EC225 crash near Bergen, Norway April 2016
Join Date: May 2016
Location: Home
Posts: 72
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mitchaa I agree that seems high when you break it down like that, but haven't 2 of those incidents been deemed pilot error? Can't really include pilot error into the Puma issues. As for the other 4, 3 have been 225, making that number more like every 28 months for an incident. As for a fatality in the 225, first time .... Has made me consider the 225 as one of the safest to date. The 225 was the only, of popular choice, S92/AW139/S61/S76/AS332, that had not had a fatal accident.
You make a very valid point HC
However, fact of the matter is, there has been 6 accidents/incidents with Airbus helicopters in the North Sea in 7yrs.
We can quote hundreds of thousands of hours spanning decades but one accident/incident on average every 14 months is a scary scary statistic for the public to accept.
3 cases were manufacturer defects, 2 were human error, the 6th, well hopefully we find out more this afternoon.
However, fact of the matter is, there has been 6 accidents/incidents with Airbus helicopters in the North Sea in 7yrs.
We can quote hundreds of thousands of hours spanning decades but one accident/incident on average every 14 months is a scary scary statistic for the public to accept.
3 cases were manufacturer defects, 2 were human error, the 6th, well hopefully we find out more this afternoon.
And now something which is looking like a maintenance error (although we don't know for sure yet).
All that set against the fact that the SP family was by far the predominant type flying the N Sea and so not surprisingly had the most accidents.
I am certainly not trying to suggest that the recent accident rate is acceptable nor that we shouldn't be striving hard to dramatically improve it. What I am saying is that to dump a well tried and tested aircraft which has had its issues dealt with, for new stuff with as yet completely unknown issues, is madness. One thing is for sure, there WILL be an accident with a 189/169/175, and probably more accidents than if the 225 remained in service doing the bulk of the work.
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: Norway
Age: 44
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Summary of the pressbrief:
-Technical malfunction, not pilot error.
-Everything seemed normal until the accident occured, and it happened VERY quick.
-No new info other than they need to do more research, review the documentation, HUMS etc.
-They let the press view the parts of the wreckage.
-They haven't specified if it's a part that failed or maintenance error.
-Technical malfunction, not pilot error.
-Everything seemed normal until the accident occured, and it happened VERY quick.
-No new info other than they need to do more research, review the documentation, HUMS etc.
-They let the press view the parts of the wreckage.
-They haven't specified if it's a part that failed or maintenance error.
Google translation:
2:21 p.m. crashed due to technical fault ein AIBN vindicated ein press briefing en that helikopterstyrten was a technical car accident, and not a humanitarian failure.
2:21 p.m. crashed due to technical fault ein AIBN vindicated ein press briefing en that helikopterstyrten was a technical car accident, and not a humanitarian failure.
I'd like to add a little info from the press conferance:
- They had not been able to retrieve HUMS data from the accident flight, and they didn't think they would be able to.
- They wouldn't answer anything technical but made it clear that they shared what they found with "those with responsibility" like operator, manufacturerer and authorities. I interpret it as quite evident that they know much more that they were willing to share - so one could speculate what the reason for that could be.
- They had not been able to retrieve HUMS data from the accident flight, and they didn't think they would be able to.
- They wouldn't answer anything technical but made it clear that they shared what they found with "those with responsibility" like operator, manufacturerer and authorities. I interpret it as quite evident that they know much more that they were willing to share - so one could speculate what the reason for that could be.
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: Norway
Age: 44
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I think the accident rate we have seen the past years is unacceptable.
There are different types-and reasons for the accidents, but the rate is unacceptable anyway. It's starting to look like the trend that has been with in-land aerialwork in Norway for some time. But offshore-ops is a different league when it comes to regulation, redundancy, crew and crew training. There shoundn't be that many accidents. Period.
I totally understand that people are loosing faith in the 332/225 now.
Yes, the 92 has had it's accidents too, and incidents.
But WHY does this happen again and again?
And WHY would it be expected that new types will have similar accidents? I don't think that's acceptable.
An accident is very expencive. And the cost lasts for selveral years.
That's why companies and manufacturers should be more proactive to prevent accidents instead of improving AFTER the accident. Some companies do a very good job.
