G550

Ok, see what you mean! But then is the 5(3)(a) requirement not to damage persons on the ground, or any persons? And secondly, what exactly constitutes "property"? Are natural features (field/trees/hedge) property?

Absolutely loads of photos out there now of great accidents highlighting reasons not to get airborne in marginal conditions. Stick them on your iPads and show them to your corporate bosses when next faced with that decision...:ugh:

NRDK

I agree, the image of G-LBALs cabin reduced to confetti should certainly remind any passenger that a change to method of transport is far more sensible than pressing on with the original plan if the pilot says no.

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
 

It's a simple call. Safe to go or not? If the forecast is for more of the same then take an alternative mode if transport. Gethomeitis ?

Surely the moral of this accident is that if you are going to fly without adequate visual references (or run the risk of doing so) get your basic IF scan going straight away.

Even if you allow for some somatogravic illusion affecting the pilot's inner ear, 25 degrees nose down is difficult to achieve or ignore if you are actually looking at the AI.

Why always after the event?
 

What puzzles me with this type of thread (quite aside from the bun fighting) is that ultimately we all happily conclude that the pilot fired the machine up and so it all rests with him. Running out of fuel, bad weather decisions, poor maintenance, poor skill level, out of currency - whatever it might be - nothing anyone could have done because in the end the law, the rules say its all down to the pilot.

Maybe that sits well with purists who don't want or don't think anyone should interfere but as we can see even the best pilots can shunt. In fact the Mull Chinook crash is a case in point. Which ever way you believe this aircraft met its demise its clear that there was a degree of discomfort making the flight in that aircraft.

In this case the owners attitude has been put into question. That's not just based upon comments post this accident but upon reflection of many years of prior postings on this very site. The detail around such "issues" remains (at least to me) a mystery because actually no one has come out and said - perhaps that's further evidence of commercial pressures? Who knows.

What I don't understand however is that whilst there is no effective union for helicopter pilots there are a number of effective and respected organisations that either align themselves or suggest they represent the professional pilot. Could they not do more or assist when presented with or finding cases such as this? (I'm talking about doing more in respect to getting involved with the business over what would seem to be a multi year complaint about an owner with questionable history that includes one previous fatal accident).

High Spirits,
Can't speak for everyone but ,on this side of the Pond, more and more civilian operators require running a risk assessment matrix, on paper, prior to a flight. Every element of the flight is awarded a number.For instance ,pilot experience in type: if less than 100 hours ,gets a higher value.Similar values are awarded for weather, route, fuel planning, maintenance issues ,time of day, ,NVG non NVG etc.If the total number exceeds a certain value, the PIC is required to call his next level of supervision and get clearance.
Looks good on paper but,I suspect, behavior is modified and pilots change values around to avoid calling the next level.So,like every other paper driven exercise, the compliance is more honored in the breach than in the observance.Still, it is a start and there are plenty of level headed guys out there who actually understand the value of a risk assessment and take it seriously.
Not sure how it would work in a single owner/ corporate world but,like I said, it is a start and maybe regulators and operators need to look at it seriously.
Alt 3.

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
 

Risk assessment- is what every pilot does before any flight. If it's paper based then it demonstrates that someone has actually done the math and concluded that on balance it's safe to fly. However, objectivity is required and it is easy to input values which give the result you require. If a proper, objective RA is completed prior to flight then this would demonstrate the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. Where the values ascribed to variables had been manipulated to reach a desired outcome the opposite may be true. The difficulty with this process is the human factor. Perception if risk is subjective, the requirement to ascribe values to each of many variables may not actually achieve the correct outcome. One man's pea souper is another's low cloud with marginal vis. It does come back to the old vs bold factor.

Munnyspinner,
You hit the nail on the head. From whichever angle you look at things, it all comes down to the nut behind the wheel.
You can have an ultra sophisticated aircraft, reams of paperwork and yards of regulations to protect pilots and their passengers. However, the nasty little human factors pops its head up at every stage and nullifies everything.
The military squadron concept mitigates this a bit. There are supervisors, mentors and peers looking over one's shoulder,always on the ready to castigate one for a poor decision. In the civilian single pilot world,not so much.
When I am on shift for twelve hours,I AM my company.Operations, safety, business development,public relations,maintenance and so on. That can be intimidating at times, especially when you are new to the game.That is where good human factors research and knowledge would help.From the time of recruitment to retirement.No amount of legislation will help.
As we all know, one cannot legislate human behavior.
Alt3.

