Very sobbering reading adding to an already weighted statistic.
Regards
MF 26

Thanks, I haven't flown the type and am corrected.

A professional pilot must recognise the limitations of his experience, currency and training (I know, easier said that done you may say - but true nevertheless).
Being one of those KOSs, I have had a number of occasions in the past when over-confident & very forceful passengers have insisted in attempting landings at private sites below limits, 'finding a hole in the fog', etc, etc, and the only answer is to politely decline the unsuitable request.
We must try and find a way to get the message across to those who have not yet had the chance to accumulate the experience & confidence that goes with it (and in a few cases of those who have the experience & should know better) to stand up to unreasonable demands from passengers.
The whole industry is greatly damaged by wholly preventable accidents such as this, together with the enormous distress to the families and friends of all those involved.
Thorough IF training and regular recurrency is a must if you are going to fly in poor weather. The helicopters are fully capable these days and so must be the pilots.

That, and having practiced the maneuver correctly a few times previously. Looks like what was being attempted was a combination "obstacle clearance takeoff" and "instrument take off."

I note from the initial findings that the passengers were late. Granted, in a private deal, it may be that the discretion of actual take off time is in their hands. I'll edit this post when I recheck the time of sunset. The original take off time versus actual had more than one change in the environment.
EDIT:

Back to this case, with two professional pilots to hand, one would expect that they re-briefed and adapted to the changing conditions ... or had that as their plan.

Lomewolf_50

The extract you took from my post is more correctly summarised with a longer quote:
Somatogravic illusion kills even when the associated manouvre has been practiced countless times. Far more frequent in FW accidents, it is a depressingly frequent contributor to CFIT. Which is precisely what this accident would appear to have been?

Only robust instrument flying techniques offer any protection when electing to fly manually.

Fair point, TR, my underlying point is the old saw about currency and proficiency. Apologies if I misrepresented your meaning, I think we are in general agreement.

So if I understand this correctly, there was a perfectly adequate and functioning AP and the pilot decided to over ride and fly manually and then crashed the aircraft?.

Chopjock,

The report refers to the force trim release switches being held in (depressed) to enable full manual control, nothing to do with the AP. There is no AP designed to be capable of carrying out a take-off profile from the ground, but setting up and using the stability aids such as stick trim can greatly aid getting away from the ground and flying a pre-planned profile. The use of helicopter APs are limited by the relevant AFM to certain limits such as not below a certain speed or height. Of course it is prudent and good airmanship to pre-select/arm hdg and alt holds prior to take off in these circumstances.

Art hi.

I'm not type rated on this a/c but I thought someone who is, suggested to me G-LABL may have had doppler derived auto hover as a feature of the autopilot? In other words it could have maintained a fixed ground position, even in IMC, as the aircraft climbed vertically?

Of course that may not be correct?

Chop jock is correct. Art of Flight - I think you are confusing yourself between the APs and the flight director (I know terminology is different from type to type).
On the AW139, the APs allow the attitude hold to do exectly that - hold the selected attitude unless you press the cyclic FTR button, overriding the clever system and converting the aircraft into a very expensive R22. The FD is the piece of kit which (subject to being within design parameters), will allow you to select altitude, heading and airspeed holds etc., and on more advanced models allow coupled transitions to and from the hover.

Thanks PC, no confusion on my part, just trying to respond in a general way to a question of why the pilot was apparently overriding the AP during takeoff phase.

Seems a Circular discussion going on here.

Was bad Decision Making that caused the Crash or a Loss of Control during the Takeoff?

It appears to me the situation needs to be parceled out into several lanes of discussion.

One relates to the Weather and Darkness and being at an unlit off airport departure point.

Then we ought to consider the Take Off Procedure.

Also we ought to discuss use of the Force Trim, Auto Pilot, and Flight Director. Is this another indication of a Crew not understanding how to best utilize the capabilities of the Aircraft Systems?

We cannot get away from hashing out what rules, regulations, orders, directives, instructions, and advisories pertained and how they were dealt with.

