Looks like press-on-itis to me.

Not the end of the world and clearly they came out the other side or we would be looking at a pile of wreckage on the side of the hill.

However, given the proliferation of dash cams, phones, social media, and 24 hour news - if you flout with the regulations, especially in a National Park - you are more and more likely to be splashed all over the internet!

I reckon they could have landed on if they had wanted to. When operating IN SUPPORT of these special folk (training or otherwise), it sometimes takes more balls to say ‘No’ than it does to keep pushing the envelope.

Still - it did look like fun :)

There seem to be a lot of circular arguments going on here, with no ability to come to a common ground.

I’m intrigued that there are so many assumptions being made to justify criticisms of the crew; not one of us here have the faintest idea what preceded or followed the short vision of the 365 emerging from the low cloud yet experts are fanging on without any let up, based on assumptions.

How do the detractors know there were any POB other than the crew? The rear door is open and a crewman is checking outside, but is there actually anyone else there; yet mention has been made of the crew carrying SAS pax into danger. There is no vision of what is happening after the vehicle passes, so how do we not know that it was a landing into a safe area to await the cloud lifting? There is no vision ahead of how far the low cloud extends, so how do we know how long the crew had been committed to a safe option to terminate the flight?

DB, your neck of the woods in Mil may have omitted flight in fog but some of us with wings on our sleeves spent years operating in <100 yards vis, below 200ft, day and night. Legally with full knowledge and approval of command and without any synthetic aids. Faffing on about current Civ Reg’s is a red herring, IMO.

At least we didn’t have to contend with those spawns of the devil; dashcams and smartphones/cameras!

In my time I've hover taxyed sideways up Mt Byron, grovelled through low cloud and mist in Bosnia, flown Hereford - NI at night in a snowstorm, IFR'd a road in Wales as the weather forecast caught us out and the icing level meant I couldn't go up and the terrain too sloped to land on, and invaded Iraq on a night of somewhat less than VMC conditions. Why do I list them? Because I learnt from each one, and the context behind each decision was different. In hindsight, as a young tyro, going up Byron to pick up the CSE show was daft, but "we all did it" and I was with a very experienced QHI and my horizons and capabilities were broadened in doing so. I applied that lesson in Bosnia where, after the Puma crash in Kosovo, I pushed to my limits and ultimately failed to get across a ridge line - I made the decision that the "risk/reward" balance was firmly one way, so we took our pax back. Low level, below limits, in a snowstorm at night I justified as the guys in the back were going to do a critical time-sensitive job, whilst invading Iraq was "the job" but it was a tough night (especially the USMC CH-46 guys…). This reminds me of the Wales occasion; the weather looked OK at the planning phase but changed swiftly in the hills - we slowed down, went down and considered turning around - only for the "back door" to slam shut (as it can very quickly in the hills). We came to the hover and discussed our options. The LL abort was possible, but the terrain around us meant that we would have to fly it very accurately and the thought of being close to big hills in cloud frankly wasn't that appealing - especially in pre-DAFCS days. We couldn't land on due to terrain so, as a crew, we decided to IFR a road to the ridge line in the expectation that the weather would be better the other side. We were at 10ft in a Chinook following a road as several cars came past - doubtless we'd of been on a dash cam nowadays! We reached the ridge line, came down the other side and, as expected, we cleared the conditions. My point; we did everything right in the planning and got genuinely caught out by weather. As a crew we paused, completed a DODAR analysis and came up with a sensible, workable, plan which we executed. I appended the auth sheets accordingly when I got back and we de-briefed it thoroughly. Nothing more was said. The moral? Unless you were on the cab you do not know the thought process, and a non-contextual 10-second clip does not tell the whole story of the conditions in front/ behind the cab. Apart from the pub, there are few obstructions on that route. They may also have been doing it for Op reasons - not every Op makes the news for good reason. SAR Wannabe - the only bo**cks being discussed here are massive ones, which, sometimes, when appropriate, as a military aviator you need to use….At issue here is "appropriate", and without the full context, we're unable to judge that from our armchairs.

Evalu8ter and Heli - thank you for bringing us back to reality and dismantling the outrage from those with febrile imaginations about how they would have done it so much better.

Why those who have never done the mil-flying thing keep trying to align it with HEMS is quite beyond me. Trying to make this event into a potential CFIT scenario is equally fatuous.

Heights Good - would you care to elaborate which Lynx crash you are talking about?

I so so wish there was a "Like Post" feature at pprune.

Eval's post is one that deserves such endorsement.

Posts such as his get copied and stored away for future reference!

Heli makes very good points as well.

On the other hand......That mindset hits a very low note....as the crew are Military Personnel who put their Lives on the line for the British People....and that Sport makes them very special.

Luck always trumps Skill and often substitutes for the lack of Skill.

DB is right.....HEMS Go-No Go Decisions are not based upon the Patient's Condition, Prognosis, or Needs, Flight County, or Revenue generated......it is a simple (in theory) decision based upon the Weather and other Aviation related factors.....ONLY.

If the weather and related factors are within the published minima and crew capability....one departs.

