My deepest sympathies go those affected.

I remember reading once about a helicopter accident leaving a remote area with no published departure and the pilots anticipated entering IMC shortly after the climb out. After the VFR departure they coupled the auto pilot, set heading, speed, but sadly forgot to set a vertical speed. Already in IMC the crew failed to realize they didn't have a climb and impacted an obstacle not far from the take off site. Not drawing any conclusions as to what happened here with these excellent pilots and equipment but I was reminded of that tragic accident. I agree extra regulations isn't what we need. What I take away from this is we must remain vigilant because even those far greater in abilities/experience then ourself are also vulnerable to the risks of the operations.

Greetings,

It is really sad and i'm sorry for the family of
those who died in the crash for thier loss.

The accident had happened for whatever reason.
The most important thing is to have RESPECT for
all the individuals and LEARN from the actual cause
to avoid such things in the future.

Accidents happen either in simple or complicated
aircraft, day, night, VFR, IFR or even on ground.

Rules were made and updated as experts see
them necessary. So, try to follow the rules as much
as you can

..

Fly safe ;)

Unconnected with the accident but curious nonetheless. Do crew and passengers travelling in a private helicopter across the Irish Sea have to wear immersion suits? I can't imagine corporate clients routinely going via Campbelltown so the shortest crossing of what is a very cold sea looks to be over 20 miles. Neither can I imagine ultra-wealthy passengers such as the ones on this aircraft or the one that crashed in the Mournes being over the moon about donning an immersion suit. Military crews would ordinarily wear a suit when there is any risk of ditching. Why not corporate? Or have I got it wrong and they'd all be suitably dressed for a lengthy over sea crossing?

The rules for overwater flights in helicopters are broadly similar to those for fixed wing aircraft.

But a helicopter arguably has a much greater chance of ending up in the drink.

We are speculating about sh.. weather, technical or software problems of the helicopter.
Fact is, for all reasons: If it's not safe, say NO!!!
I did it several times, for weather and technical reasons and I'm still here after more than 40 years flying.
Workmates who could not say NO ended somewhere crashing into the hills.
Making this decisions can be very difficult and it's getting not easier the more experience you have.
I'm in the very lucky position to work for a company which accepts pilots decisions as final.

Shy,

if I have offended you or anyone else on this forum with respect to this thread then I must apologise, it was not intentional, however if we are not going to speculate as to the possible causes of the accident and then the follow on information from that then this thread may as well be deleted leaving just the condolences thread.
We can say no more about it and wait the 12/18 months for the AAIB report.

Whilst I appreciate you knew the two pilots and therefore your emotions may be higher than those who didn't, speculation will always be evident.

R.I.P all those on board LBAL.

Out.

Spencer, I agree but as far as I'm concerned, any company I work for has to accept my word as final. Because if I say it's unsafe and they disagree I just walk away. I've done so a number of times and that's probably why I never got promoted to upper management, i.e. not being a perpetual yes man. But as we see here, no one respects you once you crash.

Jeeps, as I said before, I knew these two pilots only as fellow aviators. I'm not emotional about the accident, but I am principled in what I post on a public website after a fatal accident.

Over many years many references to Haughey Air have led down a path of concern over attitudes and treatment of it's pilots. Why is that?

So what we know so far (won't use the word facts yet) The aircraft took off at night from a confined site/HP, the lone tallest tree within a few hundred metres of the site was chopped in half at a point just above the surrounding trees. The aircraft then contacted the ground in the field beyond and struck a substatial row of hay bales before coming to rest in the opposite direction. The crew knew this site well and recently.
We don't know if there was mechanical failure during or shortly after take-off, we know the weather visibility was poor in places in the area, but not what it was like at the site until witnesses/cctv at the house are questioned. Others have speculated that the owner was a man who liked to go when he said it was time to go, but that he felt concerned enough about the aircraft to take procedings against the manufacturer to get rid of it. If it's not mechanical failure, or crew error, it could just be that they were unlucky with the one tall tree in the darkness.

I don't think luck had anything to do with this accident.

