8-months since G-LAWX Incident - has anyone seen a report of findings / lesson learnt ?

AAIB website lists the incident as "Still under investigation" which would be as expected in terms of time frame.

Beggars belief that such a single-aircraft incident could take so long.
I guess we’re back to AAIB struggling to promulgate safety-related Information in a timely fashion.
I wonder if this is another COVID casualty or simply down to a lack of resources?

Some news at least
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/s..._content=daily

sounds vaguely similar to the Harrods Paul McCartney S76 incident a few years ago...I know they are not the AOC operator but are Harrods are still involved in the management/private operation of G-LAWX (they were a few years ago) or have all operations switched to the current AOC holder?

my thoughts too. Plus this one https://assets.publishing.service.go...BYPA_11-08.pdf

Harrods have had nothing to do with the operation of GLAWX for at least 5 years.
The only Harrods input is the maintenance and hangarage

operator
 

Starspeed me thinks

S-92A G-LAWX Anniversary Statement AAIB
 

UPDATE - NOT ABLE TO POST URL as have not posted at least 10 times. !

GOV.UK
SIKORSKY S-92A
G-LAWX
ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT

Don’t worry, Boney. The link was posted 5 posts above your’s. ;)

Did Starspeed ‘take’ the IMC letdown that you and ST used to fly in GLAWX though when they took over operating the aircraft 🤔

ok - this is ridiculous - still nuffink! negates the point of an investigation if timing is not an issue........

The AAIB Serious Incident report into G-LAWX has now been published on the AAIB website. I am afraid I am not allowed to post any links yet so google will have to be your friend. Suffice to say that it makes some pretty eye-watering reading!

That report is one of the most comprehensive I’ve read since I began flying, over forty five years ago.

Oh my.. Got lucky when luck wasn’t needed; just better decision-making and robust procedures. Simply astounding that a second approach was attempted after the first was so badly managed; and that one was also then badly managed.

The decision to fly manually seems suggestive of a lack of familiarity and confidence in using the automatics. With less than 500 on type and few hours on-type in the period pre-incident, versatility and confidence in using the AFCS to full advantage may have been lacking. This was also accepted by the more experienced pilot on type, who was also a commander. Given the seniority in the company of the commander on the day, it is hard to escape the impression that the P2 went along with a lot more that they should have. In fairness, irrespective of culture and hierarchy, SOPs on challenge and intervention are often not very comprehensive, specifying a very narrow set of deviation parameters, which offer little help for a broader set of circumstances which can be implicitly dangerous and need action. The flight read anything but safe and well-judged.

Glad all came out of it safely and provided us with things to learn from.

As a fixed wing pilot with corporate experience this reads to me frighteningly close to the N303GA accident in Aspen

Very lucky indeed.

I think the Safety Recommendation 2021-027 stands out and I believe that PinS approaches should be widely developed and be available for civil onshore helicopter operations. Planning and flying IFR en-route and provides a black & white 'visual, landing' or 'go around' decision at the end of an instrument procedure, which offers easier decision making than scud running and saying "I'm just going to try one more mile" (in my opinion).

I believe that knowing that the flight would be IMC and planning to use a PinS approach at the end also makes the possibility of not reaching the destination due to weather much more difficult to ignore and necessitates a back-up IFR diversion, which in this case seemed to have been ignored as the possibility of IIMC was not considered and Wellesbourne was discussed as the diversion (Birmingham was only brought up by the crew as a diversion once they had already gone IIMC).

Do we as helicopter pilots have a mass self-esteem problem or something? You would be daft to try this in a 206, that is getting the customer through bad weather, let alone something a lot bigger. Why do we keep thinking we have to solve other peoples' problems? If the weather is bad, that's it, go by car.

What is the point of us teaching our students that this is not part of the service we should be providing? This flight should have been thrown away a lot earlier, and I speak as a corporate pilot of many years' standing.

In jobs like this, where the weather goes against you, the pressure to go is always present or implied, much more so than in the airline world. The pilot has the option of possibly being stood up against the wall by the CAA, if it goes badly wrong, or directly on the day by the customer if a more cautious no-go option is chosen. I've often taken the latter option and then been taken to task by the aircraft owner, who after the event asks the opinions of non experts, such as his estate manager or taxi driver and tells you it was the wrong choice because "You would have got in".

Such is the lot of the corporate heli pilot and one needs to have very broad shoulders.