FNW

Fair enough. No offence intended.

TR

Me to FNW, no offence intended at any time, just looking out for the families.

Cheers

RV

I'm not sure this is relevant to this accident but the timing is questionable.

31AgustaWestland: Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings
News Staff posted on March 31, 2014 11:25

An EMERGENCY airworthiness directive (EAD) 2014-07-51 is being sent to owners and operators of AgustaWestland S.p.A. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This EAD was prompted by reports of certain Lower Half Scissor Spherical Bearings (bearings) dislodging from certain Main Rotor (M/R) Rotating Scissors.

This EAD requires inspecting the M/R Rotating Scissors for play of the bearing. If the play is beyond allowable limits, this EAD requires removing the affected bearing and re-identifying the M/R Rotating Scissors. This EAD also requires removing all affected bearings.

The actions of this EAD are intended to detect excessive play of the bearing and prevent failure of the M/R Rotating Scissors and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

Already mentioned in post 358 (page 18). And no, probably not relevant due (IIRC) to the age of G-LBAL.

It was CFIT, and didn't hit anything en route:

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...4%20G-LBAL.pdf

seems like disorientation?

I am curious to know the PIC's multi-engine IFR time ... presumably not just the 580 hours on type?

The total time is perhaps a little on the low side .. personally if I owned a 139, I'm not convinced I would be happy with 2300 hour Capt ....

Actually, I would probably go for a 6k plus Captain and a 3k plus FO, both with five years onshore relevant experience .. and even then I would be careful !

My post #276 on Page14 stated:

"An IFR departure was legal, according to my understanding of the ANO Rules 32 to 34. However, the inference I get from this thread, given their non-mil background, is that they probably had little or no initial or recurrent training in the necessary techniques.

Is it reasonable to assume that 'zero/limited' vis take-offs are occasionally carried out, quite legally, on Private category flights by potentially 'untrained' crews? Given that the required technique isn't brain surgery - the mil do it - but it is a skill that requires careful instruction and recurrent training. Is there not a case for including it the civilian IR syllabus and recurrent IRTs?"

Anyone care to comment?

JJ

Very sad, and very predictable.

G550 driver, I think you'll find that a few with the experience levels you quoted as being desirable for this operation had already given it a go and moved on.....

It all depends on if you are willing to pay for it. In this specific case, with this owner, I have my serious doubt!

JJ, IMHO I don't believe you should destinguish between ex mil and civ. trained, only what the rules says about min. vfr wx for t/o. It's the same minima no matter your background and experience. End of story. If the rules were broken, and the accident wouldn't have happend if the crew had followed the rules, then all I can say is: Too bad, you paid the ultimate price, but it was your own fault. The rules are there for a reason.

Rather a sobering report and one that sketches a worrying trend, though one unlikely to continue in this outfit by the sound of it.

I just re read the Haughey air S76 accident report, and the similarities in terms of unsuitable operation using unsuitable procedures in unsuitable weather (and, quite possibly with unsuitable/insufficient planning or briefing) is striking.

In both this thread and others there are repeated references to extreme pressure put on Haughey pilots to operate outside their comfort zone, to their pilots refunding training bonds in order to leave early, to pilots leaving immediately after joining, to their recruiting "every six months" and so on. It's far too widespread not to be true. It doesn't take a psychic to picture the sort of operation that inspires that sort of behaviour of it's pilots, does it?
Further, testimonials from acquaintances of the pilots tell the all too familiar story of how professional they were, how they strove for perfection and took such pride in the job - none of which I doubt for a moment but sadly after so much repetition of these sentiments from the Mull to Battersea, Sumburgh, that S76, possibly Glasgow and now this latest incident it seems to show that no matter how professional, careful and dedicated pilots are they (we) are frighteningly susceptible to "company pressure" to do things we don't like or know we shouldn't be contemplating.

I've worked for some dodgy operators and made myself unpopular by saying No and i'd do it again if I had to, but I only got there by frightening myself on previous occasions. I've sat and watched others being browbeaten into it, I've talked to dozens on long night sectors about past shenanigans, and the same old company names keep coming up. Rarely have they had two fatals like Haughey which is perhaps how they get away with it but it is often so blatant that one wonders how on earth it isn't dealt with.

I'm loathe to suggest more legislation but I can't see how we can carry on like this. Full blown corporate 2 pilot ops in complex all weather aircraft just can't be allowed to continue under the same rules as a private R22 just because they mainly carry the same pax - just as the authority can't continue turning a blind eye to the known mavericks out there on the basis that they haven't had a accident yet. The CAA need to take charge, just for once but I'm not holding my breath. How we get over the company pressure think I frankly have no idea, except for us all to perhaps be a bit more bolshie about pushing the limits. Fat chance of that.

I note from the S76 report the almost grateful remark that the presence of a CVR made all the difference their investigation. No one would have had a clue what had happened otherwise. The investigators working on the Glasgow accident will be shaking their heads ruefully at that. Coming soon, CVRs for all, I hope. It has to happen.