If not...one does not depart.

In the USA...we strive to free the Pilot of the Patient Information as much as possible in an attempt to lessen the psychological pressure one might feel otherwise.

The hard part of the decision making process is when the weather is marginal and there appears to be no clear cut, easily defined set of factors that affords that straight forward easy decision...be it go or not to go.

If one launches in marginal weather over bad terrain or in the dark of night....or all of the above....and you guessed it wrong then you are in trouble.

Guess it right and everything goes well....you are the Base Hero for a while until someone else takes the honor.

The hardest word for an EMS Pilot to vocalize is....."NO!".

It should not be at all.....as there are occasions that is exactly the right response to a request for a flight.

If we can cut through all the willy waving and heroic, life-saving adventures from previous lives, I think we can agree that we all have some common thoughts...

1. Not a good idea to continue in weather like that, regardless of how we got there, it might be time to land or recover on instruments
2. It is absurd that any crew would have chosen or would have been sent to train in poor weather by choosing a fog-bound hill in Cumbria to negotiate
3. HEMS, Mil, Police, SAR, SF etc have a tough role, often faced with tough decisions to make...unless you were in the cockpit, at this point in time you have no cause to forecast what was going on when the decision to continue was made, therefore, it could be considered wise to stop spouting about the organisation, the crew quality, airmanship, the proximity of the ground or road, the choices he should have made etc etc.
4. Questions will be asked. It will not be swept under any carpet, however, the results may not be public domain, and the flight may well have been justified in that set of circumstances.
5. Whatever we do in this modern digital world is likely to be recorded, filmed, posted, criticised, published, criticised, dissected, and criticised by anyone and everyone, whether they are informed or not.

I'd like to think that we professionals can rise above criticising until we know. Then its open season.

I hadn't realised there were so many Ppruners living in Tunbridge Wells :E

I showed you the statement from CAP 999.

Still banging on about HEMS - it isn't relevant!

No-one has suggested they were authorised to hover taxy in cloud - such an auth doesn't exist in JHC.

All the ideas about turning round or landing are good -BUT what if you can't?

If you have been caught out by a local deterioration in weather that wasn't forecast, don't have the fuel to divert (and there isn't any for miles up there anyway), the weather (and again fuel) preclude a pullup to IFR, you cant' land because the terrain is unsuitable, there may be some operational pressures to contend with and many other considerations that can't be discussed here - what do you do?

The crew will have added to their experience - as evalu8ter points out, most of us have had such situations that make us better and wiser - but have they displayed 'truly **** airmanship'?

DB-your idea of the moral high ground is very bizarre

no-one has said anything like what you have written here.

You still seem to be determined to hang, draw and quarter this crew when you still don't know their composition, task or circumstances, you only criticise from your HEMS perspective - if this was a HEMS aircraft I would completely agree with you but it isn't and I don't.

If you don't think there may be situations where hovertaxying in cloud is EVER an acceptable risk then it explains why you aren't still in the military or have ever done SAR.

DB.....Question!

When you state "Hover in Cloud".....do you actually mean hover in Fog (a ground based weather phenomenon)?

When you specify "Cloud" a non-ground based weather phenomenon I have to wonder how one does that out of sight of the ground?

I think we all know what you meant....but can you confirm for us this is the case.

Some of us also know that, that particular cab could of also - binned it at any point and pulled sufficient power - engaged the autopilot and popped out VMC on top in the sunshine a few seconds later - by my reckoning they had sufficient options up their sleeve and if at any stage the loady / DG in the back had called that he was not visual then it would of been a swift left arm movement from the rh seat - followed by the selection of the AP..... Love it when everyone bangs on about graciousness and finger-wagging..... it's not an incident - therefore it's just experience - trouble is - published on sm it suddenly becomes a mass opinion piece....

Am i the only one who cant believe you are still talking about this non event ????? DB is set in his ways and will never change so just leave him alone . We dont know the facts behind this flight , and never will , quite correctly . End of .....

Jetscream32 - Are you suggesting that aircraft can do a perfect vertical climb at zero groundspeed on autopilot at the push of a button?

The tale is told of a young and inexperienced Canberra crew, early 70s, running the MATO Low Level Route/Section 4 and heading out across the lower Firth of Clyde towards MoK, in a rapidly lowering cloudbase. Instructed NOT to climb up into the Prestwick TMA or they'd be hanged, drawn and quartered, they continued ever lower, with the nav singing out he could "still make out the wave tops, but go a bit lower...." A minute or three into this scenario, a cluster of small white things whipped past the starboard wingtip. There followed one of those 'Wha....?' moments, which passed. As did the rest of the sortie, with an uneventful landing at Kinloss, then a Nimrod base. It seemed odd to be told by Local to turn off the runway, stop, and shut down - and odder still when one of those green Austin Maxis came haring down the taxiway, complete with little flag. A Very Senior Wheel was driving, and he curtly ordered the two heroes into the back, then whooshed them off to the Ops Block, to a Reserved parking slot. There they sheepishly followed the Air Commode through to his plush office, where he sat magisterially, staring at them. An icy silence.....

