Helo IFR in the UK
 

Just so to clarify, it's not clear to me whether these gentlemen had an IFR flight plan on file and if so how soon would they have been able to maintain IFR obstacle separation legally if not departing from protected airspace.
By protected airspace I mean an airspace where obstacles have been surveyed not to intrude in a certain slope gradient around a defined location, to allow for departures and arrivals under not so much IFR but IMC, with adequate and published procedures.
Even in the "sporty" USA, pilots are required to maintain obstacle separation until reaching the airspace above where they can legally be IFR.

101Boy,
sorry - with all the talk of 'VFR' I forgot it was a night take off! My distinction from AOC was because in daytime the minimum vis would be 800m for JAR OPS-3

Sadly you miss my point! I am not advocating that we should all operate under a PAOC-which is not a public transport AOC in many respects. Prior to departure of any flight one of the primary tasks of pre flight planning is full and proper wx information covering the full anticipated route and any alternates. Aviation has always taken great pride in its safety culture and included in this is learning from our mistakes, if the AAIB investigation shows that WX was a major contributory factor which many think it may do, it is the responsibility of all aviators to operate to the highest standards. As a professional pilot I would welcome anything that makes my aviating safer. I am not sure what relevance driving on our roads in bad Wx has to do with this and I think the majority of the general public would agree.

Rules, JAR OP's, ANO, Exceptions, Exemptions, AOC, Private, CPL (H), IFR, VFR, Night, CAT A, Private Site, Repeatable Plan, Flight Supervision, Updates......is there someone out there that fully understands the Legal Mumbo Jumbo well enough to lay out the distinct requirements an off airport departure from a Private Site for a flight to Ireland would have to comply with in order to be legal and acceptable to the Authorities?

Simple stuff Helicopter Flying in the UK seems to be anymore!:rolleyes:

SAS,

This is the world of the onshore corporate pilot, working on his own with the demanding boss.

And yes MOST of them understand it.

Biz.

SASless.

My point exactly the rules in the uk are a joke how are we meant to follow the rules when most of us are not sure what they are ! Also explaining to the boss why you can't get airborne would be easier if you could just quote the rules

For helicopters:
OUTCAS:
VFR:
1500m horizontally from cloud or, clear of cloud, with the surface in sight and in a flight visibility of at least 1500m.
If not in compliance with the above, it must be IFR.
Can't do IFR from a private LZ. Has to be a licensed airfield. UNLESS you can guarantee clearance from obstructions below the MSA.

CAP793 refers to the layout and planning of an unlicensed strip/HLS.

and in respect of

These events just highlight how some people are living...


http://www.britishhelicopterassociat...%20Keepers.pdf

Yes, that's why it came to mind. Without sufficient visual references to properly establish the hover, in a confined area, it was essentially an IF departure. And as both of us know, it went very badly wrong. I recall the pilot was deemed to have "put the wings level", and as this was not the correct hover attitude, it naturally drifted sideways. The "blame" inferred was that the crewman saw the drift towards the obstruction but got his left and right mixed up and called a correction the wrong way.

yes, that was the tacky bit where the hot debrief evidence was subtly changed by the time the BOI interviewed them. It was at the top of a hill with only one obstruction (the radio mast) which was extremely well known to all. It was a poor decision followed by poor flying that cost the life of a good lad with a bright future.

I suspect there may be more obvious similarities between these two incidents than have been suggested to date...

TC,

I think you may have out of date info ref night VFR. The IN 2012/145 posted by 101Boy gives difinitive info re night VFR in UK.

Are you able to point me to the regulation that states that IFR isn't permitted from private sites and only licensed airfields? I can't find in ANO or INs.

CAP 793 is a guide to the CAA interpretation of 'sound practice' and not mandatory.

JJ

A-B,any idea of the temperature at the apprx .t/o time...? Norwich was about 3-5..

Not having a pop but I think we are missing the woods for the trees here.

Here is a £11m machine, with 2 paid crew and an owner with the resources of what is being reported as being close on half a yard (or in common parlance £500M).

I'd like to think that should I decide that my personal transportation requirements dictate that I need to employ my capital to such a level that the very least I could do is follow that sound practice... perhaps I might even be guided by one of these professionals that I trust with my £11m machine and ultimately my life.

