" (in my opinion).
I believe that knowing that the flight would be IMC and planning to use a PinS approach at the end also makes the possibility of not reaching the destination due to weather much more difficult to ignore and necessitates a back-up IFR diversion, which in this case seemed to have been ignored as the possibility of IIMC was not considered and Wellesbourne was discussed as the diversion (Birmingham was only brought up by the crew as a diversion once they had already gone IIMC). |
Do we as helicopter pilots have a mass self-esteem problem or something? You would be daft to try this in a 206, that is getting the customer through bad weather, let alone something a lot bigger. Why do we keep thinking we have to solve other peoples' problems? If the weather is bad, that's it, go by car.
What is the point of us teaching our students that this is not part of the service we should be providing? This flight should have been thrown away a lot earlier, and I speak as a corporate pilot of many years' standing. |
In jobs like this, where the weather goes against you, the pressure to go is always present or implied, much more so than in the airline world. The pilot has the option of possibly being stood up against the wall by the CAA, if it goes badly wrong, or directly on the day by the customer if a more cautious no-go option is chosen. I've often taken the latter option and then been taken to task by the aircraft owner, who after the event asks the opinions of non experts, such as his estate manager or taxi driver and tells you it was the wrong choice because "You would have got in".
Such is the lot of the corporate heli pilot and one needs to have very broad shoulders. |
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