I would agree that all things considered there was no 'luck'.

RIP to all the guys.

Having survived for more than 40 years of flying helis, I can only agree with the relatively few who say you need to say NO on occasions and make sure that the owners know that. I have worked for a company Shy has and was given the CP job after everyone else left. I had to start from scratch and the basic was explaining to the owner why everyone had left. Whilst he did not like it he eventually agreed and life, I think, improved for all. We used to fly in some awful weather but having written an ops manual which the boss accepted, we were able to achieve about 95% without incident. I left him in no doubt who had the last say! Corporate flying is good and rewarding as long it is safe. I worked on the principal there was only one person who had to survive and that was me, after which everyone else should be ok.

@HLCPTR

"Does anyone have the serial number of this aircraft?"

c/n 31421 (from airframes.org)

NS

Shy, we do know the weather conditions. Read my post no. 156

Nice one NightSurfer, however don't expect any thanks, I didn't get any after my similar answer yesterday :ok:

Aw, come on....


Not everyone has constant access.


But thank you both.

Aga......I read your Post 156 again.

Would you share with us what you considered the weather conditions at the accident scene at the time of the accident to be....including amount of daylight, celestial illumination, etc. You were in close proximity of the scene at about the time of the accident and definitely have a background and experience level to provide for a qualified opinion.

Wx at the accident scene - must be surmise on my part. I had driven 8 miles or so in the opposite direction at 2130 with no significant variation in the 30-40m vis so think it unlikely it would have been different a mile away at the Hall. The hall is on a slight rise I guess 50 ft above sea level max, my place is 30 ft. Wind calm. Light - none. very dark despite a full moon. When I was looking for the circling helos at 2100 - 2130 the moon was occasionally visible for an instant as a dim disk. The helos were not visible, nor were any lights on them.

True, this was a couple of hours after the accident so I can't be sure what things were like at 1930. As I drove to the pub at 1840 it was dusk with mist forming fast at ground level and vis I'd estimate at 2-3000m and reducing quickly. It would have been dark by 1930.

I don't think we should read too much into the weather at Gillingham Hall at the time of the accident from what Aga has said - as I'm sure he would agree. Yes on the face of it it was simply foggy and VFR flight could not have been possible - but I'm not so sure. We all know mist and fog forming on the ground, as he says it was a mile or so away, at 18.40 could have barely affected vertical visibility. Indeed I think it is interesting the full moon was still discernable at 21.00 - a long time after the accident time. It has to be quite possible that the vertical vis at GH at the 19.30 take off time was pretty clear - clear enough for a vertical climb to be made using the full moon as a visual reference if required. One presumes the crew might have known there was fog building in the area but then maybe expected to transition to forward flight once above any fog in the area - say at a height of 100ft or so.

The location of the accident is interesting - thanks Silsoe. I suggest it is too far away from the take off location (assuming take off within the grounds and say 50m from the hall) for there to have been loss of control during the vertical climb through fog, as some are suggesting must have occurred. More likely is that either something was hit then (where was the damaged tree?) and perhaps a rotor blade damaged that then failed say 10 secs and 400m later, or perhaps more likely still, having made a successful vertical climb to the 100ft of so required to clear the surrounding trees, transition to forward flight was made too early, before being well above any surrounding fog, and maybe the crew, expecting to be effectively VFR on top, became disorientated and lost control in IMC. If this hypothesis was true, perhaps if the whole departure profile had been on instruments this could have been avoided by ensuring sufficient height was reached and a positive ROC was instigated on transitioning with forward pitch at the top of the vertical climb. Of course, all just theories.

I must say I am surprised not to see evidence of a permanent helipad at the hall on Google Earth, though maybe it was built after the 2006 image. I would definitely want to have a hard surface to land a wheeled 139 on regularly.

With regard to the crew it would be interesting to know if the co-pilot was IR - I suspect not. Again, be interesting to know what sort of total and IR time the captain had.