There is no way to point a single extended digit and identify the exact single cause of the Crash as there were many factors, causes, and failures to be able to isolate the cause to a single thing.

One question I would ask is whether the two Pilots were victims to a system that set them up for this tragic event by loading them down with concerns that diverted their attention from the basic requirement of just flying the machine.

Had they been so influenced by all sorts of profiles, SOP's, and rigid adherence to Procedures that they really were not able to just fly the machine. Had the Crew become to indoctrinated in Standard Procedures they could not realize it was a non-Standard situation that required a different method for Take Off and they were unable to figure one out that might not necessarily comport with the Standard Procedures?

They were products of a training and certification system that claims to prepare and ensure Pilots are capable. They were in a very new and sophisticated twin engine helicopter. The maneuver they were performing should not have been beyond their abilities although not one they did on a regular basis.

It is not just the Pilots that need to be critiqued here, but also the system that put them in that situation. The Pilots made some mistakes certainly but they sure had a lot of help in that happening.

Bob, you have probably picked the worst possible example to try and prove your theory that we 'stiff assed Brits' are overly regulated and procedurally retentive. The CAA have very little authority to regulate private operations like the one involved in this unfortunate accident. It doesn't prove anything other than the well known fact that if you want to create a situation where something might go horribly wrong, throwing a human being or two into the mix is a pretty sure fire way of achieving eventual success:(

B Bob

I think you're over complicating the situation. I think the pilots flew beyond their competency level, no doubt succumbing to owner pressure they should have resisted.

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
 

Rotor speed, the ability to manage client expectation and owner pressure may be the core competency that let them down. It's a circular argument but was the decision made to fly because they felt able and competent to handle the conditions, which were below sensible minimums, or simply because they couldn't say no?

Apart from the persons on board was there anything else loaded that might have influenced the need to take off in atrocious weather conditions?

Having flown for some time when there were not so many rules as there are now I have done scores of IMC take offs during the day and night. The conditions have ranged from blowing or laying snow, Norway and the UK; blowing or enveloping dust, Cyprus, Middle East and Australia; heavy rain, Australia and the South Pacific and Fog, Everywhere.

The golden rule is: Do Not Look Out of the Cockpit until you are established in the climb.

The visible snow, dust, raindrops and mist swirling around the cockpit will create an overwhelming impression that the aircraft is going the wrong way. At night the stuff going through the landing light beam will double it. If one does not ignore this than the situation can get out of hand so the only safe course of action is not to look.

Whether this effect had any bearing on this case I will not speculate but if somebody remembers that rule in the future then that is enough.

We're at risk of going over very old and long-tread ground here, but apart from the lack of an icing clearance, the aircraft type didn't even have a valid release to service. The MOD (test pilot) department responsible for producing it had refused to fly their example of the type, out of general safety concerns. The "Mull" pilots could possibly have been Court Martialled if they had refused to fly the sortie as ordered on the day; they would have been fully aware of this fact because as far as the military were concerned it was an operational theatre, albeit not publicised as such for political reasons.

At least civilian pilots don't have that pressure put on them from above, but they could lose their job over a refusal to fly, especially if the man paying your salary is your passenger. Disregarding that, there is always a personal desire to get the job done whatever, but as I've said here before, it can be a very fine line to tread.

Gentlemen,

Respectfully, can we get back to thread?

JJ

JJ, the point is, the above diversification of the main topic shows that even with a rule book in place, aircraft captains can, and do, come under intense pressure to do something they might not ideally wish to do.

If that pressure is to do something outside of the rules, or outside of common sense, the pilot will always be made responsible for his actions, whatever he does on the day.

JJ;


Hopefully this one's back on topic.............


I'm not surprised at the relative inexperience of the crew. Too many of us in the industry knew Spotty Muldoon (last words on the CVR of their last big crash were his saying he was unhappy at what was going on) the rumours were out there and although I'm very happy for FNW to correct my thoughts/attitude, there seemed to be a very high rotation of experienced pilots through their Human Resources Dept.