If you "save" money on safety, it will eventually backfire.
I'm not blaming CHC or Airbus of anything, but watch the aftermath after this accident, and see what the consequenses will be the next months.
There are different types-and reasons for the accidents, but the rate is unacceptable anyway. It's starting to look like the trend that has been with in-land aerialwork in Norway for some time. But offshore-ops is a different league when it comes to regulation, redundancy, crew and crew training. There shoundn't be that many accidents. Period.
I totally understand that people are loosing faith in the 332/225 now.
Yes, the 92 has had it's accidents too, and incidents.
But WHY does this happen again and again?
And WHY would it be expected that new types will have similar accidents? I don't think that's acceptable.
An accident is very expencive. And the cost lasts for selveral years.
That's why companies and manufacturers should be more proactive to prevent accidents instead of improving AFTER the accident. Some companies do a very good job.
If you "save" money on safety, it will eventually backfire.
I'm not blaming CHC or Airbus of anything, but watch the aftermath after this accident, and see what the consequenses will be the next months.
Join Date: May 2012
Location: Aer
Posts: 431
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
So in terms of the 2 pilot error ones, I suggest they should be discounted in terms of blaming the airframe. The two ditchings due to bevel gear shaft - possibly avoidable with more rigorous use of HUMS abut anyway problem identified and sorted. REDL with its planet gear, there is perhaps some debate as to whether it was avoidable with more rigorous maintenance procedures (trivial things like communications with the manufacturer in writing, not over the phone). This is the only one that leaves me a bit uncomfortable. But then again if you look at the number of hours flown by the SP fleet etc...
And now something which is looking like a maintenance error (although we don't know for sure yet).
All that set against the fact that the SP family was by far the predominant type flying the N Sea and so not surprisingly had the most accidents.
And now something which is looking like a maintenance error (although we don't know for sure yet).
All that set against the fact that the SP family was by far the predominant type flying the N Sea and so not surprisingly had the most accidents.
Now that Airbus has lifted the suspension, my regulator is mute, having not suspended flights, all I have to do is persuade our operator to lift their (apparently unnecessary) suspension and the pilots to fly as normal and all will be statistically fine.
Last edited by terminus mos; 3rd May 2016 at 14:08. Reason: "Grumpy" added to suggest irony
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Europe
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Notes - the AIBN press conference
I took down notes for my non-Norwegian speaking colleagues:
Dealing with a technical accident, not caused by flight crew (clarified to: they don’t see any signs of a typical precipitating event that would indicate human error). Very sudden event.
Next steps are to review:
Preliminary investigation reports would be issued when there’s something to tell. The CAA and others (Airbus and UK AAIB) are involved and thus aware of all information as it appears.
Follow-up questions by press gives a little more detail:
Cockpit voice recorder and other data indicates there was no human error on the part of the flight crew.
Sending some parts to the AIBN home base tomorrow to give them better access to their analytical equipment.
Dealing with a technical accident, not caused by flight crew (clarified to: they don’t see any signs of a typical precipitating event that would indicate human error). Very sudden event.
Next steps are to review:
- Wreckage
- HUMS data
- Maintenance documentation
- Other documentation
Preliminary investigation reports would be issued when there’s something to tell. The CAA and others (Airbus and UK AAIB) are involved and thus aware of all information as it appears.
Follow-up questions by press gives a little more detail:
Cockpit voice recorder and other data indicates there was no human error on the part of the flight crew.
Sending some parts to the AIBN home base tomorrow to give them better access to their analytical equipment.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: France
Age: 66
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sorry for my poor english but I will try to answer CharlieDontSurf
Had the S92 been the main helo in NS, pilot error would have occured on S 92 - Should I blame the S 92 for that ? No, for sure,
Had the S92 been the main helo in NS, pilot error would have occured on S 92 - Should I blame the S 92 for that ? No, for sure,
dipper, the term "pilot error" should be banished to Room 101 (refer to Google), please stop using it.
Like all accidents and incidents, it is important to understand why the error was made, not just stop at "the pilot got it wrong".