It is totally unnecessary and indeed it would be very negatively burdensome to the industry to change regulations as some have suggested by licensing private sites for night use etc. Many of us frequently operate helicopters into private sites at night perfectly safely with whatever level of lighting is prudent. Helicopter pilots - particularly those involved in corporate ops - need to have the intelligence and judgement to make safe decisions, all the time. At private sites even if they were licensed there would be no weather for example, so sensible judgements must be made about night take offs particularly and many are best considered as IMC departures anyway.

Where there could be a case for new regulation is in the employment of pilots. Given some of the comments on this thread about boss pressure, maybe any employer of a pilot (outside of an AOC operation) should have a licence from the CAA, granted after an interview and briefing session with the CAA (which they can pay for of course) to establish their suitability as an employer, and during which time the key employing passengers were taught some basics about helicopter regulations and safety - eg no IFR flying in singles. There is a lot of ignorance about, unsurprisingly. This licence would be anually re-issued and any comments from current or ex-pilots sought and considered by the CAA.

Helicopter pilots need to operate much more on their own initiative than fixed wing pilots and must ensure their flying is safe by being highly competent and responsible for their own judgements and decisions, but a process to minimise employer pressure (through education as much as anything else) might just be the most valuable outcome to corporate ops safety from this accident, if it is found to have no mechanical cause.

Really?!
 

"The power required to satisfy the programmed 80 kts and 750 fpm climb rate is less then the initial power used. When engaged at 60 kts reduces the power and sets up a sink rate to reduce climb. This technique may work on departure from runway but not in an area with obstructions. It is better to engage airspeed and heading maintaining the higher power setting and accelerate to VY with cyclic trim. The climb rate will be more than double of the GA mode."

DAPT, I believe you are overdue for refresher training. To put it mildly.:=

rs, Your answers can be found with the help of google and Linkedin!

I would agree that there is no need to change the legislation. It would seem obvious to anyone reading 'rotorheads' over the years, that this industry and private helicopter flying in particular has an element of risk greater than other forms of flying. This factor results in a tragic loss every couple of years, the greater majority of the time due to human factors. The rules are quite clear, just that at times circumstances combine to make entirely reasonable people make the wrong decision, often when pressing on in poor weather is concerned. The record shows it's a fairly constant rate, take a look around your local small airfield and compare the amount of rotary against the amount of planks. Then consider the fatality rates.

I did just over six hours flying today with about 25 differant people and every single group has asked about Thursday night as if I had all the answers , just like they did after Glasgow . It may be a bit unfair but my standard answer are " it's fine we are in a single , have lots of fuel (small lie ) and it's not foggy and that seems to do the trick . Not sure what point I'm trying to make it's been a long day but while we debate these crashes the public is watching and the industry will suffer if we don't get some solid answers

I think the best offer of a solid answer is repeated every 6 months during CRM recurrency trg. Aircraft are becoming more reliable, regulations are tightened, but human factors are still consistantly the biggest cause of accidents. It seems not to matter wether it's a twin or a single, one pilot or two.

AG it was dark on the ground by 1900. I live a couple of miles from Gillingham (in fact I am sitting on a chair that came from Gillingham Hall as I type). I was away on Thursday but my wife was driving home at about 1900. She says the fog was thick enough for her to use the fog lamps on the car - something she does not always do - and there were patches of fog that were thicker than others as she drove.

DAPT, not the right thread and time, however several of your notions are not correct and imply a less than adequate understanding of the AW139 AFCS with regards to RoC and PI Limiting when collective modes are engaged.

Feel free to PM me, I believe we stole too much bandwidth from this thread already.

Cheers to all and heartfelt condolences to those who lost a dear one in this tragedy.

CRM courses bang on and on about "the cockpit gradient" maybe for corporate charter they should bang on about the cabin/cockpit gradient. Where the gradient is not from the experienced pilot to the less experienced, whichever seat they occupy, but from the hugely wealthy holder of a pilot's contract to the pilot.