On our fleet insurance, AOC/Private management the MINIMUM hours for an IFR P1 are 2 500, and even then every flight that pilot conducts has to be sanctioned by either me, or the head of training, or the accountable manager (our signatures approving actually have to be on his flight brief) until he reaches 3000 hours.


There has grown up around the IFR pilot an apparent aura of experience and knowledge. The IR is intended to allow you to fly IFR in controlled airspace, fly IFR airport to airport or to recover to an airport IFR when the weather craps out. It does NOT allow you to pull a towering take-off from a paddock with cloud on the ground and a viz in "tens of metres). it does NOT allow a pilot to fly an approach into a paddock in those conditions (I would love to know what the weather was like when they arrived)


One AOC in the UK has recently taken a kicking from the CAA because a pilot took off from an airfield in the UK with no approach aids, no IFR assistance in weather conditions well below what was either legal or sensible. His actions have caused the company both massive embarrassment and financial loss.


I used to fly off-shore (about 11 years of it) and became very accustomed to taking off into immediate instrument flight, but I learned those skills sitting next to some very experienced captains who showed me how and then talked me through how, until I got it right.


I have had the client in the back yelling about "What do you mean you won't land in my garden?!! I hired a F***ing IFR helicopter and pilot, I'll go back to White Knuckle Helicopters next time, they always get me in!" A long time ago I caved to that pressure and scared myself witless, now I'm old enough and ugly enough to argue the point, and if the client walks, so be it. I have also had the argument on behalf of other pilots, and expect to have it again, sadly, because as an industry we are crap at telling the punters exactly what an IFR helicopter/pilot combination is really capable of.


SND

Too true. The aircraft salesman will prefer to let the potential customer believe that the aircraft is "all weather", rather than "IFR equipped".

On two occasions I've had people who don't know any better tell me that helicopters are fitted with radar so the pilot can land in fields in cloud. One was an army captain, one an aircraft owner/employer. Both became angry at me for telling them that unfortunately wasn't the case and I couldn't do what they asked.

Shy;


My favourite has always been "surely it comes to a hover at a couple of thousand feet and then descends vertically, after all that's what helicopters do!"


SND

SND,

I would never correct anything you think or go anywhere near your attitude! ;-)

Welcome home - we have missed you!

FNW x

Yes, unfortunately, that is another common misunderstanding of the capability of a helicopter.

A few years ago I had cause to write an article outlining what could and couldn't be done with the machine I was flying. The passengers / PAs had some totally false ideas.

Also other things such as:

"We need to fly three more passengers than we originally said, so you'll just have to put some more fuel in before you go".

"What do you mean the aircraft is still on maintenance? They've had it for a day already. Tell the garage we now need to fly it this afternoon and just to do the oil change for now; we'll have the rest done another day when we don't need to use it!"

(This was the aircraft annual inspection....)

I find post 431 offensive. It reads as factual. You are correct, you didn't make a list, please consider this as a 100% apology.

SND

I'm sure that not only are the hours important (you mention minimum 2500 hours for your insurance) but also how relevant are those hours? for example 2500 hours underslung or instructing may not be that relevant for an IFR operation! 2500 hours on say AS350 would be much more relevant than 2500 on R22, etc, etc.

This is why I previously asked, what was the previous experience of the Capt? No one on here seems to know.

If he had 2000 hours on IFR helis as a FO then that is quite different to if he had say 600 hours IFR heli time and the rest on a R22? Offshore and Onshore time both have advantages. If for example, he had carried out 100 offshore departures at night or 100 military IFR towering take-offs then it is likely that the departure would have been uneventful.

Uneventful, but not sensible, as a reject before CDP would probably not end well if no visual reference - and you could not be sure of meeting Rule 5 (3) (a)

If the Capt lacked the experience levels that one would normally have to be commanding this aircraft in this weather, perhaps the Operator may have some responsibility and duty of care and may well be considered negligent. There could be a case for the pilots families v the Operator.

So I think it is important to know the previous experience, single engine charter/ corporate, any military time, offshore, IFR heli time (not IFR time but time on an IFR heli so that there is sufficient experience to make decisions re IFR weather)

It seems that there is a fair amount of evidence that this Operator lacked a good safety culture.