AW139 G-LBAL helicopter crash in Gillingham, Norfolk
 

Alt3, so true. I have seen the military model at work and you are correct. However, even that is not infallible. I have also flown with and worked with single pilot ops/ small charter organisations. Despite the pressures most make the right call most of the time- thankfully.

It might be there in the 25 pages of posts but I haven't seen it.

The minimum instrument speed for this helicopter is 50 knots.

the expectation of being in instrument conditions at low speed should be a big enough red flag IMO to prevent flight.

At last. Well pointed out Camp Freddie!

Under US FAA Rules, the type Take Off being done by the 139 Crew would require the Aircraft to maintain VMC until achieving Vmini which is said to be 50 KIAS.

Does the UK CAA require the same?

If so, how does One do that with Visibility in the Tens of Meters as reported by the AAIB?

He or she or they gamble until VminI.

Camp Freddie;


Good post, there are a lot of other questions like yours to be asked either about this take-of, or others done in similar style/conditions.


SND

Camp Freddie raises an interesting point with respect to Flight Manual (RFM) Limitations.

In the US, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM are embodied in FAR 91.9(a) for all helicopters (thus, for those helicopters with more than 9 seats, the HV diagram is a limitation). For commercial operations in Europe (up to October), the same requirement is contained in JAR-OPS 3.005(c). Both of these regimes have appropriate alleviations under controlled conditions.

Up to October in Europe with respect to GA/private flight, the status of the RFM limitations is unclear (it depends upon the State's regulations). From October, the requirement to observe the limitations of the RFM is contained in the Basic Requirements - i.e. it becomes law and it applies to all. Unfortunately, the authors did not have the foresight to (or did not understand why they should) put a reference to applicable alleviations contained in the implementation rules (as is done in FAR 91).

Whether there was a requirement to observe the RFM limitations in this case (or others) will be a matter of reference to the ANO. Is it in the ANO or not?

Jim

Jim, as far as I can tell, it's not. But it has always seemed to me that failing to comply with the RFM in any way contravenes the principle of good airmanship. Apart from the obvious, insurance companies require it to be complied with and in the event of any insurance claim, I have no doubts about them trying to find good reason not to pay out.

However, discussion over this tragic accident has shown that some might believe that flying to performance Class A/1 (or whatever the fashionable term might be this year) is mandatory for all flights. For private operations it isn't. An alternative departure profile may be safer in conditions of very low visibility, especially from a confined area. In other words, blind adherence to alleviate one perceived risk (engine failure) may increase risk in another way (bumping into something).

ANO Part 14 Operating Minima for Aerial Work And Private Aircraft:
109(2)(b) An aircraft operating for aerial work or privately shall not take off if the relevant RVR is less than 150m, unless in accordance with an approval from the country of registration.


I've edited the above part because I couldn't get it to cut and paste. The AAIB reports visibility in "tens of metres", Carl and Lee had a legal get out, They could have quoted Part 14 and if disciplined would have had the law on their side. Let alone no formal RVR reporting.


It comes back again to the fact that "Captaincy" isn't just pulling the levers and a thorough knowledge of the task you are on, you must have the facts available to protect yourself from the pressures you can come under.


SND

SND

Quite agree, thorough knowledge is required so you can back up an unpopular decisions !

I think you're saying 109(2)(b) is not an issue as RVR was not reported. (and converted met viz does not apply for take-off). But I take it, you're not suggesting that this alone is the only go/ no-go factor to consider?

Accidents like this are dreadful, but if the industry can learn from this and make a re-occurrence less likely, then that's got to be beneficial.

Many factors could be at play here, for instance;

1. Crew experience

2. Crew training with respect site selection, performance, take-off profiles, weather minima, etc

3. Company culture

3. CRM - crew - crew and pax, etc

G550;


The actual list is far too long for on here. But that one ANO article gave them a legal get out with the owner. If he had really thrown his toys after that then I'm pretty sure a court (employment tribunal) would have found in favour of the crew.


I don't know the 139, but I bet the RFM has a pretty long list of limits/restrictions any number of which would have been on the side of the crew.


SND

The term RVR implies that a runway is available and an RVR measurement system is in place. Unfortunately, neither are available at most private HLSs.

The commander is therefore left to decide whether the departure can be safely made, all factors considered. The commander of a private flight, as this was, has the option of not using the performance class departure profiles.

SND

Ah I see, I thought you meant they had a legal get out, as in that they were ok to go - but understand you mean legal get out as in not to go with respect the owner !

Sorry to say, but I think that ANO article only applies if the RVR is reported. It is not assessable by crews. In UK, Runway visual range is usually assessed electronically, or otherwise by the human observer method in accordance with CAP493 or CAP168. No runway, no RVR report - then 109(2)(b) does not apply in my view.