As an industry I do believe we need to address the pressure aspect though, we owe it to our fare paying passengers, our principals and our industry whether we are flogging a pipeline in a Jetranger, hauling Sheikh Yerbouti to his donkey-walloping or driving a 737 to Malaga.

I just wish someone could figure out how.

The bare facts of this report point to pilot decision making in poor weather again. If any shred of good could be taken forward from this, it would be in future CRM studies of owner/pilot pressure. I remember attending a CRM session involving an aircraft accident from the same owner around 5 years ago. Perhaps owners should have to attend a CRM session annually with their crew. Other than that I would not want to see increased regulation.

Minima
 

ANO minimum for private /aerial work take off = 150m R(unway) Visual Range implies measured and reported. How does this work in a non-runway environment?
Vmini for AW139 = 50KIAS is a FM limitation(?) below which VMC/visual references required?

Tango 123

Forgive me if I gave the impression I was trying to turn this into a civ/mil pissing match. That was never my intention.

I have just reacquainted myself with Rule 28 and you are indeed correct, unless they had written permission from the CAA in respect of that site.

However, we are agreed that VFR was probably not an option, I believe it could have been legally conducted under IFR Rule 33. At least that's my interpretation and I stand-by to be corrected. If my understanding of Rule 33 is correct, surely crews should receive training in techniques they, on the face of it, seem likely to employ.

JJ

8021123

Have you got the ANO reference for your RVR statement please?

JJ

Tango123, blunt summary, but correct.

The last 2 posts have it.....when we start looking for the 'implied' version of a regulation or an 'interpretation' to allow flight in otherwise out-of-limits weather (IMC?) we really need to think again about wether it is a VFR departure.

Minima
 

Art 109(2)(b)

8021123

Thank you. You learn something every day!

JJ

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
 

Another accident where an improper trim-technique was a contributing factor. Even the best AFCS cannot improve handling qualities when FTR is continously pressed.

Posts from about 260 to 285 or so in this thread are worth having a second look at.

Add in the useful benefits of a fully slaved Autopilot system and this take off should have been an easy maneuver to accomplish.

Set heading, set pitch attitude, pull power and monitor the Autopilot. At some previously decided height/altitude (known to clear all obstacles) and beep in a bit of nose down trim from that set originally and off you go. In no time at all you would be VFR/VMC over the Fog.....or at least entering Controlled Airspace under IFR.

Attitude Hold is your friend.

In instances like this where corporate / private pilots are hired in / employed; do they (the pilots) require liability insurance to protect their estates?

An excellent suggestion from a previous poster about owners doing CRM (related) courses. It should be compulsory for the owners of all private a /c to complete (successfully) a CRM module.
[And I don't just mean owner/drivers either.]
RiP guys.

Re post 425
 

Boudreaux, maybe that's just what he was doing.... and so it goes on.

25 degrees nose low and 90 knots 2400 FPM ROD?

I don't think so!

I would assume the ATTitue Hold goes away with the FTR mashed.

Oh dear.

That AAIB report makes for very sobering reading indeed! Any pilot reading this, unfamiliar with somatogravic illusion should start reading now, and learn to fly on instruments. Luckily for all of us, there is ample RECORDED evidence that this was an intentional, manually flown manoeuvre with good oversight, and prompting by the F/O!

Agaricus:
As you will well know, you are UTTERLY out of order involving the Mull of Kintyre Chinook in your 'roll call' of pilot error! Though that may be your personal 'opinion' it is clearly unsupported by any facts, which is precisely why both pilots have, after a long battle for the truth, been unambiguously cleared of any blame whatsoever!

Though clearly you 'think' you know better than the experts!

I think he was drawing parallels with an occasion where the crew went flying despite nagging doubts, in this case about the aircraft, in the back of their minds.

Tragically this looks like a departure technique that sadly the pilots were not comfortable with, had not thought through properly or executed competently. Hovering out to the middle of a field surrounded by trees was sensible. But (assuming I read correctly) why did the captain elect to climb with force trim released? And then why did he start to transition at just 32 ft in IMC with trees around? Big mistake - he should have just held the hover attitude climbing to at least ensure clearance of trees so say 150ft before nose down pitch was applied to commence a transition. And it would have been best to have climbed until he picked up the visual clues that were probably above the fog (eg stars) before transitioning. Feels like he was uncomfortable with a vertical climb and too eager to get some airspeed registering. Having said that it appears he got away with that, with 60kts at 125ft height.

But then finally it seems he became (more?) disorientated and applied far too much nose down pitch which was not recognised and corrected early enough by the co-pilot. Or maybe the co-pilot couldn't overcome the pilots force on the cyclic?

TC - agree, as usual! And I do think as I said before that there may be a case for heli owners employing pilots (outside of an AOC operation) to have to undergo a training session and preferably be granted a licence to employ a pilot by the CAA. This should have been unlikely to be provided given the attitude of the owner here.