I don't understand what you mean by that. Rule 5 doesn't apply when taking off or landing, as per Rule 6:

5(3)(a) is in respect of low flying en route, i.e. disallowing pilots from flying in the lower part of the avoid curve, which might otherwise be attempted over open land or the sea.

shy torque

I'm referring just to 5(3)(a) and not 500ft rule

My understanding is that you are exempt from 5(3)(a)at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. taking off from a private site requires you to be able to land without causing danger to persons or property on the surface in the event of a power unit failure.

But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew.

If you prefer, here's the whole section, including 5(3)(a):

shytorque

I didn't want a discussion re rules of the air, but if you insists.

I think you are missing the point that you are only exempted from 5(3)(a) by rule 6 at a Government or licensed aerodrome .. have a look at 6 (a)(i) again ..

This is quite important if you operate into private sites ...

shytorque

to give a practical example:

You're in a A109C at max weight on a summer days at a private site, on take off and landing you cannot cause danger to persons or property on the surface.

Therefore it's ok to damage the aircraft with a heavy reject on take-off provided you don't cause danger to property or persons - but it's not ok to crash into a car, lawnmower, fence, building, etc

At a government or licensed aerodrome this does not apply ...

Anyway, the point I was making, whether or not you agree with this interpretation of rule 5, is that a rejected take off in fog at night, without any visual reference is likely to not end well. However, the manoeuvre should be able to be carried out safety from a handling point of view provided an engine does not fail.

This is not an acceptable risk from my point of view, so why did not crew make this decision. Was it lack of experience? Was it pressure or perceived pressure from pax?

The experience of the crew, in particular the capt is an important factor.

G550

The crew would have made their decision to depart based on their assessment of the risk involved. Whatever view you have of the risk involved would not be something they would know - or probably even consider relevant if they did.

And furthermore, for what it's worth, I think the risk of one engine failing on this acft on the climb out would have been negligible - and far from the greatest risk of the manoeuvre. And even if one had failed, I suspect a reject landing could have been accomplished, albeit with damage to the acft, but not occupants or property.

The Engines did not fail.

There were no mechanical failures.

All this arguing about Rules, why not about argue about properly flying the machine?

Violating a Rule does not harm you but not flying the machine surely does.

Get back to 60 Knots at 35 feet and 90 Knots at 125 feet then a nose low attitude of 35 Degrees and a Rate of Descent of 2400 FPM that was increasing.

Ask yourselves how and why all that happened on a very foggy night with visibility said to be "Tens of Meters" .

Was that indicative of an appropriate Take Off Profile?

Does that suggest there may have been more Visibility and a thinner layer of Fog than is being considered by everyone?

Did that bit of Hovering clear out a small area of Fog and the Crew be able to see up?

G550 driver
With genuine respect for your experience and skill (I'm 99% sure I've worked out who you are and, if I'm right, I've flown with you ;) ) Rule 5 is a red herring IMHO and introduces an unnecessary complication.


FL

FL

Yes, we do know each other. Although I agree to a great extent rule 5 may be a “red herring” but lets just suppose that night the crew told the owner that they cannot meet the “land without danger to property requirement in event of engine failure” and the flight was delayed until the morning. That would be relevant wouldn’t it? We would not be having this discussion.

Now I am not now saying this is the case, but it could be, or alternatively the crew may have given other justification why they could not depart that night. That is also relevant? So far in this thread we do not seem to have a conclusion whether this flight was legal or sensible considering the conditions.

So it may be worth considering if there are legal reasons why the flight could not depart, because if so, the crew could have used these reason for justifying why they could not depart.

Not only that, this could be useful for other crews placed in the same situation on another occasion that will no doubt occur sooner or later.

Unfortunately all private sites need to be assessed for many factors including, Is this a congested area? Can I land without danger to persons and property on the ground in the event of a power failure? etc, etc. This is always relevant to me in case I am brought in front of a Judge.