Maybe I'd even buy a windsock?? Cut down some trees? Its absolutely dismal to be talking about what is and isn't the absolute law, what "rules" people are following... when the machine is in a thousand pieces and 4 people are dead and the initial look inside this particular box doesn't look great.

You can have a moan up and bleat about waiting for reports but I think its just ultimately delaying the inevitable.

Sycamore, no ,not something I noted but those weather conditions were so constant in the miles i drove I'd be very surprised if there was a significant difference between Gillingham and Norwich. It was a very stable weather system.

Your figures seem perfectly reasonable though.

His/her figures match the METARS, courtesy of ogimet:

##########################################################
# EGSH, Norwich Airport (United Kingdom)
# WMO index: 03492
# Latitude 52-41N. Longitude 001-17E. Altitude 36 m.
##########################################################

###################################
# METAR/SPECI from EGSH
###################################
201403131520 METAR COR EGSH 131520Z 34005KT 260V050 7000 NSC 15/09 Q1029
NOSIG=
201403131550 METAR COR EGSH 131550Z 04007KT 360V070 5000 HZ NSC 13/09
Q1029 NOSIG=
201403131620 METAR COR EGSH 131620Z 01006KT 5000 HZ NSC 12/07 Q1029 NOSIG=
201403131650 METAR EGSH 131650Z 03004KT 5000 HZ NSC 11/08 Q1030=
201403131720 METAR COR EGSH 131720Z 03005KT 5000 HZ NSC 10/07 Q1030 NOSIG=
201403131750 METAR COR EGSH 131750Z 05004KT 4500 HZ NSC 09/07 Q1030 NOSIG=
201403131820 METAR COR EGSH 131820Z 06003KT 3200 HZ NSC 07/05 Q1030 TEMPO
0200 FG=
201403131850 METAR COR EGSH 131850Z 05003KT 3000 HZ NSC 06/05 Q1030 TEMPO
0200 FG=
201403131920 METAR COR EGSH 131920Z 07003KT 3000 HZ NSC 05/04 Q1030 TEMPO
0200 FG=
201403131950 METAR COR EGSH 131950Z 00000KT 2600 HZ NSC 05/04 Q1031 BECMG
1200=
201403132020 METAR COR EGSH 132020Z 10004KT 0050 R27/0125 FG NSC 03/02
Q1031 TEMPO 0200=
201403132050 METAR COR EGSH 132050Z 07001KT 0050 R27/0175 FG NSC 04/03
Q1031 TEMPO 0200=
201403132120 METAR COR EGSH 132120Z VRB02KT 0050 R27/0150 FG NSC 05/05
Q1031 NOSIG=
201403132150 METAR EGSH 132150Z AUTO VRB01KT 0050 FG OVC000/// 05/05 Q1031=
201403132220 METAR EGSH 132220Z AUTO 00000KT 0000 FG OVC000/// 05/05 Q1031=
201403132250 METAR EGSH 132250Z AUTO 00000KT 0050 FG OVC000/// 04/04 Q1031=
201403132320 METAR EGSH 132320Z AUTO 00000KT 0000 FG OVC000/// 04/04 Q1031=
201403132350 METAR EGSH 132350Z AUTO VRB01KT 0000 FG OVC000/// 04/04 Q1031=

###################################
# short TAF from EGSH
###################################
201403131702 TAF EGSH 131702Z 1318/1322 VRB03KT 6000 NSC
BECMG 1318/1321 4000 BR
PROB30 1318/1322 0200 FG BKN001=

Pitts, you or I would but people who have that much nous don't always think like that. The uber-wealthy don't think like us or we would likely be that wealthy too, wouldn't we? Having built for several I can assure you that most are extremely cost-conscious (just with larger numbers than us) and most want some things their way no matter the cost or the rules involved. To them, rules are only suggestions to be worked around. I believe that this was a situation where he wanted his heli operated this way. The trees weren't trimmed or removed, the heli was where he wanted it to be, and the 'hole in the trees' looked big enough to him so it must be fine no matter what anyone else thought. Anyone who didn't like working in that situation quickly gets replaced by someone else. He made bad choices, some pilots tried to please him too much by pushing the limits too far and he got used to that; then the last pilot got unlucky when all the holes in the cheese finally lined up. The holes were always there and some were intentional, no matter the cost or the rules. It is the way the world is to them and because of that, this kind of thing will always happen with some regularity.