The S92 Cougar accident could have been blamed on the pilots, as they didn't ditch the aircraft when the SOPs clearly stated that was required.
Most of the time a large amount of the root cause lies with OEMs, whether it be bad design, bad manuals, no FCOMs, or might even be more basic than that in that the regulation is weak.
So should the aircraft (OEM) sometimes be blamed for "pilot error" - yes!!
Like all accidents and incidents, it is important to understand why the error was made, not just stop at "the pilot got it wrong".
The S92 Cougar accident could have been blamed on the pilots, as they didn't ditch the aircraft when the SOPs clearly stated that was required.
Most of the time a large amount of the root cause lies with OEMs, whether it be bad design, bad manuals, no FCOMs, or might even be more basic than that in that the regulation is weak.
So should the aircraft (OEM) sometimes be blamed for "pilot error" - yes!!
... ...
I am certainly not trying to suggest that the recent accident rate is acceptable nor that we shouldn't be striving hard to dramatically improve it. What I am saying is that to dump a well tried and tested aircraft which has had its issues dealt with, for new stuff with as yet completely unknown issues, is madness. One thing is for sure, there WILL be an accident with a 189/169/175, and probably more accidents than if the 225 remained in service doing the bulk of the work.
I am certainly not trying to suggest that the recent accident rate is acceptable nor that we shouldn't be striving hard to dramatically improve it. What I am saying is that to dump a well tried and tested aircraft which has had its issues dealt with, for new stuff with as yet completely unknown issues, is madness. One thing is for sure, there WILL be an accident with a 189/169/175, and probably more accidents than if the 225 remained in service doing the bulk of the work.
Somebody earlier mentioned the problem that strengthening a component might mean moving the problem elsewhere and I think there is an analogy here with change of type. UK parliamentarians pointed out in their 2014 report that the Super Puma family were 60% of the NS fleet so it was unsurprising that they were involved in most of the accidents. A very popular helicopter type in service for 12 years and hundreds of thousands of flying hours before any fatality seems like not a bad record especially when compared to previous generations of aircraft. I'd rather it were better but it's not bad.
Our friend Helicomparator has not mentioned the S-92 but we should think about the enormous pressure that will inevitably now be on the S-92 fleet and supply chain.
Join Date: Jan 2010
Location: Norway
Age: 44
Posts: 45
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dipper:
-It was NOT pilot error.
-I just said that I understand that people loose faith in the 332/225, AS they would loose faith in any type that has a high accident rate.
-My point was the accident-rate, not wich type that crashes.
-I am not claiming that the S-92 or any other type is better, I just think there's been too many accidents lately. And Airbus have been involved in the latest, that we can agree upon?
-It was NOT pilot error.
-I just said that I understand that people loose faith in the 332/225, AS they would loose faith in any type that has a high accident rate.
-My point was the accident-rate, not wich type that crashes.
-I am not claiming that the S-92 or any other type is better, I just think there's been too many accidents lately. And Airbus have been involved in the latest, that we can agree upon?
Join Date: May 2016
Location: USA
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Working for one of the major manufacturers I can attest to this. We've run into issues with cracking and you're forever chasing it down - adding straps, doublers, redesigning, etc. There's a frequency that sets up and you can fix it in one spot but it moves.
Join Date: Aug 2008
Location: Canada
Posts: 15
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Ok so, my take..
-It happened in the blink of an eye, no time for Mayday, etc.
-Given mode of failure, rotor head twisting off, epicyclic gear breakdown is likely.
-The HUMs probably did not indicate pending failure before flight. (..but HUMs data could have been misinterpreted)
-More details will trickle in over the next few months, years, before final analysis.
-Accident happened within one of the most professionally run organization in helicopter industry.
= H225 grounded for a long time (maybe forever)//confidence shattered
-It happened in the blink of an eye, no time for Mayday, etc.
-Given mode of failure, rotor head twisting off, epicyclic gear breakdown is likely.
-The HUMs probably did not indicate pending failure before flight. (..but HUMs data could have been misinterpreted)
-More details will trickle in over the next few months, years, before final analysis.
-Accident happened within one of the most professionally run organization in helicopter industry.
= H225 grounded for a long time (maybe forever)//confidence shattered