"Were you two anywhere near Ailsa Craig, in the lower Clyde, at low level about an hour ago?"

"Er, probably.... er, yessir."

The VSW waved a piece of paper at them. "This is a signal from MoD London, from MoD ( Navy) actually, requiring the identification of whoever it was. And we've now done that, I believe."

"Congratulations. You're the first aircrew ever to have an AIRMISS filed against them - by the Captain of a Polaris submarine!"

The 'cluster of small white things', it was then realised, were the naval uniform caps of the sub's bridge team.....

This is now starting to make sense.

DB - you say you don't criticise then do so again in the next sentence.

You say you have done this yourself and learned from it but don't allow this crew the freedom to do the same thing.

HEMS is ambulance driving - SAR is often very boring searching but also plenty of flying in atrocious weather over inhospitable terrain to save life, they are not the same other than the fact you end up with poorly people in the back of the aircraft on the way to hospital.

If my rules were as you say (and helonorth seems to imply) not only would I have creamed in a long time ago but anyone I have taught or examined (especially in the SAR role) would have done the same - ergo it is another 'fake news' statement in your continued crusade.

We (RAFSAR) have lost a few over the many years of service but none fatal and none to do with CFIT or pushing on in bad weather - the Irish CG (which I assume you were referring to) is a far more complex accident than simply bad weather - and at no point were they pushing any of their limits - so, again, totally irrelevant.

no sh*t sherlock - but you haven't answered what you would do if you found yourself in exactly that situation...............

You still don't get it - they didn't plan to go into fog, they didn't go into it deliberately and once they were in it they had to get out safely - which they did!

Which Lynx "crash" was that?? The only Lynx accident in 2011 that I'm aware of is the one that took off from Gutersloh and an engine exploded.

Somewhere in that load of bollocks, there just might be some kind of explanation about freezing level and controlled airspace above them, and exactly how the poster knows how many seconds, at whatever rate of climb that aircraft could manage, with whatever load it had... in order to break out on top, in sunshine.

Double Bogey - I'm sensing that maybe you don't like Crab? I've never met Crab, though I know that he exists, since I retired just (I think) before he joined the RAFSAR force, or Wing as I prefer to remember it, but I share his belief that you just don't get it!
During the '70's I flew SH Wessex in Germany (18Sqn) then (72 Sqn) in NI before spending 22 years on 22, 202, and 78 Sqn's flying SAR Wessex and Sea Kings. I was a Flight Commander for 4 years (hence chief authoriser - but all our Captains were self authorising) in Scotland and again Flt Cdr in Wales and Falklands at various times as a Spec Aircrew pilot. We hover taxied in cloud on occasions, sometimes up mountains, sometimes at night too. It's what we did, just like our predecessors on the bloody Whirlind, (which was always safe single engine as they used to boast! That btw was a joke). I know of no aircraft loss due to this practice and the spirit and airmanship that achieved this is what made RAFSAR the best SAR outfit in the world at the time. Only the RN would disagree with that, but they were only amateurs! :E

So DB, get over it and move on.

"We're in the soup, lads."

Hmmm...let's see here: shall we go to instruments, climb to a safe altitude and file or get some vectors? No, the controlled airspace!

Or, how's about landing? No, could damage the aircraft on all the rocks!

I think we should we fly at 20' down this here road in the mountains until things improve!

Yeah, I vote for that! We're a highly trained, tough as nails, SAR crew!

I wish I'd never posted this now... :{

I bet Crab does too! :ok:

Alright Gurls....put down the Handbags.....enough of this SAR/HEMS chit chat.

I will see your RAFSAR and UK HEMS and raise you to a simple ol' wool shirted, blue jeaned, Wellie wearing Alaska Bush Pilot when it comes to this hovering in fog thing.....yer all a bunch of light weights.

Up in the Bush...we are the crew....ground, air, met, fueler, rampy, and general dogs body....oh...and authorizing wallah to boot.

Unlike the RN we do not dress in Girlie Kit and prance around like dear old Dad!

Just a few musings:

• None of us know what was happening on that aircraft from a video clip; most of you are guessing to support a particular point of view. How do we know the weather hadn't closed in suddenly and they were trying to escape back down the hill?
• Who or what the passengers were/are is irrelevant; mountainsides don't differentiate.
• Do military units need to train for bad weather? Yes. To that extent? Possibly, possibly not - we aren't the crew, we don't know what they were doing or what they auth'd.
• Should crews train/operate beyond their capabilities? No

A lot of speculation, plenty of opinions and an absence of hard facts. I am sure whoever is responsible for the aircraft in question has seen the video and discussed it with the crew - and taken any action they deem necessary.

Feel free to knock chunks out of each other, measure d1cks or waste heartbeats if that's your particular bent.

Edit: One of the few known facts is it wasn't SAR/HEMS so can those two groups of otherwise professional individuals stop with what they would have done, and who's better now?

DB - that last post of yours was wholly unworthy and better suited to a playground than a professional forum - you have no other argument other than the fact that you don't like it.

Don't start bashing other professionals on here when you have nothing but your bitterness to support your claims.