Agree 100% with that analysis of the mindset of the ultra-rich.Or perhaps more accurately the ultra powerful.I note that this Lord Ballyedmund clawed his way up in a commercial world.It's odd because I think the vast majority of us would,once we had maybe 1% of this guys net worth would buy ourselves a chateau in France or a few expensive boys toys and just take it easy at the age of seventy.

For some reason these people are still driven.That combined with wealth and perhaps an over developed sense of entitlement create personalities best described as "I know best".In this case I think it was lethal to the man himself and those around him.I think that those who inherit wealth don't usually display this characteristic which taken to the extreme is probably dysfunctional.

Pitts

But who actually is fundamentally responsible for the points you make - landing area size,b etc? Who is the operator, in this case? Is it the owner, because he's paying the bills? Is there an ops manager or department? Or was that effectively the chief pilot? I suspect the latter.

Maybe no-one ever told the owner the landing take off area was too tight for safe night ops? However from SawMan says - and he seems to have personal knowledge - the owner was forcibly told this. Nevertheless it still comes back to the chief pilot having the strength to put his foot down. Not easy though, with a job and income to protect, I'm sure.

So, one can see a not unlikely cocktail of night, developing fog, a pretty much 0/0 take off from a fairly tight tree surrounded site, a heavy machine for a long trip, a pressurising, demanding, intimidating owner passenger, drifting into a tree on vertical climb out to whack a blade or two, which either fail several seconds later or the pilot desperately attempts a hopeless emergency landing, knowing he's hit something.

Assuming this is not far from the truth, the most important question now is are there other similar owners out there who are exploiting the vulnerability and weaknesses of pilots to put everyone (and the industry) at grave risk? And if so, what can be done to prevent this?

Or is the reality that this situation, in a very small world, so unique that given the major alarm bells from this accident any such behaviour and weaknesses will be being addressed right now and a repeat is extremely unlikely?

Re post #303 by SawMan


Excellent. That pretty well sums up my experience of more than one very wealthy company chairman, one of whom is still alive and presumably flying around in his own aircraft. I wonder if he has learnt anything yet from his turnover of pilots over the last twentyfive years .......

Hi - As you suggest in a case like this one would hope that between the crew and the manufacturer there might have been a plan to operate this machine in the best possible way, which includes what the expectation was of the sorties being flown.

There are very many wealth people and some even own aircraft of far greater value than an AW139, I suggest that nobody flying around in a private BBJ is attempting to get into (and I’m being silly to make the point) Fenland for example! So it does seem that in some cases this type of person can be controlled.

I don’t know what the background is with this owner and the way he operates his aircraft, it does seem that there is a story but as you can see from this thread discussion has been closed down. I don’t know why and when I asked Senior Pilot he said he didn’t know either.

There is this defensive attitude, from many, that attaches itself to these types of event typically behind a veil of concern for family reading comments or out of a desire to respect a fellow aviator and the dead. That is seen as noble, and in a way it is, but it is also sensible to be able to discuss potential issues.

What’s the solution? Well waiting for an AAIB report will clarify if the issues are real or if I am barking up a wrong tree. However if not isn’t it amazing how people just don’t get involved. Potentially you’ve had a 4 ton machine landing in someone’s garden, transporting a member of parliament and key man in a large corporate body having already gone through a sales process with a major helicopter manufacturer and crewed by two commercial pilots if the conversation wasn’t had then just wow.

Edited to add: His company Norbrook has on its board a Sir Roy McNulty who is also on the Chairman of Gatwick airport so aviation is very much around these people... And S76... why not speak out about the "wealthy chairman"?? just like how someone was reluctant weeks ago to talk about David Richards accident in his 109...

I have heard the wreckage left RAF Honnington this morning on a low loader.

It's a bit different Pitts, fixed wing OEMs give owners an FCOM, helicopter OEMs traditionally do not leaving the operator to work out an Ops Manual Part B (in my part of the world).

After the ETAP and Sumburgh accidents, the helicopter OEMs have realised their exposure and are scrambling to catch up with the fixed wing manufacturers. It's one of the main synergies Guillaume Faury (the new Airbus Helicopters CEO)is hoping to gain from the closer alignment with the Airbus parent.

EASA EAD 2014-0073-E released.. Lower half scissor spherical bearing inspection.
EASA Airworthiness Directives Publishing Tool

Pittsextra,


See my PM to you, there has been plenty written about him on other PPRuNe Forums.