I had a quick read of the report, surely on this model you can push forward against the force trim?? If the visual illusion is strong enough, you can push forward pretty hard!!
Did he ACTUALLY hold the force trim button down, or is that speculation???

jayteeto

Under the circumstances, (IMC) it is unlikely the pilot was suffering a 'visual' illusion. Perhaps more likely is a somatogravic effect? This is a very powerful, and widely understood phenomenon which would have seen him push the nose down more than required. The only protection against this in IMC is rock solid instrument flying skills.

Anyone else think that whilst we can bang on about technique, or lack of it. The decision to depart in darkness from the middle of an unlit field, with obstructions all around, and in visibility described in the report as in the tens of metres was a sound one? We all recognise the pressure the captain was under, but I'm afraid many of these operations survive with a little luck and we never have to pick through the bones of what went wrong.
I'm left wondering how much experience either pilot had in this sort of situation, or indeed IFR flight.

Jay, the report says the FTR was held against the spring pressure, to me that means the FTR switch held in. But, they could mean the stick was being pushed against the stick force intself?

Art

With the exception of any requirement to comply with performance 'A', yes this departure could have been carried out perfectly safely. Correct use of the autopilot in this very capable machine, would have pretty much guaranteed a successful departure. Robust IF skills would likely have prevented the accident?

Sounds like the co-pilot correctly identified the developing problem, but for whatever reason was unable to intervene. Only the presence of the CVR reveals that information.

I leave it to others to discuss whether this departure was legal.

TR, agreed, if we're talking about can this be safe when flown by those with training and experience in this type of departure. I've sat alongside other pilots in the Sim and seen them max out within seconds of take-off in IMC due to lack of basic IF skills and setting the aircraft up properly.
As someone who's done a few thousand departures using manufacturers approved helipad profiles, I worry about others just making it up as they go, and worse than that, an operation that allows it to be that way.

My understanding of against the spring pressure is that the FTR button is NOT pressed. I stand to be corrected.
Apologies on my use of the words visual illusion, please substitute to 'a form of disorientation'. Many years ago, I lifted from an island off the coast of Belize on a dark dark night. I used a mix of instrument and visual flight. In the distance there was a flat low layer of cloud that made the horizon look higher in the sky. I put the nose 'on the horizon' and the instruments were chuntering away showing a 10deg climb. EVERYTHING was telling me the instruments were right, but I couldn't look outside because I felt that I was nosing into the ground. The instruments won the fight but I admit I was SEVERELY rattled by the experience.
All we know is that this pilot nosed the aircraft into the ground, the one thing that would tell him this is his AH. The co-pilot prompted him to check his attitude. WHERE was he looking??? 35deg nose down is a scary sight on an AH.

I suspect we all agree. The pilot flying became, almost immediately, disoriented. Without the experience/training to scan the instruments in precisely the way jayteeto mentions.
Judging by the application of full collective, rather than pitching up, I would strongly suspect he was looking at the VSI/Altimeter, and not the Attitude Indicator at any time.

Here's the text from the report...


be applied against springs to achieve manual flight, were active throughout the flight."

I wonder if it was the co-pilot who pulled the collective?

Art
I imagine it's possible we'll never know that kind of detail?

All I would say is, the co-pilot had correctly identified that 'attitude' was the real problem, which increasing power couldn't, wouldn't and didn't correct?

Extremely sad for all involved.

My first on this and every on going recent helicopter accident; why not let them try to rest in peace and wait for the full reports which probably won't be that different from the initials - let it rest.

Here is a link from the local newspaper

?No fault? on helicopter - Blackpool Gazette

Seems to me like this decision was made unusually quick

AFN

MOSTAFA

I absolutely understand where you are coming from. All I would say is this: PPRUNE purports to be a site for professional aviators. Many contributors both here and elsewhere, are extremely experienced individuals. We all try to understand accidents, not to see people criticised. (Every single one of us, even the very best are always guilty of human frailty!) We do it to understand. Hopefully reducing the chances of similar accidents occurring to others..

If pilots starting out in this business can pick up the odd 'nugget' from the ramblings of the KOSs, then that's a good result. If the KOSs remind themselves of things they had forgotten, then equally good. None of us have the time, nor frankly the luck, to make every mistake ourselves!

Think of these discussions as crew room chat, (which anyone can listen in to) and you may get the idea of their value?

Edited to add: KOS = Kn@ckered Old Sh1t!

Local! 281 miles. Mind you if you are a Canadian that probably is local.

To me the HP experienced decelerative errors during his disorientation as he went IMC @ night. He might have 'felt' the cab was slowing down and thus pushed fwd on the cyclic (I say 'pushed' because he'd mashed the trim throughout (iaw the FDR) - and thus couldn't trim fwd incrementally)).

He simply didn't have time to update his SA before the inevitable.

JT2
 

I am sure the "springs" referred to are those of the button on the Cyclic (FTR) and the trigger on the Collective (FTR), both spring-loaded to the engaged position.

Tam