A broad look at UK helicopter accidents over the last ten years shows a fall off in the simpler AS355 types to the far more complex aircraft such as LBAL, I'm thinking offshore as well here. Current aircraft development has brought us into a far more automated place with much more reliance on the automatics, but from personal experience rotary training in the use of automation is far behind fixed wing training in the same arts. In the last five years I have completed two type ratings on highly automated fixed wing and rotary aircraft and the fixed wing course went into far greater detail and simulator time than the rotary course (simulators and trainers provided by the same training provider), but, the helicopter automation is far more complex than the fixed wing due to the greater mechanical and aerodynamic complexity of the helicopter.


When BA Helicopters S61 crashed in the Scilly Isles a lack of RadAlts and poor radar were serious factors, but for the first 2 500 hours of my rotary career I flew S61 equipped with basic SAS, RadAlt, monochrome radar and Decca. In that time I never once saw or heard of a crew getting into a problem due to finger trouble or poor IF skills. On transition to the 332L1 and 2 a lot of time was spent learning the automatics and when to rely on them and when to throw them away (thank you Pete Benson and Mike Tingle)


A final thought as I'm away now for a week in an internetless place. Even if the viz was poor but workable on Wednesday night a helicopter will quite easily create it's own fog bank. In 1997 I was asked by Ops to ground run a 332 before an early take off from Aberdeen. The weather was calm, high pressure temp and dew point the same, viz 7k. By the time I had finished the run the mixing from the helicopter had been enough to put ABZ into LVPs. 5 years ago I landed at night to pick up a customer from his home (helipad lights, PAPIs lead in lights, basically a dream site) but the weather was essentially the same as the morning in Abz. By the time I had shut down the viz was less than 100m, caused by the helicopter. His chauffeur drove me back to base where it was still a clear night and he stayed home.


Before you all shoot me down take a long hard think about your training on the automation on your aircraft and whether you learned most of what you know on the job. Now, take aim.........


SND

SND, perhaps we might start calling you "Joe Btfsplk" with your ability to form Fog every where you go.;)

http://s3.amazonaws.com/mmc-beta-pro...er_article.jpg

In a conversation I had with the co-pilot he stated that he indeed held an IR.

Thankfully the CAA HOIs of more recent appointment have the foresight to require pilots to use the automatics during tests. The old dinosaurs who apparently saw them as cheating (or too complicated for them to understand), and therefore under no circumstances allowed them to be engaged during test flights, have thankfully retired.

And had just come back from Italy from his LPC I believe.

BR

K

FairWeatherFlyer Not IMHO.
Education is more effective than prosecutions.


NB: That is a just a general comment in response to your post.
Whether or not visibility had anything to do with this accident has yet to be determined.


FL (Like you, a PPL.)

SAS;


Its just my little bag of gloom, I carry it everywhere!


SND

How does a single pilot IR differ from a multi pilot IR?

There is a previous PPRuNe thread, but how would it apply in this case?
http://www.pprune.org/professional-p...t-ratings.html

I was a very good friend of Lee; one of the deceased pilots. I have read the threads with interest and sadness, some of the post are not helpful. It is inappropriate and wrong to make sweeping comments about their professional abilities, qualifications and experience.

A pilot of an AS350 approached Lee & Carl at Royal Ascot last year, the pilot asked if they were with the AW139 G-LBAL, when they confirmed this, he replied that it was amazing "Northern accents flying that". The life of a VIP pilot is difficult at the best of times, but I can assure you that it is nothing compared to what their families are going through.

I knew Lee very well and one thing I do know is that Lee was not the kind of man to say 'yes' to anyone, regardless of how much money or power they had. He was a man with the highest levels of integrity, a good man, a quiet man, a thinker, a man who strived for perfection in everything that he did. He was extremely proud at what he had achieved in his life and I know that the dreams and aspirations that Lee and his family had have been tragically taken away.

I respect the fact that everyone has a point of view, but please remember that these pilots were real people, good people; with families and friends, some of whom read your posts.

FL,

For what its worth.....the FAA has had that attitude with the US EMS Operators forever and to my knowledge have never enforced Part 135 Night Flight requirements re surface lighting for Night VFR despite knowing there are many large dark areas in our country where such lighting just does not exist.