Thanks for posting that link - very interesting, especially if connected with the AAIB investigation of this accident.

The real PIC.
 

Can I throw a few words in from a different angle.

As many will know, and apart from doing the standard commercial tasks .... I've been involved in helicopter sales and marketing since the early 1970s. From time to time, one meets up with a potential buyer who unhappily possesses many of the personal traits listed above, and its a tough nut to crack I can tell you. Just like the company pilot who wants to keep his job, the sales guy needs to make sales and I've had occasions when I've made a sale and handed the guy over to the training school only to see him (always male!) blast off home in poor weather. Post event, I've even called the guy in question to offer some sage words ... and sadly on too many occasions, I'd have got a better response from my cat!

I obviously can't list them, but over the years I've seen perhaps half a dozen avoidable fatalities where the base cause has been inadequate weather and the "I've made a few million quid following my own advice so I don't need your advice now," mantra! That situation become horribly all too apparent when in the 1970s a talented F1 driver attempted an impossible landing at a rural airfield that lacked suitable IFR facilities.

Where do our industry's professional responsibilities end?

That's the problem ... anyone out there have the cure?

Safe flying to all pps. Dennis Kenyon.

rapman, Haven't seen G-LBAL's wreckage to see if the scissor link had an issue or not, but the release of the BT is coincidental and is due to issues with the new style Scissor Lever that is in use on some other AW139's.

Given the age of this machine, I doubt very much that it had the style of Scissor Lever that is affected by this BT/AD

Dennis, sage words indeed! like you I suspect that whatever guidance/rulemaking exists we will continue to read about such accidents as this.It is difficult to see how the OEM can be made responsible for how an owner operates his a/c, as long as he complies with all the regulations and rules at the point of delivery, other than sage advice the OEM is duty bound to deliver the equipment. Sadly.

Dennis I didn't know you had a cat?
What his name?

For my ole mate TO
 

He is a she ... goes by the name of Sophia being a posh Persian puss. DRK

Does the AW139 have a secondary scissor link?

It has two MR scissors links.

Hang on a minute this wealthy stand no none sense guy was sat in the back. As we all know the responsibility with whether we fly or not rests with the captain and as far as I am concerned this although very tragic accident rests with the pilots not the passengers having said that if it was a weather related accident which it all points to then don't blame the boss man

Are you for real??? Any pilot should say NO if conditions are bad, but a boss who fires anyone who says no, cannot be classed as innocent. Sat in the back or not.

Bollocks I'm not killing myself for anyone. I'm not a commercial pilot and I have no intention of flying commercially just not interested in being a taxi driver A to B for me is just boring but I do have 20 years instruction on tin pot helicopters but every time a machine goes down makes me very sad but it is down to the captain if it's pilot error. Let's hope our industry safety record starts to improve because to the average man in the street we are looking pretty bad at the moment

Cyclic Flare,
Thank you for your disparaging posts.You claim to be part of the industry but do not hesitate to call your fellow helicopter pilots "taxi drivers". Classy.
And,by the way, pick up a little booklet on English grammar. Turn to the chapter marked "punctuation". Try and get a little bit of education and then post over here. If you do that and also show a little respect for the living and the dead in "our" industry,maybe we will all take you a little seriously.

:mad:
Alt3.

Grammar and profession related class war. Last one out of this thread please turn off the lights.

'And,by the way, pick up a little booklet on English grammar.'


It could be worse, he could have started a sentence with a conjunction.


It's pretty clear that something needs to be tightened up by the CAA or EASA here. If what is reported above is true - 'a boss who fires anyone who says no' - then the potential for the erosion of safety margins is massive and beyond what is acceptable in 21st century aviation. If there's no requirement for private or corporate owners to have a Safety Management System that can be used to back up the Captain in his decision making then that is something that needs to change. Even if it's a generic SMS produced by the CAA that all private owners have to subscribe to. It is beyond comprehension that an owner can still use the 'fly me or else' line. This has to change. It's not just airborne people that are at risk. As has been seen in recent months, innocent members of the public are proving to be equally vulnerable to helicopters falling out of the sky and for many, that's beyond the pale. CAA/EASA - do something! This cannot continue.

Does a NS operator still use the 'Helibus' callsign?