When you tell an owner you cannot depart it always helps if you can back up your decision making. If you give an owner a good reason that they understand, you tend to get a better reaction than if you just say I don’t feel comfortable or you just cannot.

For example, one dark and foggy night a pilot who worked for one of my previous owners said he did not want to depart because he did not feel happy. This owner persuaded him to depart by taking the piss out of him in front of the other pax by saying ‘are you scared of the dark, what’s the matter with you, do you want to borrow my torch, etc, etc. The pilot was reminded of the story for months afterwards by the owner who took great delight in recounting the story again and again. Then on another occasion the pilot departed when he should not have, under pressure again because he could not clearly justify his reasons and they all had a near death experience!

My experience with the owner was entirely different. When I explained why we could not depart giving a good reason, the discussion was over and the decision was accepted.

So for example one could say "our departure this evening requires a TDP of 200ft due to the trees and obstacles and if we have an engine failure just prior to TDP, we would not be able to see sufficiently to avoid damage to property on the ground and we could end up damaging the aircraft or even you. This does not comply with rules of the air and so we need to delay until xxxx”

Now that may or may not apply to this site, but it is certainly a factor to consider in the decision making process regarding whether to depart or not, and may possibly have been a reason to give to the owner this night. I don’t know, but I would not rule it out entirely as a red herring. What TDP should have been used? Could one reject just prior to TDP with danger to property on surface? These issues have not been discussed and may well be relevant., but also there may be other justifications for not departing. Alternatively, perhaps it was perfectly ok to depart?

I noticed in the PB AAIB special accident report there was mention of the low flying rules, so if there are breaches of any regulations, it is likely they will appear in the final report for G-LBAL.

However FL, in my last post I did say "But in any case, my point is not intended to be a discussion about rules of the air, but rather the experience level of the crew."

I wanted to focus on experience levels as this is quite a long thread and the issue of experience seems relevant and has not been discussed.

The Captains total hours seem a little on the low side for the type of operation, so the relevance of those hours is important.

Many Operators consider the previous experience of a pilot for determining the suitability and minimum experience level for command. I would be interested to know the previous experience of the Captain to see if this meets normal industry criteria.

Experience does affect the handling ability and perhaps more importantly the decision making process and is a factor to consider in my view. For example a 20,000 hour North Sea Commander may not make the best AS350 charter pilot and vice-versa. If the Operator designated the Capt as P1 with insufficient experience then the Operator may well be negligent.

Unfortunately I know several Owners/ private Operators with Superman complexes, who think they are invincible. Many are used to taking risks in their business world and so become accustomed to risk and accept risk in their aviation departments. I have known several Owners who intentionally and wilfully break all manners of aviation law and common sense and guess what - they all get away with it most of the time.

If there is negligence on the part of the Operator, and for avoidance of doubt, I have no reason to say there is in this case, but if there is, then awarding of damages may well be a deterrent to prevent future negligence.



Rotorspeed

Yes the risk is negligible, and I agree with you - but 5(3)(a) does require you account for engine failure.

G550

Yes but Rule 5(3)(a) relates to en route flying, not taking off and landing, does it not? And you are talking about the take off phase.

Otherwise how do you think a single could ever legally make a confined area approach or take off?

Rotorspeed

5(3)(a) does not say it only relates to en-route flying

Either at a training aerodrome, at a government or licenced aerodrome where you are exempt or with a CAA exemption

Otherwise you will of course make sure your approach and departure route into the confined area allow you to meet 5(3)(a) ..

If you would like more info, PM me your number and I'll call you. Alternatively call CAA GA dept, Training Standards, your FOI or legal department ...

may I politely suggest we move back to the issue ....

G550

But under Rule 6(a)(ii) dealing with exemptions to Rule 5 low flying regulations it says landing and taking off in accordance with normal aviation practice is exempt. So unless one wants to start getting pedantic about what constitutes "normal aviation practice" surely that leaves Rule 5(3)(a) to be basically applying to en route flying? Or have I got it wrong? I don't claim to know the rule book backwards!

6(a)(ii) refers to the 500ft rule i.e. 5(3)(b) and not 5(3)(a)

over and out :)