I wonder what the effect of the FAA suspending a Part 135 Operating Certificate would be re changing attitudes about that as compared to the historical method of.....well you cannot say "seeking compliance" as they haven't.

I submit the numbers of accidents over the years might have been much reduced had the FAA placed adequate effort behind demanding adherence to the existing regulation instead of what they have done.

Anyone that has flown in the mountainous regions of the USA understand what I am talking about.....or out west in the wilds of Texas and other large expanses of nothing.

FAR Part 135, Section 207 is the pertinent Regulation and requires helicopters to have sufficient surface light reference by which to safely control the Helicopter.

Condolences to the bereaved families and RIP and respects to the pilots.
While the weather may or may not have been a factor and other issues are yet to be determined,I will refrain from making any assumptions. But----
From a purely human factors point of view I am sure the AW139 was sold to the owner as an "all weather aircraft" with all the whiz bang bells and whistles to make flying in "zero zero" conditions child's play. Well,looks as if the owner demanded a return on his investment and the piper had to be paid ---unfortunately in blood.
There have been plenty of accidents and incidents off shore and on shore of highly sophisticated aircraft with two pilots ending up in the drink, or almost there, and even other gcrashing.The reason is perhaps because the pilot on controls in IMC is the only one afflicted by, and reacting to, an SD situation.By the time pilot monitoring realizes what is happening and attempts to take control,it is too late. So, two crew or single pilot, sophisticated aircraft or not, the best thing to do on a bad weather day is to stay on the ground.And, Shy Torque, that is straight out of the airmanship book of rules.
But, like all or most of us, we are all susceptible to the pressures of the ultimate human failing : the loss of a paycheck.
Alt3

Alouette,

Yes, by not flying you mitigate most aviation risks. I had already worked that one out about forty years ago. Like any other pilot, obviously I have cancelled flights due to weather, and I have gone around from a few approaches and/or diverted. On a few occasions I have made the highly unpopular decision to leave a helicopter on the ground and gone home by other means and come back for it later when the conditions improved enough to make a safe departure.

I can't tell you what I would have done on the occasion in question because I wasn't there, and neither were any of us. Obviously, the decision to scrub due to weather is easier for non IR'd pilots but I can tell you that my own decision would not have been based on the demands of the passenger, however much that decision was challenged. I've been paying money into my pension for many years and I damn well intend to enjoy my retirement, which seems to approach ever more rapidly.

I certainly don't condone taking off or landing below safe limits with regard to visual references, (self preservation rules OK), however I challenged the reference to "breaking all the rules in the book" because I saw it as unjustified. The person who posted it didn't refer to which book that was, and hasn't responded to my question to see if his/her claim could be qualified.

None of us know the cause of this accident, however obvious it might seem from what has been published in the media, or here. I think it far more appropriate, on what is supposed to be a forum for professional pilots, to wait to find out the result of an official and expert investigation, rather than see deceased pilots pilloried in public without proper justification.

If the cause was not directly related to met conditions (and I accept that it may be), experience tells me that no-one here will issue a public apology for their unjustified, inappropriate comments. They quietly slink away.

If you see it as acceptable, then go ahead; but hopefully my point has been made.

I would think the manufacturers tag of 'All weather capability' would be backed up by some such phrase as when operated from and to suitably equipped facilities iaw with ICAO/EASA legislation. The civilian operation of 'all weather' would be very different to military or SAR for example.
There's plenty of talk on here of zero/zero profiles/capabilities, pilot IR experience etc, all irrelevent at the time of the accident, as this was a VFR take-off in VMC, there may or may not have been an intention to transition to IFR in IMC at some point after the take-off at which point crew qualifications and capability could be a subject of valid opinion.

To explain further, I've done plenty of zero/zero departures into IMC from suitably equipped airfields and i've done thousands of VFR take-offs from unregulated unlit field sites, but never an IFR departure/take-off from a field site.....the take-off has always been VFR with a suitable planned transition to IFR in IMC (or VMC). I imagine that is the experience of most on here?

The point I'm trying to make here, is that this was a VFR departure, it had to be, so talk of the 139s complexity and pilot IF experience is not valid.