For instance, at an airport, if RVR is not reported, only met viz, there is no restriction as far as this article is concerned. The same applies to approach minima, there is no approach ban for met visibility, only for RVR.

The list of factors is certainly worth a mention, it helps to enlighten and hopefully prevent reoccurrence.

One thing we can be sure of, a similar accident will occur again. If we can reduce the frequency, then there's progress. I'm sure that's one of the aims here.

Actually the response is fairly simple;


"I couldn't legally take off from an equipped airfield, therefore I can't legally or safely take off from this garden"


No matter what the owner says/does the pilot is covered, I know the risks of being jobless, but at least if you can provide yourself with irrefutable evidence then he will think twice as you the pilot are less likely to take his threats.


SND

The ANO provides the answer to a pushy passenger.

Section 10, Article 87.

Words along the lines of "My apologies but as commander of the aircraft, in my opinion the flight cannot be safely made" is all that is needed.

I'd willingly go to court or to any employment tribunal having said that.

I have had cause to say it in the past, thankfully very infrequently and I've not had to take it any further. I have walked away from the aircraft though.....

The following is not a comment on the accident - which is the subject of this thread - but a response to the many posts stating how a 'safe' departure 'could have been achieved'.

It is some time since I delved into the ANO but, with respect to commercial operations (not applicable here of course), visibility can be used in most aspects of approach/departure as follows:
The approval to apply the reduced minima for a low visibility take-off - i.e. an RVR of less than 400m - requires an approval in accordance with a set of stringent requirements specified in the regulations. These were originally in JAR-OPS but have been transposed to EASA OPS (and they remain virtually the same). Because application of low visibility take-off procedures require that the LVPs be in force, they appear to be available only to aerodromes which can apply such procedures (leaving out such as Den Helder which, I am told, 'cannot' qualify).

Providing AWO approvals for private operations in the UK was always problematical because there was no (specified) criteria by which the approval could be assessed - unless it was in accordance with commercial practices. There was also no structure for reimbursement of costs although Shell Aircraft did manage to have their AWO operations approved.

Applying the intent of such procedures to a private location is impractical, in my view, and any take-off should have been to the VFR limits applicable at the time - maintaining visual contact. A similar situation obtains with performance - whilst a Cat A procedure could be used at such locations, the notion that it provides any guarantee is not sustainable (unless tailored to the data collected in a site survey).

The operation of complex helicopters in passenger operations (even though they may be private) should demand the highest standard. These should not be the subject of invention of procedures, or adoption of military practices. They deserve better - in fact they deserve the application of the highest standards; if those standards are those for commercial air transport, that then should be the aspiration of the operator - whoever that might be.

Jim

Problem is, Jim, some owners do not want to comply with PT criteria. Instead, they just want the flight to take place. Been there, seen it. I was once "investigated" by an external auditor for daring to delay a flight for ten minutes whilst checking if an IFR alternative was available before departing a private site in marginal met conditions, to another private site.

I don't work there now.....

SND

I entirely agree, but have found the more specific one can be, the better the pax understands and co-operates.

Jim L

Agreed, the pax need to be educated re safety standards - easier said than done.

The problem here is if you say it should be VFR minima for departure and pax says "why? we've been doing this for years" - it's best if you can be more specific, otherwise it can be seen as just a difference of opinions ..

For info - the table you refer to in (h) which is (table 6) is not for departure.

1.430 a.3.(iv) "Table 6 below, for converting reported meteorological visibility to RVR, must not be used for calculating take-off minima."

Shytorque

I can second that .. too many owners just want the trip completed ....

Vmini
 

Camp Freddie,
03 Apr 1906hrs, plus the 150m 'RVR'.

Just a general question about the AW139 and its autopilot. If you were going to do an IF departure which required a vertical climb (just say you were going to go from zero vis as in this case), does the aircraft have an attitude hold so all the pilot had to do was pull up smoothly on the collective to high power and the attitude and heading would remain the same, so conducting a safe vertical climb?

If it did, then apart from the (IMHO) inherent risk of departing in fog at night, trying to over-ride the autopilot by hand flying it does seem to indicate a lack of awareness of aircraft system and a waste of a four axis system.

Sunnywa:


Depending on configuration, the AW139 could perform such a maneuver.


I have difficulty, however, in reconciling using such a procedure into what has been described as IMC conditions.


Vmini is 50kts. That limitation is found in the mandatory Section 1 of the RFM.

Sunnywa, how high would you suggest a pilot might climb vertically with no visual references and no airspeed?

High enough to clear any ground obstructions before attempting vmini. Maintaining a positive ROC

You don't understand VMinI, do you? :hmm:

Attempting Vmini? :ugh:

Perhaps not, but I do understand common sense. I appreciate you need a minimum airspeed for the AP to work at it's best. I also understand you need enough forward airspeed to safety climb away so you minimise the power required and maximise your stored energy in event of loss of power and a run on / auto rotation being required or to climb away on one.

However that would be a suitable profile when you can see where you are going. Not much point in trying for 50 kts before climbing if you have obstacles you can not see though is it?

So although we may all agree this flight should should not have happened, had the pilot simply climbed on AP and left the stick alone until two hundred feet or so then looked for 50 kts (or vmini) the outcome may have been very different.
Just my opinion.

Now we get back to reality.

We have take off Vis requirements to remain VMC.

We have VminI.

We have Take Off Profiles.

We have a four Axis Auto Pilot.

We have another bunch of Rules that are pretty lax when it comes to private operations.

We have stringent Rules that apply to on Airport Operations.

We have stringent Rules that apply to Public Transport.

We have Insurance requirements.

We have all sorts of Rules including the dreaded Rule 5.

Question: Does VminI apply to coupled Autopilot flight only or to any use of the Autopilot system? If you elect to use only the "Attitude" hold function, must you only do that at or above VminI?

For those of you that clearly know about VminI, perhaps you might educate the "unknowing" of exactly what that magic speed is ALL about.

I am willing to bet there are some huge misconceptions about the 139 and its VminI of 50 Knots.

Which one of you cares to prove you know what you are talking about?

Vmini is the speed, in accordance with RFM limitation, that must be achieved before the pilot can enter IMC (which, as has been explained before, might, or might not, be a requirement - as, for example, it is in the US under Part 91.9(a)); there is also an implication that, before Vmini is achieved, visual references must be available to maintain control of flight.

Jim

I'm not qualified on the 139, however I'm fairly sure the term used by the manufacturer is Vmini, not VminI. At least that's what it says in my RFM for a different type, published by the same manufacturer. It's defined alongside the relevant entry (aircraft limitations section) as "Minimum IFR speed", which should be self explanatory.

In general terms, this may be for reasons of AP capabilities and/or because of lack of reliable airspeed sensing/indications; which are directly related. If you have no forward airspeed indication, and no visual references, whilst in a hover attitude the aircraft may be traveling forwards, backwards, or sideways, you can't reliably tell, and neither can the aircraft.

To fly on instruments at very low speeds (i.e. where IAS indications become unreliable) requires doppler equipment. This can be tied in to some autopilots to provide auto hover/auto transition & climb capability. But even so, that does not provide an obstruction avoidance capability, hence the regulatory inclusion of helicopter RVR limits at airfields.

The transition to forward speed and climb is a critical stage of flight, both from an aircraft point of view and for the pilot himself, if he is changing from outside visual cues to instruments only. The trick is not to have both occurring at the same time.

If you have no outside visual references you are by definition relying entirely on aircraft instruments, so you cannot be operating under VFR. If an aircraft is going to depart in conditions of low vis/low cloud and climb under IFR, Vmini by definition must be achieved with reference to visual cues. Which is why attempting a Class A takeoff profile may not be a good idea at all; sufficient forward visibility and room to safely accelerate to Vmini along a clear path is required.

Shy,

We have seen it typed both ways here, with an "i" and with "I". We know what is intended no matter which way it is typed.

The question remains.

What is the 139 Vmini of 50 Knots predicated upon? How was it determined?

JimL gave a perfect CAA type response (yet again) that is factually correct but does not answer the question.

You begin to provide a better answer but still no Cigar.

Boudreaux Bob

From CS-29

VMINI means instrument flight minimum speed, utilised in complying with minimum limit speed requirements for instrument flight.

It relates to;

Static longitudinal stability

(a) General. The helicopter must possess positive static longitudinal control force stability at critical combinations of weight and centre of gravity at the conditions specified in sub* paragraphs IV (b) to (f) of this appendix. The stick force must vary with speed so that any substantial speed change results in a stick force clearly perceptible to the pilot. The airspeed must return to within 10% of the trim speed when the control force is slowly released for each trim condition specified

(d) Slow cruise.

Stability must be shown throughout the speed range from 0.9 VMINI to 1.3 VMINI or 37 km/h (20 knots) above trim speed, whichever is greater, with:
(1) The helicopter trimmed and power adjusted for level flight at 1.1 VMINI; and
(2) Landing gear retracted (if retractable).

What's the point you're making, or should we guess :)